Lee What Could Lee Have Done Differently in 1864?

@th'anchoriticsybarite makes an excellent point about Lee's health and the need for maintaining secrecy about it. Also the point where Lee would fight for the confederacy and not just the State of Virginia is an excellent example of what Lee could have done differently at least earlier in the war. Lee put his best men where he needed them, and Davis should have done likewise, which may not have been for Lee to continue guarding Richmond. Lee did request to step down after Gettysburg but his offer to resign was denied. As far as Grant was concerned, I believe he knew how costly the campaign would be, and the best way to evacuate the wounded was staying close to the Navy and connecting infrastructure. Lincoln gave him a free hand but Grant understood the timidity of his President concerning the Capital at Washington; the army needs to interpose itself between the ANV and D. C., and the last year after grinding down the resources of the southerners, Jubal Early was still a big threat. Grant had to maintain steady pressure anywhere he could, but he did not do it alone. A host of the other Generals were involved from west of the Mississippi across into Florida, out to Tennessee and Kentucky and down to Mobile. So, what could Lee have done differently? Resign.
Lubliner.
 
Lee's goal, and Davis's, was simply to prolong the war until the Nov election in the hope that the Northern voters would elect McClellan. It wasn't a bad strategy, given that they really had no alternatives. If Hood could've held off Sherman just another 2 mths, and Early gotten to DC a day earlier in July of '64, or his starving troops been able to stay organized after the morning route of the Yankees in Oct in the Shenandoah Valley, the Northern public might have said enough. As to the supposed "landslide" victory of Lincoln in that election, that is a debate for another day. Let's just say the Sec of War spent a lot of time and energy ensuring that if any Yankee soldier voted, he voted for Lincoln. If the election had been kosher, it still wouldn't have been enough unless Early and Hood had had just a bit more luck, as they nearly did. PS: I forgot to note that Price could've done a better job, or had a bit more LUCK, in his Missouri raid, which nearly reached St Louis, and then nearly reached Kansas City to boot. Nobody saw 10,000 Rebs coming out of the deepest reaches of AK & OK territory and erupting into Missouri when the state was denuded of troops to help Sherman and then Thomas in Nashville. Every decision by every commander involves an element of risk. No outcome is certain. Some bets pay off, some don't. It doesn't mean it was a bad bet just b/c you lose the bet!! (And, winning the bet doesn't automatically mean you were brilliant - you might be smart, but you also usually need a bit of luck!)
If the election had been kosher

Do I spy a little prejudice there. In 50+ years studying the war I have never seen anything that would lead to the belief that the overwhelming majority of Union troops were pro-Lincoln, pro-abolition, and pro-war.

Anything done by the administration would have been to make sure that the troops could vote. NOT that they vote for any particular candidate.
 
Logistics, logistics, logistics. Despite this seemingly wide open avenue of attack nobody really tried it. Hunter came closest then retreated in the face of Early because of his supply situation. Only Sheridan finally went this way in early 1865 and then only with a force of cavalry after having crushed the remnants of Early and there being no other Confederate armies north of Richmond.



Grant was familiar with the idea of cutting lose from his supplies temporarily (Vicksburg Campaign) yet chose not to in Virginia. Perhaps given the condition of the countryside and the size of the AOTP he concluded it wasn't feasible.

It's important to note that Lee struck at the AOTP at Wilderness. Chancellorsville saw the ANV meet the AOTP head-on.



Again, logistics. Going east the AOTP can switch to the RR from Fredericksburg or get supplies via river landings. Going west puts the AOTP on an ever more precarious supply line via the Orange & Alexandria RR and nothing else.
First of all, who is the military genius here, you, me or Grant. His own writing reveals that he considered the best route to attack the South was from the west, striking at richmond directly not allowing them the benefit of river defenses.

Secondly the only way the Union loses either Chancellorsville or the Wilderness is to allow themselves to be trapped in the Wilderness themselves. Had either Hooker or Grant advanced through the wilderness and trusted their supply trains to catch up, Lee could NOT have conducted a successful defense. He would have faced not just 2-3 times his force but without Longstreet 4-5 times as many Union troops. He would have had to withdraw and find another line to defend. Again allowing Grant the opportunity to sweep east or west and he could have made no definitive moves to defend either. Doing so would have left him vulnerable to attack from the other direction.
 
