Brass Napoleon Award Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost?

The US had more of these obsolete ships. They were never deployed as combat ships. The Confederates took advantage of circumstances that never were repeated, and the fact that the Monitor was one day late.
But the fact of the matter is that those ships were deployed to places where combat could have resulted, in so far as anywhere could have. The Union's alternative to deploying sailing ships of force to battle was often simply not to court battle at all; witness the lack of significant port attack at Charleston etc. in 1862.



As for the Monitor being late, I feel I should point out that Virginia subsequently courted battle; the Monitor declined to engage (being the one who could refuse engagement owing to her shallower draft). If the Monitor was liable to win a one-on-one duel then obviously it would be to the benefit of the Monitor to fight Virginia and eliminate her.
 
The Sabine and Santee were US sailing frigates which were finished (without engines) in the 1855-1861 period. Obsolete or not, these are ships the Union was actively building.

More to the point, the following sail frigates or ex-frigates were commissioned or recalled specifically for active Civil War service:
Brandywine
Congress (active service in Brazil area but recalled for war service)
Sabine (joined Atlantic Blockading Squadron)
Santee (commissioned 1861)
Savannah (sail sloop, converted to instruction ship 1862 so could not count)
St Lawrence (hurriedly re-commissioned at the start of the war)

The Union clearly saw value in keeping these ships in operation; indeed, it saw value in using men on these ships rather than on what steam ships could have been available.
 
The Sabine and Santee were US sailing frigates which were finished (without engines) in the 1855-1861 period. Obsolete or not, these are ships the Union was actively building.

More to the point, the following sail frigates or ex-frigates were commissioned or recalled specifically for active Civil War service:
Brandywine
Congress (active service in Brazil area but recalled for war service)
Sabine (joined Atlantic Blockading Squadron)
Santee (commissioned 1861)
Savannah (sail sloop, converted to instruction ship 1862 so could not count)
St Lawrence (hurriedly re-commissioned at the start of the war)

The Union clearly saw value in keeping these ships in operation; indeed, it saw value in using men on these ships rather than on what steam ships could have been available.
I doubt it. The sailing ships were generally used as training ships, even at Hampton Roads. The combat ships were assigned to combat missions. The faster steamships were already blockading in depth between the Confederate coast and the ports of departure of the blockade runners.
 
I doubt it. The sailing ships were generally used as training ships, even at Hampton Roads. The combat ships were assigned to combat missions. The faster steamships were already blockading in depth between the Confederate coast and the ports of departure of the blockade runners.
But the sailing ships were assigned to blockade work and shipped dozens of cannon, even in a period of significant Union dearth of cannon. Why would they send the Sabine down to join the Atlantic Blockading Squadron just to act as a training ship?

Sabine was converted to a training ship in 1864; manifestly she was not one before then. Santee became a schoolship in October 1862 and sailed to the Naval School to act as a schoolship there, not on a blockade station; St Lawrence was an active blockade unit until May 1863, and was refitted into an ordnance ship through August.
And, of course, Congress and Cumberland were both operating as blockaders when lost.
 
North Carolina started building six ironclads which only four where completed. Of those four only two saw combat operations. The cost in time and material for these six ironclads far out weighed the return to the confederacy.
CSS Albemarle - the most successful - cost unknown
CSS Neuse - never seen action - cost unknown
CSS North Carolina - built so bad it was unfit for service but did do river patrol before it sunk - It cost $76,000
CSS Raleigh - poorly built but did see action off Fort Fisher. After two days of operations, the ironclad grounded on a treacherous shoaling and despite intense efforts to refloat her, her hull broke in two parts - It cost around $76,000
CSS Wilmington - burned on the stocks to avoid capture - cost unknown
CSS ? aka Tarboro ironclad or Pamlico - damaged during union raid and never completed - cost unknown
 
The cost in time and material for these six ironclads far out weighed the return to the confederacy.
Did they? What else could the materials or the money have been used for?

