Hussar Yeomanry
Sergeant
- Joined
- Dec 6, 2017
- Location
- UK
Continued from part two https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...a-at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-two.153437/
The first part can be found here https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...n-virginia-at-first-bull-run-manassas.153357/
Part Three:
Previously we looked at the Cavalry and then the rather ad hoc composition of the various divisions and brigades.
In this part I wish to delve even further down in to the specifics.
The Infantry:
Only looking at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions there are 12 companies of regulars, 117 companies of 90 day men, 220 companies of volunteers [Educated guestimate and certainly correct to within a company or two.]
With a little rounding that's c. 3.5% Regulars, 34% 90 day men and 62.5% Volunteers.
Given the perceptions around McDowell's army I had always assumed a higher percentage of 90 day men though 34% is quite a lot and certainly more than he would wish to lose from their enlistments expiring.
The Cavalry:
Entirely comprised of Regulars but only 7 companies strong (and as previously stated only 4 companies are not being used as headquarters guards)
The Artillery:
41 pieces in 9 very uneven batteries of 1, 2, 4 or 6 guns. All but 1 of these batteries is manned by Regulars and the exception are the 6 13pdr James Rifles of the 2nd Rhode Island Artillery. There are 2 more 12pdr Howitzers accompanying the 71st New York State Militia Infantry as its Company I.
So, that's 35 guns for the Regulars. 8 for the Militia.
As to the actual composition of batteries let us take the 6 guns of the Second United States Artillery, Light Company E. It has:
2 x 13pdr James Rifles
2 x 12pdr Howitzers
2 x 6pdr smoothbores
Meanwhile First United States Artillery, Light Company G is represented by a lone 30pdr Parrott Rifle – whose effects seem to be more psychological than actual.
Does this again show the haste with which the army has been thrown together?
Why have I only included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions?
Well the 4th (Reserve) Division was held in reserve and not committed. It had also only been created the month before and lacked artillery, cavalry or indeed a brigade organisation (though some OOB's have the 4 New Jersey militia regiments divided off from the 4 New Jersey volunteer regiments). However no brigade commanders seems to have been appointed to oversee this.
Meanwhile the 5th does at least have a brigade structure and artillery. 14 pieces of which 6 arrive on the morning of the 21st. These are militia guns from the 29th New York Infantry. The rest are two Regular batteries – 4 guns in 1, 6 in the other and the infantry they are supporting are entirely volunteers. However it is also held in reserve/ guarding the flank and sees no action and there are suggestions from then Colonel Israel Richardson that Dixon S Miles who was commanding the Division was drunk. (Allegations that at a Court of Enquiry were upheld!)
I do however have a question. If the army had more cavalry could a smaller group of horsemen (if they had been available) be used to guard the army's flank rather than an entire Division? Would then the presence of another 8 regiments of infantry supported by guns have changed the outcome of the battle. Given how close things were it seems a reasonable supposition. Of course they are not available so the question is moot... but in my mind it is an interesting one.
Beyond that we have what strikes me most is the lack of Regulars amongst the infantry. In theory their presence is supposed to strengthen the army but are 12 companies really enough to do that? As to the artillery it seems that like the cavalry McDowell is having to make do with what is available? Should he have tried to even things out more because some brigades have no artillery and some have multiple batteries? As McDowell is by training an artillery man I think here we can be at least somewhat critical of him.
Thoughts?
The first part can be found here https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...n-virginia-at-first-bull-run-manassas.153357/
Part Three:
Previously we looked at the Cavalry and then the rather ad hoc composition of the various divisions and brigades.
In this part I wish to delve even further down in to the specifics.
The Infantry:
Only looking at the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions there are 12 companies of regulars, 117 companies of 90 day men, 220 companies of volunteers [Educated guestimate and certainly correct to within a company or two.]
With a little rounding that's c. 3.5% Regulars, 34% 90 day men and 62.5% Volunteers.
Given the perceptions around McDowell's army I had always assumed a higher percentage of 90 day men though 34% is quite a lot and certainly more than he would wish to lose from their enlistments expiring.
The Cavalry:
Entirely comprised of Regulars but only 7 companies strong (and as previously stated only 4 companies are not being used as headquarters guards)
The Artillery:
41 pieces in 9 very uneven batteries of 1, 2, 4 or 6 guns. All but 1 of these batteries is manned by Regulars and the exception are the 6 13pdr James Rifles of the 2nd Rhode Island Artillery. There are 2 more 12pdr Howitzers accompanying the 71st New York State Militia Infantry as its Company I.
So, that's 35 guns for the Regulars. 8 for the Militia.
As to the actual composition of batteries let us take the 6 guns of the Second United States Artillery, Light Company E. It has:
2 x 13pdr James Rifles
2 x 12pdr Howitzers
2 x 6pdr smoothbores
Meanwhile First United States Artillery, Light Company G is represented by a lone 30pdr Parrott Rifle – whose effects seem to be more psychological than actual.
Does this again show the haste with which the army has been thrown together?
Why have I only included the 1st, 2nd and 3rd Divisions?
Well the 4th (Reserve) Division was held in reserve and not committed. It had also only been created the month before and lacked artillery, cavalry or indeed a brigade organisation (though some OOB's have the 4 New Jersey militia regiments divided off from the 4 New Jersey volunteer regiments). However no brigade commanders seems to have been appointed to oversee this.
Meanwhile the 5th does at least have a brigade structure and artillery. 14 pieces of which 6 arrive on the morning of the 21st. These are militia guns from the 29th New York Infantry. The rest are two Regular batteries – 4 guns in 1, 6 in the other and the infantry they are supporting are entirely volunteers. However it is also held in reserve/ guarding the flank and sees no action and there are suggestions from then Colonel Israel Richardson that Dixon S Miles who was commanding the Division was drunk. (Allegations that at a Court of Enquiry were upheld!)
I do however have a question. If the army had more cavalry could a smaller group of horsemen (if they had been available) be used to guard the army's flank rather than an entire Division? Would then the presence of another 8 regiments of infantry supported by guns have changed the outcome of the battle. Given how close things were it seems a reasonable supposition. Of course they are not available so the question is moot... but in my mind it is an interesting one.
Beyond that we have what strikes me most is the lack of Regulars amongst the infantry. In theory their presence is supposed to strengthen the army but are 12 companies really enough to do that? As to the artillery it seems that like the cavalry McDowell is having to make do with what is available? Should he have tried to even things out more because some brigades have no artillery and some have multiple batteries? As McDowell is by training an artillery man I think here we can be at least somewhat critical of him.
Thoughts?