Murfreesboro Was Stones River Rosecrans's Greatest Victory?

Thanks for the suggestions! Did Castel write Decision in the West? I truly enjoyed that one.

Looking through some of the previous posts, I notice there was some talk about Garfield. I grew up at the James A. Garfield house in Mentor, Ohio, and am actually quite familiar with his story. He and Rosecrans were very close, but then he also seemed to undercut Rosecrans at times. Garfield was able to market himself (to use a modern term) as a hero of Chickamauga on the way to the presidency.
Garfield is an interesting and complex character who always had his own self interest in mind. In the end he liked -even loved- Rosecrans. He defended his military career and understood that politics played a big role in Rosecrans' fate. They did have a final break in 1880 because of politics. President Garfield would be assassinated the next year.
Albert Castel did write Decision in the West. He is one of the most important historians of the CW. He wrote a book of essays Winning and Losing in the Civil War which includes an essay about Sherman's Memoirs titled Prevaricating through Georgia.
 
Campaigns win wars not one battle. Stones River Tullahoma the Chattanooga Campaign and Chickamauga are all related. The Chattanooga Campaign was tougher than Tullahoma because of the more difficult terrain involved. The fact is had Rosecrans been given more troops - and he had a plan that was approved by the governors of IL PA and MA but rejected by the War Dept to do that- Chickamauga may have turned out differently. However there still would have been a battle for Chattanooga which would have resulted in two badly wounded armies with one in Chattanooga and one outside. That's essentially what did happen anyhow. The relevant question is what is it that caused Bragg to evacuate Chattanooga I'd say the threat to Bragg's rear which came about by theAOTC crossing Lookout Mountain.

If Rosecrans had gotten moving earlier in the spring, he would have had easily out-numbered Bragg at Chattanooga/Chickamauga. Braggs reinforcements would have still been preoccupied in the east.
 
If Rosecrans had gotten moving earlier in the spring, he would have had easily out-numbered Bragg at Chattanooga/Chickamauga. Braggs reinforcements would have still been preoccupied in the east.

I was sort of alluding to this: the delay of planning and planning seemed to work against Rosecrans. Grant thought that the Cracker Line was a good plan, but wondered why it has not been implemented, yet (at the time of the discussion)
 
Garfield is an interesting and complex character who always had his own self interest in mind. In the end he liked -even loved- Rosecrans. He defended his military career and understood that politics played a big role in Rosecrans' fate. They did have a final break in 1880 because of politics. President Garfield would be assassinated the next year.
Albert Castel did write Decision in the West. He is one of the most important historians of the CW. He wrote a book of essays Winning and Losing in the Civil War which includes an essay about Sherman's Memoirs titled Prevaricating through Georgia.
Regarding Garfield, he was extremely close to Salmon Chase. The generals he liked and didn't like often had to do with politics I think more than ability. For example, he was very high on Irvin McDowell and very against McClellan and Fitz John Porter. What was Rosecrans' politics? I always assumed he was of the conservative point of view of many of the other commanders during the war. However, I also have learned (maybe through your book?) that he was strongly considered as a vice presidential candidate in 1864.
 
Regarding Garfield, he was extremely close to Salmon Chase. The generals he liked and didn't like often had to do with politics I think more than ability. For example, he was very high on Irvin McDowell and very against McClellan and Fitz John Porter. What was Rosecrans' politics? I always assumed he was of the conservative point of view of many of the other commanders during the war. However, I also have learned (maybe through your book?) that he was strongly considered as a vice presidential candidate in 1864.
Rosecrans was a Democrat. Most generals were Democrats and suffered the consequence because Congress of course was controlled by the Republicans. Rosecrans however had good relations with many prominent Republicans including Chase, Garfield and Ben Wade among others. This was probably because Rosecrans was for emancipation before almost any other Dem general. Garfield offered him the VP nomination in 1864 but Rosecrans' acceptance never arrived (probably because of Stanton through whose office all military correspondence passed) at the convention in Baltimore. It should be remembered that that convention was officially the National Party convention not just the Republican convention therefore Rosecrans as a Dem could easily fit on the ticket with Lincoln.
People today have forgotten, or never knew, how highly regarded Rosecrans was during and after the War. The NY Times, edited by the chairman of the Republican Party, said in 1864 that Rosecrans was second in accomplishments only to Grant. No one can really understand the rise of Grant without understanding the role of Congressman Elihu Washburne. Grant may not have been politically ambitious but Washburne certainly was.
 
