What can today's military learn from the Gettysburg battlefield?

Hah! You got the rain we had yesterday. Deedle deedle.

It was not as bad as I first thought. It made me do something I hadn't done in a while while out in Gettysburg: study the ground with my head and eyes, not just with my feet. But I would have preferred you keep the rain another day.:smile:
 
Antebellum West Point was more a school of practical military engineering than one of modern military studies concentrating on theoretical strategy and tactics; emphasis was more on the School of the Soldier ( parade-ground drill ), gunnery ( artillery drill ) and equition ( horsemanship ) than anything cerebral. The motivating force was Professor Dennis Hart Mahan who stressed the writings of the Swiss Baron Antoine Henri Jomini for what military theory was taught. Jomini lived during the Napoleonic Wars and served as Chief-of-Staff to Marshal Michel Ney until 1813 when he saw the "handwriting on the wall", and changed sides, bringing to the Coalition arrayed against the Emperor a great deal of knowledge about his methods of warfare.
Being a Swiss mercenary and professional soldier, Jomini was convinced of the superiority of Napoleon's methods and even after Waterloo continued to advance them. His writings in French, then the international language, were published in 1836 had much wider circulation than Clausewitz' German texts, especially in Western Europe and the Americas. That's one reason for the continuing popularity of Napoleon and the French army during the 1860's. Jomini continued to serve in the Russian army and lived until 1869!


As a general rule, I think the CW should not be judged by future writings of the military art.
 
Gettysburg is clearly still relevant to today's Army.

When I returned to Hancock Avenue on Saturday afternoon, I saw these
soldiers gathered around the monument to the 72nd PA at the Angle:

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Dave
 
Just to clear up any confusion before it occurs, while Clausewitz did write an essay called "The Principles of War," where he elucidated some of his principles, the nine Principles of War used by today's military [MOOSEMUSS] were adapted from the principles first formulated by J. F. C. Fuller. A modern military staff ride would use those principles instead of the Clausewitzean principles.

As cash says, The Principles of War are a very good start point. Given enough time on the field, additional topics such as use of ground, command and control, the effect of "fog of war" and other topics can be addressed. There is nothing like standing on the ground where a given action occurred to "bring it all home" to a military audience.
 
What can be learned? To avoid mission creep if possible at the peril of your unit's overall assigned purpose and strategic success. Mission Creep is by Websters definition: "the gradual broadening of the original objectives of a mission or organization." It is usually regarded as a negative activity.

Long ago, I was a U.S. Army Infantry Grunt for four years, and one of the lessons I took from the experience was that while initiative is a very necessary quality of leadership, a competent officer or NCO must have the internal discipline, and strength of will to follow orders, and by example motivate the men in their command to do the same. Weak leadership results in poor communication, lack of control, and frequently disaster ensues. The officers I respected most were those who led by example, properly delegated to NCO's the tasks that are their purpose without micromanagement, displayed personal military competence, and were firm in their resolve. When officers or NCOs were weak, it was immediately obvious to us at the squad level. In the field, that weakness translated into their inability to exhibit control and achieve our objectives without costly mistakes or excess.

The first day's initial and successive contact by General Heath's men at Gettysburg are to my understanding and knowledge, directly the opposite of his orders from General Lee not to force a major engagement. This would seem a text book example of the danger of mission creep: a Confederate foraging raid becomes a small skirmish with local militia, the small skirmish with militia becomes a larger full on battle with regular Union Cavalry on ground of the enemy's choice, the enemy's superior command of elevated terrain negates the Confederate numerical advantage and delays their overall forward advance until Union reinforcements arrive in increasing strength. Because of the enemy's stubborn holding action in stalling for time, when the Confederate forces are finally victorious in routing the Union forces through the town, they have lost the light of day and are unable to successfully capitalize upon their gains. This leaves the Union forces in control of the high ground, and sets the stage for the impending bloody and decisive Confederate defeats of the next two days.
 
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When I was In Rotc In college. We also picked a historical commander and also studied on his Leadership abilities... I picked Joshua Chamberlin.. as did about 6 of my classmates LOL... I was an infantry officer in the army for a number of years untill i was medically retired after being injured my last tour in Afghanistan last year. In some ways certin spots of Afghanistan looked like devils den... FORBODING
 
When I was a First Sergeant of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, one of the hardest things I had to see to was making sure the officers of my company did NOT help in the setting up of tents, laying out the camp, and helping to set up camouflage netting over our vehicles and battalion tactical operations center (TOC).

