Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he positioned his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the 2nd Day of Gettysburg?

29thWisCoG

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Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he moved down from Cemetery Ridge to position his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the second day?

What would have happened if he had remained on Cemetery Ridge as ordered, would there have been less casualties, would the line have held the Rebel attack?
 
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22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an...
Sickles characterized his assigned original line as a "hole", but it looks nothing like this when I look at the map I posted earlier... which leads me to believe he didn't have a clear understanding of where Meade wanted him to be... his bivouac location at the Trostle farm house the night before (July 1), along Plum Run, that was in a low spot relative to the Peach Orchard and I can see this as being Sickles "hole"... by the time Meade went to his position at the Peach Orchard it was too late to move him back, so Meade had no other choice but to reinforce the position... Sickles misunderstanding, or blatant insubordination, needlessly cost the AoTP many thousands of lives, and almost the devastation of the entire army. It was a very unfortunate turn of events. Had Sickles remained where originally assigned, his position was reasonably defensible, and IMO it is reasonable to assume that the ANV would have been repulsed as they swept down Emmitsburg Road that day as they had intended.

The challenge is that map is rather simplistic in not showing the extent of the forestry and visually impacting greenery from the George Weikert house south to Little Round Top. The higher spots are fronted by trees & other growth with makes the area less desirable militarily. The prime artillery locations end just north of the George Weikert house until you get to LRT.

In addition you have various wood lots going east to west towards the Emmitsburg Road which are going to impact what you can see.

Here's a military game map view of that area with each hex given an elevation number– the higher the number the higher the elevation... Keeping in mind this is Gettysburg and one digit separating two elevations (such as comparing a hex with a "7" elevation to a hex with an "8" elevation) isn't a lot. Yes, there is some difference but it is not as big a difference as one may think.

Capture.JPG


The defensive "gem" of the Union position was Cemetery Hill. And the further south you went the less impressive the Union position was until you reached LRT. I'm sure Sickles recognized this from his trips back and forth to Cemetery Hill.

From the George Weikert house to LRT, Sickles had about 6/10 of a mile of territory to defend that wasn't very good for artillery and was fronted by greenery that could potential shield Confederate movements.

And no, I'm not saying Sickles should have moved his corps to the Emmitsburg Road position but as I've stated previously in this thread I think there were reasons why he did so.
 
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What seems incomprehensible to me is that Sickles completely ignored Little Round Top. Not even a skirmish line to protect his flank.

True enough as far as being on Little Round Top itself, however the 2nd US Sharpshooter regiment was in skirmish formation from Slyder Lane to Bushman's Woods in order to catch any movement (which they did) on that end of the field.
 
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Sickles characterized his assigned original line as a "hole", but it looks nothing like this when I look at the map I posted earlier... which leads me to believe he didn't have a clear understanding of where Meade wanted him to be... his bivouac location at the Trostle farm house the night before (July 1), along Plum Run, that was in a low spot relative to the Peach Orchard and I can see this as being Sickles "hole"... by the time Meade went to his position at the Peach Orchard it was too late to move him back, so Meade had no other choice but to reinforce the position... Sickles misunderstanding, or blatant insubordination, needlessly cost the AoTP many thousands of lives, and almost the devastation of the entire army. It was a very unfortunate turn of events. Had Sickles remained where originally assigned, his position was reasonably defensible, and IMO it is reasonable to assume that the ANV would have been repulsed as they swept down Emmitsburg Road that day as they had intended.

The challenge is that map is rather simplistic in not showing the extent of the forestry and visually impacting greenery from the George Weikert house south to Little Round Top. The higher spots are fronted by trees & other growth with makes the area less desirable militarily. The prime artillery locations end just north of the George Weikert house until you get to LRT.

In addition you have various wood lots going west to east towards the Emmitsburg Road which are going to impact what you can see.

Here's a military game map view of that area with each hex given an elevation number– the higher the number the higher the elevation... Keeping in mind this is Gettysburg and one digit separating two elevations (such as comparing a hex with a "7" elevation to a hex with an "8" elevation) isn't a lot. Yes, there is some difference but it is not as big a difference as one may think.

View attachment 409425

The defensive "gem" of the Union position was Cemetery Hill. And the further south you went the less impressive the Union position was until you reached LRT. I'm sure Sickles recognized this from his trips back and forth to Cemetery Hill.

From the George Weikert house to LRT, Sickles had about 6/10 of a mile of territory to defend that wasn't very good for artillery and was fronted by greenery that could potential shield Confederate movements.

