Brass Napoleon Award Were Confederate Ironclads Worth The Effort/Cost?

The problem was the lack of sufficient industrial capacity to make the effort worthwhile. Were there unemployed skilled men in UK who could have been recruited to standup a shipbuilding industry in the confederacy.
In short - no. English and Scottish shipbuilders had full order books for the RN, other navies, merchant vessels, and some had space to construct speculative builds for sale to the highest bidder.
 
It was illegal for yards in Great Britain to built warships for the CSA. There was a cat & mouse game between Minister Dana & CSA agents who were ordering ships under the table. The famous commerce raiders that were built in British yards were also largely manned by British crews. The history of the CSS Stonewall exemplifies the folly of depending on Europeans to build a navy for CSA. After the war, G.B. paid a huge sum for damages.

The reality is that an ironclad of the kind envisioned by this thread was not a seagoing vessel. The twin turreted US Monitor that went to GB & European ports postwar had masts & sails. So did the CSS Stonewall on her convoluted peregrination that ended in Havana. & ultimately Tokyo Bay. The fort on a raft ironclads built by CSA had neither the engines nor seakeeping design for blue water operations.
 
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It was illegal for yards in Great Britain to built warships for the CSA. There was a cat & mouse game between Minister Dana & CSA agents who were ordering ships under the table. The famous commerce raiders that were built in British yards were also largely manned by British crews. The history of the CSS Stonewall exemplifies the folly of depending on Europeans to build a navy for CSA. After the war, G.B. paid a huge sum for damages.
Though it should be noted that it was illegal under UK law, not international law; had the British wished they could simply have repealed the relevant Neutrality Act.
 
It was illegal for yards in Great Britain to built warships for the CSA. There was a cat & mouse game between Minister Dana & CSA agents who were ordering ships under the table. The famous commerce raiders that were built in British yards were also largely manned by British crews. The history of the CSS Stonewall exemplifies the folly of depending on Europeans to build a navy for CSA. After the war, G.B. paid a huge sum for damages.

The reality is that an ironclad of the kind envisioned by this thread was not a seagoing vessel. The twin turreted US Monitor that went to GB & European ports postwar had masts & sails. So did the CSS Stonewall on her convoluted peregrination that ended in Havana. & ultimately Tokyo Bay. The fort on a raft ironclads built by CSA had neither the engines nor seakeeping design for blue water operations.
No such thing as "fort on a raft ironclads ". The CSN vessels were casemate ironclads with proper hulls, and some were designed to be capable of coastal snd esturial operation. Not all had defective engines either. The only things on a raft were USN single and double turretted monitors, and even the later versions of those had proper hulls.
 
No such thing as "fort on a raft ironclads ". The CSN vessels were casemate ironclads with proper hulls, and some were designed to be capable of coastal snd esturial operation. Not all had defective engines either. The only things on a raft were USN single and double turretted monitors, and even the later versions of those had proper hulls.
A “ casement “ is a term derived from fortification terminology. It refers to a covered battery, which is what the CSA designs were. All iron clads of both sides were brown water & littoral craft, i.e. shallow draft. An exception was the CSS Virginia built on a blue water hull. It was burned because it could not operate in a riverine environment. Even today, the Mississippi River channels are 9’. So was the passage over the bar of the Cape Fear River. Only a flat bottomed shallow draft barge-like hull can haul a useful load in such waters.

A sea going hull with a keel drawing as much as 20’ could operate “in the River” as we call the Mississippi below Paducah KY. However, building a CW era brown water iron clad on such a hull would have been foolish.
 
A “ casement “ is a term derived from fortification terminology. It refers to a covered battery, which is what the CSA designs were. All iron clads of both sides were brown water & littoral craft, i.e. shallow draft. An exception was the CSS Virginia built on a blue water hull. It was burned because it could not operate in a riverine environment. Even today, the Mississippi River channels are 9’. So was the passage over the bar of the Cape Fear River. Only a flat bottomed shallow draft barge-like hull can haul a useful load in such waters.

A sea going hull with a keel drawing as much as 20’ could operate “in the River” as we call the Mississippi below Paducah KY. However, building a CW era brown water iron clad on such a hull would have been foolish.
A casement is not a casemate and does not refer to ships. It seems to me that all my threads on the ironclads and thirty years plus or research with the publication of my book has been a waste of time !
 
