Was Shiloh The Day The War Was Won?

Leading from the front was the ancient Germanic tradition. The person creating the war orders was supposed to face the risk he was imposing on others. He also supposed to have the best armor and equipment and be surrounded the toughest guys in the force.
Even Sheridan, who wanted to be as near the front as possible, did not take the kind of risks assumed by A.S. Johnston.
Being a good boat ride away when the shooting started must of been for Grant’s safety.
 
@gggfJulius I wanted to clear up any missunderstandings regarding the role of the 53rd Ohio and many of its brave me. Just a tidbit perhaps not well known, before the 53rd's inital relapse and retreat it had inflicted on the 6th Mississippi a withering fire. The Mississippians lost 70% of its force and was not a factor for the rest of the Battle of Shiloh.

Below are some Official Reports from the Battle of Shiloh on another thread that might be applicable in this thread.
Regards
David

After the fracas of the early morning contact and hasty retreat from its campsite, Lieutenant Colonel Fulton took command of the 53rd​ and organized a coordinated maneuver to join up with other Federal units. Here is Fulton's Official Report:

"Headquarters Fifty-third Ohio Volunteers,-
Camp, Shiloh, April 9,1862.
Sir
I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the engagements of the 6th, 7th, and 8th:

Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 6th the regiment was formed on the color line under order and direction of Colonel Appler. After remaining here for a time they were moved to the left of our camp, forming line of battle perpendicular to the first line. Soon after Colonel Appler ordered the regiment to face about and wheel to the right and take position in rear of the camp, which maneuver was executed under fire of the rebel skirmishers. The new line of battle was formed just in rear of our camp, in the edge of the woods. A section of Waterhouse's battery took position in the woods to our right.

General Sherman and staff rode up to the open field in front of the left wing, and were fired upon by the rebel skirmishers, now advancing through the thicket in front of our camp, killing an orderly. General Sherman, riding back, ordered Colonel Appler to hold his position; he would support him. A battery opened upon us. The section of artillery on our right, after firing two shots, limbered up and went to the rear.

A line of rebel infantry advanced to within 50 yards and were fired into by the left wing and recoiled. Advancing again, they were met by a fire from the regiment, under which they again fell back. At this time Colonel Appler gave the command, "Fall back and save yourselves." Hearing this order, the regiment fell back in disorder, passing around the flanks of the Illinois Forty-ninth.

Here, in connection with the company officers and the adjutant, I succeeded in rallying the regiment, and was about to station them at the crossing of the creek, above the Big Springs, to repel the force who were turning the flank of the Fifty-seventh Ohio, when Colonel Appler, by direction, he says, of a staff officer of General McClernand, moved the regiment by the left flank up the ravine and afterward by the right flank, taking position on the hill to the left of Shiloh Chapel, and near the front of General Sherman's headquarters.

The regiment remained in this position for some time exposed to a galling fire, which could not be returned without endangering the regiment in front, who were hotly engaged. Colonel Appler here abandoned the regiment, giving again the order, "Fall back and save yourselves." Companies A and F, under command of Capts. W. S. Jones and J. R. Percy, with Adjutant Dawes, remained in the front, and soon after became hotly engaged, in connection with the Seventeenth Illinois. This regiment retreating, these two companies fell back after them, making as much resistance as possible. They afterwards joined the Forty-eighth Ohio, and with them aided in repelling the final assault made Sunday evening, and joined me again at night.

When the remaining eight companies of the regiment fell back I became separated from them. When I again joined them they were formed with a portion of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, under command of Maj. B. D. Fearing.

I immediately assumed command. Shortly afterwards, at the request of Captain Bouton, First Illinois Artillery, moved to a point near the siege-gun battery, where he took position, with my regiment as support. Shortly after, at about 3.30 p. m., Captain Hammond, assistant adjutant-general to General Sherman, rode up and ordered Captain Bouton's battery into position on the front and right. He called upon us to go out and support the battery. I immediately formed my men and marched out, several fragments of regiments near by refusing to go. Marching out, probably half a mile, the battery halted, and I formed on their left. Captain Bouton opened fire and was answered by a sharp fire of shot and shell from the rebel batteries, followed by canister, which killed a number of his horses and rendered his position untenable. A detail from my regiment, under Sergant M. K. Bosworth, assisted in drawing off his guns.