Rosecrans was a Democrat. Most generals were Democrats and suffered the consequence because Congress of course was controlled by the Republicans. Rosecrans however had good relations with many prominent Republicans including Chase, Garfield and Ben Wade among others. This was probably because Rosecrans was for emancipation before almost any other Dem general. Garfield offered him the VP nomination in 1864 but Rosecrans' acceptance never arrived (probably because of Stanton through whose office all military correspondence passed) at the convention in Baltimore. It should be remembered that that convention was officially the National Party convention not just the Republican convention therefore Rosecrans as a Dem could easily fit on the ticket with Lincoln.
People today have forgotten, or never knew, how highly regarded Rosecrans was during and after the War. The NY Times, edited by the chairman of the Republican Party, said in 1864 that Rosecrans was second in accomplishments only to Grant. No one can really understand the rise of Grant without understanding the role of Congressman Elihu Washburne. Grant may not have been politically ambitious but Washburne certainly was.
Was the offer before Chickamauga (which seems early) or after?
 
If Rosecrans had gotten moving earlier in the spring, he would have had easily out-numbered Bragg at Chattanooga/Chickamauga. Braggs reinforcements would have still been preoccupied in the east.
Rosecrans moved when he felt most comfortable. He had to build up an army that was capable of passing through difficult terrain with only a railroad line as a supply route. He, unlike Grant, would have no support from the Navy. After Tullahoma came the even more difficult -the most difficult of the War- terrain of the approaches to Chattanooga.
Why couldn't Rosecrans have been reinforced in August of 1863? You and I have discussed this in the past. That isn't as important as the fact that that very question was asked from 1863 and onwards. None of the supposed controversy regarding Rosecrans and Grant is new. It was discussed openly and heatedly in the 19th century. That so many find it new reflects on the shallow state of CW scholarship and readership.
 
Was the offer before Chickamauga (which seems early) or after?
Garfield's offer was in June of 1864 well after Chickamauga while Rosecrans was in command in Missouri.
This is important because it shows many things such as Rosecrans was not seen as being disgraced, Garfield regarded Rosecrans as a viable candidate despite Chickamuaga, Rosecrans was seen as a popular figure. I have seen letters from others who were at the Convention that attest to the enthusiasm for Rosecrans at the Convention.
Again the notion that he was in disgrace after Chickamauga is false. If anything he was another Democrat general who had been eased out of prominent command.
Btw the official name was the Union Convention not as I said in an earlier post the National Convention.
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I was sort of alluding to this: the delay of planning and planning seemed to work against Rosecrans. Grant thought that the Cracker Line was a good plan, but wondered why it has not been implemented, yet (at the time of the discussion)
The plan wasn't carried out earlier because of a shortage of transportation animals. Hooker, who was at Bridgeport AL, requested a delay in putting the plan in effect.
The notion Rosecrans was idling away time instead of carrying out his plan is a Grant creation from his Memoirs.
 
The plan wasn't carried out earlier because of a shortage of transportation animals. Hooker, who was at Bridgeport AL, requested a delay in putting the plan in effect.
The notion Rosecrans was idling away time instead of carrying out his plan is a Grant creation from his Memoirs.

No, it was not even close to being Grant's "creation," and for once maybe leave Grant out of it. Washington was not happy about how long it took Rosecrans to get moving.

In June '63, Halleck wrote Rosecrans, "I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity."
 
No, it was not even close to being Grant's "creation," and for once maybe leave Grant out of it. Washington was not happy about how long it took Rosecrans to get moving.

In June '63, Halleck wrote Rosecrans, "I deem it my duty to repeat to you the great dissatisfaction that is felt here at your inactivity."
Mr Hawk you are citing a quote from June when the topic was about a plan being carried out in October. To leave out Grant when discussing Rosecrans is to be either negligent or dishonest. Anyone who has studied the period with an open mind knows that this is one of the most important keys in understanding the war. I again urge you to read Victors in Blue by Albert Castel and the essay by Evan Jones, A Malignant Vindictiveness: The Two-Decade Rivalry between Ulysses S. Grant and William S. Rosecrans, in Gateway to the Confederacy. I of course also recommend the recent books by Frank Varney, Joe Rose and Myself. You may not like the similar conclusions all these books have reached but you can't, honestly, deny there is no connection between Grant and Rosecrans.
 
