Wellesley's British-Portuguese Army Vs Lee's Army of Northern Virginia

John Wolf Smith

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Inspired by Luke Freet's Thread about Army of Northern Virginia vs. La Grande Armee.
Same thing except its Wellesley's British-Portuguese Army at 91,000 men
Lee with Jackson from the Battle of Chancellorsville (plus Longstreet and his 2 divisions which were away at Suffolk)
So 91,000 vs. 73,000 men
Who would win?
(You can make an order of battle)
 
Inspired by Luke Freet's Thread about Army of Northern Virginia vs. La Grande Armee.
Same thing except its Wellesley's British-Portuguese Army at 91,000 men
Lee with Jackson from the Battle of Chancellorsville (plus Longstreet and his 2 divisions which were away at Suffolk)
So 91,000 vs. 73,000 men
Who would win?
(You can make an order of battle)

Well by ~1813-14 Wellington's army is very high quality and has an edge in numbers but as posted in the other thread by 1862 artillery has developed somewhat so if used well that would be an advantage for the south. Also Wellington's force is a lot weaker on cavalry than Napoleon's Grand Army. On the other hand it also has a good level of skirmishers and the elite Light Division which includes the Rifle Brigade.

I would suspect that, assuming both sides are willing to fight and no great advantage in knowing the ground - which is another important issues - the edge would be with whoever was defending. Wellington was an expert at the defensive battle, especially if he had any say in the choice of the battle field.
 
I think the only American Civil War units that could approach Wellington's Peninsulars would be those armed with repeating rifles such as Wilder's Brigade or the 7th Illinois. For sheer steadiness under fire and ferocity in the attack Wellington's army might be the best of the 19th Century.

"Die hard 57th, die hard!"
 
Wellington was an expert at the defensive battle, especially if he had any say in the choice of the battle field.
He could attack quite well as well, though - just look at Vitoria, and for that matter Salamanca.


...actually, here's an interesting thing to ponder, because I think that Wellington's army might actually be the one with better rifle fire. They've got a fairly large number of men with the Baker rifle and good rifle training, while Lee's force isn't yet at the point it has rifle training.
 
Napoleonic artillery were popguns compared to Civil War guns. It was standard doctrine to deploy the artillery in front of the infantry because of the short range of muzzleloading smoothbore muskets. The infantry stood in blocks, shoulder to shoulder, stoically enduring whatever the opposition dealt out to them. At a range far outside that of Napoleonic 3 pdr field guns, well within that of rifled muskets & rifled cannon, any army from circa 1814 would have been slaughtered by Civil War ordinance.

At Stones River, where 60% of Confederate infantry was armed with smoothbores, there was an example of what happened when men armed with smoothbore muskets took on rifled muskets & cannon. At the end of the first day, repeated Confederate attacks by men armed with Napoleonic weapons were defeated with great slaughter before they came into range of their smoothbores. So, we do not need to speculate.
 
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Napoleonic artillery were popguns compared to Civil War guns.
Really? Because in many cases they were pretty much the same guns. What's the major difference between a smoothbore Napoleon 12 pounder and a smoothbore 12 pounder owned by Napoleon?
Of course the 3" rifles extended engagement range somewhat, but it's not like Wellington was fundamentally unused to facing an enemy with a longer ranged artillery park.

The infantry stood in blocks, shoulder to shoulder, stoically enduring whatever the opposition dealt out to them.
This is both kind of a stereotypical view of a very light infantry dominated time period (the Napoleonic wars) and ignoring the extent to which Civil War units also moved with the close order touch of elbows.
Wellington in particular shielded his units behind hill crests and employed copious rifle-armed light infantry to shield his main line, so I'm not really seeing why he'd act in keeping with the cliche view you're espousing.

At Stones River, where 60% of Confederate infantry was armed with smoothbores, there was an example of what happened when men armed with smoothbore muskets took on rifled muskets & cannon.
What percentage of the Union forces at Stones River were armed with smoothbores? Just curious...
 
Actually, since we're talking about the AoNV as of Chancellorsville, what's an example of the AoNV's line troops engaging with rifle fire at outside smoothbore range in 1862 or 1863?
 
And I found a mention of the AoNV's summer 1863 artillery park:


Artillery - Army of Northern Virginia (Summer 1863)
107 12 pdr Napoleons
103 3" Ordnance
30 12 pdr Howitzer
4 12 pdr Whitworths


This is more long range guns than there were at Waterloo (in fact they're basically all long range guns by that standard) but that may not actually be an unmitigated good. It certainly means Wellington has to be circumspect because of the potential to get shelled, but on the other hand it simply emphasizes the point that attacks by the AoNV were pure infantry work and didn't involve infantry-cavalry-artillery cooperation - that was what the 6 pounder guns used by Napoleon himself were for, they would follow the infantry on attack, and 8 pounder guns were considered too heavy for this job. (The Napoleon 12 pounder weighs somewhat more than the 8 lber in the Systeme An XI)


My suspicion is that Wellington picks his ground (and he was a master at it) and Lee attacks him (Lee attacked often, including against good defensive ground) and so Lee's artillery isn't as helpful as it might otherwise have been...
 
