Was Shiloh The Day The War Was Won?

A good case has been made that the War was won / lost in the West. IMO Shiloh was the last Confederate opportunity to close the door that had been kicked open at Forts Henry and Donelson. Manpower always favored the Federals, but the Confederates controlled the rivers and rails. That changed in early 1862.
 
Ernie that is an excellent point! It was great to meet you at Antietam and hope to see you at the next muster.
Regards
David
 
Johnston’s actions in leading from the front are not those of a commanding general
Very true. But in the heat of the moment, even Lee on at least 2 occasions during the Overland Campaign tried to lead from the front. But at least his troopers had the good sense to order "Lee to the rear!"
 
In episode two of the Ken Burns series A very bloody affair in the Shiloh segment, Shelby Foote summarized the battle: "Shiloh had the same number of casualties as Waterloo, and yet when it was fought there were another twenty Waterloos to follow; and Grant shortly before Shiloh said 'I consider this war practically over and they're ready to give up', and the day after Shiloh he said 'I saw this was going to have to be a war of conquest if they were going to win'. Shiloh did that, and it sobered the nation up something awful with the realization that they had a very bloody affair on their hands."
 
Shiloh was the last Confederate opportunity to close the door that had been kicked open at Forts Henry and Donelson.
Even a Confederate victory at Shiloh may have been too late to "close the door." At best, it may have given the Confederacy some breathing room, but the northern surge had already gained control of the key riverine entryways to the southland. Which also raises the question of what a Confederate victory at Shiloh would have looked like. The assumption being that the foothold gained on day 1 by Johnston/Beauregard's Army of Mississippi would have resulted in the capture of the remnants of Grant's AotT at its Pittsburg Landing defense line. But that would have meant that a victorious AoM would still need to confront Buell's AotO that was rapidly coming up across the river. Presumably, the AoM might have consolidated by establishing a strong defensive position at the important Corinth rail junction and tried to hold a new line from northern Mississippi and Alabama to Chattanooga. But that would have meant a diffusion of southern manpower facing a rising tide of northern power.
 
Shiloh did that, and it sobered the nation up something awful with the realization that they had a very bloody affair on their hands."
Shiloh was an "eye-opener" in that respect. The Union defeat at 1st Manassas was a shock to the public's perception that this was a war that would not be settled by a single battle. But it took the blood letting at Shiloh to finally end all illusions about the scale of what the war would be like.
 
Not to be argumentative, but did Grant take command of his regiments and lead an attack on the enemies line as did Johnston? Regimental and Brigade commanders were expected to lead from the front but not Division or Corps commanders, let alone the Army commander.

Grant, Sherman, Gladden, Bragg and other commanders were seen along the line by their soldiers but I do not know of any time that they led a charge at the front of their troops. I am always open to learning more and certainly admit my mistakes.
Regards
David

All the commanders at Shiloh were equally exposed to risk, Johnston just had the misfortune of being hit. I acknowledge that it's all a matter of opinion though...

I agree with Wiley Sword's opinion: "Considering the fatal result, Sidney Johnston's exposure on the front line has been frequently interpreted as grossly reckless, and improper conduct for a commanding general. Yet, aside from considerations of misguided heroism, Johnston's presence along the battle line involved maintaining tactical control of his main offensive thrust. Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all. Due to the tactical nightmare of mixed commands and random unit coordination, it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack. Like Johnston, the other senior commanders, Grant, Sherman, and later Beauregard, personally exposed themselves along the front line to obtain information, rally troops, and direct the fighting. All had close calls and were occasionally fired at. In fact, Johnston's limited exposure, and the random, chance nature of his fatal wound seems to have involved more ill-luck than a reckless abuse of command responsibility."
p447, Shiloh: Bloody April.
 
All the commanders at Shiloh were equally exposed to risk, Johnston just had the misfortune of being hit. I acknowledge that it's all a matter of opinion though...

I agree with Wiley Sword's opinion: "Considering the fatal result, Sidney Johnston's exposure on the front line has been frequently interpreted as grossly reckless, and improper conduct for a commanding general. Yet, aside from considerations of misguided heroism, Johnston's presence along the battle line involved maintaining tactical control of his main offensive thrust. Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all. Due to the tactical nightmare of mixed commands and random unit coordination, it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack. Like Johnston, the other senior commanders, Grant, Sherman, and later Beauregard, personally exposed themselves along the front line to obtain information, rally troops, and direct the fighting. All had close calls and were occasionally fired at. In fact, Johnston's limited exposure, and the random, chance nature of his fatal wound seems to have involved more ill-luck than a reckless abuse of command responsibility."
p447, Shiloh: Bloody April.
I believe Sherman was hit in his hand. Some of his staff people died on the field. Grant had a bullet deflect off his sword scabbard in some accounts. But I doubt he actually wore one on that first day.
 
There's no such thing as a guarantee in war. No victory is inevitable. No defeat is predetermined. Anything could have happened at any point to irrevocably change the tide of the Civil War. A stray bullet......Lincoln dies at Fort Stevens.....

That being said, I think the early maneuvering of Union forces in 1861 and the top of 1862 is often overlooked in favor of the larger, bloodier, flashier battles that came later. Seizing Alexandria on May 24, 1861 and thereby protecting Washington and securing part of Virginia. Gaining control over West Virginia in 1861. Maneuvering the Confederates out of Kentucky in 1861. Securing Columbus, Paducah, and Smithland on the Mississippi, Tennessee, and Cumberland rivers respectively. Driving Johnston from Bowling Green at the top of 1862. The Battle of Hatteras Inlet Batteries securing Union domination of the North Carolina Sounds in August 1861.