Remained here during the night, and in the morning were ordered to advance, the Eighty-first Ohio on our left and the Forty-fifth Illinois on our right.
Moved out with skirmishers well to the front for nearly a mile, when our skirmishers, under command of Lieut. R A. Starkey and Lieut. J. W. Fulton, encountered the rebel vedettes, driving them steadily until we reached the edge of the field known as McClemand's drill ground. Here a rebel battery opened upon us, doing but little damage, however, as our men were protected by the conformation of the ground. This battery was soon partially silenced by our artillery, and we were ordered to fix bayonets and charge. My men advanced in good style across the field. Hearing the battery, it was discovered to be entirely abandoned.

The line was halted, and skirmishers sent out in front reported a large rebel force rapidly advancing immediately in our front. They opened a sharp fire upon us, which was returned with good effect. Shells from a battery of our own upon our right and rear commenced bursting over our heads. The rebels, repossessing the battery from which we had once driven them, opened upon us again. The Eighty- first Ohio, upon my left, fell back across the open field. The staff officer who had taken upon himself the direction of the line rode up and twice ordered my regiment to retreat. The second time they fell back in considerable disorder, having to pass the line of fire of our own and the rebel batteries. While engaged in rallying my regiment, upon the other side of the field, General McOlernand rode up and ordered me to post them as sharpshooters. Remained in this position until the advance of General Buell's troops across the field to the left closed the day in our favor, when I marched my regiment to the left, through the drill ground of our division, to Shiloh Chapel, where I was shortly afterward joined by the remainder of the brigade.
On the morning of the 8th we were ordered with the rest of the brigade to pursue the retreating army. About 5 miles out a cavalry charge was made upon the Seventy-seventh Ohio, deployed in the advance, resulting in the rout of that regiment and a battalion of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, their immediate support. We were ordered by Colonel Hildebrand to their support, and advanced at a double-quick, with fixed bayonets, driving the rebel cavalry before us, killing and wounding number of them and forcing them to relinquish most of the prisoners taken.

Halting here, details were made from my regiment to destroy the rebel camp near at hand, to carry off the wounded, bury the dead, and collect the arms. This being accomplished, we returned to our old camp near Shiloh Chapel. The list of casualties during the 6th and 7th is as follows: KIA 9 WIA 44 MIA 0. Seven men were slightly wounded on the 8th.
Respectfully,
R. A. FULTON, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.
Lieut. S. S. McKaughton Acting Assistant Adjutant- General."***



The performance of the 53rd​ was noticed by Colonel Hildebrand and he commented about the regiment in his Official Report. Considering the circumstances of the unit, I believe he was fair in his comments.

"Excerpt of Col. Jesse Hildebrand, Seventy-seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
Headquarters Third Brigade, Fifth Division,
West Tennessee District, Camp, April 10,1862.

The Fifty-third Regiment, after forming in line of battle under my order, fired two rounds, and immediately fell back into the woods. It appears From the report of Colonel Appler that, apprehending a flank movement on his left, he ordered a retreat, but subsequently rallied in the rear of the Eighteenth Illinois. This regiment became separated from my command, and its movements throughout the balance of the day were general. +++


The Fifty-third I have already referred to. The regiment under the command of J. J. Appler fell back after two rounds, under the order of Colonel Appler. Soon afterward, as I am informed, he left the field, and was not again with the regiment during the day or Monday.
Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, in command of the regiment, the adjutant, and company officers behaved well.
All of which I respectfully submit.
J. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Commanding.
Note.—About 6 o'clock on Sunday evening a portion of my brigade, including the Fifty-third and Seventy-seventh Regiments, took a position near the heavy guns on the hill near Pittsburg, where they were prepared to support them. This was during the critical period when the enemy+++ attempted to storm our position. The Fifty-third Regiment did good service during the afternoon of Sunday operating with other regiments.++"


The 53d Infantry suffered a black eye early in the fight on Sunday morning but 2 companies, A and F, held their ground while the other companies were caught up in the withdrawal. The units esprit de corps was badly battered but it was not out. The remnants of the 53rd​ fought valiantly alongside other regiments the rest of that terrible Sabbath as well as supporting various batteries as they worked to stem the Confederate flood.

