What battles would have changed the War if a different side won?

Antietam, a CSA victory would likely have led to recognition from Britain.
Gettysburg, had Lee won in a convincing manner, the ANV could have continued pressing towards Philly, Baltimore or DC.
Shiloh for reasons mentioned in earlier posts.
And a strong Confederate victory at Vicksburg not only would have secured the Mississippi, but also would have damaged Grant to the point where he may not have taken over the AOP.
As I see things, The Federals had such an advantage in materials, logistics and manpower that Lee could not have won a fight in PA that might result in much further success.
As to Vicksburg, as things were the Confederates could not win. They could hold Vicksburg or lose it. In fact it was held for quite a while. Then the Confederates lost it.What might have been a CSA victory would have happened had Pemberton not defended Vicksburg, joined with Joe Johnston, and turned on Grant. That would have been a Confederate victory, had Grant got whooped.
 
jackt62

What was the nature of this planned intervention please? I have a vague memory of reading of Britain offering to mediate, which is likely - since by definition for Lincoln to agree would recognise the south as an independent state - to get that result. Howevert if Lincoln refused to accept mediation is there any evidence that Britain would have sought to impose economic pressure say? I can't see them going to war or anything like that but unless it also meant a defacto lifting of the blockade by Britain recognising the Confederacy I'm not sure it would have a massive effect.

Steve

The planned intervention was never formalized, but both Earl Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, and British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who tilted towards the Confederacy, favored mediation in the ACW. This of course, would have been tantamount to British recognition of the Confederacy as mediation would involve finding a means to stop the fighting, which could only occur if the south was able to achieve its goal of independence. Of course, Lincoln and the administration were totally against any mediation scenario, as they understood it would lead to Confederate independence. Which is why the stakes were very high for the north to prevent such an occurrence as in fact did happen, once the British concluded that the run of battlefield victories attained by the ANV in the previous months finally ran into a wall after the Antietam battle. It can only be speculation but, had the battle gone against the Union, and the British forced mediation, there would have been other likely European participants including France, which would have increased the pressure on the Lincoln administration to mediate.
 
Here's a couple:

1) Gettysburg is the classic. Lee wins at Gettysburg and not only has he beaten the Union field army, he's beaten it for a third successive time - Fredericksburg, then Chancellorsville, now this. The fallback position along the Pipe Creek Line also has pretty serious problems, so it's possible Lee would attack it again, but even if he doesn't he's probably forced the Union to transfer significant amounts of troops east; the Army of the Potomac's morale is shot until they get something like a battlefield victory.

2) The Seven Days sequence. Not any one battle as such, but there are several possible alternate outcomes in the Seven Days sequence, and they include:
2A) Franklin remains in position at Glendale and that's the Union main line of resistance from then on, possibly providing a stronger argument for reinforcing the Union army and continuing towards Richmond.
2B) Malvern Hill as a battle just plain doesn't happen, Longstreet makes an evening march to envelop the hill and McClellan's army is encircled atop Malvern Hill. He's compelled to surrender within a day or two for lack of food and ammunition, and literally the only Union army left in the Eastern Theatre is Pope's wide-flung Army of Virginia; the Union is in enormous trouble.

3) Shiloh. Deploying the Confederate corps in line-of-columns instead of column-of-lines and slightly better operational control permits ASJ's strategy to execute properly, splintering the majority of Grant's army by wheeling to pin it against a swamp on the first day; on the second day Buell's reinforcements are effectively fended off.
Things have gone enough worse that it's possible Grant never gets trusted with an army again, which would certainly change the war one way or another.

4) Harpers Ferry, 1862. Holding out for one more day would mean a quarter of Lee's army bottled up and forced to surrender in the Pleasant Valley, and that HF doesn't fall at all that year; South Mountain still happens, naturally, and it's possible Antietam would as well (though whether that destroy's Lee's army is another question.)
 
The planned intervention was never formalized, but both Earl Russell, the British Foreign Secretary, and British Prime Minister Lord Palmerston, who tilted towards the Confederacy, favored mediation in the ACW. This of course, would have been tantamount to British recognition of the Confederacy as mediation would involve finding a means to stop the fighting, which could only occur if the south was able to achieve its goal of independence. Of course, Lincoln and the administration were totally against any mediation scenario, as they understood it would lead to Confederate independence. Which is why the stakes were very high for the north to prevent such an occurrence as in fact did happen, once the British concluded that the run of battlefield victories attained by the ANV in the previous months finally ran into a wall after the Antietam battle. It can only be speculation but, had the battle gone against the Union, and the British forced mediation, there would have been other likely European participants including France, which would have increased the pressure on the Lincoln administration to mediate.
It's important to consider that the British as a whole (either Russell or Palmerston specifically, can't remember which) considered that mediation had to involve the Russians as a pro-Union Great Power. So if the Russians don't sign on at least in support, it's not happening.
 
