Brass Napoleon Award Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost?

The defensive weapons and the long war strategy adopted after September on 1862 were not worth. Though historians and advocates have maintained the Confederacy had some chance of independence, that is not accurate. As the war progressed, there wasn't much slavery left in the US, and the US was going to complete abolition in some manner even if the Confederacy survived. That meant that when recovery was the issue, investors in New England and Old England would be looking at one country in line with British policy, and another holding on to an archaic labor system which even the modern empires had abandoned.
Moreover the war was being fought almost entirely in the Confederacy. The physical damage was occurring in the rural Confederacy. The urban centers in what had been the south and border states, where slavery was already fading, Baltimore, Louisville, St. Louis and New Orleans, passed through the war largely undamaged. The mobilization in the Confederacy had drawn down the white labor force very severely. But especially in the Midwest, the farm economy was growing, while the war progressed. The disparity between the sections was growing during the long war. To the extent that there was raiding, it was in the Confederacy or Confederate raids into the border states. Very few Confederate raids crossed the Ohio or the Potomac.
The longer the Confederates fought the war the more they were delivering the future wealth of the US into the accounts of investment class former Whigs, who had become Republicans. And finally, the US industrial base was not damaged, and instead was growing.
Thus any political settlement reached because the Confederacy outlasted US war enthusiasm would have been temporary and unstable.
On blogs like this people want to write about violence reversing the long term trends of history. But any Confederate existence would have been temporary. The western economy was taking a final turn towards paid labor and colonialism, and away from serfdom and slavery.
Power was inevitably shifting towards industry, science and finance. Land ownership was no longer the primary source of power.
The odds that the Confederacy could have survived after the war were decreasing as the war continued past September 1862. Confederate ironclads were consistent with the belief that somehow violence and cotton would allow the archaic regime to survive.
But by resorting a modern, industrialized weapon, they were quietly accepting that coal mines, rolling mills, steam engine engineers and modern tax systems were the future.

The Confederates were playing catch up in industrialized warfare, and they were bound to fail. Only the where and when had to be decided.
 
Thus any political settlement reached because the Confederacy outlasted US war enthusiasm would have been temporary and unstable.
One could have tried to say the same about a lot of independence movements, but independence tends to lead to a subsequent and quick diversification of national identities.

On blogs like this people want to write about violence reversing the long term trends of history. But any Confederate existence would have been temporary. The western economy was taking a final turn towards paid labor and colonialism, and away from serfdom and slavery.
Power was inevitably shifting towards industry, science and finance. Land ownership was no longer the primary source of power.
I'm not sure how that necessarily follows - not least because slavery does work in industrial settings, if managed properly.

But by resorting a modern, industrialized weapon, they were quietly accepting that coal mines, rolling mills, steam engine engineers and modern tax systems were the future.
And this is a bit rich. The CSA was not incapable of industrializing and was not a polity built on opposition to industrialization; it was a polity built on a specific type of labour relationship, one which as was shown in WW2 can function in a much more modern economy. Some would argue the modern US police system also demonstrates that unfree labour can work in a modern economy... as indeed does most clothing manufacturing in the modern day.

Unfree labour isn't something which goes away because of the moral arc of the universe. It takes a lot of positive work to eradicate and to keep eradicated...
... and that's sort of getting away from the core question of the thread. What is the better use of the manpower and materials used in constructing the CS ironclads?
 
Were ironclad ships really that powerful? The original designs were slow, unseaworthy, lacked range, and the armor compromised the weight of the guns. Neither side committed to pay the cost of building water tight bulkheads below the water line. And in engagements after the Virginia steamed into Hampton Roads, wooden ships fared well against ironclads, though they were not to match up against them. But the Hampton Roads result may have been due to incompetence of the old deadwood naval commanders left at Hampton Roads, rather than the superiority of ironclads. The wooden ships continued to have more range, and more manueverability, and those turned out to be important factors in massing firepower.
 
Were ironclad ships really that powerful? The original designs were slow, unseaworthy, lacked range, and the armor compromised the weight of the guns. Neither side committed to pay the cost of building water tight bulkheads below the water line. And in engagements after the Virginia steamed into Hampton Roads, wooden ships fared well against ironclads, though they were not to match up against them. But the Hampton Roads result may have been due to incompetence of the old deadwood naval commanders left at Hampton Roads, rather than the superiority of ironclads. The wooden ships continued to have more range, and more manueverability, and those turned out to be important factors in massing firepower.
Ironclads had to ram a ship to sink it. Gunfire alone rarely sank a warship -- fires might be started, magazines exploded or boilers ruptured, but sinking by gunfire was rare. Ironclads had the problem of having a few, very slow firing, large guns. This produced a rate of fire on a single target too slow to create enough hits to sink the target -- ironclad target or wooden one.

Albemarle, the Charleston ironclads, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Manassas -- ALL failed to sink ships by gunfire. Oh yeah, the monitors did not sink any ironclads either.
 
