Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he positioned his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the 2nd Day of Gettysburg?

29thWisCoG

Corporal
Joined
Apr 12, 2021
Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he moved down from Cemetery Ridge to position his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the second day?

What would have happened if he had remained on Cemetery Ridge as ordered, would there have been less casualties, would the line have held the Rebel attack?
 
Best Answer
22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an...
Obviously you aren't a "Dan-man". lol

I don't have quite the negative bent towards the guy's abilities.

To understand why he did it takes a certain amount of empathy for his situation and the recent past, i.e. Chancellorsville.

Meade and Pleasonton did not do Sickles any favors.

Sickles' aid made numerous trips to Meade's headquarters to get clarification. Finally Sickles went there himself– Certainly not the act of someone trying to be a "loose cannon".

Finally Meade sent Hunt to review the position Sickles was interested in occupying offering both negative (i.e. longer line and the gap created between the right flank of Humphries division and the left flank of the II Corps, and positive views of the position.

And when Buford's division marched off at about 10:30AM leaving the extreme left-flank of the army with no cavalry screen– that's all it took to set everything into motion.
That's all spiffy and lovely. But in the end, he intentionally disobeyed a direct, lawful order. That's insubordination, and he would have been relieved of command and court-martialed but for the nearly fatal wound. Empathy is irrelevant.
 
Vote Here:
I am doing research on how certain generals are remembered with the goal of publishing an article. Sickles has become a big part of my research. These questions I'm asking are questions that I have been asking myself. Thought I would pose them to get other interpretations.
As a big fan of historiography, I look forward to reading what you come up with.

My thoughts, for what they're worth: I've found (in all time periods) that the people who talk about it the most tend to get the most attention. Sickles had a natural tendency to invite controversy and make bombastic statements, which by its nature grabs attention. Like today, people are drawn to that sort of thing. He was also a major public figure, remained heavily involved in the battlefield throughout his life, and drew other well-known people into the controversy. All that produced very public debate and also makes sources readily available. Drama, availability, and at this point, pedigree (it has a long history of being THE controversy) all mix to make it what it is today.
 
Vote Here:
I've walked Sickles intended line numerous time because this "what if" part of the battle fascinates me, and I will say that area from the present Father Corby monument south to LRT never knocked my socks off from a defensibility point-of-view. Arguably it may have been the worst section of defensible line out of the entire "fish-hook". I'm not saying that Sickles was correct in doing what he did, but I'm not sure a Union force in that area would have repulsed a strong Confederate attack either.

It will remain one of those great unanswerable parts of the battle.
I am curious what the topography of that line was... did it slope down from Cemetery Ridge to the base of LRT, and how wooded is that area?
 
Vote Here:
Obviously you aren't a "Dan-man". lol

I don't have quite the negative bent towards the guy's abilities.

To understand why he did it takes a certain amount of empathy for his situation and the recent past, i.e. Chancellorsville.

Meade and Pleasonton did not do Sickles any favors.

Sickles' aid made numerous trips to Meade's headquarters to get clarification. Finally Sickles went there himself– Certainly not the act of someone trying to be a "loose cannon".

Finally Meade sent Hunt to review the position Sickles was interested in occupying offering both negative (i.e. longer line and the gap created between the right flank of Humphries division and the left flank of the II Corps, and positive views of the position.

And when Buford's division marched off at about 10:30AM leaving the extreme left-flank of the army with no cavalry screen– that's all it took to set everything into motion.
To be clear, my criticism of the decision has nothing to do with his complete lack of character. The decision viewed strictly objectively was an egregiously bad one from a tactical standpoint. His abhorrent character comes into play on two other issues. He held his position because he used his political power to get it despite his wholesale absence of any military experience or training - he wasn't a "victim". That lack of qualifications was on full display on July 2 and a lot of good Third Corps soldiers paid for it with their lives. It also comes into play in his disreputable campaign of lies and slander to promote himself as some sort of hero, at the calculated expense of Meade. Small wonder that in 1886 $27,000 intended for NY monuments at Gettysburg under Dan's authority went missing. Convert that into 2021 dollars. $!00 in 1886 is $2,890 today.
 
Vote Here:
That's all spiffy and lovely. But in the end, he intentionally disobeyed a direct, lawful order. That's insubordination, and he would have been relieved of command and court-martialed but for the nearly fatal wound. Empathy is irrelevant.
Nail on the head - he would have been deservedly cashiered "but for the nearly fatal wound ..." - and his estimable skills as a corrupt politician who knew how to work his friends in Washington and how to convince the guys in the Third Corps who paid the price for his arrogant incompetence that they - due to his valiant "leadership" - "saved" the Army.
 
