Was Wright Wrong about Cemetery Ridge on 7-2-'63?

Speaking of the three guns that Weir brought back to Cemetery Ridge, Col. Heath of the 19th Maine wrote (Bachelder Papers, 3: 1652) that the battery on his right was deserted when Lang's Floridians were approaching his position. I think he is referring to Weir's three "saved" cannon. Lang would have reached these cannon before Wright, but remember that some members of Wright's 2nd Georgia Battalion had attached themselves to the left of Lang's left regiment (2nd Florida) in its initial advance, and thus would also be able to claim the guns for Wright (Wright was accused of overstating the number of Federal cannon taken by his brigade, but some historians have overlooked Weir's guns - a total of 6 - as being included in Wright's tally).

On a separate but related topic, you will recall that when Wright (in his report) looked around, he did not see the Florida brigade, and concluded that they had not advanced (or did not advance as far as he did), which led to a separate controversy that afterwards played out in the press. Actually, I think at the moment Wright made his observation, Lang's men were concealed by brush and trees (besides smoke) not much more than 100 yards from his right regiment and slightly to his rear, where they were still battling with the 19th Maine. I reached this conclusion from a report of the 13th Vermont (five companies), which upon arriving on the ridge while Wright was pulling back, reported Confederates off to the left, which I believe were Lang's men just falling back. So, in fact, Wright retreated (perhaps three minutes) before Lang did, not the other way around as Wright believed and reported. Lang fell back because of the unyielding stance of the 19th Maine, in combination with a Federal force (1st Minnesota) that had already passed his right and right rear.
 
Speaking of the three guns that Weir brought back to Cemetery Ridge, Col. Heath of the 19th Maine wrote (Bachelder Papers, 3: 1652) that the battery on his right was deserted when Lang's Floridians were approaching his position. I think he is referring to Weir's three "saved" cannon. Lang would have reached these cannon before Wright, but remember that some members of Wright's 2nd Georgia Battalion had attached themselves to the left of Lang's left regiment (2nd Florida) in its initial advance, and thus would also be able to claim the guns for Wright (Wright was accused of overstating the number of Federal cannon taken by his brigade, but some historians have overlooked Weir's guns - a total of 6 - as being included in Wright's tally).

On a separate but related topic, you will recall that when Wright (in his report) looked around, he did not see the Florida brigade, and concluded that they had not advanced (or did not advance as far as he did), which led to a separate controversy that afterwards played out in the press. Actually, I think at the moment Wright made his observation, Lang's men were concealed by brush and trees (besides smoke) not much more than 100 yards from his right regiment and slightly to his rear, where they were still battling with the 19th Maine. I reached this conclusion from a report of the 13th Vermont (five companies), which upon arriving on the ridge while Wright was pulling back, reported Confederates off to the left, which I believe were Lang's men just falling back. So, in fact, Wright retreated (perhaps three minutes) before Lang did, not the other way around as Wright believed and reported. Lang fell back because of the unyielding stance of the 19th Maine, in combination with a Federal force (1st Minnesota) that had already passed his right and right rear.

I have just this past year become aware of the fighting done by the 19th Maine. The way they conducted their stand, fighting withdrawal, stand, advance on the 2nd, not to mention their contribution on the 3rd, is another example of the fine fighting done by the fighting men in the Army of the Potomac during the battle.
 
Speaking of the three guns that Weir brought back to Cemetery Ridge, Col. Heath of the 19th Maine wrote (Bachelder Papers, 3: 1652) that the battery on his right was deserted when Lang's Floridians were approaching his position. I think he is referring to Weir's three "saved" cannon. Lang would have reached these cannon before Wright, but remember that some members of Wright's 2nd Georgia Battalion had attached themselves to the left of Lang's left regiment (2nd Florida) in its initial advance, and thus would also be able to claim the guns for Wright (Wright was accused of overstating the number of Federal cannon taken by his brigade, but some historians have overlooked Weir's guns - a total of 6 - as being included in Wright's tally).