Ironclads had to ram a ship to sink it. Gunfire alone rarely sank a warship -- fires might be started, magazines exploded or boilers ruptured, but sinking by gunfire was rare. Ironclads had the problem of having a few, very slow firing, large guns. This produced a rate of fire on a single target too slow to create enough hits to sink the target -- ironclad target or wooden one.

Albemarle, the Charleston ironclads, Tennessee, Arkansas, Louisiana, Manassas -- ALL failed to sink ships by gunfire. Oh yeah, the monitors did not sink any ironclads either.
That's what I thought. Until the French technology for breach loaded naval guns was proven, the swivel guns on the steam sloops seem to have been the most dangerous weapons. The steamships had sails to get where they need to be. And they had enough steam power to maneuver in combat.
 
I think the ironclad operations to support a long war strategy was not well thought out. General Lee's operation, to throw everything on one hand of cards, and risk complete victory or complete defeat, was more logical. If the war could not be won at a place like Gettysburg, with the level of sacrifice made by the Confederate soldiery, then it could not be won. But the government of the Confederacy did not see it that way, and there 21 months more of fighting.
 
I think if the fighting is going on at that kind of temperature there are other concerns to be going on with, like the crew being frozen to the bulkheads!

The transition temperature relating to iron armour is an issue that wasn't known at the time but which could explain some of the odd behaviour in tests.


That's dents in 10 5/16 inch thick laminate armour. If the same resistance could have been achieved by 4.5 inches of backed rolled iron, or indeed 3x 2" layer laminate, then that's better; 11 inch thick rolled armour would be something like ten times as resistive.

The fact the turret was taking damage at that range from those guns also restricts operations, of course.
Actually, British iron masters knew about the effect low and high temperatures had on iron very early on from railway experience. their blacksmiths learned to heat hammerheads before forging, as one example.
 
Actually, British iron masters knew about the effect low and high temperatures had on iron very early on from railway experience. their blacksmiths learned to heat hammerheads before forging, as one example.
Interesting - I wonder why it was forgotten, then! Unless it's a case of knowing a specific effect but not about the brittle-ductile transition.
 
Interesting - I wonder why it was forgotten, then! Unless it's a case of knowing a specific effect but not about the brittle-ductile transition.
The the railway workshops learned very early that tools such as hammers had to be heated in very low temperatures, and boiler smiths heated both tools and the iron sheets.
 
The the railway workshops learned very early that tools such as hammers had to be heated in very low temperatures, and boiler smiths heated both tools and the iron sheets.
Which brings up another interesting point, which is that the Monitor turrets were bent cold if I recall correctly. That would be distinctly deleterious to their resistive capabilities.
 
I've got mixed feelings on this.

On the one hand the Confederacy was always going to be out-built by the US. And their designs were inferior.

OTOH they did help keep the USN out of Charleston and helped Vicksburg hold out a bit longer. What was really needed were ocean-going (or at least ocean-capable) ships that could destroy or drive off the blockaders long enough to get needed supplies in.
 
Does anyone know what the contribution of private people were?
There were all those “petticoat gunboat”-societies in the South - maybe a relevant part of the investment was private?
Might it be that relevant public pressure existed to build ironclads?

And somehow (even being aware of the shortcomings of most of the vessels and of some bizarre constructions without any chance to ever result in a usable warship) I am of the same opinion as @bradford011: the ironclads contributed something to restrict Union naval and amphibious operations.
Another question would be if that justified the effort - hence my initial questions: maybe the confederate government was influenced by public demand?
 
OTOH they did help keep the USN out of Charleston and helped Vicksburg hold out a bit longer. What was really needed were ocean-going (or at least ocean-capable) ships that could destroy or drive off the blockaders long enough to get needed supplies in.
This I think is something the CSN wasn't really capable of constructing domestically. Ocean-going ironclads take a lot of time and effort and money to build, and indeed the USN struggled with them; most monitors weren't really ocean going (they could transit, but not in good shape to fight, and transiting was risky).

They made plenty of attempts at overseas purchase (which would have worked but they were blocked for political reasons) and it's possible they could have built something like the Aetna which was transit-capable but it's a little hard to determine where.
 
@DaveBrt 's argument is supported by the fact that although the original Virginia enjoyed great success on the first day at Hampton Roads, it was against two sailing frigates, and probably an under armed screw frigate, the Minnesota. Even the Minnesota was able to fight back, though stranded.
These were ships, and commanders that were left behind by Farragut, Lee and Porter when the flotilla planning the New Orleans operation was organized. Even Goldsborough was apparently absent. The sailing ships were not employed in the Gulf operation, and not deployed to North Carolina either.
It was a great high for the Confederacy, but it was never duplicated. I don't think any Confederate ironclad got in the middle of a group of sailing ships, that were so incompetently commanded ever again. Most of the rest were too late, too slow, too limited in range, and too unsupported to do much harm.
The US navy was never that unprepared again.
 