Vote Here:
I am curious what the topography of that line was... did it slope down from Cemetery Ridge to the base of LRT, and how wooded is that area?
Yeah, you pretty much nailed it. It was low with wood lots here & there. Even though the park service has done a good job restoring the 1863 "look", I think that part of the battlefield today is still too "Woodsy".
 
Vote Here:
To be clear, my criticism of the decision has nothing to do with his complete lack of character. The decision viewed strictly objectively was an egregiously bad one from a tactical standpoint. His abhorrent character comes into play on two other issues. He held his position because he used his political power to get it despite his wholesale absence of any military experience or training - he wasn't a "victim". That lack of qualifications was on full display on July 2 and a lot of good Third Corps soldiers paid for it with their lives. It also comes into play in his disreputable campaign of lies and slander to promote himself as some sort of hero, at the calculated expense of Meade. Small wonder that in 1886 $27,000 intended for NY monuments at Gettysburg under Dan's authority went missing. Convert that into 2021 dollars. $!00 in 1886 is $2,890 today.

No one is nominating Dan for a "Good citizenship award." lol

While I understand your point-of-view, I just do not see it quite as extreme.

I don't view Dan as quite as incompetent.

He did a masterful job of moving the III corps to Gettysburg while being hit with confusing orders. Also did the right thing by leaving a couple brigades behind just in case.
 
Vote Here:
No one is nominating Dan for a "Good citizenship award." lol

While I understand your point-of-view, I just do not see it quite as extreme.

I don't view Dan as quite as incompetent.

He did a masterful job of moving the III corps to Gettysburg while being hit with confusing orders. Also did the right thing by leaving a couple brigades behind just in case.
Don't get me wrong - moving troops to a specific destination, setting up encampments, etc, is important. But what's more important is what happens once the shooting starts. I grade what he did on July 2 as "F" and his own explanations/justification show he wasn't fit for the job. I haven't seen your analysis of the decision on July 2. A good place to start is the one I and others have used - the Powell evaluation. Feel free to take it on. (By the way, this isn't a zero-sum game. One can find places to debate Mead's actions without converting Sickles' grade into an "A")
 
Vote Here:
Don't get me wrong - moving troops to a specific destination, setting up encampments, etc, is important. But what's more important is what happens once the shooting starts. I grade what he did on July 2 as "F" and his own explanations/justification show he wasn't fit for the job. I haven't seen your analysis of the decision on July 2. A good place to start is the one I and others have used - the Powell evaluation. Feel free to take it on. (By the way, this isn't a zero-sum game. One can find places to debate Mead's actions without converting Sickles' grade into an "A")

Any grade you want to give him is hunky-dory by me.
 
Vote Here:
Any grade you want to give him is hunky-dory by me.
I have no problem with anybody disagreeing - if they can point to reasons. I think that's a tough uphill climb with Dirty Dan. (He retained his commission as Brigadier General only with a boatload of political lobbying in Spring 1862.) If you're looking to give him an "A", use it for squirreling away that $780,000 that was supposed to go for monuments. Now that's impressive ... 😎
 
Vote Here:
this is what I was looking for, don't know why that original position is so indefensible? might be hard to read but the dashed line is where Meade had placed Sickles originally

day2.jpg
 
Vote Here:
I agree that we should not judge the decision to advance III Corps based on murder trials, embezzlement, or bearing false witness against others, etc.

There were thousands of reasons Sickles advance was unfortunate. Specifically how disruptive it was to the AOP's defense and the number of troops moved or disrupted to rectify the mistake. Burling's Brigade was divided and mixed in here and there and intermixed commands seemed to factor negatively at the Peach Orchard, Carr was borrowed from, Tilton and Sweitzer (effective or not) were advanced when they could otherwise have been in reserve, Caldwell's Division got consumed, Willard's Brigade was called from the area of Ziegler's Woods towards the Cordori Thicket, the 1st Minnesota had to nearly sacrifice itself and the bulk of the XII Corps, save one Brigade, left Culp's Hill. I'd respectfully submit that the high water mark of the Confederacy may have been it's occupation of lower Culp's Hill which was handed to them because of events Sickles put in motion. Had the sun been up longer, the Baltimore Pike was there for the taking which likely makes Cemetery Hill untenable. Overall, the move forced the AOP to assume the tactical offensive when they were in a defensive position causing unnecessary casualties. Just my humble opinion.
 