Really? Because in many cases they were pretty much the same guns. What's the major difference between a smoothbore Napoleon 12 pounder and a smoothbore 12 pounder owned by Napoleon?
Of course the 3" rifles extended engagement range somewhat, but it's not like Wellington was fundamentally unused to facing an enemy with a longer ranged artillery park.


This is both kind of a stereotypical view of a very light infantry dominated time period (the Napoleonic wars) and ignoring the extent to which Civil War units also moved with the close order touch of elbows.
Wellington in particular shielded his units behind hill crests and employed copious rifle-armed light infantry to shield his main line, so I'm not really seeing why he'd act in keeping with the cliche view you're espousing.


What percentage of the Union forces at Stones River were armed with smoothbores? Just curious...
About 40% had smoothbores, the rest had the craziest menagerie if rifled muskets imaginable.
And I found a mention of the AoNV's summer 1863 artillery park:


Artillery - Army of Northern Virginia (Summer 1863)
107 12 pdr Napoleons
103 3" Ordnance
30 12 pdr Howitzer
4 12 pdr Whitworths


This is more long range guns than there were at Waterloo (in fact they're basically all long range guns by that standard) but that may not actually be an unmitigated good. It certainly means Wellington has to be circumspect because of the potential to get shelled, but on the other hand it simply emphasizes the point that attacks by the AoNV were pure infantry work and didn't involve infantry-cavalry-artillery cooperation - that was what the 6 pounder guns used by Napoleon himself were for, they would follow the infantry on attack, and 8 pounder guns were considered too heavy for this job. (The Napoleon 12 pounder weighs somewhat more than the 8 lber in the Systeme An XI)


My suspicion is that Wellington picks his ground (and he was a master at it) and Lee attacks him (Lee attacked often, including against good defensive ground) and so Lee's artillery isn't as helpful as it might otherwise have been...
In some early civil war engagements there were attempts to deploy artillery in the Napoleonic manner. Confronted with skirmishers armed with rifled muskets that were effective at 300 yds vs 50 yds, that stopped in a hurry. The effect of counter-battery fire of case & shell on Napoleonic gun crews & horses deployed in the open ahead of the infantry line would have been awful.

Breckenridge's attack on the third day of Stones River & Pickett's attack/repulse are two examples of artillery/infantry coordination. It was standard doctrine to advance artillery with the infantry.
 
Upon reflection, we don't have to imagine what would happen if Wellington's army confronted a Southern army. Andrew Jackson settled that question at the Battle of New Orleans. The fire of batteries of cannon did great execution that day. The same thing happened to Bragg's smoothbore armed infantry at Stones River. In any case, history has shown that Napoleonic era tactics & weaponry were obsolete by the time of the Civil War. A cavalry charge against formed CW infantry was a formula for suicide, for example.
 
Upon reflection, we don't have to imagine what would happen if Wellington's army confronted a Southern army. Andrew Jackson settled that question at the Battle of New Orleans. The fire of batteries of cannon did great execution that day. The same thing happened to Bragg's smoothbore armed infantry at Stones River. In any case, history has shown that Napoleonic era tactics & weaponry were obsolete by the time of the Civil War.

I've had a look at New Orleans and the problem was mainly that an experienced battalion of the 93rd advanced to the defences, but then stood in front of them engaging in a firefight rather than storming them. I remain firmly of the opinion that had the 2/93rd made an assault it would have been a bloody victory instead of a defeat.

Technology had advanced, but much of the increased potential was neutered by lack of training. It is unquestionable that the percussion cap increased infantry firepower, and at typical ACW firefight ranges this may have mattered more than the rifling. The percussion cap is far more reliable, and because there is no flash in the pan, you can maintain the sight picture effectively. The effect of rifling though was diminished in line combat (rather than skirmishing) due to the lack of well-trained fire control. That it could be done is demonstrated by Cleburne's Division, but it was not.

For the artillery, the 12 pdr Napoleon came about from French experiments with combining howitzers and cannon into a single weapon (hence the gun-howitzer name). The original experiments were based on bored out lighter pieces (8 pdrs I think) utilising a powder charge between that of a gun and a howitzer of that projectile weight (i.e. 2.5 lbs i a 12 pdr gun-howitzer vs 4 lbs in a 12 pdr cannon). Experiments showed the new weapon had 90% of the effect of a "full" 12 pdr, but could be handled as an 8 pdr.