And no, I'm not saying Sickles should have moved his corps to the Emmitsburg Road position but as I've stated previously in this thread I think there were reasons why he did so.
Dave Powell assessed the Peach Orchard turf in light of the Cemetery Ridge line (already posted). As an aside, I can assure you that Dave has walked this field and explored elevations and terrain far more than you or I ever will. Dave, among his many other skills, is a talented consim designer and was involved in designing two board games for The Gamers - This Hallowed Ground (regimental level) and Thunder at the Crossroads (brigade level). The maps used for his several designs are deeply researched, so he knows his stuff. It was an amateur mistake likely based on the erroneous conclusion that he was in the same circumstances as on May 3.
 
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Dave Powell assessed the Peach Orchard turf in light of the Cemetery Ridge line (already posted). As an aside, I can assure you that Dave has walked this field and explored elevations and terrain far more than you or I ever will. Dave, among his many other skills, is a talented consim designer and was involved in designing two board games for The Gamers - This Hallowed Ground (regimental level) and Thunder at the Crossroads (brigade level). The maps used for his several designs are deeply researched, so he knows his stuff. ersal osriosads It was an amateur mistake likely based on the erroneous conclusion that he was in the same circumstances as on May 3.

Who's debating that the move to the Peach Orchard was the right move?
 
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Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he moved down from Cemetery Ridge to position his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the second day?

What would have happened if he had remained on Cemetery Ridge as ordered, would there have been less casualties, would the line have held the Rebel attack?
No one can know for sure. My opinion has usually been that of viewing the results of an action. We cannot know what might have happened for moves that did not, in fact, happen.

Lee's plan seems to have been to attack up Emmitsburg Pike, and roll up Hancock's Line onto the Union Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill Line.

It is well to remember confederate corps were oversized in comparison of the AoP and III Corps was badly depleted from its actions at Chancellorsville . . Very few Union cops could take on a confederate corps without help., especially if surprised by a full blooded assault on its flank.

Sickles' Corps had to spread itself dangerously thin to just reach the base of LRT(not occupy it), i.e., he had no mass at any point of his line to receive a serious attack.
Lee, in his reports
I believe mentioned in his reports that the high ground at the Peach Orchard gave his artillery a clear line of fire on Cemetery Hill , i.e., it dominated Cemetery Hill and Sickles' assigned position on Hancock's flank.

Lee's attack was to be on the flank of the AoP and the veteran Hood was disconcerted when he reached his jump-off position for his division , supposedly to the South of the Union Line and found Union troops to his front. What disconcerted him, was not that there were Union troops there, but that they were facing his line of attack, in Line of Battle.

Instead of a full blooded, coordinated assault on the Union MLR, with full artillery support and open ground for the assault to gain momentum. The attack was stalled at its very beginning and turned into a slow grinding battle of attrition., that took the entire afternoon to overcome, prolonged, whether by chance or plan, is unclear to me, by Meade feeding in just enough reinforcements to lengthen the battle without endangering his Cemetery Hill defenses


P.S. it seems that Lee's failure on Day and 2 was cause for blame. That it might have been done better, is an assumption, based upon other assumptions. If anything, the confederate failures on all 3 days of the battle rests on Lee and his faulty system of command; if Lee had been able to command Longstreet, the attack would have began before III Corps was even in position in its original position, even before Sickles' made his movement forward, in the first place.
 
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Who's debating that the move to the Peach Orchard was the right move?
I don't know. You put up a map from a consim game and made observations about the terrain. I'm simply pointing out that Dave's analysis of the terrain stems not only from his numerous visits to the field but that he has designed maps for consims based on that work. I'd recommend those. Another guy who has designed solid maps for consims covering that terrain is the late Rick Barber (who actually made a number of visits in Dave's company). Those maps are worth looking at, as well.
 
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His Chickamauga books are really well worth reading. His narrative cuts through the confusion The same goes for his collaboration with Eric Wittenberg on Tullahoma.

Yes, I have the Tullahoma book and also the Chickamauga map book. I recently visited the Golden Spike national park in Utah and am reading a book I bought there on the building of the transcontinental railroad, "Empire Express". Then I'll tackle Chickamauga.

243FA203-65B2-4471-8F71-6B1BEC96B747.jpeg
4B89FC54-FFC5-4373-8563-463AE37536FA.jpeg
 
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I don't know. You put up a map from a consim game and made observations about the terrain. I'm simply pointing out that Dave's analysis of the terrain stems not only from his numerous visits to the field but that he has designed maps for consims based on that work. I'd recommend those. Another guy who has designed solid maps for consims covering that terrain is the late Rick Barber (who actually made a number of visits in Dave's company). Those maps are worth looking at, as well.

