Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he positioned his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the 2nd Day of Gettysburg?

29thWisCoG

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Was Sickles justified in disobeying orders when he moved down from Cemetery Ridge to position his corps along Emmitsburg Road on the second day?

What would have happened if he had remained on Cemetery Ridge as ordered, would there have been less casualties, would the line have held the Rebel attack?
 
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22 pages and counting!

Some great points have been brought up in this thread, which is obviously a perrenial and polarized topic, and has been since it happened. My experience with these threads is that nobody changes their mind, either. Lol

One account that isn't mentioned much in these threads is that of Henry Tremain. At one point in his narrative (after Hunt's inspection of the proposed 'new' line), he describes being out with Graham at the Peach Orchard and observing a Confederate column crossing the Emmitsburg Road to the south (Hood's division moving into position). When reporting this information to hq, "General Meade expressed a wish to see General Sickles." Tremain went on to say "I did not understand it to be an...
Thanks for your response.
Like so much about past events, we just don't know. However, I tend to agree that regardless of Sickles' position, the rebel assault would have failed. In my thinking, all Sickles accomplished by his unauthorized move was more Union casualties.
Well, as to casualties, who can say? Casualties are a part of battle, who is to say a victory was too costly, although I do think, it an easier calculation for a defeat. In any case, I think studies after the war have generally shown, that proportionately to the numbers involved on both sides in most battles, the confederates lost more men than the Union, and this includes Lee and the ANV. Not a good ratio if you have the smaller numbers to begin with.

Sometimes, I get the impression that some on this thread, seem to be assuming that ithe AoP lost on Day 2.
 
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I agree that Sickles main concern was the defensibility of his position. That his movement made the Federal Left Less secure is debatable.

It is possible(no one can say for sure) to assume III Corps would not have been wrecked if it stayed where assigned. It seems from the events that Longstreet's attack would have missed III Corps altogether , or only brushed against Sickles Line on its way up the Emmitsburg Pike. But, it does not follow that doing so would have resulted in a better result than it did in the event. In fact the history of Confederate flanking movements against the AoP, as opposed to meeting it head on, could lead to the opposite conclusion.

It's my opinion that the orientation of the attack would have changed and still not had progressed as originally planned even if Sickles had maintained a defensive position along the southern end of Cemetery Ridge culminating at Little Round Top...

Sickles would have had skirmishers along Emmitsburg Road and possibly in the various woodlots (Rose Woods, Trostle Woods) between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

On top of that I would be sure that Union batteries would have been in place on Little Round Top and just north of the George Weikert home.

The upshot of all this is that as soon as Hood's division disembarked Warfield Ridge they would start taking fire from their right thus dispelling the notion that the Union line ended further north than what it actually did.

The result being the orientation of the attack would have altered (or even been paused) based on this information.
 
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Well, as to casualties, who can say? Casualties are a part of battle, who is to say a victory was too costly, although I do think, it an easier calculation for a defeat. In any case, I think studies after the war have generally shown, that proportionately to the numbers involved on both sides in most battles, the confederates lost more men than the Union, and this includes Lee and the ANV. Not a good ratio if you have the smaller numbers to begin with.

Sometimes, I get the impression that some on this thread, seem to be assuming that ithe AoP lost on Day 2.
Who is assuming that? To the contrary, most posts I've seen conclude that the ANV attack on July 2 was defeated, but that the result was in spite of Sickles' reckless insubordinate decision, because Meade competently cobbled together troops from the V and II Corps and slammed them into the breach - piecemeal, since Sickles left him no other choice. By the way, if you're looking for an interesting little factoid about casualties in this fiasco, re-read that Powell analysis again.
 
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It's my opinion that the orientation of the attack would have changed and still not had progressed as originally planned even if Sickles had maintained a defensive position along the southern end of Cemetery Ridge culminating at Little Round Top...

Sickles would have had skirmishers along Emmitsburg Road and possibly in the various woodlots (Rose Woods, Trostle Woods) between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

On top of that I would be sure that Union batteries would have been in place on Little Round Top and just north of the George Weikert home.

The upshot of all this is that as soon as Hood's division disembarked Warfield Ridge they would start taking fire from their right thus dispelling the notion that the Union line ended further north than what it actually did.

