Hussar Yeomanry
Sergeant
- Joined
- Dec 6, 2017
- Location
- UK
Part Five:
Continued from here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...-at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-four.153627/
Part Three can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-three.153549/
Part Two can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...a-at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-two.153437/
Part One can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...n-virginia-at-first-bull-run-manassas.153357/
Previously we looked at the composition of the army and more recently the officers that led them. In this part I wish to examine the far more subjective question of the quality of this very infantry heavy army.
With only 3.5% of its infantry being Regulars (and even then many of these are brand new to the ranks) it makes more sense to look at the 96.5% who weren't. A mix of militia and volunteers approximately 34% are 30 day men whose enlistments are soon up. These are almost entirely drawn from the various State Militia's and many of the longer enlisted 'Volunteers' are from a similar source.
They at least have the advantage of being available (at least for now in the case of the 90 day men) and bring weapons with them. Theoretically they are also trained but is this really the case? Certainly there is a perception of them as barely trained rabble. Is this fair? Unsure of the answer I asked @major bill who I was aware has spent many years examining the Michigan militia. After all the state sent four regiments to Bull Run and these were all in the 3 Divisions that were committed during the battle.
His answer was extensive and I wish to attribute the vast majority of the next four paragraphs to information he supplied though he also directed me to Philip Karcher's The Complete Civil War. He states that Karcher has taken a good but short look at the issue and that Mr. Karcher's conclusion is unsurprising. It varied by State. Supposedly (and against the normal perception) the best State Militia system was that of New York. Virginia and Kentucky were also considered to have a fine Militia system while certain states that are often assumed to have a good system did not (Georgia).
It is also undoubtedly the case that during the 1850's and into the 60s attempts are made to improve the system but that results were at best patchy. Major Bill was then kind enough to explain specifically the state of things in Michigan. There each Militia company was required to attend a three day inspection camp once a year and there they were graded on how they looked and marched (with their grading determining how much money they received from the State). Musketry skills were not tested and indeed Major Bill states that many companies did not do any training in this. Further some of the elite Militia companies paid people to set up their tents at these encampments. Worse at the outset of the war many companies would be missing canteens, tents and field gear.
So, while they can drill and dance (for the social aspect of these organisations should not be overlooked) there is the question as to whether they can or will fight. What we can say is that one of the four Michigan Regiments at First Bull Run will find themselves in the thick of it. Therefore let us look at these Regiments. First and Fourth will serve under Orlando B Wilcox in the 2nd Brigade of Heintzelman's 3rd Division and the First will be heavily engaged (the 4th Michigan will be ordered in a rather muddled fashion to guard the depot at Fairfax Court House) while the Second and Third will serve under Israel Richardson in the 4th Brigade of Tyler's 1st Division and while not technically engaged will be one of the few brigades that stands firm during the Union rout. [Interesting the Brigade Commanders are the Colonel's of the 1st and 2nd Michigan respectively]
Now, who are these Regiments? Well, they are the Michigan Militia with supposedly the best rated companies going in to the First (who are the only 90 day men), the next best in to the Second and so on. However Major Bill suggests that it is not as simple as this for the ratings aren't all they seem for given the size of Michigan there was not one annual inspection camp. Instead there were three (The Main Encampment, Grand Rapids and Flint) and there was some grumbling at the time that those who went to the Grand Rapids and Flint encampments were under marked. Then there was also an element of prejudice. Being German appears to have been a 'defect' and so some militia companies left the system and set their own up. Beyond that when the word went out to call up the militia because of how the railroads and roads ran some of the better companies (from Lansing and Grand Rapids) went in to the 3rd Michigan.
Are the four Michigan regiments representative of the men this army is drawn from? If they are then the bulk of the army already knows basic drill which is a start. Beyond that? Most have weapons. But what can really be done to train them in the eighty or so days (including transport) before the battle? Now in Europe it was felt as a rule of thumb that it took four weeks to train an infantryman. However and there is a big however this is for an infantryman going into an established company and led by experienced officers and NCO's.
As a result ex Regular officers and soldiers are in high demand and thankfully they are out there. Are there enough to go around? Given the size of the pre war army that is not possible. Officers and NCO's are also voted upon which means the vast bulk of the officers and NCO's are going to have to be new to this. Most likely they are well meaning but it takes a lot longer to train an NCO or officer than it does a man. Probably they will have access to basic drill books – perhaps with Hardee's name hastily crossed out – but do they really understand them. Certainly there is anecdotal post war accounts of officers unable to work out how to get their company to cross a fence line. Therefore they had their men fall out for a five minute break and informed them when they reformed they were to do so... on the other side of the fence. How well this is going to work in combat conditions I leave to the reader.