The unit's performance at Fallen Timbers helped assuage the shame they immediately felt and began their climb back to respectability. Colonel Appler's actions ended his career yet the 53rd​ earned an enviable war record and served faithfully till it was mustered out on August 11, 1865.
Regards
David

*** Page 264-266 Official Records
+++ Page 262-264 Official Records
 
The thread I mentioned above was a Say What Shiloh Special: "Take your d***ed regiment back to Ohio. There are no Confederates closer than Corinth."

This thread provides a deeper look into the 53rd Ohio and its role in the Battle Shiloh.
Regards
David

 
Just in case anyone is interested here are some photos I have taken regarding the 53rd Ohio and their initial position at Shiloh. I might also point out that 2 of the 5 Known Confederate Burial Trenches are nearby.
Regards
David

The campsite of the 53rd Ohio in the middle of Rhea Field looking East with their 1st line of defense in the woodline behind the tablet (Monument # A 62 Location C 9 Trailhead Graphics Map)

1636046949083.jpeg


Regiment Monument in Rhea Field (Monument # 131 Location C 9)

1636047275849.jpeg
 
@gggfJulius I wanted to clear up any missunderstandings regarding the role of the 53rd Ohio and many of its brave me. Just a tidbit perhaps not well known, before the 53rd's inital relapse and retreat it had inflicted on the 6th Mississippi a withering fire. The Mississippians lost 70% of its force and was not a factor for the rest of the Battle of Shiloh.

Below are some Official Reports from the Battle of Shiloh on another thread that might be applicable in this thread.
Regards
David

After the fracas of the early morning contact and hasty retreat from its campsite, Lieutenant Colonel Fulton took command of the 53rd​ and organized a coordinated maneuver to join up with other Federal units. Here is Fulton's Official Report:

"Headquarters Fifty-third Ohio Volunteers,-
Camp, Shiloh, April 9,1862.
Sir
I have the honor to submit the following report of the part taken by my regiment in the engagements of the 6th, 7th, and 8th:

Shortly after daylight on the morning of the 6th the regiment was formed on the color line under order and direction of Colonel Appler. After remaining here for a time they were moved to the left of our camp, forming line of battle perpendicular to the first line. Soon after Colonel Appler ordered the regiment to face about and wheel to the right and take position in rear of the camp, which maneuver was executed under fire of the rebel skirmishers. The new line of battle was formed just in rear of our camp, in the edge of the woods. A section of Waterhouse's battery took position in the woods to our right.

General Sherman and staff rode up to the open field in front of the left wing, and were fired upon by the rebel skirmishers, now advancing through the thicket in front of our camp, killing an orderly. General Sherman, riding back, ordered Colonel Appler to hold his position; he would support him. A battery opened upon us. The section of artillery on our right, after firing two shots, limbered up and went to the rear.

A line of rebel infantry advanced to within 50 yards and were fired into by the left wing and recoiled. Advancing again, they were met by a fire from the regiment, under which they again fell back. At this time Colonel Appler gave the command, "Fall back and save yourselves." Hearing this order, the regiment fell back in disorder, passing around the flanks of the Illinois Forty-ninth.

Here, in connection with the company officers and the adjutant, I succeeded in rallying the regiment, and was about to station them at the crossing of the creek, above the Big Springs, to repel the force who were turning the flank of the Fifty-seventh Ohio, when Colonel Appler, by direction, he says, of a staff officer of General McClernand, moved the regiment by the left flank up the ravine and afterward by the right flank, taking position on the hill to the left of Shiloh Chapel, and near the front of General Sherman's headquarters.

The regiment remained in this position for some time exposed to a galling fire, which could not be returned without endangering the regiment in front, who were hotly engaged. Colonel Appler here abandoned the regiment, giving again the order, "Fall back and save yourselves." Companies A and F, under command of Capts. W. S. Jones and J. R. Percy, with Adjutant Dawes, remained in the front, and soon after became hotly engaged, in connection with the Seventeenth Illinois. This regiment retreating, these two companies fell back after them, making as much resistance as possible. They afterwards joined the Forty-eighth Ohio, and with them aided in repelling the final assault made Sunday evening, and joined me again at night.

When the remaining eight companies of the regiment fell back I became separated from them. When I again joined them they were formed with a portion of the Seventy-seventh Ohio, under command of Maj. B. D. Fearing.