Logistics, logistics, logistics. Despite this seemingly wide open avenue of attack nobody really tried it. Hunter came closest then retreated in the face of Early because of his supply situation. Only Sheridan finally went this way in early 1865 and then only with a force of cavalry after having crushed the remnants of Early and there being no other Confederate armies north of Richmond.



Grant was familiar with the idea of cutting lose from his supplies temporarily (Vicksburg Campaign) yet chose not to in Virginia. Perhaps given the condition of the countryside and the size of the AOTP he concluded it wasn't feasible.

It's important to note that Lee struck at the AOTP at Wilderness. Chancellorsville saw the ANV meet the AOTP head-on.



Again, logistics. Going east the AOTP can switch to the RR from Fredericksburg or get supplies via river landings. Going west puts the AOTP on an ever more precarious supply line via the Orange & Alexandria RR and nothing else.
So logistics apply only to Northern troops/armies not Southern ones. Not once. Not twice. Get ready. THREE TIMES. The Confederacy was able to successfully invade the North with no logistic supply whatsoever. Lee at Antietam. Lee at Gettysburg. Early at Monocacy.

Every single Union general gave Lee the advantage of riverine defenses Only McClelland and Grant who copied him after a summer of failure, realized the ease with which the Union could approach Richmond from the sea. Every single union commander repeated the failures of his predecessor(s) INCLUDING GRANT.

The only way Lee wins either Chancellorsville or Wilderness is to trap the Union army inside the wooded area. He is thus able to disable the Unions numerical advantage by focusing his attack ala Jackson attacking in force against an unprepared opponent or as in the case of the Wilderness when his opponent is forced by constricted roads to attack against tactically superior units as his forces deploy from the narrow roads of the Wilderness.
 
True Believers are not exempt from being delusional. Religous zealots at least have a degree of unprovability - there's no way to disprove most of their spiritual and morality views. Jeff Davis was demonstrably factually wrong. The Confederacy in 1865 was disintegrating and did fail across the board. He wasn't trying to go down with the ship; he was convinced the ship wasn't sinking.

I read a great line in a book yesterday that applies here: even if you lie to the public, never lie to yourself.
I am not defending slavery. What I am trying to emphasize is that in the South of the 1860's almost every single Southerner believed that slavery was ordained by god. Not only that but they also believed that God would personally intervene to uphold his will.

Churches literally split down the middle over this simple statement. Baptist, Methodist, and my own Presbyterian sect all split and stayed that way for almost 100 years. I remember as a teenager my own church in Augusta Ga struggleing over whether to rejoin the northern church. To this day almost half of the Southern pres churches have not rejoined the national church.
 
"The Overland Campaign from the first bullet fired at the Wilderness till the end of Cold Harbor was a total and unadulterated failure. His enormous losses did not get him one step closer to his goal of investing Richmond"

Not so fast, with all due respect. Grant wasn't the only one suffering "enormous losses" and there's good reason to conclude based on recent studies that ANV losses in the campaign have been historically understated. By June the ANV had lost the ability to execute its forte - offensive maneuver. In addition, at the end of the 6 weeks Lee was exactly where he did not want to be and where he had predicted the war would become merely a matter of time. One need not equate the Overland Campaign with the 1940 Blitz or the 1941-42 invasion of Malaya but it was not a "total and unadulterated failure".
When the last bullet was fired at Cold Harbor, Grant was no closer to investing Richmond than he was at the first day of The Wilderness. His next step the great flanking movement to invest Petersburg was a true riverboat gambler move. Had Lee had a single inkling of the move, he could easily have come close to destroying the AoP. Is that what you think grand strategy should consist of--rolling the dice. Suppose he came up craps, would you like a less than 50 starte Union today.

Lee took loses, Grant took loses. Lee is still able to mount successfull defenses against a numerically diminished foe.
 
So admit he was wrong and seek an honorable end. Stay in touch with Grant and stop uselessly trying to tell Grant the USCT's were properly treated as escaped slaves.
In January of 1942 when George Marshall came to the White House with his recommendations for the prosecution of WWII, he basically said that the US should transfer almost all of its naval forces to the Pacific. They should progeressively build up their ground forces in Hawaii and Australia. They should actively seek out the Japanese navy and blunt and eventually repel its advances. They should use their ground forces to retake the Philippines as well as taking back Japanes gains in the East Indies, SE Asia (Vietnam, Burma, Thailand). When this was accomplished they could turn and help the European allies to repel and defeat the Germans. Is that the course that was adopted.