The Russians were more pro-Union than the other great European powers and they could have exerted some pushback against any British and French mediation proposal. But I'm not informed enough about Russian affairs to say whether they would have done so, stayed neutral, or joined in with the other Europeans. Anyway, it's speculation at best.
 
The Russians were more pro-Union than the other great European powers and they could have exerted some pushback against any British and French mediation proposal. But I'm not informed enough about Russian affairs to say whether they would have done so, stayed neutral, or joined in with the other Europeans.
That's exactly the point. Mediation would have been multi-lateral, and explicitly intended to not be viewed as winning Confederate independence for them; only the buy-in of the Russians would have made this diplomatically possible.

Without Russian buy-in, the British were against imposing mediation in the first place.
 
Here's a third one that might be different in the Seven Days sequence. It would require a setup some weeks beforehand, but I think this one's plausible:


During June, after Seven Pines, McClellan recieves not just McCall's division but all or most of McDowell's corps - probably by sea. Here the different event that changes things is that Lincoln decides to send McDowell's corps by sea instead of by land; this isn't especially unlikely as an event because that was the original recommendation made to Lincoln, which he overruled.

Subsequently, what would now be 1st Corps, Army of the Potomac is posted north of the Chickahominy along with those troops there historically. This changes matters in the Seven Days sequence, because it means that Jackson can't successfully cut in behind the Union forces at Mechanicsville; in turn this means that the little-known fighting south of the Chickahominy in the Oak Grove-Garnetts Hill area is what's decisive.

Assuming the fighting south of the Chickahominy remains roughly as it was historically, as of 27 June 1862 Union heavy artillery is being deployed on the heights over Richmond and within long gun range of the city centre.

The reason I think this is interesting is because it doesn't so much involve a single battle going differently as such; the likelihood is that Gaines Mill simply doesn't happen rather than being a Union victory. Instead the Union wins the operational sequence of the last week of June 1862, and what follows is a regular approach sequence to Richmond.
 
Here's a third one that might be different in the Seven Days sequence. It would require a setup some weeks beforehand, but I think this one's plausible:


During June, after Seven Pines, McClellan recieves not just McCall's division but all or most of McDowell's corps - probably by sea. Here the different event that changes things is that Lincoln decides to send McDowell's corps by sea instead of by land; this isn't especially unlikely as an event because that was the original recommendation made to Lincoln, which he overruled.

Subsequently, what would now be 1st Corps, Army of the Potomac is posted north of the Chickahominy along with those troops there historically. This changes matters in the Seven Days sequence, because it means that Jackson can't successfully cut in behind the Union forces at Mechanicsville; in turn this means that the little-known fighting south of the Chickahominy in the Oak Grove-Garnetts Hill area is what's decisive.

Assuming the fighting south of the Chickahominy remains roughly as it was historically, as of 27 June 1862 Union heavy artillery is being deployed on the heights over Richmond and within long gun range of the city centre.

The reason I think this is interesting is because it doesn't so much involve a single battle going differently as such; the likelihood is that Gaines Mill simply doesn't happen rather than being a Union victory. Instead the Union wins the operational sequence of the last week of June 1862, and what follows is a regular approach sequence to Richmond.

Interesting!
 
As I see things, The Federals had such an advantage in materials, logistics and manpower that Lee could not have won a fight in PA that might result in much further success.
As to Vicksburg, as things were the Confederates could not win. They could hold Vicksburg or lose it. In fact it was held for quite a while. Then the Confederates lost it.What might have been a CSA victory would have happened had Pemberton not defended Vicksburg, joined with Joe Johnston, and turned on Grant. That would have been a Confederate victory, had Grant got whooped.
I don't necessarily believe that the CSA could have won any or all of these battles, and certainly not the war itself, rather I was addressing the question as to what battles could have changed the war had the outcome been different.
 
It seems to me there are three kinds of ways of making the outcome of a battle different.