The result being the orientation of the attack would have altered (or even been paused) based on this information.
The only "flanking movement" based on Meade's intended line and intended direction of Lee's attack would have been against the Confederates' unprotected right flank (and possibly right rear). As I keep saying, maps are our friends.
 
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The only "flanking movement" based on Meade's intended line and intended direction of Lee's attack would have been against the Confederates' unprotected right flank (and possibly right rear). As I keep saying, maps are our friends.

Correct me if I'm misinterpreting... But you're saying or at least implying that the attack direction by Hood & McLaws would not have changed period?
 
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The concerns of Hancock, et. al., were the same concerns of Sickles for his command, weren't they?(III Corps was covering their flanks, who was covering II Corps?)

That Sickles was a 'political general' says nothing about how justified was he in moving his Corps, under the circumstances known to him at the time.
You find it odd that Humphreys and Hancock were concerned about their flanks being uncovered? Sickles, on the other hand, could not have been concerned about that fundamental military proposition. His movement left both his flanks uncovered. He had to try to protect his now-uncovered left flank by bending his line sharply back, creating a salient and limiting the artillery now on his left by sticking them with unsuitable turf. He never took care of his now-uncovered right flank, which is why Humphreys had the concern. All aside from those nasty gaps he couldn't avoid by doubling the length of his line after deciding that his corps lacked enough men to hold Meade's line. Maps, maps, maps, ....
 
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Correct me if I'm misinterpreting... But you're saying or at least implying that the attack direction by Hood & McLaws would not have changed period?
Oh, it may have once they figured out that Meade's line extended all the way to LRT. Now your turn - as in, "what next?" Start with when and how they would have learned that. What they encountered with Sickles left the way open to the LRT area.
 
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Oh, it may have once they figured out that Meade's line extended all the way to LRT. Now your turn - as in, "what next?" Start with when and how they would have learned that. What they encountered with Sickles left the way open to the LRT area.

You'll have to find Kreskin or find another Miss Cleo to determine "what's next".

One thing we should all realize is that Civil War battles rarely turned out how they were projected prior to the first shots being fired in anger.

But I am pretty confident in feeling that the Confederate forces would found out very quickly the Union left was in a far different place than where they thought when the attack was originally planned– And not being dunderheads would have made adjustments.

Who knows what would have transpired after that.
 
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You'll have to find Kreskin or find another Miss Cleo to determine "what's next".

One thing we should all realize is that Civil War battles rarely turned out how they were projected prior to the first shots being fired in anger.

But I am pretty confident in feeling that the Confederate forces would found out very quickly the Union left was in a far different place than where they thought when the attack was originally planned– And not being dunderheads would have made adjustments.

Who knows what would have transpired after that.
"Who knows what would have transpired after that". No doubt. Of course, finding a coherent Union line ending far below where they thought it ended would have definitely required "adjustments" - in fact, more of them than they had to make because a certain insubordinate politician had gotten himself - and the rest - in a fix out by his lonesome. I think that we can safely assume that a head-on attack against a fully-articulated Federal line would have given pause ....
 
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"Who knows what would have transpired after that". No doubt. Of course, finding a coherent Union line ending far below where they thought it ended would have definitely required "adjustments" - in fact, more of them than they had to make because a certain insubordinate politician had gotten himself - and the rest - in a fix out by his lonesome. I think that we can safely assume that a head-on attack against a fully-articulated Federal line would have given pause ....

You may want to "assume" that... lol
 
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One thing we should all realize is that Civil War battles rarely turned out how they were projected prior to the first shots being fired in anger.
Not limited to Civil War battles. In general, plans become obsolete as soon as contact with the enemy is made....
 
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It's my opinion that the orientation of the attack would have changed and still not had progressed as originally planned even if Sickles had maintained a defensive position along the southern end of Cemetery Ridge culminating at Little Round Top...

Sickles would have had skirmishers along Emmitsburg Road and possibly in the various woodlots (Rose Woods, Trostle Woods) between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

On top of that I would be sure that Union batteries would have been in place on Little Round Top and just north of the George Weikert home.

The upshot of all this is that as soon as Hood's division disembarked Warfield Ridge they would start taking fire from their right thus dispelling the notion that the Union line ended further north than what it actually did.