These campaigns weren't splashy, and many are ignored or overlooked. But at the end of this string of Union moves the table had been set for every successful campaign that followed. Victory wasn't inevitable on January 1, 1862 any more than it was inevitable on April 8, 1862. But the odds had been shifted.
 
Sherman was wounded when riding to the noise of battle along his lines that he said was not happening.
Regards
David

There's an interesting psychological component to Sherman's behavior at Shiloh. Coming off of his nervous breakdown in Kentucky, he was definitely trying not to appear scared or alarmist.

In his biography of Sherman, James Lee McDonough writes, "How Sherman could have so completely missed or ignored the signs that should have alerted him to the imminent danger remains a puzzle. Perhaps, besides his preconceived idea that the Rebels would not attack, and the possible influence of General Halleck, he overcompensated, trying to avoid the kind of criticism he had encountered earlier in Kentucky......In years to come, the General might find amusement in recalling accusations that he was crazy. Not in the spring of 1862 though. The Kentucky experience remained fresh in his mind. More time would have to pass before Sherman could take delight in reflecting that he had the last laugh on the insanity issue. At Pittsburgh Landing, he did not intend to make the same mistake again."
 
In episode two of the Ken Burns series A very bloody affair in the Shiloh segment, Shelby Foote summarized the battle: "Shiloh had the same number of casualties as Waterloo, and yet when it was fought there were another twenty Waterloos to follow; and Grant shortly before Shiloh said 'I consider this war practically over and they're ready to give up', and the day after Shiloh he said 'I saw this was going to have to be a war of conquest if they were going to win'. Shiloh did that, and it sobered the nation up something awful with the realization that they had a very bloody affair on their hands."

Perhaps the sentiment is correct, but Shelby Foote is pretty off on the numbers.

Shiloh casualties amounted to some 23,746 for both sides and Waterloo was (at the low end) 64,000. Unless he just means the Allied army, in which case yes 23-24,000 casualties for the Anglo-German Force.
 
Sherman had heard from various regiments in his Division about the Rebels in the woods especially the 53rd Ohio. Colonel J. J. Appler had notified Sherman several times about having seen and heard large Confederate forces and Ole Uncle Billy had enough. He suggested that the Colonel should take the 53rd home
Regards
David
 
Colonel J. J. Appler had notified Sherman several times about having seen and heard large Confederate forces and Ole Uncle Billy had enough. He suggested that the Colonel should take the 53rd home
Appler and the Ohio 53rd, admittedly along with others, fled to the rear almost immediately when attacked the first morning, leaving a battery unsupported. Perhaps Appler's reputation preceded him so Sherman had reason to be reluctant to heed his warnings. Not to defend Sherman, he could have sent reconnaissance to verify one way or the other.
 
Historians seem to overestimate Union control in West Virginia because of the Wheeling government, which was almost as far out of West Virginia as you could get, and McClellan's early victory. WV was more of a quagmire that required the use of 25-40,000 Union troops for much of the war. This article is from 1863 from the Morgantown Monitor on the very day WV statehood began, June 20.

"Less than half the territory of West Virginia can be reached by our authorities. Whever we go south of the N.W. Va. Railroad [B&O], we shall find but few counties, if any, in which a draft can be executed to do any good."


_20%2C_1863%2C_western_Virginia_military_situation.jpg
 
Sherman had heard from various regiments in his Division about the Rebels in the woods especially the 53rd Ohio. Colonel J. J. Appler had notified Sherman several times about having seen and heard large Confederate forces and Ole Uncle Billy had enough. He suggested that the Colonel should take the 53rd home
Regards
David
He told him "Take your regiment back to Ohio. Beauregard is not such a fool as to leave his base of operations and attack us in ours. There is no enemy nearer than Corinth."
 
All the commanders at Shiloh were equally exposed to risk, Johnston just had the misfortune of being hit. I acknowledge that it's all a matter of opinion though...

I agree with Wiley Sword's opinion: "Considering the fatal result, Sidney Johnston's exposure on the front line has been frequently interpreted as grossly reckless, and improper conduct for a commanding general. Yet, aside from considerations of misguided heroism, Johnston's presence along the battle line involved maintaining tactical control of his main offensive thrust. Thus, both his bravery and commitment to win should be apparent to all. Due to the tactical nightmare of mixed commands and random unit coordination, it was imperative that someone with high command authority be present to organize a cohesive attack. Like Johnston, the other senior commanders, Grant, Sherman, and later Beauregard, personally exposed themselves along the front line to obtain information, rally troops, and direct the fighting. All had close calls and were occasionally fired at. In fact, Johnston's limited exposure, and the random, chance nature of his fatal wound seems to have involved more ill-luck than a reckless abuse of command responsibility."
p447, Shiloh: Bloody April.

I tend to criticize generals with larger responsibilities doing their brigade commanders’ job, but I have to say this is fair.
 
A good case has been made that the War was won / lost in the West. IMO Shiloh was the last Confederate opportunity to close the door that had been kicked open at Forts Henry and Donelson. Manpower always favored the Federals, but the Confederates controlled the rivers and rails. That changed in early 1862.
Indeed the war was won in the West. However Ft's Donaldson and Henry fell and the war raged on. Shiloh was as stunning reversal of fate but the North won. Stones river, victory snatched from the hands of defeat by the North, and the war raged on. Grant engineers the fall of Vicksburg and the war is not even halfway over. Chickamauga, a fleeting Southern victory is squandered when the north sends the Southern forces in precipitious retreat. Atlanta falls, Sherman heads for the Sea.

Yet even after Bentonville, it is not until Lee has his eventful meeting with Grant that the death knell of the Confederacy occurs.

If the greatest military mind of the US cannot prevail, then quite obviously the principal that civilians run the military has been definitively established.
 
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