I immediately assumed command. Shortly afterwards, at the request of Captain Bouton, First Illinois Artillery, moved to a point near the siege-gun battery, where he took position, with my regiment as support. Shortly after, at about 3.30 p. m., Captain Hammond, assistant adjutant-general to General Sherman, rode up and ordered Captain Bouton's battery into position on the front and right. He called upon us to go out and support the battery. I immediately formed my men and marched out, several fragments of regiments near by refusing to go. Marching out, probably half a mile, the battery halted, and I formed on their left. Captain Bouton opened fire and was answered by a sharp fire of shot and shell from the rebel batteries, followed by canister, which killed a number of his horses and rendered his position untenable. A detail from my regiment, under Sergant M. K. Bosworth, assisted in drawing off his guns.

Remained here during the night, and in the morning were ordered to advance, the Eighty-first Ohio on our left and the Forty-fifth Illinois on our right.
Moved out with skirmishers well to the front for nearly a mile, when our skirmishers, under command of Lieut. R A. Starkey and Lieut. J. W. Fulton, encountered the rebel vedettes, driving them steadily until we reached the edge of the field known as McClemand's drill ground. Here a rebel battery opened upon us, doing but little damage, however, as our men were protected by the conformation of the ground. This battery was soon partially silenced by our artillery, and we were ordered to fix bayonets and charge. My men advanced in good style across the field. Hearing the battery, it was discovered to be entirely abandoned.

The line was halted, and skirmishers sent out in front reported a large rebel force rapidly advancing immediately in our front. They opened a sharp fire upon us, which was returned with good effect. Shells from a battery of our own upon our right and rear commenced bursting over our heads. The rebels, repossessing the battery from which we had once driven them, opened upon us again. The Eighty- first Ohio, upon my left, fell back across the open field. The staff officer who had taken upon himself the direction of the line rode up and twice ordered my regiment to retreat. The second time they fell back in considerable disorder, having to pass the line of fire of our own and the rebel batteries. While engaged in rallying my regiment, upon the other side of the field, General McOlernand rode up and ordered me to post them as sharpshooters. Remained in this position until the advance of General Buell's troops across the field to the left closed the day in our favor, when I marched my regiment to the left, through the drill ground of our division, to Shiloh Chapel, where I was shortly afterward joined by the remainder of the brigade.
On the morning of the 8th we were ordered with the rest of the brigade to pursue the retreating army. About 5 miles out a cavalry charge was made upon the Seventy-seventh Ohio, deployed in the advance, resulting in the rout of that regiment and a battalion of the Fourth Illinois Cavalry, their immediate support. We were ordered by Colonel Hildebrand to their support, and advanced at a double-quick, with fixed bayonets, driving the rebel cavalry before us, killing and wounding number of them and forcing them to relinquish most of the prisoners taken.

Halting here, details were made from my regiment to destroy the rebel camp near at hand, to carry off the wounded, bury the dead, and collect the arms. This being accomplished, we returned to our old camp near Shiloh Chapel. The list of casualties during the 6th and 7th is as follows: KIA 9 WIA 44 MIA 0. Seven men were slightly wounded on the 8th.
Respectfully,
R. A. FULTON, Lieutenant-Colonel, Commanding.
Lieut. S. S. McKaughton Acting Assistant Adjutant- General."***



The performance of the 53rd​ was noticed by Colonel Hildebrand and he commented about the regiment in his Official Report. Considering the circumstances of the unit, I believe he was fair in his comments.

"Excerpt of Col. Jesse Hildebrand, Seventy-seventh Ohio Infantry, commanding Third Brigade.
Headquarters Third Brigade, Fifth Division,
West Tennessee District, Camp, April 10,1862.

The Fifty-third Regiment, after forming in line of battle under my order, fired two rounds, and immediately fell back into the woods. It appears From the report of Colonel Appler that, apprehending a flank movement on his left, he ordered a retreat, but subsequently rallied in the rear of the Eighteenth Illinois. This regiment became separated from my command, and its movements throughout the balance of the day were general. +++


