What could Lee have done to defeat Grant?

timothynargi

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Aug 4, 2020
Exactly right, you have put your finger on it. Someone did realize that Richmond was nothing but a rock hung around Lee’s neck & his name was U. S. Grant. He ordered Meade to get hold of Lee & not let go. The name given to Grant’s innovation Is the tactic of constant contact. When Lee realized that Grant was not after Richmond, rather the AoNV was the target, he knew that defeat was only a matter of time. Lee himself said that & he knew what he was talking about.

Defeat Lee’s army & Richmond would fall... it is obvious today, it should have been obvious to anybody back then. As it was, it took a real military genius to realize that & win the war.

The USCT 25th Corps entered Richmond not as conquerors. No, the former slaves fought not valiant defenders... no flower of Southern manhood fighting to the end... they fought the fires set by the panicked Confederates as they fled without firing a shot & saved what was left of the city.

A few hours later, Lincoln entered Richmond almost unescorted. When Lincoln sat down in Davis’ chair, the vast treasure & rivers of blood Lee expended on defending Richmond was shown up as the greatest strategic blunder of the war that it was.

CowCavalry’s question sums up the crux of the matter exactly. Well done.

Once Lee realized Grant was after him and not Richmond, but also that he couldn’t abandon Richmond, how could Lee defeat Grant? Let’s speculate. What could Lee have done to defeat Grant?
 
Once Lee realized Grant was after him and not Richmond, but also that he couldn’t abandon Richmond, how could Lee defeat Grant? Let’s speculate. What could Lee have done to defeat Grant?
The problem is that Grant commanded the entire U.S. Army. His forces outnumbered Lee by something like 100 to one. Lee only commanded a remnant of the Confed. army for a few weeks, long after it didn't really matter anymore. Putting Lee in charge of the army was just one of Davis' rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic gestures.

Lee lost West Virginia to Rosecrans. At the same time, Albert Sydney Johnston was doing a spectacularly incompetent job, what would have happened if Lee had replaced him? However, given the impossible task he was given, defending the border between Kentucky & Tennessee, I don't see how Lee could have done much better. Without doubt the retreat would have been better organized, or should I say organized at all, under Lee. Without a riverine force able to take on the the Union gunboats, there was nothing anybody could have done to to defend the Tennessee border. The only substantial option open to Lee would have been to defend Nashville. There are simply way too many pieces scattered all over the board in Middle Tennesse for me to make an intelligent judgment on what Lee could have done differently.

It is arguable that Lee would never have made the series of blunders that led up to the defeat at Shiloh. I will take a pass on that one.

Vicksburg is where a Lee-Grant confrontation gets really interesting. Once again, without a fleet, it would only be a matter of rearranging the pieces on the game board. Grant reacted to the tactical reverses that sent McClellan running for cover as nothing but tactical setbacks that are an inevitable part of any campaign. As fascinating as the tactical maneuvers might have been, the Confederacy was incapable of supporting Vicksburg. One way or another, the garrison would have been starved out.

Chattanooga has many intriguing possibilities. R. E. Lee walks into the the little white house on Missionary Ridge at the same time as Grant arrives at Thomas' HQ in Chattanooga. Like Bragg, Lee would only command the Army of Tennessee. He would not have been boneheaded enough to send Longstreet off to Knoxville where he was beaten like a drum. That would be an advantage. Lee would, however, been stuck on the south side of the Tennessee River. The AoT was physically incapable of crossing the river & campaigning toward Nashville. By the same token, the landscape did not allow for the kind of maneuvers Lee is famous for. On better ground, the combination of Lee, Longstreet, Cleburne & Forrest is an intriguing combination. However, Grant not only commanded the army group at Chattanooga, he was also in command all forces west of the Allegheny Mountains. Once again, the pieces would have been moved about the board differently, but there is no rational combination that leads to Lee defeating Grant, Thomas & Sherman at Chattanooga.

We all know what happened next. So, my conclusion is that there is no likelihood that Lee would have defeated Grant. One man was an army commander, the other commanded multiple armies & a fleet. At Chattanooga, one element of his army group was not just the Army of the Cumberland, it also included the Department of the Cumberland, 245,000 strong. The disparity of forces alone argues against Lee ever having the forces necessary to defeat Grant.
 
