Was Shiloh The Day The War Was Won?

The battle provided PLENTY of opportunities to adversely impact the careers of both and it was largely luck that prevented their disgrace and removal. Grant could easily have made his friend Sherman the scapegoat for most of the gaffes made by Federal forces prior to the battle - I can certainly imagine any of the other Federal commanders at the time - McClellan, Halleck, Pope, Burnside, etc., etc. - eagerly grasping the opportunity to save their own skins by throwing Uncle Billy under the bus! In fact it's a wonder that Halleck didn't take the same opportunity to remove Grant instead of just kicking him upstairs into the do-nothing and dead-end position of Second-In-Command during the subsequent advance on Corinth.
Halleck's "kicking Grant upstairs" was his attempt to remove Grant. One must give Halleck his due. He was a masterful "insider" politician who had great instincts for sensing who was the greatest threat to his ambitions. When Lincoln called Halleck to Washington to become General in Chief, Halleck no longer had to worry about Grant as a revival; instead, he could build Grant back better so that he and Buell's successes would become further evidence of how much Lincoln needed Halleck to be in overall charge. (Halleck was careful to make certain that Grant had no more soldiers than Buell.) The great irony is that Halleck could have achieved his ultimate ambition - to be President - if he had simple let Grant be the field commander. When Halleck went back East, he discovered that his ego was going to be matched by those of Pope, McClellan and Burnside and Stanton. They were not going to take orders and work towards victory as Grant had. What saved him was Grant's lack of malice and appreciation for what Halleck did well; instead of thinking about paying Halleck back for his political back stabbing, Grant made him Chief of Staff and then arranged for Halleck to be able to return to his home state of California in triumph.
 
Halleck's "kicking Grant upstairs" was his attempt to remove Grant. One must give Halleck his due. He was a masterful "insider" politician who had great instincts for sensing who was the greatest threat to his ambitions. When Lincoln called Halleck to Washington to become General in Chief, Halleck no longer had to worry about Grant as a revival; instead, he could build Grant back better so that he and Buell's successes would become further evidence of how much Lincoln needed Halleck to be in overall charge. (Halleck was careful to make certain that Grant had no more soldiers than Buell.) The great irony is that Halleck could have achieved his ultimate ambition - to be President - if he had simple let Grant be the field commander. When Halleck went back East, he discovered that his ego was going to be matched by those of Pope, McClellan and Burnside and Stanton. They were not going to take orders and work towards victory as Grant had. What saved him was Grant's lack of malice and appreciation for what Halleck did well; instead of thinking about paying Halleck back for his political back stabbing, Grant made him Chief of Staff and then arranged for Halleck to be able to return to his home state of California in triumph.
My impression is that Grant didn't fully realize or appreciate the true nature and extent of Halleck's treachery until he became C-in-C and likely even then not until the war was over. It wasn't until after the fighting ended and Grant's return to Washington on a full-time basis that he was able to delve into the correspondence that had built up in the War Department and see it for himself.
 
My impression is that Grant didn't fully realize or appreciate the true nature and extent of Halleck's treachery until he became C-in-C and likely even then not until the war was over. It wasn't until after the fighting ended and Grant's return to Washington on a full-time basis that he was able to delve into the correspondence that had built up in the War Department and see it for himself.
I agree. Grant's character - and his political understanding (the quality that is least well understood about him) - are revealed by his having Halleck stay on as Chief of Staff. Paying Halleck back would have served no purpose except to give Stanton even greater influence over Lincoln's decisions as Commander-in-Chief.
 
Grant was a decent man swimming in a pool of sharks! The DC crowd then, as now, are not concerned with truths and facts when it comes to climbing the political ladder. The Army has always had movers and shakers and many are behind the scenes
Regards
David
 
It seems that nobody want to admit to what Grant's forte really was. Unlike McClelland, Pope, McClelland again, Burnside, Hooker, and Meade, Grant alone realized the North's advantage. His army was bigger. He could afford losses if Lee also suffered losses.

At the end of the day, Grant would still have an army and Lee wouldn't. Is that not the exact definition of Appamatox.

Grant had 2 goals. He had to stay in command. He had to defeat Lee. To do the second he had to do the first. Lincoln had gone through a truck load of generals who he did not think were willing and/or able to fight. When Grant proved he was willing to fight, Lincoln was willing to give him slack to eventually defeat Lee.
 
I would say the idea of "The Day The War Was Won" (or "The Night the War was Lost") comes from the process of selling books whatever it's about- Vicksburg, Shiloh, New Orleans, etc. Of course, the writer and publisher want to promote it as the most important battle of the war.