Vote Here:
Yeah, I'm not saying it an "A" move. Not hardly.

But I believe the reason(s) why he made the move needs to be viewed as a separate event.

That's all.
I think it's artificial to try to "separate" the reason why he made the move from the move itself. But here goes ... He apparently made the move - according to everybody I've seen who has analyzed the subject, anyway - because of the perceived similarity of his circumstances on July 2 to those he was in on May 3 at Chancellorsville. Dave Powell has shown in specific detail why that was wrong. If he made the move merely because of the simplistic notion that the ground was "slightly higher", that was even worse, because any "reason" has to involve a "cost benefit" analysis. Look at how he ended up, which was a function of the terrain. Either he had no clue how he would end up or he disregarded it. Either one is an unmitigated "F".
 
Vote Here:
I think it's artificial to try to "separate" the reason why he made the move from the move itself. But here goes ... He apparently made the move - according to everybody I've seen who has analyzed the subject, anyway - because of the perceived similarity of his circumstances on July 2 to those he was in on May 3 at Chancellorsville. Dave Powell has shown in specific detail why that was wrong. If he made the move merely because of the simplistic notion that the ground was "slightly higher", that was even worse, because any "reason" has to involve a "cost benefit" analysis. Look at how he ended up, which was a function of the terrain. Either he had no clue how he would end up or he disregarded it. Either one is an unmitigated "F".

I fully understand your position.
 
Vote Here:
I agree that we should not judge the decision to advance III Corps based on murder trials, embezzlement, or bearing false witness against others, etc.

There were thousands of reasons Sickles advance was unfortunate. Specifically how disruptive it was to the AOP's defense and the number of troops moved or disrupted to rectify the mistake. Burling's Brigade was divided and mixed in here and there and intermixed commands seemed to factor negatively at the Peach Orchard, Carr was borrowed from, Tilton and Sweitzer (effective or not) were advanced when they could otherwise have been in reserve, Caldwell's Division got consumed, Willard's Brigade was called from the area of Ziegler's Woods towards the Cordori Thicket, the 1st Minnesota had to nearly sacrifice itself and the bulk of the XII Corps, save one Brigade, left Culp's Hill. I'd respectfully submit that the high water mark of the Confederacy may have been it's occupation of lower Culp's Hill which was handed to them because of events Sickles put in motion. Had the sun been up longer, the Baltimore Pike was there for the taking which likely makes Cemetery Hill untenable. Overall, the move forced the AOP to assume the tactical offensive when they were in a defensive position causing unnecessary casualties. Just my humble opinion.
"I agree that we should not judge the decision to advance III Corps based on murder trials, embezzlement, or bearing false witness against others, etc."

I'm sure you're not referring to me, because I've made it beyond clear more than once that my analysis of the decision itself has literally zero to do with anything other than it lack of tactical merit. On the other hand, pointing out how Sickles got his appointment in the first place helps explain how he could make such an inept military decision, including unilaterally disobeying a order. And pointing out that he was a mendacious politician is directly relevant to assessing his post-battle campaign to present his decision as one that "saved" the Army and the battle.
 
Vote Here:
this is what I was looking for, don't know why that original position is so indefensible? might be hard to read but the dashed line is where Meade had placed Sickles originally

View attachment 409392
In short, it isn't. You can clearly see LRT anchoring his left and the Second Corps on his right. And not shown is the Fifth Corps in close support. "Higher ground" towards the Emmitsburg Road would have to be akin to Mt. Everest to justify unilaterally moving out of that alignment. Picture Longstreet attacking where the ANV thought at the time that the Union left ended. And you can see the ground controlled by the Federal artillery along Cemetery Ridge.
 
Vote Here:
"I agree that we should not judge the decision to advance III Corps based on murder trials, embezzlement, or bearing false witness against others, etc."

I'm sure you're not referring to me, because I've made it beyond clear more than once that my analysis of the decision itself has literally zero to do with anything other than it lack of tactical merit. On the other hand, pointing out how Sickles got his appointment in the first place helps explain how he could make such an inept military decision, including unilaterally disobeying a order. And pointing out that he was a mendacious politician is directly relevant to assessing his post-battle campaign to present his decision as one that "saved" the Army and the battle.
I wasn't referring to any person specifically.
 
Vote Here:
Back
Top