I appreciated the maps "heads-up". I enjoy maps period.
 
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No one can know for sure. My opinion has usually been that of viewing the results of an action. We cannot know what might have happened for moves that did not, in fact, happen.

Lee's plan seems to have been to attack up Emmitsburg Pike, and roll up Hancock's Line onto the Union Cemetery Hill, Culp's Hill Line.

It is well to remember confederate corps were oversized in comparison of the AoP and III Corps was badly depleted from its actions at Chancellorsville . . Very few Union cops could take on a confederate corps without help., especially if surprised by a full blooded assault on its flank.

Sickles' Corps had to spread itself dangerously thin to just reach the base of LRT(not occupy it), i.e., he had no mass at any point of his line to receive a serious attack.
Lee, in his reports
I believe mentioned in his reports that the high ground at the Peach Orchard gave his artillery a clear line of fire on Cemetery Hill , i.e., it dominated Cemetery Hill and Sickles' assigned position on Hancock's flank.

Lee's attack was to be on the flank of the AoP and the veteran Hood was disconcerted when he reached his jump-off position for his division , supposedly to the South of the Union Line and found Union troops to his front. What disconcerted him, was not that there were Union troops there, but that they were facing his line of attack, in Line of Battle.

Instead of a full blooded, coordinated assault on the Union MLR, with full artillery support and open ground for the assault to gain momentum. The attack was stalled at its very beginning and turned into a slow grinding battle of attrition., that took the entire afternoon to overcome, prolonged, whether by chance or plan, is unclear to me, by Meade feeding in just enough reinforcements to lengthen the battle without endangering his Cemetery Hill defenses


P.S. it seems that Lee's failure on Day and 2 was cause for blame. That it might have been done better, is an assumption, based upon other assumptions. If anything, the confederate failures on all 3 days of the battle rests on Lee and his faulty system of command; if Lee had been able to command Longstreet, the attack would have began before III Corps was even in position in its original position, even before Sickles' made his movement forward, in the first place.
The original Union line was actually even further south than Lee had thought, and it was anchored on LRT. As for the Peach Orchard position, Powell has explained its vulnerability to Union guns along the Ridge. So while Alexander's boys were launching long range shots at the Hill, they would have been taking a large dose of incoming. As for anything about Lee not managing Longstreet adequately, I assume you're referring to the conventional wisdom that Longstreet delayed implementing what Lee wanted him to do. I found Pfarr's excellent 2019 book (that I referred to in an earlier post) very enlightening on this subject.
 
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I appreciated the maps "heads-up". I enjoy maps period.
He did a set of 9 for the Gamers' three Seven Days sims. There are a couple in which he developed previously-unknown information The area was poorly-mapped as of 1862 and there was no well-known historical base for covering some of the terrain, which was long since buried under pavement or construction. One example was an area near Malvern Hill called "the slashing". He and Barber are two examples of guys who designed consim maps that almost make buying the games worthwhile for that reason alone - even with adjustments for using hexes, etc.
 
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How much blame can be placed on Meade in the instance of giving Sickles that part of the Cemetery Ridge line to begin with. If Meade new the difficulties Sickles faced in obedience and training, would it not have been better to keep him closer on a tether, and not at the extreme flank of the AOP? Would Meade have time on July 1st, evening to form a better plan for defense by giving switching corps with one another, and placing Sickles at a less vulnerable spot?
Lubliner.
 
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How much blame can be placed on Meade in the instance of giving Sickles that part of the Cemetery Ridge line to begin with. If Meade new the difficulties Sickles faced in obedience and training, would it not have been better to keep him closer on a tether, and not at the extreme flank of the AOP? Would Meade have time on July 1st, evening to form a better plan for defense by giving switching corps with one another, and placing Sickles at a less vulnerable spot?
Lubliner.

The timing of how the corps arrived on the field and their locations on the evening of July 1st/morning of July 2nd, I could easily see the II and III Corps switching places.
 
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Some thoughts after reading some of these discussions:

Terrain

While I would not characterize the terrain that Sickles was supposed to hold as a "hole" like he did, there are spots where it was noticably lower than the Emmitsburg Road ridge to his front. In addition, it was poorly suited for artillery as there were numerous woodlots that cut down sight lines but it was also quite rocky, hindering the guns' deployment. For modern reference, the Third Corps line extended from about the Father Corby monument to Munshower's Knoll. I get why Sickles didn't like his position but his problem was his inability to see the bigger picture and how he fit within the greater plan. As James Hessler puts it, Sickles was an emotional man who led with his gut but needed affirmation. As early as the morning of July 2, he was already looking to the front and developed tunnel vision regarding the two positions. He never went to LRT and never really scouted the Second Corps' position to see how he fit in with the rest of the army.

