Brass Napoleon Award Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost?

Mallory, as I've said, had much better preparation to be CS Navy Secretary than Welles had to be Union Navy Secretary, but that was no guarantee of good decision-making... One item I read on the Confederate Naval Academy made the interesting observation that the Academy really made no sense in the context of the immediate conflict, but was a forward-looking arrangement, based on the assumption that the Confederacy would survive long enough to have a need of an Academy-trained officer corps. In the event, it became a bit of a diversion of already-scarce resources.

The Confederate Navy absolutely could not afford any mistakes or diversions. They weren't fools, and they made many good moves, but their record was far from perfect, in a situation where only perfection would serve. The U.S. Navy could afford mistakes, because it had the depth and infrastructure to recover from them.
 
I agree that the Tennessee was too little help for Mobile's forts, but Mobile's value was its RR connection, not its blockade running capacity and the loss of the forts had no effect on the railroad.

The failure to take Ft. Fisher in 1862 or 1863 is a major strike against the Union military leadership. Lincoln should have insisted on it and made it happen. When Knoxville fell in fall of '63, Richmond and the ANV could only be sustained by the railroad through northeastern NC to Petersburg. To not make this critical and vulnerable area (Wilmington to Weldon NC) a primary target in early 1864 was to ensure the slaughter of the Overland and Petersburg campaigns. An Albemarle completed in 1864 should have had not effect on going after this critical area, except to have increased the naval forces assigned.
The threat of the ironclads was greater than their actual fighting capabilities. The weaknesses were in their power plants and the inability to create turrets. Technology was already moving towards pivot guns and turrets. The heaviest guns a ship mounted mattered more than the number of guns.
I am not too dug in on this, I think the US Navy had to plan to deal with the ironclads. The plan at New Orleans was to not let the Confederates finish the ironclad. The plan in North Carolina was to not guarantee absolute naval supremacy if they were unsure of the Albermarle's capabilities.
As to your other point, it is not clear why Grant had to convince the administration that Mobile Bay and Wilmington had to be closed, and that buying cotton from the enemy had to be stopped.
 
As a deterrent, and as political inspiration, the ironclads were more effective than they were as weapons in naval combat.
Maybe that is the synthesis. :angel:
 
As a deterrent, and as political inspiration, the ironclads were more effective than they were as weapons in naval combat.
Maybe that is the synthesis. :angel:
While a true statement, it does not address the question -- were they the best use of the materials and effort they consumed?
 
The threat of the ironclads was greater than their actual fighting capabilities.

Very much so... the fear of a new and unfamiliar weapons system is in many cases more effective than the weapon itself. The Union benefited from this early on on the Mississippi, where the mere approach of gunboats was often enough to cause the Confederates to have one foot out the door already, whereas it later became apparent that a stout defense could still frustrate them.

It's anachronistic, but the concept of "Risikflotte" (sp?) is appropriate here-- this was the pre-WW1 German concept of, since it was not possible to have a fleet capable of defeating their enemy, at least have one to present a clear and present danger or risk to the enemy. While not formally codified in naval strategy to my knowledge, this was still a factor instinctively sensed by alert naval officers on both sides.
 
Mallory, as I've said, had much better preparation to be CS Navy Secretary than Welles had to be Union Navy Secretary, but that was no guarantee of good decision-making... One item I read on the Confederate Naval Academy made the interesting observation that the Academy really made no sense in the context of the immediate conflict, but was a forward-looking arrangement, based on the assumption that the Confederacy would survive long enough to have a need of an Academy-trained officer corps. In the event, it became a bit of a diversion of already-scarce resources.

The Confederate Navy absolutely could not afford any mistakes or diversions. They weren't fools, and they made many good moves, but their record was far from perfect, in a situation where only perfection would serve. The U.S. Navy could afford mistakes, because it had the depth and infrastructure to recover from them.
The question I am trying to address is really a step above the Navy. Its the question of allocation of national resources -- should Davis have allowed Mallory to do his best or should he have limited him for the good of the country?
 
Very much so... the fear of a new and unfamiliar weapons system is in many cases more effective than the weapon itself. The Union benefited from this early on on the Mississippi, where the mere approach of gunboats was often enough to cause the Confederates to have one foot out the door already, whereas it later became apparent that a stout defense could still frustrate them.