The rifled guns are more interesting, but the exact combination of shot geometry and weight, rifling and velocity necessary for effective long range fire was not known. What worked was determined during the 1862 campaigns.

The idea that artillery could "charge" in Napoleons time is not borne out by close examination of Friedland. Senarmont was the artillery commander for Victor's 1er Corps. The action involves DuPont's division of 1er Corps advancing to support Ney's corps attack (on Victor's right), but then being stopped dead by a charge of the Russian cavalry. DuPont's division is forced into squares to protect themselves. The divisional battery under Capt Ricci is firing well, but it is suffering by Russian artillery. Victor directed Senarmont to reinforce Ricci with the whole corps artillery. Senarmont did this, and lined up 30 guns just as a Russian infantry division moved to overrun DuPont's paralysed division. These 30 guns broke up the Russian infantry attack very effectively, and the French 4th Dragoon Division drove off the Russian cavalry.

Rather than the claimed "artillery charge", Senarmont's actions at Friedland were reactive and defensive. In putting the whole Corps artillery in a stop line, he probably saved DuPont's division from complete destruction. It was not particularly innovative or that well regarded - hence the lack of comment at the time. It became exaggerated by the post-war writing of Senarmont himself.
 
About 40% had smoothbores, the rest had the craziest menagerie if rifled muskets imaginable.
So it's fundamentally two sides with roughly equivalent weapons. (One 60% smoothbores, the other 40%, a bit different but not hugely.) I'm not seeing how this proves anything except that attacking is hard.


In some early civil war engagements there were attempts to deploy artillery in the Napoleonic manner. Confronted with skirmishers armed with rifled muskets that were effective at 300 yds vs 50 yds, that stopped in a hurry.
Example? I know at Antietam that there were cases of Confederate guns unlimbering at sub-200 yards and delivering fire without loss, and 200 yards is within long light infantry range in the Napoleonic period.
Of course by "deploy artillery in the Napoleonic manner", you have either the grand battery (which shows up at Gettysburg), the stop line (which turns up all over the place) or infantry advancing with small artillery pieces right alongside the attacking columns to unlimber in canister range - when is that tried in the Civil War?


Breckenridge's attack on the third day of Stones River & Pickett's attack/repulse are two examples of artillery/infantry coordination. It was standard doctrine to advance artillery with the infantry.
Out of interest, which batteries advanced along with the infantry during Pickett's attack? Can you name them?


Upon reflection, we don't have to imagine what would happen if Wellington's army confronted a Southern army. Andrew Jackson settled that question at the Battle of New Orleans.
No, he didn't. That wasn't Wellington's army.


In any case, history has shown that Napoleonic era tactics & weaponry were obsolete by the time of the Civil War.

Really? When Emory Upton conducted a proper Napoelonic columnnar assault in 1864 at Spotsylvania it's a great revelation. Where are the uses of mixed order, battalion carré, the pressed attacks?
If you think rifles were what made those not work, where are they in 1862 when smoothbores were still more or less the standard?


A cavalry charge against formed CW infantry was a formula for suicide, for example.
You are aware that few proper cavalry charges actually took place in the Civil War, right? I know at least one case late-war where what was meant to be a proper cavalry charge got repulsed by the Texan Brigade (who were armed with smoothbores) and since that was a fundamentally Napoleonic-era defensive situation and it didn't work we should see from that that we can't conclude that a proper cavalry charge (that could defeat smoothbore defenders) was impossible.
 
Out of interest, which batteries advanced along with the infantry during Pickett's attack? Can you name them?

I can't remember which batteries they were, but the guns were supposed to follow Pickett in. Once Pickett broke in they were to go into battery on the ridgeline and secure the position. They were scattered during the counterbattery fire and moved to the rear. They could not be found when it was time.

Edit, checking Harman, one of the batteries was Richardson's Battery (2nd Coy, Louisiana Howitzers), and it was lost. The others Alexander had put into his gunline and exhausted their ammunition.
 
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@Rhea Cole A couple of thoughts. You made a reference above to cavalry charging against formed infantry as being suicide. What about the charge by Union Cavalry at the Third Battle of Winchester? My understanding is that it was quite successfull. Also, if memory serves, (and often it doesnt), didn't Minty's Union cavalry brigade successfully charge Confederate infantry in the West?

