Was Meade an Effective Commander at Gettysburg?

The decision to stay & fight at Gettysburg was Meade's (along with Hancock's). Buford & Reynolds got things started, and who knows how things might have developed if Reynolds had not been killed. Meade sent Hancock to take Reynolds's place, and Hancock saved Cemetery Hill. Hancock also sent back word that he thought Gettysburg was a good place to fight & that the position was a strong one "provided it was held by good troops." The decision to concentrate at Gettysburg and fight the major battle there was Meade's alone, and get made it sometime during the late afternoon on July 1 (my opinion is soon after he received Buford's message from the front saying "We need help now" and before he got word from Hancock.

As for "not having to do anything" once get got to Gettysburg, Meade made all the major decisions about shifting troops to endangered positions. He sent Sykes to the left, ordered Slocum/Williams to send troops to the left, and sent in the 6th Corps to various locations once they arrived. There are two (I believe) major exceptions. Meade had ordered troops to Little Round Top, but it was Warren who grabbed Vincent's brigade specifically to save the hill. The other major exception was Hancock sent Carroll's brigade to save East Cemetery Hill -- I am not aware Meade had any involvement in that decision. Aside from Meade, Hancock made the major troop decisions involving shifting troops to threatened areas, but these were troops under his nominal command after July 1.
 
I think you make a good point. However, in my opinion I think Wade Hampton and certainly Jeb Stuart were fine examples of effective offensive cavalry leaders. The artillery materials used by the Confederates were not of the best quality especially their fuses. On the other hand, Union artillery was of very good quality and provided effective ranges for their various artillery units. Also, as the war endured, arms manufacturers, such as Colt and Remington, made better and more accurate rifles and small arms with better effective fire power. Just a thought. David.

I just don't remember them destroying a fleeing defeated atmy. Also cavalry rarely crushed an opposing army's flank and caused an army to fall apart. There were few major battles where the cavalry played a decisive roll. The US nor Confederates had heavy cavalry which was armed and trained to play a major roll in battles.
 
Buford and Reynolds decided to make a fight west of town; within a short time the fighting went past Buford's authority and Reynolds was killed. They set up little and soon what they had set up was a shambles.

As for Meade's decisions being easy and obvious, I think that's a very simplistic assertion.

I don't know if the chaos on the First Day of Gettysburg matches the chaos in my brain when I try to sort it out. For every bad thing that happened (Barlow's Knoll) I think of a good thing (Howard secures Cemetery Hill). It is rather pathetic that for all of my reading, Pfanz, Gettysburg the First Day, Sears, Gettysburg, I simply cannot summarize the First Day, without viewing it as several localized battles verses a single battle.
 
I don't know if the chaos on the First Day of Gettysburg matches the chaos in my brain when I try to sort it out. For every bad thing that happened (Barlow's Knoll) I think of a good thing (Howard secures Cemetery Hill). It is rather pathetic that for all of my reading, Pfanz, Gettysburg the First Day, Sears, Gettysburg, I simply cannot summarize the First Day, without viewing it as several localized battles verses a single battle.

You have it right. There's morning on McPherson Ridge, which was a Union victory. Then a lull, then afternoon, where Rodes' Division appears on the Union First Corps' flank, then Early's Division appears on the Union Eleventh Corps' flank. That causes the collapse and the Union forces retreat through the town to Cemetery Hill.
 
You have it right. There's morning on McPherson Ridge, which was a Union victory. Then a lull, then afternoon, where Rodes' Division appears on the Union First Corps' flank, then Early's Division appears on the Union Eleventh Corps' flank. That causes the collapse and the Union forces retreat through the town to Cemetery Hill.

This is very encouraging. Thank you! :smile:
 
You have it right. There's morning on McPherson Ridge, which was a Union victory. Then a lull, then afternoon, where Rodes' Division appears on the Union First Corps' flank, then Early's Division appears on the Union Eleventh Corps' flank. That causes the collapse and the Union forces retreat through the town to Cemetery Hill.

