Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he positioned his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the 2nd Day of Gettysburg?

29thWisCoG

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Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he moved down from Cemetery Ridge to position his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the second day?

What would have happened if he had remained on Cemetery Ridge as ordered, would there have been less casualties, would the line have held the Rebel attack?
 
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22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an...
@Belfoured is it possible Sickles may not have anticipated a direct assault on his floating wing? If he was anticipating a confederate drive from the southern parts of the field, and maybe the northern parts, could he have felt the confederates wouldn't converge against his open flank at the peach orchard?
Below I tried to diagram what I mean.
|----- ___; , / -->......../ <--
............................./ <--
Lubliner.
 
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Quote: "Clearly one of the reasons Meade tended to ignore Sickles concerns, was that he did not expect any enemy movements on his Left"
On the contrary, Meade knew he had to fill the left flank because he feared such a move. Meade knew he was wide open there and it seemed like the most likely move Lee would make next.
Indeed the history of the AoP up to then, would certainly indicate such a move. But, the evidence that Meade was aware of it, is slight, if not none existent. In fact, it would seem that his attention was diverted to his Right, if anything.
 
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@Belfoured is it possible Sickles may not have anticipated a direct assault on his floating wing? If he was anticipating a confederate drive from the southern parts of the field, and maybe the northern parts, could he have felt the confederates wouldn't converge against his open flank at the peach orchard?
Below I tried to diagram what I mean.
|----- ___; , / -->......../ <--
............................./ <--
Lubliner.
@Lubliner: He had two exposed flanks. He adjusted for the left by having to "refuse" - which then created the vulnerable salient in the middle (pick your poison) but did nothing about his right (or about the significant gap in his front that resulted from his lack of enough troops to man his line). He significantly increased the distance from any support for his now-isolated corps. I don't think we have any idea as to what he "anticipated" or, if so, whether that made sense. It's complete speculation. All the problems were created by his decision to move unilaterally - despite even Hunt's advice when Hunt left to check with Meade.

As I keep saying, all anybody has to do is look at an accurate map of his second line position in relation to the rest of the Army. I still await the opinion of a military professional that the second line was a good idea. That's completely different from whether he somehow blundered into a location that Longstreet, et al thought was open. And anybody who thinks that Sickles knew the intended location and direction of Longstreet's attack is actually going farther than even good old "Historicus" went in his pr campaign. It should come as no surprise that his corps was wrecked and that - despite his post-battle spin - the day was salvaged on the Union left by Meade, et al slamming in troops from the V Corps and the II Corps.
 
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Indeed the history of the AoP up to then, would certainly indicate such a move. But, the evidence that Meade was aware of it, is slight, if not none existent. In fact, it would seem that his attention was diverted to his Right, if anything.
Facts would help in making an assertion that evidence of Meade's awareness of a move against his left is "non existent". Otherwise it's what's known in the legal realm as a "conclusory allegation".

As an aside, the "move" by the ANV that occurred here was categorically different than the one Sickles had completely misread at Chancellorsville.
 
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Goals are scored in the NHL when the puck hits an out-of-position attacking player in the elbow and is deflected past the G. That doesn't make it a smart play in the O Zone or something the coach is going to draw up on the white board.

"Most positions taken up hastily in expected battle, have flaws and the commanders who detect them first has the advantage"

Any shave tail who submitted a paper to the C&GS College arguing that Sickles' line was a solid tactical alignment would be steered to another line of work. There's a difference between "flaws" in "positions taken up hastily in battle" and a deliberate decision to abandon all connection with supporting forces, opening your flanks, doubling the length of a line you already thought was too thinly-held and therefore creating large gaps with a vulnerable salient in the middle. I haven't seen anybody claim that Sickles' poor alignment was calculated to disrupt Longstreet's attack at the destruction of his own corps.
No one on this thread has claimed Sickles' movement was 'a solid tactical alignment' the Question Of The OP, is was Sickles' movement justified?

The movement was justified by events. Whatever the reasons for the movement, it, in fact, placed III Corps in a position to defend in-depth and block Lee's flank attack up Emmitsburg Pike.
 
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Facts would help in making an assertion that evidence of Meade's awareness of a move against his left is "non existent". Otherwise it's what's known in the legal realm as a "conclusory allegation".

As an aside, the "move" by the ANV that occurred here was categorically different than the one Sickles had completely misread at Chancellorsville.
Do you have non Conclusory allegations that shows Meade's concerns for his Left Flank?


P.S. Chancellorsville was, hopefully, Sickles' first experience with his command bearing the brunt of ill considered orders from Hdqtrs.
 
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Do you have non Conclusory allegations that shows Meade's concerns for his Left Flank?


P.S. Chancellorsville was, hopefully, Sickles' first experience with his command bearing the brunt of ill considered orders from Hdqtrs.
"Do you have non Conclusory allegations that shows Meade's concerns for his Left Flank?"

When you answer a question with a question, we know what the answer is. The way this works is that I asked first. (Although I did address that in an earlier post).

P.S. The "ill-considered orders from HQ" at Chancellorsville were based in part on Sickles' dead-wrong misinterpretation of what Jackson was doing. Chicken-egg.
 
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No one on this thread has claimed Sickles' movement was 'a solid tactical alignment' the Question Of The OP, is was Sickles' movement justified?