Mr Hawk you are citing a quote from June when the topic was about a plan beingis carried out in October. To leave out Grant when discussing Rosecrans is to be either negligent or dishonest. Anyone who has studied the period with an open mind knows that this is one of the most important keys in understanding the war. I again urge you to read Victors in Blue by Albert Castel and the essay by Evan Jones, A Malignant Vindictiveness: The Two-Decade Rivalry between Ulysses S. Grant and William S. Rosecrans, in Gateway to the Confederacy. I of course also recommend the recent books by Frank Varney, Joe Rose and Myself. You may not like the similar conclusions all these books have reached but you can't, honestly, deny there is no connection between Grant and Rosecrans.
The fact is that Washington was not at all happy with how long it took for Rosecrans to get moving in the spring of 1863. That is a fact. No amount of complaining about Grant changes that fact. No amount of excuse-making on Rosecrans' behalf changes that fact. Discussion of this fact does not in any way require involving Grant in the discussion.

As to the books of Varney, Rose, and yourself... I've read Rose's and was not impressed. I'll get around to yours and Varney's at some point.
 
The fact is that Washington was not at all happy with how long it took for Rosecrans to get moving in the spring of 1863. That is a fact. No amount of complaining about Grant changes that fact. No amount of excuse-making on Rosecrans' behalf changes that fact. Discussion of this fact does not in any way require involving Grant in the discussion.

As to the books of Varney, Rose, and yourself... I've read Rose's and was not impressed. I'll get around to yours and Varney's at some point.
Washington wasn't happy about a lot of things. Washington had little understanding of the terrain Rosecrans faced. (When Montgomery Meigs went to Chattanooga he wrote to Washington that he had no idea of the topography of the area.) Washington refused to support the plan Rosecrans had - a plan endorsed by the governors of IL, PA and MA -to reenlist veteran two year soldiers who would then serve in his army. He actually offered to resign if Washington was unhappy with him. That offer was refused. Garfield said there were leaders in Washington who "were not unwilling to see evil befall Rosecrans."
It appears you express a lot of opinions about the contents and conclusions of books you haven't read.
That is something I personally would avoid doing. Perhaps it would be more fruitful to refrain from commenting on my conclusions until you've actually looked at my supporting documentation.
Have you read the relevant essays regarding Grant and Rosecrans in Victors in Blue and Gateway to the Confederacy?
The authors have come to a similar conclusion about the two generals as I have.
BTW some of the most supportive and moving letters about Rosecrans I have come upon in my research have been from Wisconsin soldiers.
 
I found this exchange, here, as this is way outside my area of study, I have not confirmed the sourcing (the individual link appears broken) Anyhow, if valid, it does illustrate the discussion about terrain. What I am REALLY curious about is this: Halleck seemed to have it in for everyone Grant-Hooker-Meade --you name him, he seemed to be on Halleck's "list", was Rosecrans personally at odds with Halleck, also?


Near Chattanooga, Tenn.:

You give me no information of the position of Bragg and Buckner. If they have united, it is important that you and Burnside unite as quickly as possible, so that the enemy may not attack you separately.

H. W. HALLECK,

General-in-Chief.

*********************************************


HEADQUARTERS DEPARTMENT OF THE CUMBERLAND
, Trenton, Ga., September 7, 1863-midnight.
(Received 5 p.m., 8th.)
Major General H. W. HALLECK,
General-in-Chief:
Your dispatch of yesterday received with surprise. You have been often and fully advised that the nature of the country makes it impossible for this army to prevent Johnston from combining with Bragg. When orders for an advance of this army were made, it must have been known that those two rebel forces would combine against it, and, to some extent, choose their place of fighting us.

This has doubtless been done, and Buckner, Johnston, and Bragg are all near Chattanooga. The movement on East Tennessee was independent of mine. Your apprehensions are just, and the legitimate consequences of your orders. The best that can now be done is for Burnside to close his calvary down on our left, supporting it with his infantry, and, refusing* his left, threaten the enemy, without getting into his grasp, while we get him in our grip and strangle him, or perish in the attempt.

W. S. ROSECRANS,
Major-General.
 
You leave out the real power in my opinion: Stanton. These were ambitious people who realized that the end of the War would bring political change and opportunity. The fate of generals, and sadly soldiers, was not as important as the fate of politicians. Generals rose and fell based on their political support. Politicians latched on to generals and hoped to turn their battlefield success into political power. Who that general was was not as important as whether the general could be controlled politically.
Rosecrans refused to play the game and paid the price. (He was sounded out by an emissary from Horace Greeley on being a candidate for president in 1864. Rosecrans strongly rejected the idea.)
Grant, a man of no strong political convictions, was chosen and backed by Elihu Washburne one of the most ambitious and powerful men in Washington. To not know this is to not know a key part of the CW.
People today may find the dominant role of politics ludicrous but I can assure you people in the 19th century knew it was true.
(We are getting off target of the original post but all of this is interrelated.)
All I can suggest to people is to read deeply and broadly on the subject.
 