On a separate but related topic, you will recall that when Wright (in his report) looked around, he did not see the Florida brigade, and concluded that they had not advanced (or did not advance as far as he did), which led to a separate controversy that afterwards played out in the press. Actually, I think at the moment Wright made his observation, Lang's men were concealed by brush and trees (besides smoke) not much more than 100 yards from his right regiment and slightly to his rear, where they were still battling with the 19th Maine. I reached this conclusion from a report of the 13th Vermont (five companies), which upon arriving on the ridge while Wright was pulling back, reported Confederates off to the left, which I believe were Lang's men just falling back. So, in fact, Wright retreated (perhaps three minutes) before Lang did, not the other way around as Wright believed and reported. Lang fell back because of the unyielding stance of the 19th Maine, in combination with a Federal force (1st Minnesota) that had already passed his right and right rear.

In regards to Lang, I tend to agree that Wright retreated first by a handful of minutes. And Wright claimed to have captured 22 guns (IIRC) so, even counting Weir's guns, he's still seriously overstating his captures.

I also agree that it may have been elements of the 2nd Georgia Battalion that overran Weir's position since the guns seem to have been positioned between the lines of Lang and Wright which was where part of the 2nd was operating.

Ryan
 
I have just this past year become aware of the fighting done by the 19th Maine. The way they conducted their stand, fighting withdrawal, stand, advance on the 2nd, not to mention their contribution on the 3rd, is another example of the fine fighting done by the fighting men in the Army of the Potomac during the battle.

One of the many regiments which have been overlooked at Gettysburg.

Ryan
 
Hancock was riding northward, back along his lines, around 7:15 p.m. on July 2. He recalled, "I found, much to my surprise, that a battery of artillery which I had planted there, on the elevated open ground, just before going down to the left, and a regiment of infantry which I had placed in the edge of the bushes close to their left, as a support, had left their positions. Save the guns of the battery, which were left on the field, cannoneers, horses and infantry were gone. I have always been under the impression that the battery was Weir's ... and that the regiment was the 19th Maine." [Bachelder Papers, 2: 1136]

Hancock's recollection appears to be accurate. Earlier in the afternoon, Hancock had personally conducted the left man of the 19th Maine, George Durgin of Company F, to a particular spot and directed the rest of the regiment to align on Durgin. Just moments before, as the 19th was moving to the left (south) into that position, a battery cut right through the regiment on its way to the front, and Hancock swore at the battery commander [probably Weir] for doing so. Hancock did not see the 19th Maine on his return because that regiment advanced to the Emmitsburg Road about 7:10 p.m., although he took note of Weir's battery (probably just the three guns), and it was still abandoned. Weir's other three guns (captured south of the Codori buildings and afterwards recaptured) were being hauled back by Federal infantry at that time and rejoined the three guns back on Cemetery Ridge about 7:45 p.m., when the entire battery left the field, so evidently Weir's men returned to their posts shortly after Hancock passed by, or about 7:30 p.m., give or take a few minutes.
 
Hancock was riding northward, back along his lines, around 7:15 p.m. on July 2. He recalled, "I found, much to my surprise, that a battery of artillery which I had planted there, on the elevated open ground, just before going down to the left, and a regiment of infantry which I had placed in the edge of the bushes close to their left, as a support, had left their positions. Save the guns of the battery, which were left on the field, cannoneers, horses and infantry were gone. I have always been under the impression that the battery was Weir's ... and that the regiment was the 19th Maine." [Bachelder Papers, 2: 1136]

Hancock's recollection appears to be accurate. Earlier in the afternoon, Hancock had personally conducted the left man of the 19th Maine, George Durgin of Company F, to a particular spot and directed the rest of the regiment to align on Durgin. Just moments before, as the 19th was moving to the left (south) into that position, a battery cut right through the regiment on its way to the front, and Hancock swore at the battery commander [probably Weir] for doing so. Hancock did not see the 19th Maine on his return because that regiment advanced to the Emmitsburg Road about 7:10 p.m., although he took note of Weir's battery (probably just the three guns), and it was still abandoned. Weir's other three guns (captured south of the Codori buildings and afterwards recaptured) were being hauled back by Federal infantry at that time and rejoined the three guns back on Cemetery Ridge about 7:45 p.m., when the entire battery left the field, so evidently Weir's men returned to their posts shortly after Hancock passed by, or about 7:30 p.m., give or take a few minutes.

David Shultz, in "Gulian V. Weir's 5th U.S. Artillery, Battery C" (Issue 18, Gettysburg Magazine) argues that the battery that broke up the 19th Maine was the remnants of Lt. Francis Seeley's Battery K, 4th U.S. Artillery. In any case, it's an excellent article.