The first is "something changes during the battle itself" - for example, none of the Confederate Generals at Gettysburg go down on Day Two, so the echelon attack executes roughly as planned.
The second is "something changes immediately or shortly before the battle" - for example, the Confederates deploy at Shiloh in line-of-columns instead of column-of-lines, and they don't eat all their rations the first day they march out of Corinth, so they don't get all snarled up with CCs unable to control their lines and troops breaking discipline to loot the Union camps.
The third is "something changes in the setup of the battle or earlier" - for example, McDowell's corps arrives on McClellan's northern flank during June 1862, or to use an extreme case one side or another undergoes serious rifle-accuracy training over the winter of 1861-2.

It's my understanding that all of these are "fair game" here.
 
So here's another possibility - Second Bull Run.

The idea behind this one is that Pope issues a non-discretionary order to attack to FJ Porter on August 29, instead of August 30, and consequently Longstreet's attack comes crashing in on the afternoon of the 29th instead of on the 30th. (Historically it was the presence of FJ Porter's forces that prevented Longstreet's flanking force from attacking on the 29th, and it was when he was ordered to attack on the 30th that the flanking attack could come in and hit hard.)

Historically, on the 29th Smith's division was the vanguard of the relief forces, and he was at Annadale when he halted; on the 30th Franklin's 6th Corps was forming into a fighting line along the Cub Run pretty much as Longstreet hit Pope's hanging flank. The difference is how far Pope's forces have to travel before they reach succor.

From the top of Henry Hill to the Cub Run is about 3.5 miles; from the same point along the turnpike to Annadale is 17.5 miles. The difference is, naturally, about a day's marching, and the thing which really has the chance to destroy an army of the period is a driving, persistent pursuit.
I would say that, with Stuart's cavalry present plus a fairly significant amount of infantry (including AP Hill's Light Division, who marched famously hard in the Maryland campaign) the scope is there for a real pursuit of the sort that rarely happened in the Civil War. The Army of Virginia was rendered seriously vulnerable by the near-complete rout it suffered at Second Bull Run, and while a driving pursuit wouldn't necessarily inflict all that much more in casualties it could feasibly completely wreck the ability of the force to be reconstituted for the field. Not even Napoleon himself thought it was possible to rally units so shattered to a fighting fitness in only a few weeks.

This then plays in turn into the Maryland Campaign; if it's not feasible to use anyone from the Army of Virginia in a field force until October, then any Union army for the Maryland Campaign will consist of about half of McClellan's old Army of the Potomac plus raw recruits with no unit training and in some cases no weapons practice. With Lee mustering ca. 75,000 PFD (per Harsh) after the Northern Virginia Campaign, all veterans, Lee can practically do what he likes for the next month. Certainly if a battle resulted there's just not enough good AotP units to stiffen the green volunteers to make them the equal of Lee's veterans.


This isn't technically a different side winning - the CSA is still triumphant. But they have the chance for a triumph of a greater scale, and to subsequently and consequently win the Maryland campaign.
 
So here's another possibility - Second Bull Run.

The idea behind this one is that Pope issues a non-discretionary order to attack to FJ Porter on August 29, instead of August 30, and consequently Longstreet's attack comes crashing in on the afternoon of the 29th instead of on the 30th. (Historically it was the presence of FJ Porter's forces that prevented Longstreet's flanking force from attacking on the 29th, and it was when he was ordered to attack on the 30th that the flanking attack could come in and hit hard.)

Historically, on the 29th Smith's division was the vanguard of the relief forces, and he was at Annadale when he halted; on the 30th Franklin's 6th Corps was forming into a fighting line along the Cub Run pretty much as Longstreet hit Pope's hanging flank. The difference is how far Pope's forces have to travel before they reach succor.

From the top of Henry Hill to the Cub Run is about 3.5 miles; from the same point along the turnpike to Annadale is 17.5 miles. The difference is, naturally, about a day's marching, and the thing which really has the chance to destroy an army of the period is a driving, persistent pursuit.
I would say that, with Stuart's cavalry present plus a fairly significant amount of infantry (including AP Hill's Light Division, who marched famously hard in the Maryland campaign) the scope is there for a real pursuit of the sort that rarely happened in the Civil War. The Army of Virginia was rendered seriously vulnerable by the near-complete rout it suffered at Second Bull Run, and while a driving pursuit wouldn't necessarily inflict all that much more in casualties it could feasibly completely wreck the ability of the force to be reconstituted for the field. Not even Napoleon himself thought it was possible to rally units so shattered to a fighting fitness in only a few weeks.