It's anachronistic, but the concept of "Risikflotte" (sp?) is appropriate here-- this was the pre-WW1 German concept of, since it was not possible to have a fleet capable of defeating their enemy, at least have one to present a clear and present danger or risk to the enemy. While not formally codified in naval strategy to my knowledge, this was still a factor instinctively sensed by alert naval officers on both sides.
The English term is "fleet in being."
 
The question I am trying to address is really a step above the Navy. Its the question of allocation of national resources -- should Davis have allowed Mallory to do his best or should he have limited him for the good of the country?

Unfortunately, that presupposes that Davis had more awareness of naval affairs than he displayed. From my reading, in large part he almost left Mallory to his own devices.

I think Mallory could have benefited from a strong naval strategy board or staff, but, again, that's anachronistic.
 
Unfortunately, that presupposes that Davis had more awareness of naval affairs than he displayed. From my reading, in large part he almost left Mallory to his own devices.

I think Mallory could have benefited from a strong naval strategy board or staff, but, again, that's anachronistic.
Yes, as a matter of naval questions, but here we have the next level up. Lee, Johnston, Beauregard, the QMG, the Commissary General, the Ordnance Bureau, and finally the Railroad Bureau ALL wanted the logistical movement that the railroads could provide. Once the railroad maintenance issue came to the fore, it became a national/army issue, with the navy fighting the rest of the organization for resources.

Davis was aware of this, as NC Gov. Vance wrote him about Mallory wanting NC RR iron for warships and Vance insisting any RR iron he gave up must be used on ironclads in NC (great strategic thinking!!). When Lee's troops and animals were starving (as they were from late 1862 on), the answer was not to take RR iron and build another ironclad in Richmond, but Davis let it happen.
 
We are all familiar with the idea of a man who is a good division commander, but is over his head at corps. Or a corps commander who is over his head as an army commander (Hood and Longstreet). I think we have the same problem here -- Davis was evidently a great Secretary of War, but did not have what it took to step up to President -- he could not raise his eyes enough to see the whole national picture and make decisions based on that level of vision.
 
Unfortunately, that presupposes that Davis had more awareness of naval affairs than he displayed. From my reading, in large part he almost left Mallory to his own devices.

I think Mallory could have benefited from a strong naval strategy board or staff, but, again, that's anachronistic.
In fairness to Davis how much skilled manpower does the Confederacy have to devote to manning and maintaining these complex ships?
As @archieclement noted the Confederacy lacked the needed machinery and skilled manpower to produce an adequate number of reliable power plants to power the ironclads.
Stephen Freeling in his book "the South vs the South" noted the Union had a tremendous advantage in that by safeguarding St.Louis the Union had the ireplacable advantage of the factories and skilled manpower that exsisted nowhere in the Confederate States.
Leftyhunter
 
To me it seems like questioning why would the south go to war if they knew they would lose........I tend to think because they thought they might win.

Part of waging war requires a degree of optimism or you wouldn't wage it.....................They didn't think Memphis, New Orleans, or Norfolk would fall, and once they did ,they probably never gave up hope that at some point they could retake them.............

And as Mark pointed out, if one is under the assumption they are going to win.....your planning your strategy not just on months , but also planning for the years ahead as with the naval academy
 
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Very much so... the fear of a new and unfamiliar weapons system is in many cases more effective than the weapon itself. The Union benefited from this early on on the Mississippi, where the mere approach of gunboats was often enough to cause the Confederates to have one foot out the door already, whereas it later became apparent that a stout defense could still frustrate them.

It's anachronistic, but the concept of "Risikflotte" (sp?) is appropriate here-- this was the pre-WW1 German concept of, since it was not possible to have a fleet capable of defeating their enemy, at least have one to present a clear and present danger or risk to the enemy. While not formally codified in naval strategy to my knowledge, this was still a factor instinctively sensed by alert naval officers on both sides.
risikoflotte (literally risk fleet)
 
Yes, as a matter of naval questions, but here we have the next level up. Lee, Johnston, Beauregard, the QMG, the Commissary General, the Ordnance Bureau, and finally the Railroad Bureau ALL wanted the logistical movement that the railroads could provide. Once the railroad maintenance issue came to the fore, it became a national/army issue, with the navy fighting the rest of the organization for resources.