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Lee was intimately familiar with the terrain and people of central and northern Virginia -- an advantage he would never have had elsewhere. Lee made the most of his advantages, as long as the Union did not have more important advantages to counter him with.
You have made an important point. The intel that Lee received from local residents was what my granddaughter would call the "magic wiffle dust" of Lee's operations in Virginia. The lack of that vital intel dramatically affected his maneuvers in Pennsylvania.
 
The War had become a slugging match under Grant, confederategenerals, even Lee, needed more muscle to fight that kind of war.

In the end, the South just could not match North pund for pound,so it would be necessary to get at the Brain. Grant(or Lincoln) would have to be eliminated. The will to victory no matter the cost, resides not in the armies but their leaders.
 
Let's consider that Lee did a remarkable job in besting Grant and the AOTP during the Overland Campaign. Once Grant ran out of maneuvering space at Cold Harbor, he was forced to acknowledge that the war of movement had not accomplished its primary goal of defeating the ANV although it seriously diminished its irreplaceable manpower. Given that reality, Grant was astute enough to transfer the AOTP across the James River and begin a "war of posts" at Petersburg. Lee was caught off guard by Grant's move to the James; perhaps the only other opportunity, sort of a hail Mary pass, would have been for Lee to counterattack after Grant's failed assaults at Cold Harbor and attempt to cut off the AOTP from the James River crossings. But that's a tall order for an exhausted army with considerable fewer manpower.
 
The War had become a slugging match under Grant, confederategenerals, even Lee, needed more muscle to fight that kind of war.

In the end, the South just could not match North pund for pound,so it would be necessary to get at the Brain. Grant(or Lincoln) would have to be eliminated. The will to victory no matter the cost, resides not in the armies but their leaders.
Thanks for the typo! I gotta admit, the image of Pinky & the Brain in CW uniforms your typo gave me is a very welcome laugh out loud during a very stressful morning.

‘What do we do?’ Asks General Grant.
‘What we do every day, Sam. Whop those pesky rebels!” Declared the Brain
 
Let's consider that Lee did a remarkable job in besting Grant and the AOTP during the Overland Campaign. Once Grant ran out of maneuvering space at Cold Harbor, he was forced to acknowledge that the war of movement had not accomplished its primary goal of defeating the ANV although it seriously diminished its irreplaceable manpower. Given that reality, Grant was astute enough to transfer the AOTP across the James River and begin a "war of posts" at Petersburg. Lee was caught off guard by Grant's move to the James; perhaps the only other opportunity, sort of a hail Mary pass, would have been for Lee to counterattack after Grant's failed assaults at Cold Harbor and attempt to cut off the AOTP from the James River crossings. But that's a tall order for an exhausted army with considerable fewer manpower.
Actually, From the very start of the campaign, Grant had settled on what military historians call a tactic of close contact. Grant ordered the AoP to hold any ground it took. No matter what the outcome of an engagement, Meade was ordered to entrench as close to Lee’s lines as possible. This not only kept constant pressure on Lee’s army, it deprived him of the initiative. As the campaign clearly demonstrated, Grant maneuvered, Lee had no option but to react. When it became clear that Grant’s order to the AoP was to destroy the AoNV not take Richmond, it was too late. The AoNV was locked in a death grip, it was only a matter of time.
 
Vicksburg is where a Lee-Grant confrontation gets really interesting. Once again, without a fleet, it would only be a matter of rearranging the pieces on the game board. Grant reacted to the tactical reverses that sent McClellan running for cover as nothing but tactical setbacks that are an inevitable part of any campaign. As fascinating as the tactical maneuvers might have been, the Confederacy was incapable of supporting Vicksburg. One way or another, the garrison would have been starved out.

I guess what you're doing here is speculating what would have happened if Lee had been up against Grant in the West, earlier in the war.