I'm not saying you're wrong, I'm asking for you to explain how you go from the cost statement to the conclusion they cost more than they should. Certainly they could have been managed more efficiently though.
 
Which brings up another interesting point, which is that the Monitor turrets were bent cold if I recall correctly. That would be distinctly deleterious to their resistive capabilities.
Indeed they were, the technique of bending iron sheets and bars cold had been developed on both sides of the Atlantic by 1860, but it wasn't until much later that what became Hadfield's of Sheffield England, Creusot in France and Krupp in Germany more or less simultaneously found how to bend really thick sheets, but that again needed judicious application of heat.
 
North Carolina started building six ironclads which only four where completed. Of those four only two saw combat operations. The cost in time and material for these six ironclads far out weighed the return to the confederacy.
CSS Albemarle - the most successful - cost unknown
CSS Neuse - never seen action - cost unknown
CSS North Carolina - built so bad it was unfit for service but did do river patrol before it sunk - It cost $76,000
CSS Raleigh - poorly built but did see action off Fort Fisher. After two days of operations, the ironclad grounded on a treacherous shoaling and despite intense efforts to refloat her, her hull broke in two parts - It cost around $76,000
CSS Wilmington - burned on the stocks to avoid capture - cost unknown
CSS ? aka Tarboro ironclad or Pamlico - damaged during union raid and never completed - cost unknown
Actually CSS Raleigh was well constructed and perfectly happy cruising at sea (at least in coastal waters). She suffered the not unique fate of wooden and even some iron and steel hulled vessels of getting stranded on a shifting tidal bar. It's possibly the worst thing for any wooden hulled vessel to do, as if the water level drops the keel is put under enormous pressure. The example that comes to mind immediately is the 100 gun HMS Conqueror, only 6 years old which stranded on Rum Key in December 1861.
 
Actually CSS Raleigh was well constructed and perfectly happy cruising at sea (at least in coastal waters). She suffered the not unique fate of wooden and even some iron and steel hulled vessels of getting stranded on a shifting tidal bar. It's possibly the worst thing for any wooden hulled vessel to do, as if the water level drops the keel is put under enormous pressure. The example that comes to mind immediately is the 100 gun HMS Conqueror, only 6 years old which stranded on Rum Key in December 1861.
Agree, but this is the information I found. Initially, it was believed the weight of the armor plate had been responsible for crushing her timbers; but a later court of inquiry found that the 'Raleigh' was most likely a victim of poor construction and sub-standard materials
 
Sirs, perhaps the will be of value...

Naval War College Review
Volume 54
Number 1 Winter
Article 8
2001

The Confederate Naval Buildup
David G. Surdam

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Naval War College Review by an authorized editor of U.S. Naval War College Digital Commons. For more information, please contact [email protected].

Could the Confederate government have fielded an even stronger navy, a navy strong enough to at least break the blockade? Did the Confederate navy make the best use of its time and resources? What were the important issues facing Mallory and the Confederacy in creating their navy? Did Mallory and the Confederate government make decisions that retarded the buildup of the Confederate navy?


Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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The Cumberland and the Congress were sailing frigates. They would have useless on the Mississippi, and the most likely drew too much water to make it into Pamlico sound. The Minnesota was a powerful vessel. Its draft was also too deep to be of assistance in either North Carolina or Louisiana. The Minnesota grounded in Hampton Roads, but the Virginia was unable to close in and finish her off on the first day of fighting because the Virginia had to be careful about grounding also.
That's what the Virginia got, two sailing ships and some temporary damage to a steam frigate. Two months later the Confederates scuttled the Virginia.
Actually CSS Raleigh was well constructed and perfectly happy cruising at sea (at least in coastal waters). She suffered the not unique fate of wooden and even some iron and steel hulled vessels of getting stranded on a shifting tidal bar. It's possibly the worst thing for any wooden hulled vessel to do, as if the water level drops the keel is put under enormous pressure. The example that comes to mind immediately is the 100 gun HMS Conqueror, only 6 years old which stranded on Rum Key in December 1861.
Which implies a vessel shouldn't make the attempt without nearby support able to rescue it if it gets stuck. Its almost like experience in coastal waterways is important.
 