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@th'anchoriticsybarite i agree that Grant knew he had numbers on his side in 1864. However at Shiloh he was still operating under Halleck’s thumb and was still learning how to operate an army of 40,000 with all the requirements such as logistics, clashing personalities of generals, individual state governors practicing state rights, bureaucratic layers and other problems that I do not about

Grant was a learner and seldom made the same mistakes. His ability to get along with troublesome individuals, such as McClernand and Halleck till he was able to move them or they were moved is a little recognized skill
Regards
David
 
... Grant was a learner and seldom made the same mistakes. His ability to get along with troublesome individuals, such as McClernand and Halleck till he was able to move them or they were moved is a little recognized skill
Regards
David
I was surprised to learn fairly recently that he also got along well with such dubious characters as Ben Butler and Banks - at least as long as they were in favor with the administration. Of course both were eventually sidelined, but not until AFTER they had essentially slit their own throats, Banks in the Red River and Butler at Fort Fisher. Persons like Buell, McClernand, Rosecrans, and eventually Halleck not so much though, especially once he got the idea they were working against him or trying to replace him.
 
I agree. Grant's character - and his political understanding (the quality that is least well understood about him) - are revealed by his having Halleck stay on as Chief of Staff. Paying Halleck back would have served no purpose except to give Stanton even greater influence over Lincoln's decisions as Commander-in-Chief.
Grant and Halleck had a rocky relationship in 1862. They managed to work together, though, and by the end of 1862 they were in cahoots together to grab McClernand's troops for Sherman's expedition against Vicksburg.

Through it all, Grant felt that Halleck had acted to protect him when McClellan wanted to remove him (after Donelson, in the spat Halleck-Buell had over Nashville) and perhaps again after Shiloh. It would not have been too surprising, because Halleck definitely acted to save the careers of Sherman (Halleck's good friend) and Sheridan (about to be court-martialed) in late 1861 and early 1862.

So Grant's feelings about Halleck are a mixed bag, but not as harsh as we might think in 1864. Keeping two HQs (Halleck in Washington, Rawlins in the field) allowed Grant to separate the work, letting Halleck deal with the Washington politics and bureaucracy (and acting as Grant's eyes and ears back in the capital). This was useful to Grant and worked out well.

Things changed for the worse after the war. Grant was now commanding general, Andrew Johnson was President, and Grant had more time. He called for the records on Henry and Donelson. He saw the messages where Halleck was essentially shopping Grant as a potential scapegoat for problems up on the Cumberland -- realizing that McClellan wasn't actually trying to get rid of Grant, that Halleck was the one floating that trial balloon. Grant was often forgiving, but he was good at holding a grudge when he wanted to be. Post-war Grant is much harsher about Halleck.
 
@th'anchoriticsybarite i agree that Grant knew he had numbers on his side in 1864. However at Shiloh he was still operating under Halleck’s thumb and was still learning how to operate an army of 40,000 with all the requirements such as logistics, clashing personalities of generals, individual state governors practicing state rights, bureaucratic layers and other problems that I do not about

Grant was a learner and seldom made the same mistakes. His ability to get along with troublesome individuals, such as McClernand and Halleck till he was able to move them or they were moved is a little recognized skill
Regards
David
Halleck ordered Grant not to send out scouting parties. Any general in enemy territory who would obey that army is guilty of criminal malfeasance.

In all his time camped at Shiloh Grant ordered not one defensive position prepared. Criminal malfeasance in the highest degree.

Two major felonies.

To give credit where credit is due. Once the battle started, even God Almighty cannot find a single thing to criticise Grant about.
 
Halleck ordered Grant not to send out scouting parties. Any general in enemy territory who would obey that army is guilty of criminal malfeasance.

In all his time camped at Shiloh Grant ordered not one defensive position prepared. Criminal malfeasance in the highest degree.

Two major felonies.

To give credit where credit is due. Once the battle started, even God Almighty cannot find a single thing to criticise Grant about.
It was his pal Sherman who established and laid out the camps at Pittsburg Landing, not Grant. At the time it was Charles F. Smith, Grant's former West Point instructor and mentor, who was in command of the army gathering there. Smith had established headquarters in the Cherry Mansion ten miles downriver at Savannah; neither he nor Grant when he replaced him in command ever camped there prior to the battle, leaving all dispositions up to Sherman. Grant continued to utilize the Cherry House as headquarters, making daily trips by steamer back and forth to the encampments.
 
Since we are speculating about the day that won the war, I will say that the Hornet's Nest position saved the day for the Union by preventing a coordinated attack on Pittsburg Landing. My relative served in Co. G, 14th Iowa, and was in the thick of the action in the Hornet's Nest. He was eventually captured in sent to Camp Ogelthorpe in Macon, GA.