Kinda, but not quite. For the 35,000 view it is fine, but AP Hill's Corps had a bit to do with the PM Union defeat, as the capturing of the commanding point of that area (Oak Hill) and filling it up with Ewell's (Rodes's) artillery, coordinating with AP Hill's artillery (Heth's) at Herr's Ridge. Add a few head-scratching moves by Barlow and Stone, and Howard pretty much depleting the Cemetery Hill sending men North brigade by brigade, just to be saved by Hancock's arrival, and it starts to get clearer.

However (back to the discussion here) Meade had nothing to do with that mess. He was way South when all was said and done.
 
I just don't remember them destroying a fleeing defeated atmy. Also cavalry rarely crushed an opposing army's flank and caused an army to fall apart. There were few major battles where the cavalry played a decisive roll. The US nor Confederates had heavy cavalry which was armed and trained to play a major roll in battles.
Major Bill. I appreciate your response and Thank You but I'm not sure that it is correct. If you don't mind, lets ask the cavalry expert, Eric Wittenberg, what he thinks about our discussion. Oh @Eric Wittenberg could you please comment on our discussion relative to the cavalry and its offensive uses, if any, during the civil war. Thank You. David.
 
Bill is correct with respect to the traditional Napoleonic model for the use of cavalry. There were only a handful of instances where it was done--Third Winchester and Cedar Creek being the most notable. It's worth noting that not even at Third Winchester or Cedar Creek were the enemy's armies destroyed.

The problem was complex:

  • American terrain was generally too heavily wooded and not conducive to large-scale cavalry operations;
  • Doctrine was different;
  • Technology had changed things dramatically--the advent of long-range rifled muskets made mounted charges against infantry really dangerous and subject to being torn up as they charged the positions.
Napoleonic doctrine was great in the era before rifled muskets but not so much after the technology changed. I did several pieces on this topic that can be found on the Emerging Civil War blog if it's of further interest.
 
Bill is correct with respect to the traditional Napoleonic model for the use of cavalry. There were only a handful of instances where it was done--Third Winchester and Cedar Creek being the most notable. It's worth noting that not even at Third Winchester or Cedar Creek were the enemy's armies destroyed.

The problem was complex:

  • American terrain was generally too heavily wooded and not conducive to large-scale cavalry operations;
  • Doctrine was different;
  • Technology had changed things dramatically--the advent of long-range rifled muskets made mounted charges against infantry really dangerous and subject to being torn up as they charged the positions.
Napoleonic doctrine was great in the era before rifled muskets but not so much after the technology changed. I did several pieces on this topic that can be found on the Emerging Civil War blog if it's of further interest.

Straight from the horse's mouth! Thanks for the rundown, Eric. I'll definitely be taking a look at those pieces when I touch the cavalry. :smile:
 
Bill is correct with respect to the traditional Napoleonic model for the use of cavalry. There were only a handful of instances where it was done--Third Winchester and Cedar Creek being the most notable. It's worth noting that not even at Third Winchester or Cedar Creek were the enemy's armies destroyed.

The problem was complex:

  • American terrain was generally too heavily wooded and not conducive to large-scale cavalry operations;
  • Doctrine was different;
  • Technology had changed things dramatically--the advent of long-range rifled muskets made mounted charges against infantry really dangerous and subject to being torn up as they charged the positions.
Napoleonic doctrine was great in the era before rifled muskets but not so much after the technology changed. I did several pieces on this topic that can be found on the Emerging Civil War blog if it's of further interest.
Eric. Thanks for responding to the inquiry and Thanks for the useful information. David.
 
Meade was capable and efficient, but still ceded the initiative entirely to his opponent. A young Napoleon might have used the entire Sixth Corps like the Old Guard to counterattack after the Confederate assault failed on July 3, and split the enemy army into two parts to achieve a decisive victory.

Meade did willingly cede the initiative to the opponent by having the AOTP assume a defensive position against which the ANV would exhaust itself in what turned out to be a series of relentless but unsuccessful assaults.
 
Meade did willingly cede the initiative to the opponent by having the AOTP assume a defensive position against which the ANV would exhaust itself in what turned out to be a series of relentless but unsuccessful assaults.

Agreed. "The initiative" is an important element, but just as important is how it's used. By ceding it to Lee and taking a strong defensive position he utilized the initiative effectively.
 