The Cumberland and the Congress were sailing frigates. They would have useless on the Mississippi, and the most likely drew too much water to make it into Pamlico sound. The Minnesota was a powerful vessel. Its draft was also too deep to be of assistance in either North Carolina or Louisiana. The Minnesota grounded in Hampton Roads, but the Virginia was unable to close in and finish her off on the first day of fighting because the Virginia had to be careful about grounding also.
That's what the Virginia got, two sailing ships and some temporary damage to a steam frigate. Two months later the Confederates scuttled the Virginia.
So why were the Cumberland and Congress in use at all, if they were so ineffectual? Why not put them out of use, and disperse the trained manpower and guns to other places they were needed?

The answer is that they were not - not by the standards of what the USN actually had. They were heavily armed ships of force, not in the same rank as steam frigates but the USN only had a few steam frigates.
 
So why were the Cumberland and Congress in use at all, if they were so ineffectual? Why not put them out of use, and disperse the trained manpower and guns to other places they were needed?

The answer is that they were not - not by the standards of what the USN actually had. They were heavily armed ships of force, not in the same rank as steam frigates but the USN only had a few steam frigates.
They were training ships. They were ships in which recruits learned the navy system and the officers found out which sailors could handle themselves in the rigging. Most steamships still had masts and sails. And they were others that were never outfitted. And they weren't on blockade duty because they were generally too slow to catch a steamer.
 
They were training ships. They were ships in which recruits learned the navy system and the officers found out which sailors could handle themselves in the rigging. Most steamships still had masts and sails. And they were others that were never outfitted. And they weren't on blockade duty because they were generally too slow to catch a steamer.
Training ships?

To be clear, are you saying that the Congress and the Cumberland were training ships, and that they were deployed to the place the Confederacy was known to be building an ironclad warship to train?
That the Congress was serving as a training ship when she was flagship of the Brazil squadron from 1859 to 1861? That she was ordered to be part of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron not to be part of "blockade duty" but because she was a training ship?
That the Cumberland was the flagship of the Home Squadron because she was a training ship? That she was involved in the bombardment line from the Battle of Hatteras Inlet Batteries (and captured several small ships before Hampton Roads) not as part of acting as a ship of force but because she was a training ship?

Citation needed please, to the effect of the Congress or Cumberland being explicitly referred to as a training ship in her posting.
 
So why were the Cumberland and Congress in use at all, if they were so ineffectual? Why not put them out of use, and disperse the trained manpower and guns to other places they were needed?

The answer is that they were not - not by the standards of what the USN actually had. They were heavily armed ships of force, not in the same rank as steam frigates but the USN only had a few steam frigates.
I think @DaveBrt has pointed a Confederate ironclad never again sank a USN steamship or gunboat. The Cairo might be the exception.
 
The Minnesota was the flagship of the Atlantic Blockading Squadron. I don't believe either the Congress or the Cumberland ever were the flagships. The sailing vessels were obsolete. The could not escort steamships. The did not have steam to operate in harbors. They weren't reliable on blockade duty. Several more such vessels were in places like Annapolis and Boston, to house recruits and get them used to their duties.
The Minnesota drew too much water to cross the bars at either the mouth of the Mississippi or in North Carolina. The similar Colorado never made it into the Mississippi and some of it armaments were transferred to other vessels.
What the Cumberland and Congress were designated for is immaterial. They weren't on blockade duty. Goldsoborough did not take them to No. Carolina. They weren't with Farragut and Lee in the Gulf and they could not even be used to escort steamships on either side of Isthmus of Panama. And Hampton Roads was hardly a blockade runners' port.
 
I think @DaveBrt has pointed a Confederate ironclad never again sank a USN steamship or gunboat. The Cairo might be the exception.