FDR rejected absolutely that policy. HE determined that Germany was the principle foe and must be vanquished first. Everything in the Pacific HAD to take 2nd place. Tell me which policy prevailed.

Washington who could have demanded and gotten whatever policy he wanted, instead accepted the will of the Continental Congress. He allowed inferior men to be placed in positions of power (ala Gates), he acquiesced in capable men being stripped of authority (ala Arnold). In doing so he established the rule that in the US the military serves at the will of the President not the other way around.

In the CW had not Lee followed that absolute rule. Could we have seen him overrule Davis in replacing Johnston with Hood. If so there is no march to the sea. Perhaps there is no Bragg in tennessee to screw up Stones River and Chickamauga or Lookout mt.

But in the US (that includes the Confederacy) civilians tell the military what to do not the other way around.
 
So admit he was wrong and seek an honorable end. Stay in touch with Grant and stop uselessly trying to tell Grant the USCT's were properly treated as escaped slaves.
Get down to brass tacks. Suppose Grant responds with terms that Lee thinks are generous. Does he immediately send the ANV home. Does he allow the AoP to move whereever it wants.

No. He forwards the letter/terms to Davis and tells or suggests that it be taken or not. If JC himself comes down and whispers in Lee's ear that he better take the offer. He still suggests or recommends to Dais and then follows orders.
 
I am not defending slavery. What I am trying to emphasize is that in the South of the 1860's almost every single Southerner believed that slavery was ordained by god. Not only that but they also believed that God would personally intervene to uphold his will.

Almost every single Southerner? The enslaved were Southerners, what did they believe?
 
When the last bullet was fired at Cold Harbor, Grant was no closer to investing Richmond than he was at the first day of The Wilderness. His next step the great flanking movement to invest Petersburg was a true riverboat gambler move. Had Lee had a single inkling of the move, he could easily have come close to destroying the AoP. Is that what you think grand strategy should consist of--rolling the dice. Suppose he came up craps, would you like a less than 50 starte Union today.

Lee took loses, Grant took loses. Lee is still able to mount successfull defenses against a numerically diminished foe.
"When the last bullet was fired at Cold Harbor, Grant was no closer to investing Richmond than he was at the first day of The Wilderness".

Actually, he was 60 miles closer. And whether he then set up a siege at Richmond or at Petersburg, it was still a siege and it definitely was not where Lee had wanted to be when the campaign started in early May.

"Had Lee had a single inkling of the move, he could easily have come close to destroying the AoP"

By doing what? The ANV was no longer an effective offensive force because it had suffered more losses than the historical "wisdom" has always believed and those were losses it could afford even less than the losses Grant could afford. Lee had also just sent Early away to the Valley. And - shockingly - Grant had actually taken precautions to cover the move. "Destroying the AoP"? Makes for a good hypothetical, but that's about it.

"Is that what you think grand strategy should consist of--rolling the dice."

Nothing I said could be read - if read accurately and not distorted - as suggesting that "grand strategy" should "consist of rolling the dice". Simplistic analysis of that ilk or similar is unhelpful - such as labeling the Campaign a "total and unadulterated failure".
 
Almost every single Southerner? The enslaved were Southerners, what did they believe?
There were also some Southern abolitionists. And there were those in the pro-union upcountry regions whose existence wasn't framed by a biblical conviction about slavery That's the problem with blanket pronouncements like "almost every single Southerner believed that slavery was ordained by god."
 
Had either Hooker or Grant advanced through the wilderness and trusted their supply trains to catch up, Lee could NOT have conducted a successful defense
Agreed, although Hooker actually halted his advance beyond the Wilderness and basically pulled Meade's V Corps back from open ground. Had Hooker followed through on executing his original plan, the AotP would have double enveloped the ANV if it hadn't already retreated. If Grant had passed quickly enough through the Wilderness he might have been able to flank the ANV and get in its rear, as he had initially planned. But the big difference between Hooker and Grant is that Hooker turned tail and withdrew across the Rappahannock, whereas Grant pushed on and continued his attempt to outflank the ANV.
 