The officers, in my view, were trying to be 'one of the guys' or to be thought of as 'good guys' pitching in and helping the privates with their details. I flat out discouraged this EVERY time I saw an officer start to pitch in and help with soldier chores. The plain fact of the matter was, this is not an officers job, to pound tent pegs or lug gas cans for the generators to power up radios and such.

I often had to make officers go to the front of the chow line when we were in the field, making sure they ate first, before any of our privates or sergeants did. I would find the battalion staff going to the end of the line, not wanting to 'cut' in front of soldiers who were already in line. I would walk up to them and make them go to the front of the line so they could eat first.

Was I being a suck-up? Did I hate my soldiers? No, in both cases.

The job of officers is to look beyond the day-to-day functions and chores of military life and PLAN for tomorrow, to plan where the gas, bullets, bandages, food and water were to come from and ensure it made its way to the company. It was their job to PLAN on how to respond to suspected enemy moves and attacks, to set up defensive positions, listening posts, establish contact with units in the rear and on each flank. They had enormous responsibilities that often kept them up long hours with little rest. They HAD to get fed, they HAD to be kept from doing the little details so they could concentrate on the BIG picture. Whenever I saw officers 'pitching in to help' I got angry and upset. Being a good officer is not being in any kind of popularity contest or getting your soldiers to 'like' you. The old saying is, "Familarity breeds contempt" is exactly correct when it comes to officer/soldier relations.

We had our battalion staff go on a few battlefield rides when I was stationed at Ft. Drum, New York, and I always supported them doing so. The more the lesson of a past battle, the features of that battlefield, the tactics and mistakes that took place on it, seemed to force them to realize the big picture of what their actual jobs were.

And it sure as heck made my job a lot easier.

Sincerely,
Unionblue
When I was a First Sergeant of a Headquarters and Headquarters Company, one of the hardest things I had to see to was making sure the officers of my company did NOT help in the setting up of tents, laying out the camp, and helping to set up camouflage netting over our vehicles and battalion tactical operations center (TOC).

The officers, in my view, were trying to be 'one of the guys' or to be thought of as 'good guys' pitching in and helping the privates with their details. I flat out discouraged this EVERY time I saw an officer start to pitch in and help with soldier chores. The plain fact of the matter was, this is not an officers job, to pound tent pegs or lug gas cans for the generators to power up radios and such.

I often had to make officers go to the front of the chow line when we were in the field, making sure they ate first, before any of our privates or sergeants did. I would find the battalion staff going to the end of the line, not wanting to 'cut' in front of soldiers who were already in line. I would walk up to them and make them go to the front of the line so they could eat first.

Was I being a suck-up? Did I hate my soldiers? No, in both cases.

The job of officers is to look beyond the day-to-day functions and chores of military life and PLAN for tomorrow, to plan where the gas, bullets, bandages, food and water were to come from and ensure it made its way to the company. It was their job to PLAN on how to respond to suspected enemy moves and attacks, to set up defensive positions, listening posts, establish contact with units in the rear and on each flank. They had enormous responsibilities that often kept them up long hours with little rest. They HAD to get fed, they HAD to be kept from doing the little details so they could concentrate on the BIG picture. Whenever I saw officers 'pitching in to help' I got angry and upset. Being a good officer is not being in any kind of popularity contest or getting your soldiers to 'like' you. The old saying is, "Familarity breeds contempt" is exactly correct when it comes to officer/soldier relations.

We had our battalion staff go on a few battlefield rides when I was stationed at Ft. Drum, New York, and I always supported them doing so. The more the lesson of a past battle, the features of that battlefield, the tactics and mistakes that took place on it, seemed to force them to realize the big picture of what their actual jobs were.

And it sure as heck made my job a lot easier.

Sincerely,
Unionblue



You were an Outstanding NCO... THE heart and SOUL of any army.... thank you for your service
 
One of the things I hope they teach is -- "ascertaining the strategic and tactical aims of the enemy, and adjust accordingly, quicker than the collective 'he'" can do so. Anyway, to the point:

There is a maxim that "no plan survives contact with the enemy", but even at a cursory level, Lee's moves for the AofNV seem entirely predictable at Gettysburg. I've read essays about how the "theories in place" rate the overall commands at the army and corp levels, even with the Fuller methods of analysis. The consensus seems to be that Meade blew it before day #1, day #1 was basically a tie in terms of poor executions, and that Lee blew it on both days #2 and #3, because with the interior positions, the AoftP had better maneuver, etc. and Lee's strategies never changed enough to negate that tactical advantage.

