Was Meade an Effective Commander at Gettysburg?

Meade was capable and efficient, but still ceded the initiative entirely to his opponent. A young Napoleon might have used the entire Sixth Corps like the Old Guard to counterattack after the Confederate assault failed on July 3, and split the enemy army into two parts to achieve a decisive victory.
Tom. I agree with you wholeheartedly. Not only Napoleon but Jackson would have continued the battle by driving the enemy into submission especially if the forces were available to him. I say this since Jackson was an avid reader of Napoleon's Maxims. David.
 
Tom. I agree with you wholeheartedly. Not only Napoleon but Jackson would have continued the battle by driving the enemy into submission especially if the forces were available to him. I say this since Jackson was an avid reader of Napoleon's Maxims. David.

This rarely happened during the Civil War. In the vast majority of battles the loser retreated more or less intact. This applies to both sides.
 
Have been digging in the OR for another project this evening, so I dug this up, which I think might put a bit of a light into the discussion:

Halleck to Meade
Washington July 28th 1863
General: I take this method of writing you a few words which I could not communicate in any other way. Your fight at Gettysburg met with the universal approbation of all military men here. You handled your troops in that battle as well, if not better than any general has handled his army during the war. You brought all your forces into action at the right time and place, which no commander of the Army of the Potomac has done before. You may well be proud of that battle. The President's order, or proclamation, of July 4, showed how much he appreciated your success.
OR Chapter XXXIX, p 104.
 
Thanks for the information. David.

I have to believe that the ability to pursue and destroy a defeated enemy army was much more limited during the Civil War than it had been during the Napoleonic Wars. The lack of effective offensive cavalry may have played a part as did the use of longer range long arms and longer range cannons and guns.
 
I have to believe that the ability to pursue and destroy a defeated enemy army was much more limited during the Civil War than it had been during the Napoleonic Wars. The lack of effective offensive cavalry may have played a part as did the use of longer range long arms and longer range cannons and guns.
I think you make a good point. However, in my opinion I think Wade Hampton and certainly Jeb Stuart were fine examples of effective offensive cavalry leaders. The artillery materials used by the Confederates were not of the best quality especially their fuses. On the other hand, Union artillery was of very good quality and provided effective ranges for their various artillery units. Also, as the war endured, arms manufacturers, such as Colt and Remington, made better and more accurate rifles and small arms with better effective fire power. Just a thought. David.
 
Easier said than done.
Irishtom29. I apologize for misusing the word "submission." I think a better word would be "confusion." When I made the correlating statement about Jackson and Napoleon I was thinking specifically about Jackson's Shenandoah Valley Campaign and specifically the First Battle of Winchester (May 25, 1862) in which Jackson's forces defeated Nathaniel Bank's troops and drove them back across the Potomac River into Maryland and away from Richmond. Jackson employed the Prussian military doctrine of "force concentration" during this battle. David.
 
I found it interesting that on the evening of July 4, Mead held a Council of War with the main questions of whether to stay in Gettysburg or pursue Lee: Those in favor of staying in Gettysburg — Birney, Sedgwick, Sykes, Hays, and Warren. Those who wished to pursue - Newton, Pleasonton, and Slocum. Doubtful - Howard. It seemed that even Halleck had his reservations about when to engage: he postponed "general engagement" twice: on the night of the 8th (OR 27, 3:517) and again on the night of the 10th (OR 27, 1:89) giving the impression that Mead was stalling engagement unilaterally if the missives were not public at the time. Source: Hours spent pouring over Eric Wittenberg's writings/blog. Paraphrased.

This commentary below does not necessarily address 6th corps as the sole means of pursuit, but it discusses another option of pursuit that I had not considered. It wanders into "What-If" territory -- something I avoid, but perhaps others can see it as a viable option.


Cutting Lee off at the pass, so to speak, has merit, but I wonder if Meade and/or 6th Corps is the force to do that. Meade was starting from behind Lee, and in choosing a route to send some or all of his command around Lee, would have to first divine where Lee was headed, and then require that any flanking force march faster and farther than Lee's advance guard. That's a pretty tall order.

Also, in terms of devining intentions, Meade has already lost one cavalry division (Buford, with his best mounted commander) withdrawn for remounting. The state of his other cavalry become critical in this situation - especially since Stuart is now present, and any Union recon must penetrate the CSA screen.