Ryan
 
Ryan, I also like the article generally, but do not agree at all with some of the author's analysis of the actions of Weir's battery and the 19th Maine on July 2.
 
Based on Hancock's description of where he placed the 19th Maine and Weir's battery, it would seem the battery was along the general line on Cemetery Ridge (see Bachelder Map, 2nd Day) and not down in the low ground just east of the Emmitsburg Road and near the Codori farm buildings as depicted in most recent histories and map studies. That position is where the Confederates had succeeded in dragging the guns to before the 13th Vermont's five advance companies persuaded them to give up on the idea.

And, Weir didn't lose three guns, he lost five.

Weir believed that with proper infantry support on his left he would be able to hold off the Confederates advancing toward his guns. Unfortunately, the 19th Maine’s attention had been distracted by their on-going fight with Lang’s Florida brigade. The time spent by Weir in limbering up to withdraw and then coming back into battery gave Wright’s 22nd Georgia the critical edge. According to Weir, “...The enemy were too close. I endeavored to get my guns off the field; succeeded in getting off but three, as some of the drivers and horses were disabled while in the act of limbering up.”

On further reflection, however, Weir would revise downward the number of his guns that escaped capture from three to one.

Informed that, after the day’s battle, one of his officers, Lieutenant Jacob Roemer, recovered seven guns from the field, Weir deduced that five of those seven were his guns, and the other two from another battery [probably Turnbull’s]. In his letter to Hancock, Weir stated, “...it now comes to me that I can solve the mystery of the guns. When I was running up the hill in retreat, I looked behind me, and saw three (3) guns remaining on the field-the others were going off, the middle (entire) section (platoon) where I had my position, of the battery had suffered most-It is not [now?] likely that both of these guns and one belonging to the right section, were those I saw. Everything else was going back. The left section must have been intact, so I made my report accordingly. Now the guns Mr. Roermer had, were the left section, which he tells me, he took charge of after Lieut. Baldwin’s horse was killed. This would make 5 guns that Mr. Roermer took from the field, belonging to battery “C” and 2 from some other battery. (he says he had seven (7)). My impression all along has been that I had three guns with me that night, but it must have been one (1) gun, some caissons, battery wagon and forage. I left that field in sorrow, for I thought that half of the battery was on its way south.

The 13th Vermont recaptured four of Weir’s guns at about 8:00 p.m. and the 105th Pennsylvania recovered the fifth a few minutes later. On July 3rd, these five joined with the gun Weir was able to bring off and Battery C, 5th U.S., was made whole.

Lieutenant Weir’s November 25th 1885 letter to General Hancock referenced the fact that on the morning of July 3rd he found, “...all the missing parts of the battery (6 gun battery) on the other side of a road, I had camped on the left side as I came from the field.” In a follow-up letter Weir wrote, “...There is only one item I wish to add to what I have written, which is this, that on my retreat on the 2d of July, I have never been able to recall that I met any troops in the direction from which I came. I went straight back from the centre of my battery.” That undefended gap would be exploited by the 22nd Georgia.

Captain B. C. McCurry, 22nd Georgia, reported that his regiment, “...Made a very successful charge, going on the right of the brigade and to the left of Perry’s brigade.” This claim to have penetrated the Union line is confirmed by General Gibbon’s report, “...The enemy came on with such impetuosity that the head of his column came quite through a vacancy in our line to the left of my division, opened by detaching troops to other points.”

Major Curtis, 7th Michigan, anxiously observed the Confederate advance, reporting that the enemy, “...succeeded in passing through between the guns of the battery on our left, driving the gunners from their posts. The line on our left gave way and our flank was almost turned, but the enemy’s line was fast melting away under the scathing fire of our men....”

While their comrades were penetrating the Union center, others in Wright’s command started to carry off the guns of Battery C, 5th U.S. General Hancock had placed these guns about 6:45 p.m., “...on the elevated open ground” of Cemetery Ridge just before he had been given command of the 3rd Corps. On his return a little more than an hour later (about 7:48 p.m.), Hancock saw the guns, apparently abandoned by both the cannoneers and the supporting infantry he had left to protect them, being carried off by the Rebels. Spotting Colonel Randall, who had ridden ahead of his five 13th Vermont companies, Hancock exclaimed, “...they have just captured that battery yonder (a battery about 20 rods in front) [5.5 yards to a rod equals a football field away] and are dragging it from the field. Can you retake it?” Colonel Randall reported that the men of the 13th Vermont, “...sprang forward with the bayonet…and continued our pursuit of the guns, which we overtook about half way to the Emmitsburg road...These guns, as I am told, belong to the Fifth U.S. Regulars, Lieutenant Weir. There were four of them....”