The reason I am always drawn back to Hancock as a pivotal figure is that in my book, he was the best "on field", using the advantages which he had according to my reading of all of those theories. Meaning the one portion of the battlefield that the AofNV should have avoided was "anything anchored by II Corp". Fight all the other generals instead, picking off the weakest links, etc. especially with motion towards the south/left flank area held by V Corp.

I would want my cadets and students to see how the battle played out in reality, and see if they can game out better force combinations and counters to those combinations very very quickly while still being constrained with the two main tactical problems: the sustained marching speed of infantry, the ability re-configure artillery strategy on the fly, and the deployment of both into advantageous positions on the battlefield.
 
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The U.S. Army obviously still thinks there's something worthwhile about "staff rides" to Gettysburg because when I was there this April there were four big buses with Old Guard (the Third U. S. Infantry Regiment, the ceremonial troops stationed around Washington, D. C. at places like Arlington Cemetery's Tomb of the Unknowns) emblazoned on their sides full of troops taking the driving tour of the battlefield. We encountered them at the rest stop on McPherson's Ridge, Oak Hill and the Peace Light, and maybe somewhere else too.
 
Military "Staff Rides" are held on many Military Parks with one group being the North and one the South. They go over what, when, where and why things were done, what could have been done differently and what lessons for today's military can be brought away from the actions that took place on those fields150 years ago.

Foreword
Staff rides represent a unique and persuasive method of conveying the lessons of the past to the present-day Army leadership for current application. Properly conducted, these exercises bring to life, on the very terrain where historic encounters took place, examples, applicable today as in the past, of leadership, tactics and strategy, communications, use of terrain, and, above all, the psychology of men in battle. This historical study, particularly with personal reconnaissance, offers valuable opportunities to develop professional leader-ship and the capacity for effective use of combined arms on the air-land battlefield. Take Gettysburg, for example. The resolution, initiative, and courage of Colonel Joshua Lawrence Chamberlain of the 20th Maine reflect valuable principles for study by today's leaders. These leadership principles transcend technological advances and have no historical bounds, no binding parameters of geography and time. After a long hiatus, staff rides have again found their place as an accepted part of professional leadership development, be it at the Army War College, the Command and General Staff College, or a battalion in the Seventh Army. We welcome The Staff Ride as an important new Army publication. The wisdom contained within its pages will provide appropriate guidance for those of us who want to utilize the staff ride to enhance the professionalism of the Army. Our turn-of-the-century staff rides stressed those "elements still important in battle ... leadership and the psychology of men in combat." The participant in a properly conceived and conducted historical staff ride will be rewarded by an enhanced understanding of those key elements and of the essential fact that battles are not systematic, logical undertakings but rather activities of men with all their frailties and strengths. JOHN A. WICKHAM, JR. General, United States Army Chief of Staff , Washington, D.C. January 1987

Staff rides represent a unique and persuasive method of conveying the lessons of the past to the present-day Army leadership for current application. Properly conducted, these exercises bring to life, on the very terrain where historic encounters took place, examples, applicable today as in the past, of leadership, tactics and strategy, communications, use of terrain, and, above all, the psychology of men in battle. This historical study, particularly with personal reconnaissance, offers valuable opportunities to develop professional leadership and the capacity for effective use of combined arms on the air-land battlefield.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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It is my understanding that the Battle of Gettysburg is reviewed and analyzed in every highly regarded military school of higher learning...and being so close to the establishment in Carlisle, a wonderful hands-on experience for the students.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
I once helped put on a one-day leadership seminar for seasoned U.S. government officials. The focus was on critical leadership decisions that were made on the field - the information available to the decision-maker, their reasoning, the consequences, etc. The program focused on ten specific lessons:
1. Buford's decision to stand and fight on July 1.
2. J.E.B. Stuart's role.
3. Ewell's decision not to press the attack late on July 1, and his discretionary orders from Lee.
4. Decision-making styles of Meade versus Lee.
5. Longstreet's objections and approach to Lee's plan for the grand charge on July 3 (risk-taking behavior, confronting a superior, etc.).
6. Warren's assumption of authority in dealing with the imminent threat to Little Round Top.
7. Chamberlain's solutions to problems faced at Little Round Top (tenacity, creativity, determination, etc.)
8. Courage of the Federals defending against the Confederate charge on July 3.
9. Tactical and strategic issues facing Meade after the battle, versus Lincoln's expectations.
10. Reflections on Lincoln's Gettysburg Address, and the debt owed to our predecessors.

Incidentally, the U.S. Naval Academy has also instituted a program to send midshipmen to Gettysburg for leadership training.
 
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