The movement was justified by events. Whatever the reasons for the movement, it, in fact, placed III Corps in a position to defend in-depth and block Lee's flank attack up Emmitsburg Pike.
That's completely circular, with all due respect. His movement was unilateral. It resulted in a poor alignment. You seem to find it "justified" by completely ignoring the context. It was not "justified" because it was unilateral. Had it not been unilateral, the fatal defects in the second line could have been avoided. Why do you think Hunt told him to hold off?
 
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@Lubliner: He had two exposed flanks. He adjusted for the left by having to "refuse" - which then created the vulnerable salient in the middle (pick your poison) but did nothing about his right (or about the significant gap in his front that resulted from his lack of enough troops to man his line). He significantly increased the distance from any support for his now-isolated corps. I don't think we have any idea as to what he "anticipated" or, if so, whether that made sense. It's complete speculation. All the problems were created by his decision to move unilaterally - despite even Hunt's advice when Hunt left to check with Meade.

As I keep saying, all anybody has to do is look at an accurate map of his second line position in relation to the rest of the Army. I still await the opinion of a military professional that the second line was a good idea. That's completely different from whether he somehow blundered into a location that Longstreet, et al thought was open. And anybody who thinks that Sickles knew the intended location and direction of Longstreet's attack is actually going farther than even good old "Historicus" went in his pr campaign. It should come as no surprise that his corps was wrecked and that - despite his post-battle spin - the day was salvaged on the Union left by Meade, et al slamming in troops from the V Corps and the II Corps.
Your explanation has me believing Sickles felt he could defend his position better without coordinating his Corps with the rest of the army. Of course, it is a major flaw to a combined army, and Sickles should have known. But now, I am beginning to think he trusted his own judgement more than an established doctrine. I wonder if Eisenhower ever made a comment on this decision of his?
Lubliner.
 
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22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an imperative order."

Who was ignoring who?
 
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Your explanation has me believing Sickles felt he could defend his position better without coordinating his Corps with the rest of the army. Of course, it is a major flaw to a combined army, and Sickles should have known. But now, I am beginning to think he trusted his own judgement more than an established doctrine. I wonder if Eisenhower ever made a comment on this decision of his?
Lubliner.
I guess I'd respond by saying (1) look at an accurate map of his second line and the location of the rest of the Army and (2) compare Sickles' numbers with Longstreet's. In other words, he may have believed that but if he did that says a whole lot about his qualifications. Personally, I think his only consideration was with "higher ground", and even that could go both ways, as Hunt observed.

According to the NPS, this was Ike's view: "And he thoroughly detested Gen. Dan Sickles for not only disobeying orders at Gettysburg, but having the audacity to claim he was the hero of the battle and Gen. Meade a coward." Game over.
 
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22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an imperative order."

Who was ignoring who?
Well, Tremain was a Sickles acolyte, so I'm not sure I'd tote that one to the betting window. Hunt, as we know, was over there at Meade's direction. Hard to say Meade was "ignoring" the left.
 
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"Do you have non Conclusory allegations that shows Meade's concerns for his Left Flank?"

When you answer a question with a question, we know what the answer is. The way this works is that I asked first. (Although I did address that in an earlier post).

P.S. The "ill-considered orders from HQ" at Chancellorsville were based in part on Sickles' dead-wrong misinterpretation of what Jackson was doing. Chicken-egg.
Meade's continuous ignoring of Sickles' concerns about his assigned position, is pretty good evidence that he did not share Sickles' concerns'.

P.S. Do you have any information of what part, exactly, of Sickles share of misinformation that decided Hooker's ill advised orders.
 
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Well, Tremain was a Sickles acolyte, so I'm not sure I'd tote that one to the betting window. Hunt, as we know, was over there at Meade's direction. Hard to say Meade was "ignoring" the left.
"When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an imperative order."
When one general says he wants to see another general, he means he wants to see him now. From my own experience I would never entertain the thought of keeping a general waiting till I saw fit to see him.
 
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Meade's continuous ignoring of Sickles' concerns about his assigned position, is pretty good evidence that he did not share Sickles' concerns'.

P.S. Do you have any information of what part, exactly, of Sickles share of misinformation that decided Hooker's ill advised orders.
Feel free to explain why he sent Hunt over there.

At Chancellorsville Sickles concluded that Jackson was probably retreating the morning of May 2 and obtained authority to commence an attack. Was he the only one who fed that erroneous impression? Not hardly, but his mistake certainly fed it.
 
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"When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an imperative order."
When one general says he wants to see another general, he means he wants to see him now. From my own experience I would never entertain the thought of keeping a general waiting till I saw fit to see him.
Exactly. And we'll never know why Meade wanted to see him, but if it was related to the council summons, I suspect Tremain would have added that clarification. I think the argument can be made that Meade wanted to discuss Sickles's concerns directly, and not through a young aide.
 
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Exactly. And we'll never know why Meade wanted to see him, but if it was related to the council summons, I suspect Tremain would have added that clarification. I think the argument can be made that Meade wanted to discuss Sickles's concerns directly, and not through a young aide.
That certainly could be the case. I'm just skeptical about anything coming from Sickles' camp given the stuff he generated after the battle that doesn't correlate to the facts.
 
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