Rosecrans had a long supply line over the rails from Louisville all the way down to Murfreesboro. It was very vulnerable to Confederate raiders. The line was knocked out half the time. So Rosecrans was correct in building up a large stock of supplies before moving even farther south.

I've read how Meigs was shocked at how awful the road system was in the west, and that it made him appreciate things much better. The War Dept was just looking at a map wondering why in the heck is he not moving. They were afraid they had another McClellan...when in reality the West was much different than the Eastern Theater. Much rougher country with extended supply lines open to attack.

It would have been interesting to see what Rosecrans would have done marching through Georgia.

The troops loved the guy. They believed he had their well being in mind. When he was relieved they weren't happy. After the war he was given standing ovations by the troops at the Army of the Cumberland reunions he attended. This made him feel vindicated by his men.
 
"Politics" didn't sink Rosecrans. His failures as an army commander and his snide whiny communications with DC is what did him in.

Stanton, Halleck, Dana, Grant... all started with a high opinion of Rosecrans. And they all were disappointed by Rosecrans.

Dana was not the only journalist to observe and criticize Rosecrans performance as a commander. Henry Villard documented his first-hand experiences with Rosecrans as well, in his memoirs...

Villard Rosecrans.png


"There are flaws in his moral as well as intellectual composition and professional capacity, which the future will surely develop into prominent shortcomings..."

Villard's memoirs have many first-hand observations of Rosecrans, before and after Chickamauga.
 
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Rosecrans had a long supply line over the rails from Louisville all the way down to Murfreesboro. It was very vulnerable to Confederate raiders. The line was knocked out half the time. So Rosecrans was correct in building up a large stock of supplies before moving even farther south.

I've read how Meigs was shocked at how awful the road system was in the west, and that it made him appreciate things much better. The War Dept was just looking at a map wondering why in the heck is he not moving. They were afraid they had another McClellan...when in reality the West was much different than the Eastern Theater. Much rougher country with extended supply lines open to attack.

It would have been interesting to see what Rosecrans would have done marching through Georgia.

The troops loved the guy. They believed he had their well being in mind. When he was relieved they weren't happy. After the war he was given standing ovations by the troops at the Army of the Cumberland reunions he attended. This made him feel vindicated by his men.
Everything you have written is correct and easily verifiable with a little time in a good research library. That few CW students know this and many deny it is puzzling at best and troublesome at worst. Keep reading and studying. The truth is out there and discovering it is its own reward.
 
"Politics" didn't sink Rosecrans. His failures as an army commander and his snide whiny communications with DC is what did him in.

Stanton, Halleck, Dana, Grant... all started with a high opinion of Rosecrans. And they all were disappointed by Rosecrans.

Dana was not the only journalist to observe and criticize Rosecrans performance as a commander. Henry Villard documented his first-hand experiences with Rosecrans as well, in his memoirs...

View attachment 126518

"There are flaws in his moral as well as intellectual composition and professional capacity, which the future will surely develop into prominent shortcomings..."

Villard's memoirs have many first-hand observations of Rosecrans, before and after Chickamauga.
Please let me know when you've read some of the books that I've recommended and I will be happy to discuss these things with you. However you seem to be deficient in recent scholarship on this topic. I will add Marvel's biography of Stanton to the recommended list. Marvel notes that duplicity was a hallmark of Stanton's character.
As far as Villard you are quoting a small thing from a book published in 1904. Most of the people he discusses were dead and unable to respond to what he wrote. Have you read Lamers' Edge of Glory? (btw Lamers was a superintendent of Milwaukee public schools) If not you can use this link and search the word Villard to get his take on aspects of Villard. https://www.amazon.com/dp/080712396X/?tag=civilwartalkc-20
 
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Please let me know when you've read some of the books that I've recommended and I will be happy to discuss these things with you. However you seem to be deficient in recent scholarship on this topic. I will add Marvel's biography of Stanton to the recommended list. Marvel notes that duplicity was a hallmark of Stanton's character.
As far as Villard you are quoting a small thing from a book published in 1904. Most of the people he discusses were dead and unable to respond to what he wrote. Have you read Lamers' Edge of Glory? (btw Lamers was a superintendent of Milwaukee public schools) If not you can use this link and search the word Villard to get his take on aspects of Villard. https://www.amazon.com/dp/080712396X/?tag=civilwartalkc-20

And likewise, Rosecrans waited until after Garfield died to write his detailed account explaining why he retreated to Chattanooga while Garfield went to Thomas at Chickamauga.

And speaking of "hallmarks of character," Villard writes of his first-hand observations of Rosecrans character...

villard 1.jpg
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