The Fifty-third I have already referred to. The regiment under the command of J. J. Appler fell back after two rounds, under the order of Colonel Appler. Soon afterward, as I am informed, he left the field, and was not again with the regiment during the day or Monday.
Lieutenant-Colonel Fulton, in command of the regiment, the adjutant, and company officers behaved well.
All of which I respectfully submit.
J. HILDEBRAND,
Colonel, Commanding.
Note.—About 6 o'clock on Sunday evening a portion of my brigade, including the Fifty-third and Seventy-seventh Regiments, took a position near the heavy guns on the hill near Pittsburg, where they were prepared to support them. This was during the critical period when the enemy+++ attempted to storm our position. The Fifty-third Regiment did good service during the afternoon of Sunday operating with other regiments.++"


The 53d Infantry suffered a black eye early in the fight on Sunday morning but 2 companies, A and F, held their ground while the other companies were caught up in the withdrawal. The units esprit de corps was badly battered but it was not out. The remnants of the 53rd​ fought valiantly alongside other regiments the rest of that terrible Sabbath as well as supporting various batteries as they worked to stem the Confederate flood.

The unit's performance at Fallen Timbers helped assuage the shame they immediately felt and began their climb back to respectability. Colonel Appler's actions ended his career yet the 53rd​ earned an enviable war record and served faithfully till it was mustered out on August 11, 1865.
Regards
David

*** Page 264-266 Official Records
+++ Page 262-264 Official Records
@Ole Miss
Thank you for the clarification. I have read a total of three - well, 2 1/2, still working on the third - books regarding Shiloh, so I admit that I am by no means a Shiloh scholar. I understand the 53rd Ohio was quite active throughout the two day battle. My original intent was to provide possible reasoning, however slight, as to why Sherman did not heed Appler's warning of advancing enemy troops as that was part of the discussion at that point.
Personally I think the next time anyone wants to produce a big budget documentary on the Civil War, this board should be their first stop.
 
@gggfJulius please do not think I am an expert thou I have heard Mr. DeBarry twice and he is. Shiloh Tours
I have read a few books and the Official Records and have been visiting Shiloh since 1960. I may be ahead of you now but you can catch up quickly
To understand this battle you need to visit the park and see the terrain
Just holler if I can be of assistance

I believe part of Sherman’s reluctance to believe the warnings may have been 2 part
1) He had been called Crazy months earlier because of his warnings the War would be long and bloody
2) He did not trust his Volunteer officers who had never seen combat
Regards
David
 
Clark I agree with you that McClernand was a jewel! His ego coupled with his feisty nature made him a troublesome man to his superiors, E.g. Grant and Halleck.

John Hay wrote:
"vain irritable overbearing exacting man who is possessed of the monomania that it was a mere clerical error which placed Grant's name and not his in the Commission of the Lieutenant General."*

Regards
David
*http://www.mrlincolnandfriends.org/the-officers/john-mcclernand/
1st big, out of control battle that let both sides know that this is what future, horrible combat entailed. Yep..from what I’ve read McClernand had the ego of a McClellan; the irritability of Bragg; without the competence of either one. The consummate “political” general (think Ben Butler..on steroids!).
 
It took Grant a year to conquer Vicksburg. Federals had 125k troops at Corinth after Shiloh. They should of gone to Vicksburg then. John Sherman saved Crump. Washburn saved Grant.

Federals are pushed off of the Peninsula. Lost 1st and 2nd Manassas. Bragg goes to KY, Lee to Maryland. High water mark of the Confederacy was probably just before Antietam. So, several things could have happened during this period to secure Southern Independence.

People make the argument Sumpter turned the tide. Shiloh was important. A Confederate victory wouldn’t have secured a Confederate Independence. Most of these battles were a near stalemate. Yankees thought that Shiloh was the beginning of the end. They had suspended recruitment. Confederacy lasted a long time after losing the Mississippi River. Some argue that losing Vicksburg was a net gain for the Confederacy. It opened up trade. Cotton trading gave the Confederacy money and war material. All of that made the war last longer..

Who knows.
I've always considered Vicksburg to be a side issue. Granted taking the forts along the Mississippi opened up the river to Mid-Western agricultural products being sold abroad. I see that as a side issue. Following the victory with a push south into and through Mississippi to Mobile would have bisected the South. Better yet a drive due south would not provide the Confederate commander (whoever it might have been) with easy defensive points at river crossing such as Lee always had in Virginia. It would have literally turned the Confederacy from a 12 state union to essentially a 5 state country (Va, NC, Sc, Ga, and Fla) Jeff Davis would have been compelled to alter his absolute defense of Richmond and detach Lee to counter the threat to his far South. Either way it would have fundamentally changed the essential paradigm of the war.