First of all, who is the military genius here, you, me or Grant. His own writing reveals that he considered the best route to attack the South was from the west, striking at richmond directly not allowing them the benefit of river defenses.

Secondly the only way the Union loses either Chancellorsville or the Wilderness is to allow themselves to be trapped in the Wilderness themselves. Had either Hooker or Grant advanced through the wilderness and trusted their supply trains to catch up, Lee could NOT have conducted a successful defense. He would have faced not just 2-3 times his force but without Longstreet 4-5 times as many Union troops. He would have had to withdraw and find another line to defend. Again allowing Grant the opportunity to sweep east or west and he could have made no definitive moves to defend either. Doing so would have left him vulnerable to attack from the other direction.

We've got a lot more information available to us than Grant did so reappraising his (or Lee's) conclusions is very much fair game.

I agree a westward swing against Richmomd had advantages. That doesn't mean it was logistically feasible.

At Chancellorsville, Hooker needed to aggressively push the lead Confederates blocking him. Whether he did or didn't his supply line was safe, at least unti Jackson's flank attack after Hooker had already gone over to the defensive.

At Wilderness, the Confederates struck at the Union flank. If the AOTP simply presses on it opens the supply line and rear to attack.

That doesn't mean Meade and Grant acted correctly. They turned to fully engage Lee. Alternatively, they might have simply taken up blocking positions and immediately gone on the defensive. Keep the flank safe while the rest of the Union army and its suppy train passes behind the blocking force.

So logistics apply only to Northern troops/armies not Southern ones. Not once. Not twice. Get ready. THREE TIMES. The Confederacy was able to successfully invade the North with no logistic supply whatsoever. Lee at Antietam. Lee at Gettysburg. Early at Monocacy.

And yet logistics were serious problems for both Sigel and Hunter. (Possibly also for some forces facing Jackson in 1862?)

The Confederates were moving into territory (Maryland and Pennsylvania) largely untouched by war so they could and did forage. Lee's first invasion (Antietam) also passed well east of the Shenandoah, although he did retreat there.

Central Virginia had few supplies left when the Union moved toward that area. The Shenandoah offered supplies willingly to Confederates but not so willingly to the Union. Partisan raiders like Mosby also wrecked havoc on Union supply lines in the northern half of Virginia, but Confederates faced no comparable difficulties.

What I am trying to emphasize is that in the South of the 1860's almost every single Southerner believed that slavery was ordained by god. Not only that but they also believed that God would personally intervene to uphold his will.

Relying on a miracle is a pretty poor strategy.

If Jeff Davis expected divine intervention in 1865 then yes he was delusional.
 
When the last bullet was fired at Cold Harbor, Grant was no closer to investing Richmond than he was at the first day of The Wilderness. His next step the great flanking movement to invest Petersburg was a true riverboat gambler move. Had Lee had a single inkling of the move, he could easily have come close to destroying the AoP. Is that what you think grand strategy should consist of--rolling the dice. Suppose he came up craps, would you like a less than 50 starte Union today.

Lee took loses, Grant took loses. Lee is still able to mount successfull defenses against a numerically diminished foe.

I think this is a bit too far.