Albert Clarke, a lieutenant in one of those five companies, recalled that the guns were, “...in the shallow valley between” Cemetery Ridge and the Emmitsburg road.

As for the over counting of guns taken and recaptured, here's my take:

General Wright believed his brigade captured, “...over twenty pieces of artillery, all of which we were compelled to abandon. These pieces were taken by the respective regiments composing this brigade, as follows: The Third Georgia, 11 pieces; the Twenty-second Georgia, 3 pieces; the Forty-eighth Georgia, 4 pieces, and the Second Battalion several pieces-the exact number not ascertained, but believed to amount to as many as 5 or 6 pieces.”

Obviously, with only 12 guns available to be captured (the two six gun batteries of Brown and Weir), Wright had doubled the number of guns his men actually captured. Wright probably knew when he filed the report that his math involved some double counting of guns. But, if his objective was to make a point (the cost of his not being supported), it obviously better served his purpose to use the inflated number. So, if only nine guns at most were captured, how does one reconcile the individual claims of Wright’s regiments (totaling twenty-four guns) with that number; where might these fifteen extra guns be found?

Besides the “fog of war”, more than likely the principal factor contributing to the miscount was that the 3rd Georgia’s claims overlapped those of the two regiments on its flanks. With some members of its extreme left companies participating with the 48th Georgia in assaulting Brown’s battery, the 3rd Georgia obviously included those four guns in its count. Similarly, some members of its extreme right companies participated with the 22nd Georgia in its attack on Weir’s battery, adding those five guns to the 3rd’s tally.

According to Wright, the 2nd Georgia captured up to six pieces of artillery. Undoubtedly it, along with the 22nd Georgia, had taken Weir’s battery, but the 2nd should only be credited with the two guns not claimed by the 22nd Georgia. The additional four guns attributed to the 2nd Georgia bring to thirteen the number of double-counted guns identified, leaving two yet to be explained. The Confederates were able to start five of Weir’s guns back toward their lines. However, these guns were left on the field when the Confederates abandoned the contest (Hancock subsequently ordered the 13th Vermont to go and recover them). As some members of the 3rd Georgia retreated past two of these guns, they may have concluded that they belonged to a completely different Federal battery, which would account for the eleven guns the 3rd Georgia reported it had in its “possession” (but not necessarily captured by them) during the battle. When these two, possibly thrice-counted guns are factored in, the total of over-counted guns reaches fifteen. Voila!


Jim
 
Here's my take:

Weir's Battery C, 5th U.S. (six guns) moved forward (west) about 300 yards from the main line to a position roughly 150 yards south-southeast of the Codori buildings prior to the Confederate attack. It was during this movement that I believe Weir cut through the 19th Maine as it was moving south into a position that was personally selected by Hancock. As Ryan has pointed out, Weir's battery was in the zone between Lang and Wright. Lang's brigade preceded Wright in the advance, although some men of Wright's 2nd Georgia Battalion (who were skirmishing) had joined Lang. Three of Weir's guns were captured, and three made it back to the main line, 300 yards to the east. Some Floridians and Georgians tried to move the three captured pieces to the rear but did not get very far - perhaps 100 yards at most. Two other guns of Turnbull's Battery F-K, 3rd U.S. were captured (by the 9th Alabama) near the Rogers house, while two other guns of Battery F-K, 3rd U.S. were captured in the field southeast of the Rogers house. The 13th Vermont (5 companies) had a hand in first reclaiming the three guns from Weir that were then nearly south of the Codori buildings, and then the two from Turnbull (referred to as Confederate guns) that were near the Rogers house (by Company A, 13th Vermont), for a total of five. The 19th Maine and 106th Pennsylvania also went forward to the same vicinity in following behind the retreating Confederates and helped recover some of these same guns.