Davis was aware of this, as NC Gov. Vance wrote him about Mallory wanting NC RR iron for warships and Vance insisting any RR iron he gave up must be used on ironclads in NC (great strategic thinking!!). When Lee's troops and animals were starving (as they were from late 1862 on), the answer was not to take RR iron and build another ironclad in Richmond, but Davis let it happen.
I think a lot of the Confederate war strategy was intended to produce some moral sustaining victories, while trying to deny the significance of crippling strategic loses.
Both the ironclads and the raiders produced the basis for good copy. Meanwhile the United States navy captured ports and deterred the bulk of the sailing ships from trying to run the blockade.
 
To me it seems like questioning why would the south go to war if they knew they would lose........I tend to think because they thought they might win.

Part of waging war requires a degree of optimism or you wouldn't wage it.....................They didn't think Memphis, New Orleans, or Norfolk would fall, and once they did ,they probably never gave up hope that at some point they could retake them.............

And as Mark pointed out, if one is under the assumption they are going to win.....your planning your strategy not just on months , but also planning for the years ahead as with the naval academy
They should have gone to war knowing they were at severe disadvantages and could only win by conserving their limited resources -- railroad rails and good ports being two of those resources. They achieved nothing by building many of their ironclads and would have lost nothing by not building them and using those resources in other ways.
 
They should have gone to war knowing they were at severe disadvantages and could only win by conserving their limited resources -- railroad rails and good ports being two of those resources. They achieved nothing by building many of their ironclads and would have lost nothing by not building them and using those resources in other ways.
That doesn't change your basing conclusions on they wasted resources by doing this or that......when they obviously weren't planning on losing this and that to lose the resources.......your using hindsight, they couldn't........

If you want to say at this point they knew the effort was lost so they shouldn't have continued pursued building this......I'd agree, they also wouldn't have continued pursuing the war........That they did continue would seem to indicate to their minds that the effort was lost, wasn't as obvious as it to us today..........
 
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I like Dave's argument. The idea of the ironclads was a good one. But since the Confederacy did not have the machine shops to maintain the steam engines, and because design limitations seriously impaired the sea worthiness of the ironclads they far less useful in practice than the Confederates had hoped for. They were very difficult to maintain and very difficult to move from place to place and as noted tended to become the property of local interests.
I'll differ from his conclusion by arguing that the Confederacy could not have maintained their railroad locomotives and rolling stock even if they could have maintained their rails a little longer.
The Confederates would have needed ironclads that could completely disperse the blockade at one or more ports so that locomotives and rails could be obtained from abroad and successfully delivered. They would have needed better ironclads and many of them in one place to achieve that goal.
 
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Mallory was the best the South could have hoped for. But, like any service head, Mallory saw everything through the eyes of his service. It was up to Davis (and Congress to an extent) to see the big picture and correctly prioritize. When national leaders refuse to do this, or come to the wrong priorities, they loose.

WW2 Japan had the same problem -- #1 need was to secure the incoming supplies, but they chose to make the conquest of China and the attack on the US battle fleet higher priorities.

WW2 Germany made the punishment of Hitler's enemies #1 priority. This led to the attack on the USSR before other festering sores were dealt with completely. It also led to Germany declaring war on the US for no reason.

Britain was the master of keeping the eye on the ultimate goal and shifting temporary targets in order to achieve victory. From the Dutch wars to the Cold War, they got it right every time -- except when trying to figure out the American problem.

Regarding Mallory's three mistakes:
Failure to create a Mississippi navy -- agree
Trying to create a blue-water navy -- agree
Not creating a coast defense navy -- I think that is what he was trying to do with the ironclads. But as I said above, his job was to help achieve the strategic goals of the country -- in the CS/CSN situation, the number 1 goal was to keep the internal and external supply lines open, not create a coast defense navy. The coast defense ironclads not related to the Mississippi River or the blockade running were wasted projects.

Regarding the James River squadron to prevent a river attack on Richmond -- do you have any documents that show that the US was deterred from making such an attack by the presence of these ships? I don't know of any.
Neither do I, but a coast defence force strong enough to keep the enemy from making landings was then and is still now essential even if you don't have a requirement for a blue water fleet.
 
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