Now, let's look at the Michigan regiments again, specifically the 90 day men of the 1st Michigan. The 1st was 780 strong by the time they reached Washington (according to contemporary newspaper accounts) and along with the 11th New York and 38th New York will be significantly engaged for between the 3 Regiments they will lose 1 officer and 70 enlisted dead, c.170 wounded and almost 200 missing (precise numbers vary but are in general agreement). In total that will be c.440 casualties for the brigade (and I have only been able to find brigade level casualties). So, if the casualties are approximately evenly spread (and all 3 regiments do seem about evenly engaged) between the 3 Regiments then the 1st Michigan loses nearly 150 men. To all intents and purposes that is 20% of their numbers (Likely more for they had 780 when they reached Washington rather than when they marched down to Bull Run but 780 is the only hard number I have available to work with). Whatever, for a regiment to take 20% casualties suggests to me they stuck around for a while. That they had some fight in them despite their enlistments almost being up and the OR reflects this. According to Brigade Commander Wilcox (wounded and captured) and indeed Divisional Commander Heintzelman (wounded) who was with them at times they suggest that the 1st Michigan first tangled with the 7th Georgia Regiment (Francis Bartow's 2nd Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah). This occurred for quite some time before they were able to drive the Georgians off and they only left the field when attacked in the rear by the 28th Virginia (Jackson's 1st Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah). [It should also be noted that despite their horrendous baptism of fire the vast majority of the regiment reenlist]
Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Michigan under Israel Richardson are guarding/ demonstrating opposite Blackburn's Ford. At the end of the day Johnston orders the brigades of Bonham and Longstreet to attack and further compound the rout of the Union army. Neither Confederate commander seems in any way enthusiastic over their orders especially as they don't make it clear who is senior. Therefore Richardson is able without too much trouble to cover much of the army's withdrawal.
Therefore despite the inherent weaknesses in the army we should not discount the men. I for one would not have wished to be there amidst the confusion. The chaos. The fog of war. Things that green troops deal with even worse than veterans and there are precious few of those there.
Hopefully people have liked these articles. Next I will look at the victorious opposing army in much the same manner (During the research behind these posts I have already uncovered a few interesting – to me – points that I will be pursuing)
Also, one final point. Army of Northeastern Virginia appears to be something of a misnomer (if a convenient one) for while it was the army guarding the Department of Northeastern Virginia it only seems to take the name post battle.
Continued from here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...-at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-four.153627/
Part Three can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-three.153549/
Part Two can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...a-at-first-bull-run-manassas-part-two.153437/
Part One can be found here: https://www.civilwartalk.com/thread...n-virginia-at-first-bull-run-manassas.153357/
Previously we looked at the composition of the army and more recently the officers that led them. In this part I wish to examine the far more subjective question of the quality of this very infantry heavy army.
With only 3.5% of its infantry being Regulars (and even then many of these are brand new to the ranks) it makes more sense to look at the 96.5% who weren't. A mix of militia and volunteers approximately 34% are 30 day men whose enlistments are soon up. These are almost entirely drawn from the various State Militia's and many of the longer enlisted 'Volunteers' are from a similar source.
They at least have the advantage of being available (at least for now in the case of the 90 day men) and bring weapons with them. Theoretically they are also trained but is this really the case? Certainly there is a perception of them as barely trained rabble. Is this fair? Unsure of the answer I asked @major bill who I was aware has spent many years examining the Michigan militia. After all the state sent four regiments to Bull Run and these were all in the 3 Divisions that were committed during the battle.
His answer was extensive and I wish to attribute the vast majority of the next four paragraphs to information he supplied though he also directed me to Philip Karcher's The Complete Civil War. He states that Karcher has taken a good but short look at the issue and that Mr. Karcher's conclusion is unsurprising. It varied by State. Supposedly (and against the normal perception) the best State Militia system was that of New York. Virginia and Kentucky were also considered to have a fine Militia system while certain states that are often assumed to have a good system did not (Georgia).
It is also undoubtedly the case that during the 1850's and into the 60s attempts are made to improve the system but that results were at best patchy. Major Bill was then kind enough to explain specifically the state of things in Michigan. There each Militia company was required to attend a three day inspection camp once a year and there they were graded on how they looked and marched (with their grading determining how much money they received from the State). Musketry skills were not tested and indeed Major Bill states that many companies did not do any training in this. Further some of the elite Militia companies paid people to set up their tents at these encampments. Worse at the outset of the war many companies would be missing canteens, tents and field gear.