A casement is not a casemate and does not refer to ships. It seems to me that all my threads on the ironclads and thirty years plus or research with the publication of my book has been a waste of time !
If the dictionary is not good enough, then ok.

CASEMENT, A fortified or armored structure from which guns are fired. A fortified enclosure on a warship.

It also is defined as a type of window where the window frames are hinged like gunport lids.
 
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If the dictionary is not good enough, then ok.

CASEMENT, A fortified or armored structure from which guns are fired. A fortified enclosure on a warship.

It also is defined as a type of window where the window frames are hinged like gunport lids.
It's my understanding that "Casement" is the window and "Casemate" is the fortified structure. Which dictionary are you using? I've checked the Shorter Oxford English and there is no indication of Casement as a fortified structure.
 
At the Battle of Nashville in November-December 1864, the riverine element of the Western Theater was vital. An army corps was transported & escorted from St Louis to Nashville. On the first day of Thomas’ attack, the Neosho & one of Pook’s Turtles took on everything the Army of Tennessee could hit them with at Bell’s Bed. A squadron of tin clads led by the Moose followed them up. I have looked in vain for a first person account of a CSA artilleryman who was on the receiving end of the 128 pound grape shot fired by the Neosho’s 11” cannon.

The the veteran Mississippi Squadron gunboats were of three distinct designs. The City Class gunboats were of the casement on a raft design typical of early war iron clad design. The Moose & over 100 sisters fought a 24-7 war from the head of navigation on the Cumberland & Tennessee to the Mississippi. 40 tinclads escorted a corps from Bridgeport to New Orleans in the he building up to Mobile Bey. Finally, the turreted Neosho was arguably the ideal design for a Civil War brown water gunboat. She was, with the exception of a torpedo, invulnerable to anything the CSA threw at her.

Apart from the City Class veteran, none of the squadron at Nashville was of the same Greek trimaran ram/ casement ironclad design built by the CSA all war long. A few of those obsolete design vessels here or there would have been nothing but a rounding error vs the Mississippi Squadron’s mix of vessels.
 
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If the Confederates built ironclads, they were playing to a strength of the US. The US had far more iron foundry and milling capacity. It had a world class steam engine industry centered on New York, Brooklyn, Newark and other nearby places like Patterson, NJ. The scale of the industry allowed the New York competitors to hire the best designers, industrial engineers and mechanics. Even the US navy had to compete with private industry for the skills necessary to compete.
No matter how inventive they were, and they were determined to do their best, they were going to get out built and out powered. Which is exactly what happened on the Mississippi River, and at Mobile Bay and finally at Fort Fisher.
The time and money could have been better spent on forts, mines, artillery and railroad maintenance.
 
If the Confederates built ironclads, they were playing to a strength of the US. The US had far more iron foundry and milling capacity. It had a world class steam engine industry centered on New York, Brooklyn, Newark and other nearby places like Patterson, NJ. The scale of the industry allowed the New York competitors to hire the best designers, industrial engineers and mechanics. Even the US navy had to compete with private industry for the skills necessary to compete.
Though the Union did pretty much max out its building capability, and arguably spent a lot more resources than it could have done. The Casco class for example was pretty much a massive waste, and the Passaic class was awfully expensive for a few poorly aimed shots every quarter hour...
 
If the Confederates built ironclads, they were playing to a strength of the US. The US had far more iron foundry and milling capacity. It had a world class steam engine industry centered on New York, Brooklyn, Newark and other nearby places like Patterson, NJ. The scale of the industry allowed the New York competitors to hire the best designers, industrial engineers and mechanics. Even the US navy had to compete with private industry for the skills necessary to compete.
No matter how inventive they were, and they were determined to do their best, they were going to get out built and out powered. Which is exactly what happened on the Mississippi River, and at Mobile Bay and finally at Fort Fisher.
The time and money could have been better spent on forts, mines, artillery and railroad maintenance.
I think you are right. Of course, to do what you have proposed would require a coherent CSA strategy with a national command authority to carry it out. That could never happen in the CSA. The very thing that was essential for a a successful defense was was what the CSA was created to prevent.
 