The battery between the right (north) of the 19th Maine and the left (south) of the 7th Michigan during the height of the fighting would thus be the three guns of Weir that had managed to fall back 300 yards to the main line after avoiding being captured south-southeast of the Codori buildings. If Weir had only managed to bring off only one of his six guns, I don't think the regimental commanders of the 19th Maine and 7th Michigan (and Hancock) would have referred to it as a battery. These guns were abandoned, and while it's not clear that they were physically taken by the Confederates, the latter did exert at least indirect control over them. Weir was so confused in later years, whether as the result of physical ailment and/or mental trauma, that his changing recollections cannot be trusted.

Where was Hancock while all of this was happening? Here's my view:

-July 2, around 6:35 p.m. Hancock ordered by Meade to take command of the Third Corps, after hearing of the wounding of Sickles.

-July 2, about 6:45–7:00 p.m. Hancock conducted Willard’s brigade in person to left.

-July 2, 7:02 p.m. Hancock orders the 1st Minnesota to charge, then rides north behind the main line and passes the abandoned half-battery (three guns) of Weir.

-July 2, 7:05 p.m. Hancock seen by Colonel Randall, who is in advance of his five companies of the 13th Vermont coming down the Baltimore Pike onto Cemetery Ridge; Hancock directs Randall to recapture Lt. Weir’s three guns east of the Emmitsburg Road.
 
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Here's my take:

Weir's Battery C, 5th U.S. (six guns) moved forward (west) about 300 yards from the main line to a position roughly 150 yards south-southeast of the Codori buildings prior to the Confederate attack. It was during this movement that I believe Weir cut through the 19th Maine as it was moving south into a position that was personally selected by Hancock. As Ryan has pointed out, Weir's battery was in the zone between Lang and Wright. Lang's brigade preceded Wright in the advance, although some men of Wright's 2nd Georgia Battalion (who were skirmishing) had joined Lang. Three of Weir's guns were captured, and three made it back to the main line, 300 yards to the east. Some Floridians and Georgians tried to move the three captured pieces to the rear but did not get very far - perhaps 100 yards at most. Two other guns of Turnbull's Battery F-K, 3rd U.S. were captured (by the 9th Alabama) near the Rogers house, while two other guns of Battery F-K, 3rd U.S. were captured in the field southeast of the Rogers house. The 13th Vermont (5 companies) had a hand in first reclaiming the three guns from Weir that were then nearly south of the Codori buildings, and then the two from Turnbull (referred to as Confederate guns) that were near the Rogers house (by Company A, 13th Vermont), for a total of five. The 19th Maine and 106th Pennsylvania also went forward to the same vicinity in following behind the retreating Confederates and helped recover some of these same guns.

The battery between the right (north) of the 19th Maine and the left (south) of the 7th Michigan during the height of the fighting would thus be the three guns of Weir that had managed to fall back 300 yards to the main line after avoiding being captured south-southeast of the Codori buildings. If Weir had only managed to bring off only one of his six guns, I don't think the regimental commanders of the 19th Maine and 7th Michigan (and Hancock) would have referred to it as a battery. These guns were abandoned, and while it's not clear that they were physically taken by the Confederates, the latter did exert at least indirect control over them. Weir was so confused in later years, whether as the result of physical ailment and/or mental trauma, that his changing recollections cannot be trusted.

Where was Hancock while all of this was happening? Here's my view:

-July 2, around 6:35 p.m. Hancock ordered by Meade to take command of the Third Corps, after hearing of the wounding of Sickles.

-July 2, about 6:45–7:00 p.m. Hancock conducted Willard’s brigade in person to left.

-July 2, 7:02 p.m. Hancock orders the 1st Minnesota to charge, then rides north behind the main line and passes the abandoned half-battery (three guns) of Weir.

-July 2, 7:05 p.m. Hancock seen by Colonel Randall, who is in advance of his five companies of the 13th Vermont coming down the Baltimore Pike onto Cemetery Ridge; Hancock directs Randall to recapture Lt. Weir’s three guns east of the Emmitsburg Road.

Seems reasonable.

Ryan
 
The men Wright's Brigade pushed back from the Emitsburg road would have only been pickets/skirmishers.
Wright's men never made it past the stone wall. Once the men from Brown's battery fell back the 69th and 71st opened up on them. Then when the remaining two regiments joined in, there was no hope for Wright without support.
The 106th and 72nd followed them to the Emmitsburg Rd. capturing and sending 250 to the rear.
Wrong
 
I tend to think that Wright pushed back the units that were forward of the line along the Emmittsburg Road but did not reach the top of the ridge. None of the Union units in the area talked about having retreated which would have been necessary if Wright had gotten to the top. There's little doubt he got remarkably far but not as far as he himself thought.