So, while they can drill and dance (for the social aspect of these organisations should not be overlooked) there is the question as to whether they can or will fight. What we can say is that one of the four Michigan Regiments at First Bull Run will find themselves in the thick of it. Therefore let us look at these Regiments. First and Fourth will serve under Orlando B Wilcox in the 2nd Brigade of Heintzelman's 3rd Division and the First will be heavily engaged (the 4th Michigan will be ordered in a rather muddled fashion to guard the depot at Fairfax Court House) while the Second and Third will serve under Israel Richardson in the 4th Brigade of Tyler's 1st Division and while not technically engaged will be one of the few brigades that stands firm during the Union rout. [Interesting the Brigade Commanders are the Colonel's of the 1st and 2nd Michigan respectively]
Now, who are these Regiments? Well, they are the Michigan Militia with supposedly the best rated companies going in to the First (who are the only 90 day men), the next best in to the Second and so on. However Major Bill suggests that it is not as simple as this for the ratings aren't all they seem for given the size of Michigan there was not one annual inspection camp. Instead there were three (The Main Encampment, Grand Rapids and Flint) and there was some grumbling at the time that those who went to the Grand Rapids and Flint encampments were under marked. Then there was also an element of prejudice. Being German appears to have been a 'defect' and so some militia companies left the system and set their own up. Beyond that when the word went out to call up the militia because of how the railroads and roads ran some of the better companies (from Lansing and Grand Rapids) went in to the 3rd Michigan.
Are the four Michigan regiments representative of the men this army is drawn from? If they are then the bulk of the army already knows basic drill which is a start. Beyond that? Most have weapons. But what can really be done to train them in the eighty or so days (including transport) before the battle? Now in Europe it was felt as a rule of thumb that it took four weeks to train an infantryman. However and there is a big however this is for an infantryman going into an established company and led by experienced officers and NCO's.
As a result ex Regular officers and soldiers are in high demand and thankfully they are out there. Are there enough to go around? Given the size of the pre war army that is not possible. Officers and NCO's are also voted upon which means the vast bulk of the officers and NCO's are going to have to be new to this. Most likely they are well meaning but it takes a lot longer to train an NCO or officer than it does a man. Probably they will have access to basic drill books – perhaps with Hardee's name hastily crossed out – but do they really understand them. Certainly there is anecdotal post war accounts of officers unable to work out how to get their company to cross a fence line. Therefore they had their men fall out for a five minute break and informed them when they reformed they were to do so... on the other side of the fence. How well this is going to work in combat conditions I leave to the reader.
Now, let's look at the Michigan regiments again, specifically the 90 day men of the 1st Michigan. The 1st was 780 strong by the time they reached Washington (according to contemporary newspaper accounts) and along with the 11th New York and 38th New York will be significantly engaged for between the 3 Regiments they will lose 1 officer and 70 enlisted dead, c.170 wounded and almost 200 missing (precise numbers vary but are in general agreement). In total that will be c.440 casualties for the brigade (and I have only been able to find brigade level casualties). So, if the casualties are approximately evenly spread (and all 3 regiments do seem about evenly engaged) between the 3 Regiments then the 1st Michigan loses nearly 150 men. To all intents and purposes that is 20% of their numbers (Likely more for they had 780 when they reached Washington rather than when they marched down to Bull Run but 780 is the only hard number I have available to work with). Whatever, for a regiment to take 20% casualties suggests to me they stuck around for a while. That they had some fight in them despite their enlistments almost being up and the OR reflects this. According to Brigade Commander Wilcox (wounded and captured) and indeed Divisional Commander Heintzelman (wounded) who was with them at times they suggest that the 1st Michigan first tangled with the 7th Georgia Regiment (Francis Bartow's 2nd Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah). This occurred for quite some time before they were able to drive the Georgians off and they only left the field when attacked in the rear by the 28th Virginia (Jackson's 1st Brigade of the Army of the Shenandoah). [It should also be noted that despite their horrendous baptism of fire the vast majority of the regiment reenlist]
Meanwhile the 2nd and 3rd Michigan under Israel Richardson are guarding/ demonstrating opposite Blackburn's Ford. At the end of the day Johnston orders the brigades of Bonham and Longstreet to attack and further compound the rout of the Union army. Neither Confederate commander seems in any way enthusiastic over their orders especially as they don't make it clear who is senior. Therefore Richardson is able without too much trouble to cover much of the army's withdrawal.
Therefore despite the inherent weaknesses in the army we should not discount the men. I for one would not have wished to be there amidst the confusion. The chaos. The fog of war. Things that green troops deal with even worse than veterans and there are precious few of those there.
Hopefully people have liked these articles. Next I will look at the victorious opposing army in much the same manner (During the research behind these posts I have already uncovered a few interesting – to me – points that I will be pursuing)
Also, one final point. Army of Northeastern Virginia appears to be something of a misnomer (if a convenient one) for while it was the army guarding the Department of Northeastern Virginia it only seems to take the name post battle.