It would have been riveting watching Lee using Southern mobility advantage against Grant's greater resources.
 
Of course, with hindsight, arguments could be made for any number of “points” along the timeline. Personally, I accept Donald Stoker’s conclusion in The Grand Design (2010, p. 51) that going into Kentucky first was the big Confederate strategic error. Taking up the excellent position at Columbus in this way was short-sighted at best - and proved irrelevant anyway once Ft Donelson and Nashville fell. But I can see how Shiloh in particular ‘sets the seal’ on all this, as laid out in the OP. There will be no strategic recovery in the West and, at least where the rivers and railways ran, no keeping the Federals out of any place they set their sights on.

I also agree with @Stone in the wall about A Johnston’s death. It is speculation as to what he would have been able to do had he lived, but it should be noted that he had the confidence of both Davis and the army, as Lee would back East (and as opposed to Bragg who only had the former or Beauregard and J Johnston who only had the latter). This would have been an important factor even though the strategic problems would remain.

I believe Shelby Foote* said the South never smiled after Shiloh…

[Edit: Actually that was George Washington Cable.]
Yet.

On the other hand even accepting the victory at Shiloh, at 2 not 1 but TWO separate occasions, Stone River and Chickamauga the Southern forces had clear opportunities to not just defeat but destroy 2 Union armies.

Suppose a more competent commander than Bragg, who does not order fruitless frontal attacks against massed artillery and instead blocks his opponent's line of retreat AND line of supply. Especially as this defensive line is very short and can be established in depth, making attacks against it more deadly and harder to sustain.
 
With all that listed above and the loss of General A S Johnston, I'd say your right. The Army of Mississippi and those following it would never have another commander of Johnston's class. He's tactics and raids confused Sherman and are a great part of why he became paranoid and mentally unstable.
Without the "magic bullet" would anybody even know Grant's name today. Remember had Johnson not detached his personal physician, his minor leg wound would not have been allowed to bleed him out and eventually kill him. He could have easily stayed in command and prosecuted the attack to the fullest.
 
Declaring Shiloh, or any other specific event, as the day the war was won, would be an almost impossible proposition to prove or disprove. At best we can say that Shiloh as a Confederate victory, would have halted, at least temporarily, the relentless Union movement to control the important riverine and railroad "highways'' to the southern heartland. Shiloh was a last ditch effort by Johnston and the western Confederacy to turn the tide of what had been a series of successful Union efforts, and corresponding southern disappointments. But even if the south were victorious at Shiloh, the strides already made by Grant and Halleck, and the advent of Buell's army would have made it difficult for the south to build on a Shiloh victory for very long.
But a clear Confederate victory would have certainly led to a general Union withdrawal, leaving most of Tennessee in Southern hands. The Union would have been back at square one as far as how they would proceed to retake the state. This delays Vicksburg, Chattanooga and the eventual invasion of GA. This delays the actual opening of the Miss R to export trade from the Mid-West AND their support of the war AND their continuing support of Lincoln and his prosecution of the war.
 
It did for a while...

"Was Shiloh The Day The War Was Won?"

Don't think so. The Federal army was smashed on day one and driven to the Tennessee River. Only thing that saved them was Buell's reinforcements and the gunboats. The Confederates captured enough supplies to equip another army.
You could indeed be right.

But it is also entirely possible that Grant could have organized his demoralized troops along the river into a solid defense and using the USN for firepower repulsed multiple southern attacks along an easily defensible line along the river.

He would then have the opportunity to direct his troops upriver to attack the Southern left flank as well as getting Buell to go down river and after crossing attack the Confederate right flank--essentially a Union double evelopement, a Union Cannae.
 
The Confederates after withdrawing from the Shiloh battlefield still had plenty of time to increase the cost of the war, and gain forced mediation from the British. They could have achieved an armistice and temporary independence. However the 19th century Republicans would have plenty of incidents to fight another war, when the US was better prepared.
When Grant's army won the battle of Champion's Hill, without engaging General Sherman's two trailing divisions, the war took a severe turn against the Confederacy. Grant blocked the Confederate left. That left the US cavalry and Sherman's divisions a clear shot at crossing the Big Black river and reaching the Yazoo River in sufficient force to impose immediate evacuation.
From that point on, Vicksburg was going to fall. And from then on the Confederacy was not a viable long term entity.
The crisis in Mississippi provoked General Lee into a gruesome 3 day battle far from Richmond. That's an indication of how serious the loss of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was going to be.
Similarly General Johnston was trying to organize a relief force, when instead he might have been reinforcing Bragg's army in Tennessee.
Nobody on either side considered the fall of Vicksburg to be a done deal. Without Grant and his willingness to roll the dice with his amphibious transit of the Mississippi to place his army where they could in fact come to grips with the defenses of Vicksburg itself, the war might still be raging today.
 
