Chickamauga Was the Confederate victory at Chickamauga Dumb Luck?

The Army of the Cumberland was in Georgia. It had been campaigning for weeks and had hastily gathered at the Chickamauga battlefield. It should have been pulling back to Chattanooga without a second day of fighting.

Rosecrans was very lucky. If the Confederates had a better commander, Rosecrans likely would never have touched Georgia soil
 
There's a really nice article in the Southern Bivouac, December, 1886 https://babel.hathitrust.org/cgi/pt?id=wu.89062341201&view=1up&seq=480&size=125 and also a condensed version of the same article in B & L, Vol III, p. 663-65 titled The Crisis At Chickamauga, by Gates P. Thurston, Brevet Brigadier-General, U. S. V.

In this article by General Thurston (who was at Chickamauga) I get the impression that, according to Thurston, it was not a forgone conclusion; that if not for the unnecessary re-enforcement of Thomas left flank; Longstreet's attack would have met with a "well organized resistance". If the attack had occurred thirty minutes later (after the actual move of Palmer's Division) a more stout defense to the right of Longstreet's attack could (should?) have prevented the rout of the Union left. I surmise this from what he writes and, more specifically, from the following:

"Briefly, this is the story of the disaster on our right at Chickamauga: We were overwhelmed by numbers; we were beaten in detail. Thirty minutes earlier Longstreet would have met well-organized resistance. Thirty minutes later our marching divisions could have formed beyond his column of attack," B & L, p. 664

In the Bivouac Thurston mentions Longstreet's confidence in the success of the attack, saying that "it was a physical impossibility for any troops, unprotected by breastworks, to withstand such a column." I don't believe the Union troops could have erected breastworks in one night. IMO, such a compact and powerful force thrown into a specific portion of the Union left would have broken through. What's unknown is how long it would have taken for the attacking column to break through, and how would the defense have reacted to such a breakthrough, if Palmer's division had remained in place.
A stationary defense line was hard to break. But even then, if the approach provided enough cover, it could be done. But when the divisions started moving, they tended to get shook. Rosecrans' line was both too long and not set enough. That far south he should had a more compact position, probably closer to Chattanooga.
 
Rosecrans was very lucky. If the Confederates had a better commander, Rosecrans likely would never have touched Georgia soil
I disagree. He accomplished something similar in both western Virginia and in Tennessee. His planning ability was excellent and at his best he was a determined fighter. His problems were more not understanding the politics of command, and not inspiring confidence in all his subordinates.
 
A stationary defense line was hard to break. But even then, if the approach provided enough cover, it could be done. But when the divisions started moving, they tended to get shook. Rosecrans' line was both too long and not set enough. That far south he should had a more compact position, probably closer to Chattanooga.

In the Southern Bivouac article Thurston mentions the need to protect "our filed hospitals....situated nearly two miles south of the Glen House, and it was necessary to protect the position at Glenn's to cover the road to these hospitals; otherwise, Rosecrans would doubtless have shortened McCook's line, and thrown it back on the defensive spurs of the ridge."

The field hospitals were located in the blue circle, bottom left of map A, at Crawfish Springs.

battle_of_chickamauga_maps.jpg
 
This is not the way I would have described Rosecrans. Can you elaborate, please?

Ha Ha

I'm surprised Rosecrans' surrogates haven't shown up to this thread yet. Chickamauga was everyone else's fault but his, for the record. 😊

I agree Longstreet was capable of a high level of aggression and competence.
 
Ha Ha

I'm surprised Rosecrans' surrogates haven't shown up to this thread yet. Chickamauga was everyone else's fault but his, for the record. 😊

I agree Longstreet was capable of a high level of aggression and competence.
The easterners on both sides fought with an experienced intensity. The Cumberlanders were not ready for that, unless the were completely set.
 
Fair enough, @wausaubob

Longstreet's Corps was moved by rail to Georgia almost immediately after the Battle of Gettysburg. He was leading some of the Army of Northern Virginia's most experienced officers and men against Rosecrans' Army at Chickamauga.

This thread title asks the Forum about, "Dumb Luck" in Georgia.

Nah, Uh-uh, I don't think so. Rosecrans was in over his head dealing with those guys. The proof is in the pudding.
 
Confederates turned the Wrong Flank. Rosecrans gave up his right to protect his left. He lost the day but not his Army.

If Longstreet had of lined up on Polks Right. AOC would of been defeated. Lost opportunity for the Confederates. It should of been Much Worse. Many lost opportunities in the Days before the Battle.

Well maybe if Polk had executed Bragg's initial plan to turn Rosecrans' left then he wouldn't have needed Longstreet to go over there. Polk, as he did over and over, performed poorly. Actually poorly is too kind.
 