This then plays in turn into the Maryland Campaign; if it's not feasible to use anyone from the Army of Virginia in a field force until October, then any Union army for the Maryland Campaign will consist of about half of McClellan's old Army of the Potomac plus raw recruits with no unit training and in some cases no weapons practice. With Lee mustering ca. 75,000 PFD (per Harsh) after the Northern Virginia Campaign, all veterans, Lee can practically do what he likes for the next month. Certainly if a battle resulted there's just not enough good AotP units to stiffen the green volunteers to make them the equal of Lee's veterans.


This isn't technically a different side winning - the CSA is still triumphant. But they have the chance for a triumph of a greater scale, and to subsequently and consequently win the Maryland campaign.
Yes, but it would have been a Pennsylvania campaign. Lee marched into Maryland to get to PA.
 
Yes, but it would have been a Pennsylvania campaign. Lee marched into Maryland to get to PA.
That's one of those things I've seen debated even these days!
I'm comfortable calling it a Maryland Campaign because at least some of the fighting would take place along the Potomac (to whit, Harpers Ferry), possibly more if someone like McClellan is ordered out of Washington with a slapped-together army, but I do agree it's quite possible that Lee goes marauding up into Pennsylvania to try and find something to make Lincoln order an army out of Washington before it's reconstituted.

Possibly burning Harrisburg would work.
 
I do not believe any battle would have changed the war's outcome. Maybe. Saphroneth brings up some interesting points. But for instance, Longstreet sending in his Corp for an attack on the 29th instead of the 30th has a few key points that we should think of. For example, did the ANV know how many troops Pope actually had field ready. And even if they did, I would somewhat doubt the outcome would change too terribly much. At Missionary Ridge when the AOT fled the field even they successfully found some territory to successfully defend for a time. And at Gettysburg, there is some pretty decent information that Lee did not think that the entire AOP was on the field even by the 3rd day. The fog of war can be a dangerous thing.
 
I do not believe any battle would have changed the war's outcome.
I was assuming the requirement was just to have the result be quite different, instead of flipping the outcome of the war - but if the entire Army of the Potomac is captured on Malvern Hill, for example, surely that's so dramatic that it has a real chance of the Confederacy winning the war in 1862?


But for instance, Longstreet sending in his Corp for an attack on the 29th instead of the 30th has a few key points that we should think of. For example, did the ANV know how many troops Pope actually had field ready.
Yes, they actually did!
In the first place Longstreet wanted to attack on the 29th and was prevented from doing so by Porter's presence, so we can easily conjecture that Longstreet would attack on the 29th, but Lee's army had also captured a truly startling amount of Pope's correspondence.

Stuart's cavalry on the 22nd captured Pope's dispatch book with “[d]etailed data as to his strength, dispositions, and designs; and referencing expected reinforcements and identifying their whereabouts.” Six days later on the 28th, Jackson and AP Hill both captured dispatches detailing Pope's concentration at Manassas Junction and his formation of line of battle there; this, plus the dispatch book from the 22nd, would give complete information of what troops Pope had available and even their rough strength.


At Missionary Ridge when the AOT fled the field even they successfully found some territory to successfully defend for a time.
Yes, and this was because of Cleburne's division (+) which was left and formed the rearguard, and because there was little if any Union force that attempted a pursuit. But Pope's command was pretty much torn to shreds historically - if they have to get seventeen miles down the road before they hit friendly troops who can act as a rearguard, they're going to be much more vulnerable to a driving pursuit.

Note that a pursuit doesn't mean you capture or destroy all or even most of the army, it means you shatter their morale by forcing them to keep retreating until they finally reach safety. The pursuit of the French army by 4,000 Prussian cavalry after Waterloo was done by a force actually smaller than Early had on the field, and they pursued the French overnight about 30 km from La Belle Alliance to Charleroi (i.e. about 18 miles); that was enough to completely ruin any prospect Napoleon's French veterans had of reforming within less than a month.

Even if the men are still around, if it's going to take a month or more to reconstitute the destroyed morale of the forces routed at Second Bull Run then Lee has a much better situation.
 