Communication

Something that also needs to be addressed is the relationship between Sickles and Meade. They did not get along at all and on several occasions that morning, they were essentially talking past one another. Meade only sent verbal orders to Sickles and Sickles repeatedly stated that he didn't understand exactly where he was supposed to be (he was supposed to place his left where Geary's Division had been camped the night before but he did not know where Geary had been and, to be fair, we still don't know definitively where Geary was). Sickles was afraid that he was going to become the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville and the ridge to his front caused him a lot of concern. When Meade finally dispatched Hunt with Sickles late in the morning, Sickles took him out to the ridge in addition to showing him the line on the ridge that he wanted to occupy. Hunt agreed with Sickles that the ridge was a better position but pointed out that if the Confederates held Seminary Ridge, it was going to be very difficult to hold (which prompted Sickles to dispatch the 3rd Maine and 1st United States Sharpshooters to Pitzer's Woods where they bump into Anderson's Division moving into position). This firefight fed into Sickles' fear about the Rebels trying to get around his flank and when Buford's Division was ordered out for refitting, it was the straw that broke the camel's back. With no one watching his flank, Sickles felt that he had to take the ridge but in doing so, put his men right into the frying pan and then botched the deployment, leaving his corps spread too thin and exposed.

Ryan
 
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With no one watching his flank, Sickles felt that he had to take the ridge but in doing so, put his men right into the frying pan and then botched the deployment, leaving his corps spread too thin and exposed.
Realize this is a 'what-if'; If Pleasanton had replacement cavalry placed at the same location in the same role as Buford was performing prior to pulling out for the refit, would this have been sufficient to influence Sickles to stay where he was or was it a moot point as Sickles was already skittish and determined to move forward to the new ground?
 
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Realize this is a 'what-if'; If Pleasanton had replacement cavalry placed at the same location in the same role as Buford was performing prior to pulling out for the refit, would this have been sufficient to influence Sickles to stay where he was or was it a moot point as Sickles was already skittish and determined to move forward to the new ground?
My guess is that Sickles would have reinforced the cavalry with some of his men in order to beef up the forward line but he probably wouldn't have moved the entire corps forward.

Ryan
 
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Some thoughts after reading some of these discussions:

Terrain

While I would not characterize the terrain that Sickles was supposed to hold as a "hole" like he did, there are spots where it was noticably lower than the Emmitsburg Road ridge to his front. In addition, it was poorly suited for artillery as there were numerous woodlots that cut down sight lines but it was also quite rocky, hindering the guns' deployment. For modern reference, the Third Corps line extended from about the Father Corby monument to Munshower's Knoll. I get why Sickles didn't like his position but his problem was his inability to see the bigger picture and how he fit within the greater plan. As James Hessler puts it, Sickles was an emotional man who led with his gut but needed affirmation. As early as the morning of July 2, he was already looking to the front and developed tunnel vision regarding the two positions. He never went to LRT and never really scouted the Second Corps' position to see how he fit in with the rest of the army.

Communication

Something that also needs to be addressed is the relationship between Sickles and Meade. They did not get along at all and on several occasions that morning, they were essentially talking past one another. Meade only sent verbal orders to Sickles and Sickles repeatedly stated that he didn't understand exactly where he was supposed to be (he was supposed to place his left where Geary's Division had been camped the night before but he did not know where Geary had been and, to be fair, we still don't know definitively where Geary was). Sickles was afraid that he was going to become the Eleventh Corps at Chancellorsville and the ridge to his front caused him a lot of concern. When Meade finally dispatched Hunt with Sickles late in the morning, Sickles took him out to the ridge in addition to showing him the line on the ridge that he wanted to occupy. Hunt agreed with Sickles that the ridge was a better position but pointed out that if the Confederates held Seminary Ridge, it was going to be very difficult to hold (which prompted Sickles to dispatch the 3rd Maine and 1st United States Sharpshooters to Pitzer's Woods where they bump into Anderson's Division moving into position). This firefight fed into Sickles' fear about the Rebels trying to get around his flank and when Buford's Division was ordered out for refitting, it was the straw that broke the camel's back. With no one watching his flank, Sickles felt that he had to take the ridge but in doing so, put his men right into the frying pan and then botched the deployment, leaving his corps spread too thin and exposed.

Ryan

Excellent post.
 
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