I am deeply impressed that the Virginia-Centric view point completely ignores Longstreet’s failed attempt to dislodge Thomas from Snodgrass Hill. That was the place where Chickamauga could have been won. The entire battle was about taking back Chattanooga... we all know how that turned out. Thomas & his Cumberlanders held their ground, successfully fell back into Chattanooga & ultimately drove Bragg’s army into a howling retreat. How did that Knoxville thing work out?
 
I am deeply impressed that the Virginia-Centric view point completely ignores Longstreet’s failed attempt to dislodge Thomas from Snodgrass Hill. That was the place where Chickamauga could have been won. The entire battle was about taking back Chattanooga... we all know how that turned out. Thomas & his Cumberlanders held their ground, successfully fell back into Chattanooga & ultimately drove Bragg’s army into a howling retreat. How did that Knoxville thing work out?

The Rock of Chickamauga!

No argument, really. Only that the thread title asks if Confederate success in the battle was, "dumb luck." My answer to the question is no. Everyone's mileage may vary.
 
I disagree. He accomplished something similar in both western Virginia and in Tennessee. His planning ability was excellent and at his best he was a determined fighter. His problems were more not understanding the politics of command, and not inspiring confidence in all his subordinates.

Had Bragg been a bit more aggressive, and if his subordinates hadn't hated him, he should have wreck a column or two of Rosecrans during the Tullahoma campaign.
 
I think it can be argued that it was dumb luck that sent Hood crashing into a misaligned point on Rosecrans' line. It was, however, not the good luck that it might seem to be. Absent Longstreet's stroke of luck, Chickamauga would have been another of Bragg's defeats. The Army of the Cumberland was inflicting more casualties than it suffered from Bragg's disjointed attacks. Rosecrans had no record of wasting his men's lives in head-on attacks. He would have stayed hunkered down & let Bragg bleed his army. Following a series of failed attacks, there is no reason to believe that Bragg would not have followed his repeated pattern. After his army was reduced by 1/3rd, he would have withdrawn to Resaca or thereabouts.

Unlike Bragg, who went begging for support after Chickamauga, Rosecrans who commanded the 245,000 man Department of the Cumberland had vast resources at his command. Within hours of the withdrawal to Chattanooga, officers from Murfreesboro TN to Cincinnati OH were responding to the setback. Within 48 hours, the XI & XII Corps were entrained & headed for Chattanooga. The Army of the Tennessee was ordered to head eastward. Of course, the man who could personally marshal the entire resources of Union Army west of the Allegheny Mountains came to Chattanooga to command what we would call Army Group Chattanooga. Grant had enormous resources at his personal command that extended far beyond the immediate Chattanooga area. Bragg was outnumbered by something like 100 to one.

After leaving the dead unburied, Bragg's men had advanced to the edge of Chattanooga & into a series of miserable camps behind Missionary Ridge. They lived on meager supplies in camps that were literally knee deep in mud. Letters home were filled with what can only be called a mass state of deep depression. Many stated that gazing out onto the increasingly powerful Union army left them in a state not far from despair. Little did they know that worse, much, much worse was going on than just the supplies flowing in via the cracker line.

The individual members of Grant's army group had fought very different wars. The Army of the Cumberland fought a rail road campaign. The Army of Tennessee had fought a river war. The Army of the Potomac had fought a very different war than the other two. Chattanooga became a cauldron where all those disparate experiences could be compared, admixed & produce a hybrid that would know nothing but victory.

Longstreet's dumb luck attack on a disordered point in Rosecrans' line was just about the worst piece of bad luck any army ever had.
 
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This is not the way I would have described Rosecrans. Can you elaborate, please?
Old Rosey, as his men called him, was an extraordinary character. People who figure such things say that he had the highest I.Q. of any CW general. After leaving the army, he & some partners built the first successful oil refinery west of the Allegheny Mountains. He suffered terrible burns when an ironically labeled safety lamp he invented blew up. Facial scaring left him with what was perceived as a sardonic facial expression. He literally climbed out of bed to rejoin the army.

You simply never knew where Rosey would show up unannounced. He would ride up to a regiment like the 9th Michigan that was waiting for a train & dismount. He gathered the men around & asked them how they were doing. Did they have the supplies they needed? He spoke with the men directly with out any of the staff officer rah-rah that McClellan indulged in. They were invited to share with him any ideas or better way of doing things that had. Grousing artillerymen attempting to get a mired gun moving were astonished to recognize one of the horsemen who dismounted & pushed along with them was Rosecrans.