These are all good points, but in reference to II Bull Run, I think we might be missing a few points. The attack that started on the 30th by the Union played a huge part within there own rout. But if McDowell's Corp was on the move back from the peninsula, Would the battle be that much different. For one, a smaller force makes a commander less aggressive. Therefore if a commander does act aggressively due to his present information, he would still try to cover his flanks and offer as much of a reserve as practical to ensure that his army is not destroyed. And would the battle have happened?
I would also make the point that if we can see the obvious, couldn't they. I have recently read post on if the Overland Campaign was plausible in 1862. I have found that you (Saphroneth) made some very articulate reasonings why it would not have worked in 1862. I believe that the powers that were in command in 1862 saw these same issues within the logistics system that would have prevented them from making such a move.
I suppose my point is this, the fog of war sucks. And with that, no commander wants his army, or command, destroyed while under his discretion. So each commander acts as he sees appropriate and within his troops ability to accomplish the goals set before them. All of this is within the unknown. Ewell could have taken Cemetary Ridge on 7/1, but how many troops are actually on the hill after an entire days worth of fighting. McClellan could have moved on Richmond way faster, but his estimates were that the enemy was 200k. Petersburg could have been captured sooner had a more aggressive commander been around.
Lastly my interpretation of "what battles would have changed the war if a different side won" means that the south won independence. The only way that I see this as plausible would be some of the early war battles that were CSA victories became absolute routs. And there defeats were victories. Then European recognition of the south. Which I think is hard because Russia was pro union and Britain wanted Russian approval. And a long drawn out war of around 8 years. Then southern independence, maybe.
 
The fog of war can be a dangerous thing.

At the Wilderness, Lee didn't know the 9th Corps was with Grant, nor how reinforced the AoP had been. He had predicted the 9th Corps would join Butler and operate against NC or along the James. He thought he was hitting ca. 75,000 rather than 140,000. Hence he was so aggressive. One suspects had he known the real strength of the enemy, he'd have moved immediately around Grant to take up a blocking position, as Meade predicted he would.
 
The attack that started on the 30th by the Union played a huge part within there own rout. But if McDowell's Corp was on the move back from the peninsula, Would the battle be that much different. For one, a smaller force makes a commander less aggressive.
...Pope attacked all day on the 29th, and publicly expressed derision for commanders who looked to their own supply lines. This is a man whose idea of warfare concorded with Lincoln's - hit the enemy as hard as you can and don't bother thinking about what they can do to you.
Without FJ Porter's force as a flank guard on the 29th - and bear in mind Pope considered Porter to be actively treasonous for doing the flank guard job - Longstreet would have been able to attack that day.

Therefore if a commander does act aggressively due to his present information, he would still try to cover his flanks and offer as much of a reserve as practical to ensure that his army is not destroyed. And would the battle have happened?

I'm not entirely sure it's clear what my Alternate Second Bull Run concept is. The only difference here is that Pope's order on the 29th is non-discretionary; Pope genuinely was trying to attack with everything he had at once without bothering about supply lines or lines of retreat.

I believe that the powers that were in command in 1862 saw these same issues within the logistics system that would have prevented them from making such a move.
Yes, but the powers in question were corps commanders and army commanders - not Lincoln. It was at least achievable in late 1862, however, because the York and James rivers were cleared and so the main problem is getting over the Rappahanock-Rapidan in force.

McClellan could have moved on Richmond way faster, but his estimates were that the enemy was 200k.
This, on the other hand, is basically false. Not the bit about the enemy being 200K - this is correct if you use Aggregate Present, and is an overestimate of about 50,000 in AP strength - but the bit about moving on Richmond much faster coupled with it.

In April and May, McClellan's estimates are correct, so he's not moving slowly because he overestimates the enemy.
In June, McClellan's estimates are high, but the reason he's not moving has nothing to do with enemy strength and everything to do with a series of truly awful rainstorms. McClellan moves again the day before Lee's attack sequence starts, because that's the day the ground has finally dried out enough to move artillery. (That's why Oak Grove is 25 June and the first of the Seven Days, while Lee's attack sequence opens at Mechanicsville/Beaver Dam Creek on 26 June).

The real problem in the Seven Days is Jackson coming down from the north; if there was a way to have McDowell catch him in the Valley or even just block him from escaping, Lee wouldn't have been able to force McClellan away from Richmond because the Mechanicsville position would have remained secure.
 
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I've seen a suggestion that the Tullahoma movement could have been the destruction of Bragg's army if 21st Corps had been marched below the Elk river instead of merely below the Duck river.

Does that qualify? Losing one of the main Confederate field armies would be pretty bad...
 
Those are all good candidates but I always get stuck on Fts Henry and Donelson. If they had been held, it would have been a lot harder for the Union to control the rivers and eventually the Mississippi. Without control of the river system that went clear into the heart of the Confederacy, they might have had a better than average chance of winning the war altogether. The domino effect after the fall of Ft Donelson was just about the end right there.
I've seen a suggestion that the CSA was about to pull out of Donelson and concentrate at Corinth, but they held Donelson for a few days too long while they evacuated something from further south. Interesting to contemplate how different Shiloh would have been with another ca. 12K Confederate troops...
 
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