The reason Lee did not have "a single inkling of the move" was that Grant and Meade had a skillfully developed plan. That plan included:
  1. The threat of David Hunter coming through the Shenandoah Valley to Lynchburg (wrecking the RR connection there, stripping the Valley of supplies, etc.)
  2. Sending Sheridan and his cavalry on a raid to destroy the Virginia Central RR near Charlottesville, with the option of continuing to join Hunter and threaten Richmond from the West. (This leads to Trevillian Station on the 11th-12th)
  3. Building a new line of entrenchments in his rear from Elder Swamp north to Allen's Mill Pond. This was to cover the AoP's rear when the move to cross the James began. Meade had it built June 9-11. The AoP began moving towards the James during the night of the 12th, with the corps of Hancock and Wright occupying the line while Warren led the way South. Burnside and Smith then pulled out of the front line, with Burnside marching South and Smith marching to White House, where he boarded steamers and moved to Bermuda Hundred. Wilson's cavalry covered the movement.
  4. Adding Ben Butler's Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred to the AoP field command, using that position as a shield to move his main force to the south side of the James.
Meanwhile, what was Lee doing?
  1. He had sent Breckinridge's division to Lynchburg to face Hunter.
  2. He sent Hampton with two cavalry divisions to counter Sheridan, leading to Trevillian Station on the 11th-12th.
  3. On June 11 (before Grant/Meade moved), Lee ordered Early to move on the 12th to Lynchburg.
On the 12th, Lee has already sent Breckinridge's Division, Hampton's cavalry, and Early's Corps away. This is done as a result of other movements by Grant. This is an extremely coordinated and well-executed effort by the Union side, which is why Lee doesn't have "a single inkling of the move". If Lee did have an inkling of the move, he might have kept Early plus part or all of Hampton with him -- which would mean that Hunter takes Lynchburg, Sheridan runs wild in central Virginia, and quite possibly Hunter and Sheridan join forces to the West of Richmond.

If Lee does attack on the 13th as the Yankees are starting to move South, he will be attacking entrenched troops head on. In 1864, that was a bad scenario for the attacker. I don't see how we can postulate that Lee would have "easily have come close to destroying the AoP."

BTW, one main reason that Lee has difficulty finding out where Grant is going is that Beauregard doesn't tell him. Lee gets requests for troops from Beauregard, but no intel that tells him it is the Yankees main effort coming across the James. Reading the messages in the OR leads to an impression that Beauregard wants Lee's troops to come down below the James and be under Beauregard's command -- but he does not want General Lee himself to come down below the James and assume command.
 
I think this is a bit too far.

The reason Lee did not have "a single inkling of the move" was that Grant and Meade had a skillfully developed plan. That plan included:
  1. The threat of David Hunter coming through the Shenandoah Valley to Lynchburg (wrecking the RR connection there, stripping the Valley of supplies, etc.)
  2. Sending Sheridan and his cavalry on a raid to destroy the Virginia Central RR near Charlottesville, with the option of continuing to join Hunter and threaten Richmond from the West. (This leads to Trevillian Station on the 11th-12th)
  3. Building a new line of entrenchments in his rear from Elder Swamp north to Allen's Mill Pond. This was to cover the AoP's rear when the move to cross the James began. Meade had it built June 9-11. The AoP began moving towards the James during the night of the 12th, with the corps of Hancock and Wright occupying the line while Warren led the way South. Burnside and Smith then pulled out of the front line, with Burnside marching South and Smith marching to White House, where he boarded steamers and moved to Bermuda Hundred. Wilson's cavalry covered the movement.
  4. Adding Ben Butler's Army of the James at Bermuda Hundred to the AoP field command, using that position as a shield to move his main force to the south side of the James.
Meanwhile, what was Lee doing?
  1. He had sent Breckinridge's division to Lynchburg to face Hunter.
  2. He sent Hampton with two cavalry divisions to counter Sheridan, leading to Trevillian Station on the 11th-12th.
  3. On June 11 (before Grant/Meade moved), Lee ordered Early to move on the 12th to Lynchburg.
On the 12th, Lee has already sent Breckinridge's Division, Hampton's cavalry, and Early's Corps away. This is done as a result of other movements by Grant. This is an extremely coordinated and well-executed effort by the Union side, which is why Lee doesn't have "a single inkling of the move". If Lee did have an inkling of the move, he might have kept Early plus part or all of Hampton with him -- which would mean that Hunter takes Lynchburg, Sheridan runs wild in central Virginia, and quite possibly Hunter and Sheridan join forces to the West of Richmond.

If Lee does attack on the 13th as the Yankees are starting to move South, he will be attacking entrenched troops head on. In 1864, that was a bad scenario for the attacker. I don't see how we can postulate that Lee would have "easily have come close to destroying the AoP."