During battle, Rosecrans exposed himself to enemy fire unlike any other general of his rank. During the heavy fighting along the Nashville Pike during the Battle of Stones River, he was seen riding along in front of the line. The blood & brains of a staff officer that was splattered on his coat testified to his exposure to enemy fire. The stress of battle seems to have pumped his system full of adrenaline. His speech became so rapid as to be incomprehensible, which irritated the heck out of officers who received incomprehensible orders. The ordinary soldier reported that seeing Rosey riding amongst them, indifferent to the enemy's fire, was profoundly inspiring.

If like Wilder, you came to Rosecrans with a good idea, he would knock you over heading for the door to implement it. No other general in the war nurtured as many innovations as Rosecrans. All those days with four hours of sleep & high energy activity came at a price. He suffered what can only be called a severe case of burnout after Chickamauga. His exhaustion had not affected his intellect. Grant ordered the actions Rosecrans had prepared into action, openly wondering why he had not done it himself.
 
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When Grant got to Chattanooga he realized they had all been waiting for him. All they needed was for someone to take responsibility. Rosecrans' ideas were fine. It was his political position that was precarious.
 
The Tennessee and Georgia terrain created the opportunity for screened movements. Terrain and vegetation made it hard to see the movements and make accurate counts. Rosecrans used this early on, and then Bragg got the advantage when the arrival of Longstreet's divisions was hidden. Longstreet's Corp failed by a narrow margin on the second day at Gettysburg. But advancing a set enemy position, over mainly open ground, on the third day had very little chance of succeeding. I think the easterners were going to break any part of the Cumberland Army that wasn't set and wasn't expecting them.
 
The terrain tended to disperse the advancing army. It was always risky for the army to gather properly.
 
I disagree. He accomplished something similar in both western Virginia and in Tennessee. His planning ability was excellent and at his best he was a determined fighter. His problems were more not understanding the politics of command, and not inspiring confidence in all his subordinates.
Had Bragg been a bit more aggressive, and if his subordinates hadn't hated him, he should have wreck a column or two of Rosecrans during the Tullahoma campaign.
When you begin the campaign not knowing that your opponent had attacked & overrun your right flank for 48 hours, your options for masterful maneuvering is limited. Rosecrans’ brilliantly executed plan left Bragg with no option but to run for it as fast as he could go.
 
I am deeply impressed that the Virginia-Centric view point completely ignores Longstreet’s failed attempt to dislodge Thomas from Snodgrass Hill. That was the place where Chickamauga could have been won. The entire battle was about taking back Chattanooga... we all know how that turned out. Thomas & his Cumberlanders held their ground, successfully fell back into Chattanooga & ultimately drove Bragg’s army into a howling retreat. How did that Knoxville thing work out?
Getting decisively defeated by Burnside pretty much speaks for itself.
 
Old Rosey, as his men called him, was an extraordinary character. People who figure such things say that he had the highest I.Q. of any CW general. After leaving the army, he & some partners built the first successful oil refinery west of the Allegheny Mountains. He suffered terrible burns when an ironically labeled safety lamp he invented blew up. Facial scaring left him with what was perceived as a sardonic facial expression. He literally climbed out of bed to rejoin the army.

You simply never knew where Rosey would show up unannounced. He would ride up to a regiment like the 9th Michigan that was waiting for a train & dismount. He gathered the men around & asked them how they were doing. Did they have the supplies they needed? He spoke with the men directly with out any of the staff officer rah-rah that McClellan indulged in. They were invited to share with him any ideas or better way of doing things that had. Grousing artillerymen attempting to get a mired gun moving were astonished to recognize one of the horsemen who dismounted & pushed along with them was Rosecrans.

During battle, Rosecrans exposed himself to enemy fire unlike any other general of his rank. During the heavy fighting along the Nashville Pike during the Battle of Stones River, he was seen riding along in front of the line. The blood & brains of a staff officer that was splattered on his coat testified to his exposure to enemy fire. The stress of battle seems to have pumped his system full of adrenaline. His speech became so rapid as to be incomprehensible, which irritated the heck out of officers who received incomprehensible orders. The ordinary soldier reported that seeing Rosey riding amongst them, indifferent to the enemy's fire, was profoundly inspiring.

If like Wilder, you came to Rosecrans with a good idea, he would knock you over heading for the door to implement it. No other general in the war nurtured as many innovations as Rosecrans. All those days with four hours of sleep & high energy activity came at a price. He suffered what can only be called a severe case of burnout after Chickamauga. His exhaustion had not affected his intellect. Grant ordered the actions Rosecrans had prepared into action, openly wondering why he had not done it himself.
All of what you said is true. That said, even Rosecrans' energy had its limits. His "hands on" - some might call it "micro-managing" - approach had its benefits and shortcomings. He and his staff were exhausted by the second day, and a mistake was made.
 
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