John
 
I can't remember which batteries they were, but the guns were supposed to follow Pickett in. Once Pickett broke in they were to go into battery on the ridgeline and secure the position. They were scattered during the counterbattery fire and moved to the rear. They could not be found when it was time.
Right, so they're not actually supposed to be going into battery to help blast the enemy out of the way, they're there for defensive work once the position is gained. So it's not really cooperation in the attack.
 
@Rhea Cole A couple of thoughts. You made a reference above to cavalry charging against formed infantry as being suicide. What about the charge by Union Cavalry at the Third Battle of Winchester? My understanding is that it was quite successfull.
It's also worth remembering Von Bredow's Ride. That was against professional troops and was a charge of 1,000 metres against a gun line with infantry in support, and it cost 380 casualties out of 800 effectives charging; the result disrupted an entire French corps for more than an hour, preventing it from delivering a planned counterattack which would otherwise have decided the battle. Cheap at the price!

Remember that the French infantry at the battle had chassepot rifles and could use them to deliver useful fire at more than half a mile.
 
@Rhea Cole A couple of thoughts. You made a reference above to cavalry charging against formed infantry as being suicide. What about the charge by Union Cavalry at the Third Battle of Winchester? My understanding is that it was quite successfull. Also, if memory serves, (and often it doesnt), didn't Minty's Union cavalry brigade successfully charge Confederate infantry in the West?

John
There are exceptions to every rule, of course. However, in the Civil War, formed infantry had nothing to fear from mounted cavalry. A cavalry charge involved walking the horses in line to about 300 yards. At that point, they went into a canter. They did not break out into a full run until the last 50 yards in order to keep the formation intact & hit the target all together. That worked when the speed of their advance over the last 100 yards where they came under fire only allowed time for one or at most two rounds. 18th Century field artillery was made up of 3 pdrs firing solid shot. After Col. Shrapnel invented his case shot, 6 pdrs became more common. In either case, the guns were of limited lethality against a fast moving target.

During the Civil War, a cavalry line would come under accurate lethal 12 pd & 10 pd Shrapnel fire at 800 yds. Infantry armed with rifled muskets could be effective against such a target as massive as a line of horsemen at 500 yds. Doctrine was for artillery to fire a solid shot or bolt & canister round at cavalry at around 500 yds. The lethality of defensive fire from a Civil War battle line was exponentially greater than that of the 18th Century. That is why Pickett's charge was not followed by massed cavalry to exploit the infantry's piercing of the enemy's line as it would have during the 18th Century.
 
So it's fundamentally two sides with roughly equivalent weapons. (One 60% smoothbores, the other 40%, a bit different but not hugely.) I'm not seeing how this proves anything except that attacking is hard.



Example? I know at Antietam that there were cases of Confederate guns unlimbering at sub-200 yards and delivering fire without loss, and 200 yards is within long light infantry range in the Napoleonic period.
Of course by "deploy artillery in the Napoleonic manner", you have either the grand battery (which shows up at Gettysburg), the stop line (which turns up all over the place) or infantry advancing with small artillery pieces right alongside the attacking columns to unlimber in canister range - when is that tried in the Civil War?


Out of interest, which batteries advanced along with the infantry during Pickett's attack? Can you name them?



No, he didn't. That wasn't Wellington's army.




Really? When Emory Upton conducted a proper Napoelonic columnnar assault in 1864 at Spotsylvania it's a great revelation. Where are the uses of mixed order, battalion carré, the pressed attacks?
If you think rifles were what made those not work, where are they in 1862 when smoothbores were still more or less the standard?



You are aware that few proper cavalry charges actually took place in the Civil War, right? I know at least one case late-war where what was meant to be a proper cavalry charge got repulsed by the Texan Brigade (who were armed with smoothbores) and since that was a fundamentally Napoleonic-era defensive situation and it didn't work we should see from that that we can't conclude that a proper cavalry charge (that could defeat smoothbore defenders) was impossible.
During WWI, the British maintained huge cavalry reserves in France ready to exploit the breakthrough that the next offensive was going to create. The dream of the great charge with horsemen welding the arm blanch died hard.

You can easily look up the batteries that deployed behind Pickett's line.

You might want to take another look at the British infantry force at New Orleans. Even Sharp's rifles were there.

Another disadvantage that an 18th Century British army would have had was the doctrine that assigned a single battery to each regiment of infantry. That resulted in artillery fire by individual batteries forward from their position. There was no coordination between batteries. During the Civil War, doctrine was to mass the fire of numerous batteries on a single target. The Army of the Cumberland displayed the murderous effectiveness of coordinated battery fire many times. Pickett's charge where the Confederate artillery concentrated on a single target and all Union batteries that could bear fired on Pickett's infantry. That concentration of artillery fire was not practiced by Wellington's army. Once again, CW artillery fire was many times more lethal than 18th Century practice.
 
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