So, I will extrapolate and say that my relative won the war for the Union. Check and mate!
 
Since we are speculating about the day that won the war, I will say that the Hornet's Nest position saved the day for the Union by preventing a coordinated attack on Pittsburg Landing. My relative served in Co. G, 14th Iowa, and was in the thick of the action in the Hornet's Nest. He was eventually captured in sent to Camp Ogelthorpe in Macon, GA.

So, I will extrapolate and say that my relative won the war for the Union. Check and mate!
On behalf of a grateful nation…. I thank you😁
 
@stryder the belief that Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace and the troops under their command holding the "Hornets Nest" line saved the day for Grant and the Union. Many have professed this theory but I disagree.

Johnston was on the Confederate right attempting to direct his soldiers to turn the Federals' right wing so he could send his forces straight up the Hamburg-Savannah road and then turn toward Pittsburg Landing along the Corinth-Pittsburg road, At this time, circa 2:45, Johnston died and all organized command of the Confederates attack on the Union right flank ceased for practical purposes.

Grant had not assembled his last line of defense till 4 pm or so and his troops were spread out along the line of the Hamburg-Purdy road East to West. The Confederates had the units available that could have attacked straight up the road along the Union left flank and contested Buell's crossing of his army that afternoon and trough the night.

This is a brief statement explaining my view that the "Hornets Nest" was not the deciding action of the Battle of Shiloh
Regards
David
 
@stryder the belief that Prentiss and W. H. L. Wallace and the troops under their command holding the "Hornets Nest" line saved the day for Grant and the Union. Many have professed this theory but I disagree.

Johnston was on the Confederate right attempting to direct his soldiers to turn the Federals' right wing so he could send his forces straight up the Hamburg-Savannah road and then turn toward Pittsburg Landing along the Corinth-Pittsburg road, At this time, circa 2:45, Johnston died and all organized command of the Confederates attack on the Union right flank ceased for practical purposes.

Grant had not assembled his last line of defense till 4 pm or so and his troops were spread out along the line of the Hamburg-Purdy road East to West. The Confederates had the units available that could have attacked straight up the road along the Union left flank and contested Buell's crossing of his army that afternoon and trough the night.

This is a brief statement explaining my view that the "Hornets Nest" was not the deciding action of the Battle of Shiloh
Regards
David
Of course I'm being a bit obtuse, but only a little bit. If the Confederates could have attacked the Union left flank along the Hamburg-Savannah road more vigorously, why didn't they? Is it because they were more concerned with cracking the center, and the Hornets Nest position in particular or lost confidence because of Johnston's death, or both?

To me it seems they did break the Union left fairly significantly, but not early enough in the day to fully capitalize. If one reads the accounts of the 14th Iowa that day, they mention seeing units to their right and left pulling back (fleeing?) toward Pittsburg Landing.

If the center of the Union lines and the Hornets Nest could have been reduced by say 1:00 pm, perhaps Johnston wouldn't have been where he was when shot, and would have allowed time for focusing a Pittsburg Landing attack. All pure speculation of course, but that is the fun of it, and keeps history alive and interesting!
 
"If the Confederates could have attacked the Union left flank along the Hamburg-Savannah road more vigorously, why didn't they? Is it because they were more concerned with cracking the center, and the Hornets Nest position in particular or lost confidence because of Johnston's death, or both?"

@stryder I certainly don't have the answers to the questions you posed just my ideas/opinions/thoughts. I am more than willing to post my views and sincerely hope more readers will weigh in on this thread.

1) "...they were more concerned with cracking the center..."?

I do not know the "they" is you asked as I honestly believe no one was in charge of the Confederate assault on Sunday, April 6. Johnston was moving around, cheering and encouraging the troops and looking into the smoke from the front line. He was, in my opinion, was acting more like a brigadier general than the Commander of the Army of Mississippi fixated on the part of the battle he could see.

The only Corps commander that was acting somewhat like a filed commander was General Bragg who was wailing away against the right flank of "the Hornets Nest" with successive waves of attacks across Duncan Filed. Bragg believed the failure of the Confederate attacks was a lack of courage and determination.

General Beauregard was far in the rear at his Headquarters near the Shiloh Meeting House. Beauregard was far out of touch as evidenced by his telegram of Victory was sent to Jefferson Davis:

"Battle-field of Shiloh, Miss., April 6,
Via Corinth, Miss., via Chattanooga, Tenn., April 7,1862.
We this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg, and after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position. Loss on both sides heavy, including our commander-in-chief, General A. S. Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight.
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, Commanding.
General S. Cooper, Assistant Adjutant-General.
*"

Beauregard was sick and incapacitated to a degree and spent little if anytime near the front and in fact Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest could not find him or his headquarters at night to report the arrival of General Buell's Army of the Ohio!