Reading what you're saying here about Vicksburg, I wonder whether Lee's native audacity could have led to a different course of events at Vicksburg. Maybe not a different outcome, ultimately, but I can imagine things would have at least unfolded differently with Lee in charge instead of Pemberton and Johnston. Grant kind of spent a lot of time experimenting unsuccessfully with various approaches to Vicksburg. I can imagine Lee taking advantage of those delays to launch some kind of risky but bold offensive. Given the odds, I guess Vicksburg might have been taken in the end, but disrupting Grant's machinations might have at least delayed the inevitably for a couple of months.

Roy B.
 
Actually, From the very start of the campaign, Grant had settled on what military historians call a tactic of close contact. Grant ordered the AoP to hold any ground it took. No matter what the outcome of an engagement, Meade was ordered to entrench as close to Lee’s lines as possible. This not only kept constant pressure on Lee’s army, it deprived him of the initiative. As the campaign clearly demonstrated, Grant maneuvered, Lee had no option but to react. When it became clear that Grant’s order to the AoP was to destroy the AoNV not take Richmond, it was too late. The AoNV was locked in a death grip, it was only a matter of time.

So how does one fight against close contact?

And what if Lee cut off Grant from crossing the James? Would the massive numbers of Union death been too much even for Lincoln?
 
The problem is that Grant commanded the entire U.S. Army. His forces outnumbered Lee by something like 100 to one. Lee only commanded a remnant of the Confed. army for a few weeks, long after it didn't really matter anymore. Putting Lee in charge of the army was just one of Davis' rearranging the deck chairs on the Titanic gestures.

Lee lost West Virginia to Rosecrans. At the same time, Albert Sydney Johnston was doing a spectacularly incompetent job, what would have happened if Lee had replaced him? However, given the impossible task he was given, defending the border between Kentucky & Tennessee, I don't see how Lee could have done much better. Without doubt the retreat would have been better organized, or should I say organized at all, under Lee. Without a riverine force able to take on the the Union gunboats, there was nothing anybody could have done to to defend the Tennessee border. The only substantial option open to Lee would have been to defend Nashville. There are simply way too many pieces scattered all over the board in Middle Tennesse for me to make an intelligent judgment on what Lee could have done differently.

It is arguable that Lee would never have made the series of blunders that led up to the defeat at Shiloh. I will take a pass on that one.

Vicksburg is where a Lee-Grant confrontation gets really interesting. Once again, without a fleet, it would only be a matter of rearranging the pieces on the game board. Grant reacted to the tactical reverses that sent McClellan running for cover as nothing but tactical setbacks that are an inevitable part of any campaign. As fascinating as the tactical maneuvers might have been, the Confederacy was incapable of supporting Vicksburg. One way or another, the garrison would have been starved out.

Chattanooga has many intriguing possibilities. R. E. Lee walks into the the little white house on Missionary Ridge at the same time as Grant arrives at Thomas' HQ in Chattanooga. Like Bragg, Lee would only command the Army of Tennessee. He would not have been boneheaded enough to send Longstreet off to Knoxville where he was beaten like a drum. That would be an advantage. Lee would, however, been stuck on the south side of the Tennessee River. The AoT was physically incapable of crossing the river & campaigning toward Nashville. By the same token, the landscape did not allow for the kind of maneuvers Lee is famous for. On better ground, the combination of Lee, Longstreet, Cleburne & Forrest is an intriguing combination. However, Grant not only commanded the army group at Chattanooga, he was also in command all forces west of the Allegheny Mountains. Once again, the pieces would have been moved about the board differently, but there is no rational combination that leads to Lee defeating Grant, Thomas & Sherman at Chattanooga.

We all know what happened next. So, my conclusion is that there is no likelihood that Lee would have defeated Grant. One man was an army commander, the other commanded multiple armies & a fleet. At Chattanooga, one element of his army group was not just the Army of the Cumberland, it also included the Department of the Cumberland, 245,000 strong. The disparity of forces alone argues against Lee ever having the forces necessary to defeat Grant.

The Union Army never had 6 million men under arms, not even in 1864.
 
Once Lee realized Grant was after him and not Richmond, but also that he couldn’t abandon Richmond, how could Lee defeat Grant? Let’s speculate. What could Lee have done to defeat Grant?

Multiple different ways, from the onset of the campaign all the way to the James.