BTW, one main reason that Lee has difficulty finding out where Grant is going is that Beauregard doesn't tell him. Lee gets requests for troops from Beauregard, but no intel that tells him it is the Yankees main effort coming across the James. Reading the messages in the OR leads to an impression that Beauregard wants Lee's troops to come down below the James and be under Beauregard's command -- but he does not want General Lee himself to come down below the James and assume command.
So, you say that Meade was the responsible party involved in the successful movement that confounded Lee, Not Grant? I don't disagree, I just never heard of such credit given to Meade. Also concerning Beauregard and his lack of information to Lee in requesting more troops, Butler had already overtaken all the Signal Stations along the James, and was guarding Williamsburg to White House on the Pamunkey. He had control of City Point all the way to Smithfield. I would think Lee could understand the situation Beauregard faced, and the request for troops was to counter Butler I thought. Beauregard never fathomed or anticipated the connection across the James by Grant's troops to Butler's Army either did he?
Lubliner.
 
So, you say that Meade was the responsible party involved in the successful movement that confounded Lee, Not Grant? I don't disagree, I just never heard of such credit given to Meade.
Sorry if I gave you that impression. :smile:

In the Overland Campaign, Grant and Meade are acting together (or at least they should be considered that way when looking at the situation from the outside). If you look at it on a more inside-the-loop, nitty-gritty level, then Meade is running the day-to-day details of the AoP (and eventually that includes Burnside's Corps as well as Smith's). Grant is travelling near or with Meade throughout; he is in constant communication with Meade.

But Grant is also handling the rest of the war through his two HQ's (under Rawlins in the field; under Halleck in Washington). Grant is in command of Sherman in Georgia, of Rosecrans in Missouri, of Butler and Hunter and Banks and a bunch of others. Grant's control of the AoP is done through Meade in almost all cases, just as his control of all those others is done through Sherman/Rosecrans/Butler/Banks/etc. Because Grant is in the field with Meade, he has much more impact on operations, almost none on tactical details, and almost complete control on strategic decisions. As a result, it is hard to say where the responsibility of one ends and the other begins on any particular piece of the campaign.

One specific: Meade considered the Cold Harbor operation to be his baby (meaning the attempt to get around Lee's flank there, bringing Smith's Corps up from Butler to try to outflank Lee to the south and open the road to Richmond. Apparently Meade pitched it, Grant approved it, and Meade executed it. The plan is actually a very good plan that almost succeeded. Success would mean that the AoP was around Lee's left right flank, closer to Richmond than Lee, with an open road to the Confederate capital and Sheridan's cavalry massed behind the breakthrough to exploit it.

The Yankees did not pull it off, for a bunch of reasons (Smith's leadership, logistical issues, probably fatigue-breakdowns in the Union command-and-control-leadership) -- combined with some great personal leadership and initiative by Lee, hard fighting by the Confederates to hold out long enough, leading to intense fortifications. As Grant said, the final assault should have been cancelled after the 36 hour delay in making that assault; I am not sure how much of that decision was Grant and how much Meade. Everyone remembers the bloody defeat of that last day. No one pays much attention to the what-might-have-been of the week preceding it.

Also concerning Beauregard and his lack of information to Lee in requesting more troops, Butler had already overtaken all the Signal Stations along the James, and was guarding Williamsburg to White House on the Pamunkey. He had control of City Point all the way to Smithfield. I would think Lee could understand the situation Beauregard faced, and the request for troops was to counter Butler I thought. Beauregard never fathomed or anticipated the connection across the James by Grant's troops to Butler's Army either did he?
Beauregard knows what is going on only after the Yankees start moving south of the James. However he is very reluctant to reveal just how bad it is to Lee. He wants Lee to send troops down, but he doesn't want to make Lee come down -- apparently because Lee outranks him and will be in command if he comes down into Beauregard's department with his troops.
 
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well he could have played more of a defense role and if he could have done something with the blockade off the coast to get the necessary goods in it would have helped out alot
 
So, you say that Meade was the responsible party involved in the successful movement that confounded Lee, Not Grant? I don't disagree, I just never heard of such credit given to Meade.

IIRC, Gordon Rhea credits Meade and Humphreys (his chief of staff) for planning the move. Despite this, Meade's handling of the ensuing battle apparently convinced Grant he needed to be more hands-on.
 
IIRC, Gordon Rhea credits Meade and Humphreys (his chief of staff) for planning the move. Despite this, Meade's handling of the ensuing battle apparently convinced Grant he needed to be more hands-on.
The move worked brilliantly. The follow up execution on the other side of the river by Baldy Smith, et al. was abysmal.
 
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