I think you are right. Of course, to do what you have proposed would require a coherent CSA strategy with a national command authority to carry it out. That could never happen in the CSA. The very thing that was essential for a a successful defense was was what the CSA was created to prevent.
There isn't actually anything about the CSA itself which means it was created to prevent national command authority. The CSA was fundamentally intended to be the USA "done right" by the standards of the people setting it up, which means without the Northern population that was "unfairly" skewing things in the direction of Northern interests (in the minds of the people setting it up).

Nothing actually prevents a coherent national Confederate strategy, as exemplified by the land war where a coherent CSA strategy was established in 1862. That strategy consisted of focusing firstly on the Eastern theatre and second on the West, and whether that was good strategy is a separate question from the evident fact that it was a strategy.
 
There isn't actually anything about the CSA itself which means it was created to prevent national command authority. The CSA was fundamentally intended to be the USA "done right" by the standards of the people setting it up, which means without the Northern population that was "unfairly" skewing things in the direction of Northern interests (in the minds of the people setting it up).

Nothing actually prevents a coherent national Confederate strategy, as exemplified by the land war where a coherent CSA strategy was established in 1862. That strategy consisted of focusing firstly on the Eastern theatre and second on the West, and whether that was good strategy is a separate question from the evident fact that it was a strategy.
Once national unity is fractured, unless there is some dramatic action to counter act it, the states are going to do their own thing. The Confederate government set a command economy with respect to individual farmers, but state governors distrusted the Richmond government. The Confederates found out what Washington, Jefferson and the other Virginians weren't will to continue with the confederation style government.
 
Though the Union did pretty much max out its building capability, and arguably spent a lot more resources than it could have done. The Casco class for example was pretty much a massive waste, and the Passaic class was awfully expensive for a few poorly aimed shots every quarter hour...
No. The US outbuilt, out chartered, out converted and out manned the Confederate vessels and forts.
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The most important riverine city in the Confederacy by July 1862 was Vicksburg. Both sides had to deploy steamboats on the Mississippi and ironclad steamboats had inherent advantages. The Confederate forts gave the US considerable problems, but the Confederate ironclads had either been scuttled all ready or were still under construction on the Yazoo River. If the Confederate ironclads didn't help defend that location, there is strong evidence supporting @DaveBrt 's hypothesis.
They made the states feel like they were doing something, but as military weapons they were almost useless.
 
Once national unity is fractured, unless there is some dramatic action to counter act it, the states are going to do their own thing. The Confederate government set a command economy with respect to individual farmers, but state governors distrusted the Richmond government. The Confederates found out what Washington, Jefferson and the other Virginians weren't will to continue with the confederation style government.
Many aspects of how the CSA did things weren't actually anything fundamentally distinct from the way the Union did things pre-war, and there's no reason to believe the Confederacy couldn't evolve in a centralizing fashion.

I think what needs to be examined is whether the CSA could have had a better centralized ironclad strategy by a different apportionment of resources, given what they knew at the time (i.e. without it being hindsight on the level of "well they should have focused more effort on the ironclads around New Orleans so they'd have time to complete them").



No. The US outbuilt, out chartered, out converted and out manned the Confederate vessels and forts.
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What I'm arguing is that the Union's ability to manufacture ironclads was pretty much maxed out, and that those iron-clad ships often represented a considerable waste of resources. You can't call the Casco class anything else with a straight face.
 
Many aspects of how the CSA did things weren't actually anything fundamentally distinct from the way the Union did things pre-war, and there's no reason to believe the Confederacy couldn't evolve in a centralizing fashion.

I think what needs to be examined is whether the CSA could have had a better centralized ironclad strategy by a different apportionment of resources, given what they knew at the time (i.e. without it being hindsight on the level of "well they should have focused more effort on the ironclads around New Orleans so they'd have time to complete them").




What I'm arguing is that the Union's ability to manufacture ironclads was pretty much maxed out, and that those iron-clad ships often represented a considerable waste of resources. You can't call the Casco class anything else with a straight face.
I disagree on both points. Nation building is hard. That's why it took centuries for Europe to emerge from feudalism.
 
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