2) "... lost confidence because of Johnston's death..."

I believe the conditions were so chaotic on the Confederate side that Johnston's death did not cause the Confederates to lose the battle but rather some of these factors
1) Poor leadership
2) Difficult to being near impossible plan of attack
3) Poor intelligence and correct maps
4) Lack of supplies prior to and resupply Sunday night
5) No one took command to order units to be positioned correctly to be ready to repel the expected Union assault on Monday morning

These are my thoughts and I look forward to comments from members
Regards
David


*Official Records of the Rebellion
Series 1, Volume X, Part 1
Page 384
 
"If the Confederates could have attacked the Union left flank along the Hamburg-Savannah road more vigorously, why didn't they? Is it because they were more concerned with cracking the center, and the Hornets Nest position in particular or lost confidence because of Johnston's death, or both?"

@stryder I certainly don't have the answers to the questions you posed just my ideas/opinions/thoughts. I am more than willing to post my views and sincerely hope more readers will weigh in on this thread.

1) "...they were more concerned with cracking the center..."?

I do not know the "they" is you asked as I honestly believe no one was in charge of the Confederate assault on Sunday, April 6. Johnston was moving around, cheering and encouraging the troops and looking into the smoke from the front line. He was, in my opinion, was acting more like a brigadier general than the Commander of the Army of Mississippi fixated on the part of the battle he could see.

The only Corps commander that was acting somewhat like a filed commander was General Bragg who was wailing away against the right flank of "the Hornets Nest" with successive waves of attacks across Duncan Filed. Bragg believed the failure of the Confederate attacks was a lack of courage and determination.

General Beauregard was far in the rear at his Headquarters near the Shiloh Meeting House. Beauregard was far out of touch as evidenced by his telegram of Victory was sent to Jefferson Davis:

"Battle-field of Shiloh, Miss., April 6,
Via Corinth, Miss., via Chattanooga, Tenn., April 7,1862.
We this morning attacked the enemy in strong position in front of Pittsburg, and after a severe battle of ten hours, thanks be to the Almighty, gained a complete victory, driving the enemy from every position. Loss on both sides heavy, including our commander-in-chief, General A. S. Johnston, who fell gallantly leading his troops into the thickest of the fight.
G. T. BEAUREGARD,
General, Commanding.
General S. Cooper, Assistant Adjutant-General.
*"

Beauregard was sick and incapacitated to a degree and spent little if anytime near the front and in fact Colonel Nathan Bedford Forrest could not find him or his headquarters at night to report the arrival of General Buell's Army of the Ohio!

2) "... lost confidence because of Johnston's death..."

I believe the conditions were so chaotic on the Confederate side that Johnston's death did not cause the Confederates to lose the battle but rather some of these factors
1) Poor leadership
2) Difficult to being near impossible plan of attack
3) Poor intelligence and correct maps
4) Lack of supplies prior to and resupply Sunday night
5) No one took command to order units to be positioned correctly to be ready to repel the expected Union assault on Monday morning

These are my thoughts and I look forward to comments from members
Regards
David


*Official Records of the Rebellion
Series 1, Volume X, Part 1
Page 384
All very good points, and any one of the five factors you mention are enough to cause and adversary to lose a battle. If anything, your post supports a hypothesis that the Hornet's Nest action saved the Unions bacon that day. Specifically, you mention Bragg "wailing away" at the right flank of the Hornet's Nest position. His doggedness and failure (until the surrender late in the day) surely diverted time and resources away from an assualt on Pittsburg Landing.

The same assessment goes for the other confederate units which participated in the reduction of the Hornet's Nest position.
 
I was not praising Bragg as he should have attempted to flank the Federals but his Napoleonic education took over his actions and decisions. The Confederate's inability to adapt to the circumstances doomed their attack as well as wasting hundreds of lives if not more. I do not deign the bravery of the Union soldiers but merely point that an opponent who leads with his jaw usually gets knocked on his duff.
Regards
David
 
To me it seems they did break the Union left fairly significantly, but not early enough in the day to fully capitalize. If one reads the accounts of the 14th Iowa that day, they mention seeing units to their right and left pulling back (fleeing?) toward Pittsburg Landing.
It's possible that the right and left were pulling back because that was where the heaviest fighting was taking place. Current historians, like Tim Smith, have challenged the old narrative of the heaviest fighting being at the hornet's nest.

Whatever the case, if Prentiss and Wallace had noticed their flanks falling back, they should have fell back with them and maintained an unbroken line.
 
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