The result being the orientation of the attack would have altered (or PPePven been paused) based on this information.P

It's my opinion that the orientation of the attack would have changed and still not had progressed as originally planned even if Sickles had maintained a defensive position along the southern end of Cemetery Ridge culminating at Little Round Top...

Sickles would have had skirmishers along Emmitsburg Road and possibly in the various woodlots (Rose Woods, Trostle Woods) between Emmitsburg Road and Cemetery Ridge.

On top of that I would be sure that Union batteries would have been in place on Little Round Top and just north of the George Weikert home.

The upshot of all this is that as soon as Hood's division disembarked Warfield Ridge they would start taking fire from their right thus dispelling the notion that the Union line ended further north than what it actually did.

The result being the orientation of the attack would have altered (or even been paused) based on this information.
Certainly your opinion is as worthy of consideration as many others, I do not deny and I would not have been surprised if that had been the kind of consideration of Meade, in defending his inaction. Meade, like you assumed the position assigned was easily defensible, maybe so, but Sickles, the commander on the site, disagrees with both of You.

Sickles' concern was precisely that the position was not easily defensible, that, in fact, it was dangerously weak and exposed.

People persist in referring to as the area between Hancock's right and the RT's as a ridge, as in Cemetery Ridge. When in fact the ground rapidly subsides as it approaches LRT, until the part assigned to III Corps is lower than the ground it faces and dominated by the Plateau occupied by the Peach Orchard.

The badly depleted III Corps can barely reach the base of LRT and even then is stretched dangerously thin with no allowance for forming reserves to bolster the line when and if attached. So there could be no artillery on LRT with out infantry, which under the circumstances could only be provided by Meade. But, Meade seemed to avoid the necessity to see the area in question for himself, despite repeated pleas to do so by the commander on the spot.


P.S. In fact, there is no precise knowledge of what, exactly, was Lee's plan of operations on Day 2. As for instance right up to the attack, it seems that neither Lee nor Longstreet did know where the flank of the AoP was located, even before the arrival and placement of III Corps.
 
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Certainly your opinion is as worthy of consideration as many others, I do not deny and I would not have been surprised if that had been the kind of consideration of Meade, in defending his inaction. Meade, like you assumed the position assigned was easily defensible, maybe so, but Sickles, the commander on the site, disagrees with both of You.

Sickles' concern was precisely that the position was not easily defensible, that, in fact, it was dangerously weak and exposed.

People persist in referring to as the area between Hancock's right and the RT's as a ridge, as in Cemetery Ridge. When in fact the ground rapidly subsides as it approaches LRT, until the part assigned to III Corps is lower than the ground it faces and dominated by the Plateau occupied by the Peach Orchard.

The badly depleted III Corps can barely reach the base of LRT and even then is stretched dangerously thin with no allowance for forming reserves to bolster the line when and if attached. So there could be no artillery on LRT with out infantry, which under the circumstances could only be provided by Meade. But, Meade seemed to avoid the necessity to see the area in question for himself, despite repeated pleas to do so by the commander on the spot.


P.S. In fact, there is no precise knowledge of what, exactly, was Lee's plan of operations on Day 2. As for instance right up to the attack, it seems that neither Lee nor Longstreet did know where the flank of the AoP was located, even before the arrival and placement of III Corps.
"The badly depleted III Corps can barely reach the base of LRT and even then is stretched dangerously thin with no allowance for forming reserves to bolster the line when and if attached"

I assume that this is not intended to justify his decision to double the length of his line. If it is, there must be a boatload of missing information. Sickles, by the way, was the "commander on the site" who concluded that Jackson was retreating on May 2 and made the CO aware of his brilliant insight. How did that work out? Your concession that Lee/Longstreet "did not know where the flank of the AoP was located" is precisely the issue. Anybody planning an attack against a force on its flank who doesn't know the location of that flank is in for a nasty surprise.
 
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Who is assuming that? To the contrary, most posts I've seen conclude that the ANV attack on July 2 was defeated, but that the result was in spite of Sickles' reckless insubordinate decision, because Meade competently cobbled together troops from the V and II Corps and slammed them into the breach - piecemeal, since Sickles left him no other choice. By the way, if you're looking for an interesting little factoid about casualties in this fiasco, re-read that Powell analysis again.
Please, Meade could not slam reinforcements into a battle, if he sent them in piecemeal I think Meade denuded Culps Hill of troops to reinforce Sickles even though V Corps, I believe, was closer and few of those he sent from Culps Hill actually contributed to the battle at all.