Sir, Cairo was sunk by a mine - http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/gunboats/cairo.txt

...perhaps you are referring to Carondelet who went aground during the fight with CSS Arkansas - http://www.hazegray.org/danfs/gunboats/crndlet.htm.

...whether that counts as being 'sunk' or not will depend upon semantics. Was the USS Nevada sunk on 07 Dec 1941?

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
The Minnesota was the flagship of the Atlantic Blockading Squadron. I don't believe either the Congress or the Cumberland ever were the flagships. The sailing vessels were obsolete. The could not escort steamships. The did not have steam to operate in harbors. They weren't reliable on blockade duty. Several more such vessels were in places like Annapolis and Boston, to house recruits and get them used to their duties.
But that is not how the Union actually used them. Note that I specified the squadrons and periods in which the ships in question were squadron flagships; they were being used as squadron flagships by the US right up to the war.

What you said was, specifically, that the Congress and Cumberland were training ships. Not other sailing vessels, but those two ships specifically, and at Hampton Roads specifically, because I asked what they were doing there.

What the Cumberland and Congress were designated for is immaterial. They weren't on blockade duty.
They absolutely were. Blockade duty means being on the blockade in a role that is not storeship, and a substantial fraction of the US Navy at this point - including many of the gunboats taken into service for the war - was composed of sailing vessels, not just acting as storeships but acting as combat ships and taking prizes (which I would assume to usually be sailing prizes, because sailing vessels attempted the blockade as well.)


Goldsoborough did not take them to No. Carolina.
This is splitting hairs a bit, because the Cumberland was at the Battle of Hatteras Inlet Batteries, which is in North Carolina; the commander of the naval squadron was Stringham, not Goldsborough, but it makes your case quite weak.
 
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And Hampton Roads was hardly a blockade runners' port.
The James River potentially was, though, but more specifically the role of the ships of force in a blockade is largely to prevent the sally of enemy heavy units. Such as, just for example, the ironclad being built in Gosport Navy Yard.

Blockading doctrine in the 19th century relies on the following:

- Vessels which do the capturing. These are whatever happens to be the faster, more mobile and (usually) cheaper ships available to you. These are frigates (or lighter) in the sail days or steamers in the steam days, and do not have to be heavy combatants - their job is to stop blockade running vessels.
- Vessels which prevent an enemy sally by ships of force, or an intervention by enemy ships of force which are on the high seas such as by breaking out of another blockaded port. These are heavier ships, better defended and more heavily armed, and if the "capturer" vessels are threatened then they can fall back on the "heavy" ships (which means that the blockaded power cannot take out the blockade simply by snapping up light ships but must fight the heavies).

The position of the Congress and the Cumberland clearly places them in the latter category. They are there to bulk out the main combatants of the North Atlantic Blockading Squadron where it is blockading Norfolk.

(If you want an example of this in the Crimean War, you would have squadrons of steam gunboats anchored to ships of the line. The presence of the steam gunboats also allowed sailing vessels to have their bows towed around.)


But there are other sail vessels clearly and explicitly engaged in blockading duty.

The US Steamers Crusader, Flambeau, Norwich, Keystone State, Western World, Sumpter, and the armed sailing vessels Restless and Onward have also joined this squadron and are engaged in blockading duty.' Wabash, Port Royal, 2 February 1862 (series I vol. 12 p.533)
The USS Pursuit captures the sailing schooner Anna Belle on 7 March 1862 (series I vol. 17 p.184) and is "Blockading St Andrew's and Joseph's bay", 12 March 1862 (series I vol. 17 p.188)

These should suffice to indicate that sailing vessels were explicitly on "blockading duty", and that therefore the Union used sailing vessels on blockading duty.

In the Pacific, meanwhile, the Cyane is a sailing ship with 18 guns which is clearly engaged in acting as a cruiser, as is the St Mary's which has 22 guns.
 
Furthermore Hampton Roads and Gosport was the place the incompetents went to stay out the way.
The commanders had no business staying in the protected waters. Without a fresh wind they were completely vulnerable.
 
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