However, focusing on Meade is too limiting, I think. The real opportunity may well reside with Halleck. Consider that Halleck had, at close hand, some 12000 infantry in the field, yet not fully under Meade's control. French had 5100 troops near Frederick, mostly the Harper's Ferry garrison that was withdrawn to avoid a repeat of the capture of that place. Another three brigades - 5700 troops - were brought north from VA and NC to bolster the defenses of DC. Finally, there was one Brigade of Pa Reserves - 1300 strong - retained in DC. Combined, this force would match the strength of Meade's stongest Corps, and still leave DC's basic garrison of heavy Arty regiments intact. These troops were also veterans, having fought with the AOP at various times, and were likely to give a solid account of themselves - it's not as if they were simply raw militia.

In fact, most of these 7 brigades did join Meade's army in the days after Gettysburg. French and his three brigades, for instance, were assimilated into 3rd Corps, where French took command.

But what if the force were assembled at Frederick - French's location during the battle? This location puts them within a day's march of virtually all of Lee's possible crossing sites, much faster than Lee could get there. Halleck, I think, bears a much greater responsibility for lack of vision and failure to stop Lee than Meade does.

Dave Powell http://www.gdg.org/research/People/RELee/dtretrt.html
 
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This rarely happened during the Civil War. In the vast majority of battles the loser retreated more or less intact. This applies to both sides.
Major Bill. I am sorry and I certainly respect your civil war knowledge but I cannot believe that during any civil war battle that an offensive force would allow an enemy force to retreat more or less intact without levying any damages to that force. Could you educate me further on this point? David.
 
Hi David. I ask these questions partly out of curiosity, partly out of ignorance.

1. Was the battlefield of Jackson's day smaller than the encompassing battlefield(s) of Gettysburg?

2. Were Jackson's troops more dispersed, or more concentrated than Meade's army?
Bee. I am not an expert on this particular battle or campaign. However, I will try to answer your questions: regarding the first question, I would say the battlefield at First Winchester was smaller than the Battlefield(s) of Gettysburg. I must admit that I have never visited this particular battlefield. Your second question: When Jackson employed the force concentration doctrine he had to disperse his forces. Force concentration is a Prussian military theory in which a concentrating and overwhelming military force is used against an enemy's position so that the disparity between the two forces acts as a "force multiplier" in favor of the concentrated force. In other words, selecting a weak position of the enemy's forces and concentrating an overwhelming force against that position in order to overwhelm the enemy and force a possible retreat. As a result, Bank's forces ended up retreating back across the Potomac River. On the other hand, Meade's forces were certainly concentrated on Cemetery Hill and employed another Prussian military theory of interior lines which enables a commander to disperse troops rather quickly from one position in the line to another in order to foil any attack on the flanks or the center. I hope I have answered your questions satisfactorily. If not, perhaps the real civil war experts on the forum can help or supplement my poor answers. David.
 
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The result of the Siege of Yorktown, unlike that of the Battle of Gettysburg that was a Union victory, was inconclusive...
You what? It is quite clear that Yorktown was a strong defensive position and that McClellan broke through it.
 
Help with an anecdote about Meade at Gettysburg, please.

While skimming a source, which I do not remember, for something, which I also do not remember, I saw a statement that on July 2, while surveying the surge against Cemetery Ridge, General Meade either drew his pistol or was in the act of drawing it when his attention was diverted to some US troops advancing to meet the threat. Later, when it sunk in that the commander of the Army of the Potomac was allegedly about to enter combat, I could not find that reference again. Has anyone else ever run across that allegation? If so where?

Thanking you in advance.
 
Can we stay on Gettysburg?

I too am skeptical of hypotheticals. Its too easy to get the result you want. Anyone can win a battle that never took place.
 
Help with an anecdote about Meade at Gettysburg, please.

While skimming a source, which I do not remember, for something, which I also do not remember, I saw a statement that on July 2, while surveying the surge against Cemetery Ridge, General Meade either drew his pistol or was in the act of drawing it when his attention was diverted to some US troops advancing to meet the threat. Later, when it sunk in that the commander of the Army of the Potomac was allegedly about to enter combat, I could not find that reference again. Has anyone else ever run across that allegation? If so where?

Thanking you in advance.
Meade's son recounts an episode like this in his account of the battle. Meade drew his sword and he and his staff were going to "throw themselves into the breech" before reinforcements arrived. Newton then handed Meade his flask and they had something of a celebratory drink as the reinforcements went into action.

I am not aware that this story is confirmed anywhere else. It has been retold in several secondary works, although I can't recall which specific ones off the top of my head.
 
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