If Grant had lost Shiloh, he may well have been sent West like Pope or shelved like McDowell. Grant won Shiloh and was demoted! What would happen if he lost?

Halleck dumped Grant but fortunately Lincoln was wise enough to bring him back. Who would have replaced him that could have organized and attack Vicksburg in his place? Would not have been Sherman as he would have been tarred and feathered like Grant.

So if Shiloh saved Grant’s career then it may lay claim to the title The Battle that Won the War
Regards
David
Well not really. Would we even remember his name without his later fluke victory at Lookout Mt. Thomas's attack was a diversion--pure an simple. The main attack was Sherman's flank attack. An attack so badly bungled that Sherman did not even attack the correct mountain. The victory occurred when the diversionary attack by Thomas succeeded when his abused troops, facing murderous fire from Confederate artillery ensconced atop the mountain found that as they ascended their opponent's artillery could not be brought to bear on them and simplly strolled up the mountain and evicted them.
 
Without the "magic bullet" would anybody even know Grant's name today. Remember had Johnson not detached his personal physician, his minor leg wound would not have been allowed to bleed him out and eventually kill him. He could have easily stayed in command and prosecuted the attack to the fullest.
Good chance, Washington was pretty quick to replace failed generals such as Patterson and McDowell.
 
The Confederates after withdrawing from the Shiloh battlefield still had plenty of time to increase the cost of the war, and gain forced mediation from the British. They could have achieved an armistice and temporary independence. However the 19th century Republicans would have plenty of incidents to fight another war, when the US was better prepared.
When Grant's army won the battle of Champion's Hill, without engaging General Sherman's two trailing divisions, the war took a severe turn against the Confederacy. Grant blocked the Confederate left. That left the US cavalry and Sherman's divisions a clear shot at crossing the Big Black river and reaching the Yazoo River in sufficient force to impose immediate evacuation.
From that point on, Vicksburg was going to fall. And from then on the Confederacy was not a viable long term entity.
The crisis in Mississippi provoked General Lee into a gruesome 3 day battle far from Richmond. That's an indication of how serious the loss of Vicksburg and Port Hudson was going to be.
Similarly General Johnston was trying to organize a relief force, when instead he might have been reinforcing Bragg's army in Tennessee.
Au contraire. Until Grant made his strategic decision and employed the USN to cross the river and place his army where he could directly engage the Confederate defenses, the outcome was up in the air.
 
I've got a hard time seeing it as the day the war was won. By the logic of that theory, if applied to Fort Donelson then it would've been the day the war was lost as it cost Nashville, pretty much Memphis, and the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers down to Shiloh.

The theory also ignores so many other factors that almost would've turned the tables easily if they went another way. Like the 1864 Presidential Election, foreign intervention, the Vicksburg Campaign, the Sharpsburg and Gettysburg campaigns, even Gordon's proposed offensive at Fort Stedman in 1864.

I don't think the war was decided on the battlefield till maybe Sailor's Creek in 1865, and politically till well after 1900. Shiloh was a major defeat for the Confederacy, but not a crippling one. Three more years of hard fighting for both sides proves that!:D
Remember the KISS principle. When Lincoln was reelected the war was won. Without Lincoln the South achieves independence. With him the North wins.
 
I'd have liked to see that one, a double whammy, can Grant and replace him with McClernand. I don't think Grant despised anyone as much as McClernand.
Let's put it simply, the only Union commander who showed any demonstrable ability to successfully engage Lee was Grant. He was willing to accept casualties which any other Union commander would have deemed enough to disengage and withdraw. His willingness to accept casualties kept him in command and allowed him to make the successful gamble to move his army across the pontoons and along with the USN move his army to a position to threaten the Southern capitol and conclude the war.
 
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