In 1878, McLaws prepared a paper in which he addressed some of these issues. McLaws claims that he, with Wofford, witnessed the latter part of Pickett's charge, the repulse, and aftermath. He describes being ordered to retire his line back to the Peach Orchard following Pickett's repulse.
He also does a good job of explaining (in simple terms even I can understand
) why it could not possibly have been intended for either of Longstreet's other divisions (McLaws' or Hood's) to have abandoned their position, holding the reinforced Federal left, to join Pickett's charge. To do that, he says, would have resulted in an even worse disaster than that which occurred....ie. the Federal left would have come around behind them and enveloped that entire end of the Confederate line. Lights out. (Well he didn't exactly say "lights out," but you know what I mean.
)
McLaws lays blame on no one - well he does lament the lack of reconnaissance on Day 2 and says that, by the time the assault occurred, the situation had changed. The information provided by "Major Johnson" (Capt. Johnston,) conducted in the morning, was no longer accurate. McLaws calls it false information, and then corrects himself to call it "wrong information." But he doesn't even "blame" that situation on Johnston, Longstreet, or Lee.
"All this resulted from deficient organization of our staff corps, not from anybody's fault, but from the force of circumstances." In summary, I maintain that Lafayette McLaws provides one of the most tactful, unbiased Confederate eye-witness accounts available. But again, being a fan of tact and McLaws, you can see why I am partial to it.