Put Longstreet's Corps at Jackson’s Shop or Orange Springs instead of around Gordonsville, enabling it to arrive on scene faster at the Wilderness and thus secure the Brock Road for the Confederates. At that point, Grant has his back to the river and Confederates everywhere else blocking his ability to maneuver. He can either slam head first into them-ala Cold Harbor-or he has to withdraw across the river in defeat.

Moving past the Wilderness, Gordon Rhea notes of Lee's missed opportunity at the North Anna:

Lee's moment had come. His plan to split the Union army had worked, isolating Hancock east of the Confederate position, Burnside north of the river at Ox Ford, and Warren and Wright several miles to the west, near Jericho Mill. Hill, holding the Confederate formation's western leg, could fend off Warren and Wright while Anderson and Ewell, on the eastern leg, attacked Hancock with superior numbers. "[Lee] now had one of those opportunities that occur but rarely in war," a Union aide later conceded, "but which, in the grasp of a master, make or mar the fortunes of armies and decide the result of campaigns."​
Lee, however, had become too ill to take exploit his opportunity. Wracked by dysentery, he lay confined to his tent. "We must strike them a blow," a staffer heard the general exclaim. "We must never let them pass us again. We must strike them a blow."​

Have Lee avoid getting dysentery at the worst possible moment and there's a strong chance Lee can smash the Army of the Potomac good here. Lastly, we turn to the James and for that I cite Grant himself:

LEE’S position was now so near Richmond, and the intervening swamps of the Chickahominy so great an obstacle to the movement of troops in the face of an enemy, that I determined to make my next left flank move carry the Army of the Potomac south of the James River. Preparations for this were promptly commenced. The move was a hazardous one to make: the Chickahominy River, with its marshy and heavily timbered approaches, had to be crossed; all the bridges over it east of Lee were destroyed; the enemy had a shorter line and better roads to travel on to confront me in crossing; more than fifty miles intervened between me and Butler, by the roads I should have to travel, with both the James and the Chickahominy unbridged to cross; and last, the Army of the Potomac had to be got out of a position but a few hundred yards from the enemy at the widest place. Lee, if he did not choose to follow me, might, with his shorter distance to travel and his bridges over the Chickahominy and the James, move rapidly on Butler and crush him before the army with me could come to his relief. Then too he might spare troops enough to send against Hunter who was approaching Lynchburg, living upon the country he passed through, and without ammunition further than what he carried with him.

Interestingly, E.P. Alexander's own memoirs contain a speculation on Lee's opportunity here in line with Grant's thinking, but of a less dramatic opening. Alexander, like Grant, realized that the infrastructure and terrain was in Lee's favor, thus granting him the advantage of mobility. Instead of envisioning an offensive to bash Butler, however, Alexander speculated that the Army of Northern Virginia could've went on the defense to inflict a sort of "Super Cold Harbor" on Butler and Grant as he came into play. This isn't exactly idle thinking either, as during the thick of fighting Beauregard did manage to inflict 10,000 casualties upon the Federals to 4,000 of his own at a ratio of 2.5 to 1, a rate almost exactly that of Cold Harbor. This despite Beauregard being massively outnumbered to the extent there was often five feet per man in the trenches, while most of his command was either militia composed of young boys and old men or recovering wounded. This is understandable, as morale among the Federals was absolutely shot to the point there was serious risk of collapse of capability in their forces. Lt. Col. Theodore Lyman, Meade’s Aide-de-Camp, noted the route of 30,000 Federals by just 8,000 Confederates on June 22nd as a clear example of the exhaustion afflicting the Army, while the day previously Meade himself, in a letter to his wife, stated that Army of the Potomac was in desperate need of rest lest its morale utterly collapse.
 
I think once Grant came to the Eastern Theater, Lee really could not have done anything to stop him. The ANV had taken a pounding at Gettysburg that it never totally recovered from. Grant had new resources at his disposal such as the USCT's and the heavy artillery units being converted to infantry. Lee had no such resources, in fact the South was already at the bottom of the barrel. The best Lee could hope for was for war weariness to take control in the North. But once Sherman captured Atlanta and initiated his March to the Sea, optimism returned up North and it was just a matter of time before Lee would be forced to capitulate.
 
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