One can almost always see how a battle could have been fought and won, 'Better' after that battle. Meade as usual was out of the action the battle left to Hancock, III and V Corps Commanders and they needed few if any authorizations from the distant Meade, to know what to do in the event.

Was Sickles movement wrong because the battle was not neatly packaged, or because it is considered 'insubordinate?
 
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"The badly depleted III Corps can barely reach the base of LRT and even then is stretched dangerously thin with no allowance for forming reserves to bolster the line when and if attached"

I assume that this is not intended to justify his decision to double the length of his line. If it is, there must be a boatload of missing information. Sickles, by the way, was the "commander on the site" who concluded that Jackson was retreating on May 2 and made the CO aware of his brilliant insight. How did that work out? Your concession that Lee/Longstreet "did not know where the flank of the AoP was located" is precisely the issue. Anybody planning an attack against a force on its flank who doesn't know the location of that flank is in for a nasty surprise.
Errors in judgement are endemic to the human race, even I dare so to Lee, Grant or even dare I say Meade, what exactly do you think it says about Sickles ?

Certainly Hood received a nasty shock when he found the AoP in Line of Battle, facing him and quickly suggested to Longstreet a pause to reevaluate the situation, fortunately Longstreet refused. It was only the stubbornness of Longstreet and Lee, the discovery of III Corps presence and advance did not delay the attack.
 
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Please, Meade could not slam reinforcements into a battle, if he sent them in piecemeal I think Meade denuded Culps Hill of troops to reinforce Sickles even though V Corps, I believe, was closer and few of those he sent from Culps Hill actually contributed to the battle at all.

One can almost always see how a battle could have been fought and won, 'Better' after that battle. Meade as usual was out of the action the battle left to Hancock, III and V Corps Commanders and they needed few if any authorizations from the distant Meade, to know what to do in the event.

Was Sickles movement wrong because the battle was not neatly packaged, or because it is considered 'insubordinate?

Meade didn't commit the 12th Corps until after he had already committed the entirety of the 5th Corps and a significant portion of the 2nd, not before. And, while in hindsight Meade did make a tactical error in denuding Culps Hill of so much of the 12th Corps, it was an understandable mistake given that at the time he made it, the right flank of the Union line was quiet, whilst the left and center were seemingly on the verge of complete and total collapse.
 
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Please, Meade could not slam reinforcements into a battle, if he sent them in piecemeal I think Meade denuded Culps Hill of troops to reinforce Sickles even though V Corps, I believe, was closer and few of those he sent from Culps Hill actually contributed to the battle at all.

One can almost always see how a battle could have been fought and won, 'Better' after that battle. Meade as usual was out of the action the battle left to Hancock, III and V Corps Commanders and they needed few if any authorizations from the distant Meade, to know what to do in the event.

Was Sickles movement wrong because the battle was not neatly packaged, or because it is considered 'insubordinate?
Trying to end the madness, " Was Sickles movement wrong because the battle was not neatly packaged, or because it is considered 'insubordinate?"

Try this - it was "wrong" because it was militarily incompetent. After all these posts, I fail to understand why that can't be deduced simply by looking at a map. The fact that it was also in violation of a lawful order just makes it worse.
 
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Meade didn't commit the 12th Corps until after he had already committed the entirety of the 5th Corps and a significant portion of the 2nd, not before. And, while in hindsight Meade did make a tactical error in denuding Culps Hill of so much of the 12th Corps, it was an understandable mistake given that at the time he made it, the right flank of the Union line was quiet, whilst the left and center were seemingly on the verge of complete and total collapse.
Very true, but the availability of reinforcements from so many sources argues to me, that in the light of what was known to Sickles , was his movement 'Justified' under the circumstances as he saw them?

It is easy enough to nit pick any battle or command decision, after the event.


P.S. In fact though Meade weakening Culps Hill, could have had severe consequences. Ewell was to demonstrate before Culps Hill to keep Meade from reinforcing the Federal Left. Characteristically for this campaign Ewell was ineffective and Later at dusk, he did attack the lightly defended Hill and took its lower defensive works, but the Union Commander fought skillfully and prevented a breakthrough until nightfall and saved a disaster on the Union Right.
 
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