Meade did willingly cede the initiative to the opponent by having the AOTP assume a defensive position against which the ANV would exhaust itself in what turned out to be a series of relentless but unsuccessful assaults.

That puts a positive spin on it. It appears the Army of the Potomac was conditioned to cede the initiative to Lee, and that's probably what Grant thought too, when, after taking command, he became frustrated to find that his generals were always thinking of ways to counter Lee's thrusts, rather than compelling Lee to focus on stopping the Federals.
 
That puts a positive spin on it. It appears the Army of the Potomac was conditioned to cede the initiative to Lee, and that's probably what Grant thought too, when, after taking command, he became frustrated to find that his generals were always thinking of ways to counter Lee's thrusts, rather than compelling Lee to focus on stopping the Federals.

Meade also inherited the situation from Hooker, who had no problem ceding the initiative to Lee.
 
Meade also inherited the situation from Hooker, who had no problem ceding the initiative to Lee.
By the nature of the campaign -- an invasion -- Lee had the initiative anyway. My belief is that the speed & breadth of the Army of the Potomac's advance through Maryland on June 29 & 30 restricted Lee's options. This was abetted by the absence of Stuart & the fact that 2/3 of Lee's army was advancing on a single road (Chambersburg Pike), along with all his trains.

Lee was unprepared to fight a battle on July 1. He wanted to wait until the army was together before bringing on a general engagement. If Lee's army had been able to seize the Gettysburg road network on July 1 unopposed, he would have had a number of options for maneuver. Failing to seize the road network, which was not possible as long as the Army of the Potomac controlled Cemetery Hill, severely limited Lee's options for maneuver. As Lee himself later admitted (or at least implied) he basically was left with two options -- attack or retreat (he did not seriously consider Longstreet's suggested 3rd option to maneuver around Meade's left and get between the Army of the Potomac & Washington, the move Meade later said he most feared). Although Lee retained the tactical initiative on the battlefield, I think Meade did a pretty good job of limiting his strategic options.

Given that situation, and the primacy of defense over offense, I think Meade made the right choice to stay on the defensive. Meade made another point in one of his letters to his wife before receiving his command (see Life and Letters) that, considering the difference in the morale between the two armies, he believed staying on the tactical defensive gave the Army of the Potomac the best chance to win the upcoming battle.

Once Pickett's Charge failed, the opportunity to seize the initiative shifted to Meade, but he was unable to take it -- whether because of his own timidity (as some would argue), or Lee's masterful retreat (Brown's argument in his book if I understood it correctly).
 
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By the nature of the campaign -- an invasion -- Lee had the initiative anyway. My belief is that the speed & breadth of the Army of the Potomac's advance through Maryland on June 29 & 30 restricted Lee's options. This was abetted by the absence of Stuart & the fact that 2/3 of Lee's army was advancing on a single road (Chambersburg Pike), along with all his trains.

Lee was unprepared to fight a battle on July 1. He wanted to wait until the army was together before bringing on a general engagement. If Lee's army had been able to seize the Gettysburg road network on July 1 unopposed, he would have had a number of options for maneuver. Failing to seize the road network, which was not possible as long as the Army of the Potomac controlled Cemetery Hill, severely limited Lee's options for maneuver. As Lee himself later admitted (or at least implied) he basically was left with two options -- attack or retreat (he did not seriously consider Longstreet's suggested 3rd option to maneuver around Meade's left and get between the Army of the Potomac & Washington, the move Meade later said he most feared). Although Lee retained the tactical initiative on the battlefield, I think Meade did a pretty good job of limiting his strategic options.

Given that situation, and the primacy of defense over offense, I think Meade made the right choice to stay on the defensive. Meade made another point in one of his letters to his wife before receiving his command (see Life and Letters) that, considering the difference in the morale between the two armies, he believed staying on the tactical defensive gave the Army of the Potomac the best chance to win the upcoming battle.

Once Pickett's Charge failed, the opportunity to seize the initiative shifted to Meade, but he was unable to take it -- whether because of his own timidity (as some would argue), or Lee's masterful retreat (Brown's argument in his book if I understood it correctly).
Andy. Very well crafted. David.
 
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