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@DaveBrt 's argument is supported by the fact that although the original Virginia enjoyed great success on the first day at Hampton Roads, it was against two sailing frigates, and probably an under armed screw frigate, the Minnesota. Even the Minnesota was able to fight back, though stranded.
These were ships, and commanders that were left behind by Farragut, Lee and Porter when the flotilla planning the New Orleans operation was organized. Even Goldsborough was apparently absent. The sailing ships were not employed in the Gulf operation, and not deployed to North Carolina either.
It was a great high for the Confederacy, but it was never duplicated. I don't think any Confederate ironclad got in the middle of a group of sailing ships, that were so incompetently commanded ever again. Most of the rest were too late, too slow, too limited in range, and too unsupported to do much harm.
The US navy was never that unprepared again.
And one could add, the Virginia v The Monitor made the headlines, but the Burnside/Goldsboroug operation in North Carolina was successful and permanently shortened the NC coast open to blockade runners. The US ships that weren't at Hampton Roads, 7 weeks later had the wharves of New Orleans under their guns. Which demonstrates the ad hoc nature of the Confederate ironclad program, laboring under enormous transportation problems.
 
@DaveBrt 's argument is supported by the fact that although the original Virginia enjoyed great success on the first day at Hampton Roads, it was against two sailing frigates, and probably an under armed screw frigate, the Minnesota. Even the Minnesota was able to fight back, though stranded.
These were ships, and commanders that were left behind by Farragut, Lee and Porter when the flotilla planning the New Orleans operation was organized. Even Goldsborough was apparently absent. The sailing ships were not employed in the Gulf operation, and not deployed to North Carolina either.
It was a great high for the Confederacy, but it was never duplicated. I don't think any Confederate ironclad got in the middle of a group of sailing ships, that were so incompetently commanded ever again. Most of the rest were too late, too slow, too limited in range, and too unsupported to do much harm.
The US navy was never that unprepared again.
This is kind of missing the point, though. Those sailing frigates and that screw frigate were among the strongest ships of force the US Navy had, and they had ample warning the Virginia was being built.

The fact the USN was relying on sailing frigates as ships of force on a major blockade station is sort of emblematic of the parlous situation of the USN for ships of force - they had plenty of converted civilian gunboats, and a smattering of war build sloops and gunboats, but most of the serious warships were pre-war sloops and frigates and a lot of those were sail.
 
This is kind of missing the point, though. Those sailing frigates and that screw frigate were among the strongest ships of force the US Navy had, and they had ample warning the Virginia was being built.

The fact the USN was relying on sailing frigates as ships of force on a major blockade station is sort of emblematic of the parlous situation of the USN for ships of force - they had plenty of converted civilian gunboats, and a smattering of war build sloops and gunboats, but most of the serious warships were pre-war sloops and frigates and a lot of those were sail.
Nope. The sailing ships were already obsolete. They were of no use on the Mississippi and unreliable in harbor attacks. They couldn't escort steamers to and from Panama. The Minnesota was so under equipped Goldsborough did not even take it to Roanoke Island. There is reason Farragut never hesitated to attack ironclads with his most powerful ships.
And the circumstances you suggest also existed on the Mississippi and Farragut attacked before the Louisiana was ready.
 
The ironclads were not impervious to naval artillery. I think the navy quickly realized they had hit them with the heaviest solid shot they deploy.
 
Nope. The sailing ships were already obsolete. They were of no use on the Mississippi and unreliable in harbor attacks. They couldn't escort steamers to and from Panama. The Minnesota was so under equipped Goldsborough did not even take it to Roanoke Island. There is reason Farragut never hesitated to attack ironclads with his most powerful ships.
And the circumstances you suggest also existed on the Mississippi and Farragut attacked before the Louisiana was ready.
Obsolete or not, they were what the USN had. Take out the sailing frigates and sloops and the USN is down to a much smaller number of ships of force.

That is after all why they were deployed on the blockade. It's why as of the start of 1862, the Hampton Roads blockade station includes two sail ships of force (Congress and Cumberland) plus the Jamestown (a sail sloop) and two steamers (Minnesota and Roanoke); why the Pacific station includes the Lancaster and Wyoming (screw sloops) and the Cyane and St Mary's (sail sloops), why the St Lawrence is sent from Port Royal blockading duty to Hampton Roads not because she's obsolete but because she's out of water, provisions and supplies.

Most of these sailing ships of force remain in service for the entire war, while obviously if the steamer Minnesota is 'under-equipped' with 44 guns of 8" and above then the USN has no effective ships of force whatsoever apart from the Niagara.


The ironclads were not impervious to naval artillery. I think the navy quickly realized they had hit them with the heaviest solid shot they deploy.
Actually they had to develop entirely new guns. No 11" ever achieved a full penetration of any CS ironclad; it took the 15" Dahlgren which had not been invented yet to pierce, and the inadequacy of the 11" is why the Passaics had the compromise design they had.
 
The US had more of these obsolete ships. They were never deployed as combat ships. The Confederates took advantage of circumstances that never were repeated, and the fact that the Monitor was one day late.
 
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