R

For the record, I've changed my mind in the last 5 years. The evidence indicates that the 22nd Georgia (and probably elements of the 3rd Georgia) did in fact make it to the top of the ridge but likely only stayed a few moments before being pushed off by the 13th Vermont.

Ryan
 
I tend to think that Wright pushed back the units that were forward of the line along the Emmittsburg Road but did not reach the top of the ridge. None of the Union units in the area talked about having retreated which would have been necessary if Wright had gotten to the top. There's little doubt he got remarkably far but not as far as he himself thought.

R

From my book, Above the High Water Mark

ADDRESS


BY
COL. CLAIBORNE SNEAD


AT THE
Reunion of the Third Georgia Regiment,
AT UNION POINT,


On the 31st July, 1874

Papers in Virginia about the time and since have lauded Picket’s division as having made the charge, going farther over this very ground than any other body of men. And while I would not, if I could, detract one iota from that grand division or pluck one leaf from its well-earned crown, yet it is due to the vindication of the truth of history to say that they did not even get to the rock fence much less to the heights beyond, over which Wright’s Brigade passed on the preceding day. If there is any doubt, here is the testimony of one who knew, and who dealt out impartial justice to his followers:

General Lee, in his official report, says: "Wilcox and Wright’s Brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of infantry, and compelling him (the enemy) to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot, and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side."


“The Augusta Chronicle, August 1874”
 

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From my book, Above the High Water Mark

ADDRESS


BY
COL. CLAIBORNE SNEAD


AT THE
Reunion of the Third Georgia Regiment,
AT UNION POINT,


On the 31st July, 1874

Papers in Virginia about the time and since have lauded Picket’s division as having made the charge, going farther over this very ground than any other body of men. And while I would not, if I could, detract one iota from that grand division or pluck one leaf from its well-earned crown, yet it is due to the vindication of the truth of history to say that they did not even get to the rock fence much less to the heights beyond, over which Wright’s Brigade passed on the preceding day. If there is any doubt, here is the testimony of one who knew, and who dealt out impartial justice to his followers:

General Lee, in his official report, says: "Wilcox and Wright’s Brigades advanced with great gallantry, breaking successive lines of infantry, and compelling him (the enemy) to abandon much of his artillery. Wilcox reached the foot, and Wright gained the crest of the ridge itself, driving the enemy down the opposite side."


“The Augusta Chronicle, August 1874”

To be fair, I did change my mind when I looked into it more and went where the evidence led me.

Ryan
 
Pickett's men did make it to the stone wall and "quite a few" went over it, but they did not get very far. I believe the 22nd Georgia on the previous evening made it to the fence further south, which is an extension of said wall. We don't how many, if any, Georgians stepped across that fence, but why nitpick? I would also say the 22nd Georgia fell back after being there a handful of minutes at most, rather than wait to be forced back by the five companies of the 13th Vermont and other Union troops that were coming to fill the gap (about 300 yards) that existed in the line at that moment.

I am currently compiling a list of Pickett's men who sources say crossed that wall on July 3. I am just getting started, but so far the 8th, 18th, 28th and 56th Virginia are represented on that list. Oh, and let's not forget others just to the north on that day who claimed to have gone just as far to the east, if not a bit farther, than the Virginians, including a few Mississippians who came up near the west side of the Bryan barn. There was glory enough for all, as Lincoln put it.
 
I would also say the 22nd Georgia fell back after being there a handful of minutes at most, rather than wait to be forced back by the five companies of the 13th Vermont and other Union troops that were coming to fill the gap (about 300 yards) that existed in the line at that moment.

I agree. When the 22nd Georgia reached the ridge crest, elements of the 13th Vermont were coming up the far side. The 22nd levelled a volley that did very little damage (aside from killing Colonel Francis Randall's horse) and as the Vermonters continued to advance, the 22nd began drifting back towards the fence along Cemetery Ridge. At the most, they were only there for a couple minutes, almost certainly fewer than 5 minutes.

Ryan
 
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