Was Longstreet as reluctant as I was told?

kslocki

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For you Gettysburg fanactics out there, I was wondering if you coud help me with something?

I was told some years ago that General Longstreet was so opposed to attacking in Gettysburg that he countermarched his entire command twice on the 2nd day in the hopes that General Lee would call off the attack. Is there any validity to this?

Thanks,
The eager student.
 
Longstreet was very reluctant to attack at Gettysburg, but the countermarching of his command was to avoid being spotted (I believe - but I'd have to check - that was from Lee instructing that to be a priority).
 
Yes, as I read it, on the 2nd day, he had to alter his route to prevent being spotted by the Union army which is what caused his delay.
What people seem to forget in the whole Longstreet thing is that Longstreet acted as a military man, committed to what he had to do and following the orders of his commander. When he disagreed with Lee about the third day, he did it because he thought it was his duty, as one of Lee's officers, to offer his thoughts to his commander - in any other battle, they called it a "council of war". In the end, even though he still disagreed with Lee's plan, he followed his orders.
 
Probably the best scource to find this for yourself and read about it in detail is Harry Phanz's book, "Gettysburg The Second Day." I'm just finishing it up myself for about the fourth time, (each reading sheds new light on the battle as it happened on the southern end of the field on July 2). Longstreet was sort-of known for being "hard to move," how-ever he followed Lee's orders and got the attack under way. The real protester amoung Confederate generals on July 2, (south end of the field) was Hood, he thought it better to circle around the right and take the enemy from behind, "as Jackson would have done."

The delay due to "march, and counter-march" was nothing Longstreet did to delay anything, (as stated earlier, it was to remain unseen). The curious thing on July 2 was, Lee ordered several mounted scouting parties to the area, (and beyond) in the morning. These parties consisted of trusted and compitent officers who failed to report any Union troops in the area...Strange, seeing as Buford's cavalry division had camped there and was active on the morning of the 2nd, at least two regiments of Union infantry were "probing" the area at the time, Sickles had troops guarding the Emmitsburg road keeping it clear for his last brigades and ammunition trains to use, yet these scouting parties reported no enemy activity in the area. Would Lee have changed his plan if these scouts had seen, (and heard) the Federal activity going on in the area? Yes, it was early...And yes the morning was some-what misty with possible light fog in the low lying areas, but to not see or hear the activities of nearly two divisions...This is where Stuart's cavalry would have played a vital role. I do hate, "what if's" but in this case...

Longstreet probably beleived these reports up to the time he sent his own scouts out as his divisions were forming for the attack and they ran head long into Sickles advanced line, barely escaping with their lives. It was probably Lt. Col. Alexander who first made reference to seeing the Cemetary Ridge Line and realizing that July 2 would not be the last day when he advanced his artillery along the Emmitsburg road. Alexander saw clearly what Sickles had missed, the strength of the Cemetary Ridge line. Although they had smashed the advanced Federal line, the entire Cemetary Ridge line was solid, and would hold.

Longstreet may have generally disagreed with the attack, (prefering to take a defensive line) he was a professional soldier and would execute Lee's orders to his best ability as always.
 
I was told some years ago that General Longstreet was so opposed to attacking in Gettysburg that he countermarched his entire command twice on the 2nd day in the hopes that General Lee would call off the attack. Is there any validity to this?
Not in the least.
 
The counter-march was the fault of one man and it wasn't Longstreet.

Lee had been very unhappy with McLaws at Chancellorsville and Longstreet talked him out of dismissal. However, Lee was still very wary of McLaws' ability to understand and execute orders and so broke a fundamental rule of military etiquette. When discussing the assault planned later in the day, Lee ignored Longstreet's presence and bypassed the chain of command by personally directing McLaws as to where and how to position his division. Lee even made McLaws verbally acknowledge that he understood Lee's instructions just like a third grade teacher might do to a distracted pupil. To say that Longstreet was upset by this public display of Lee's opinion of Longstreet's inability to direct subordinates, is an understatement.

As per Lee's instructions, McLaws was to be deployed first in line to the right of Hill's Corps, followed by Hood.

When Longstreet saw that route laid out by Lee's staff would expose his movements to observation by Union signal men atop Little Round top, he stopped the march and ordered a counter-march to get behind a more secure ridge-line slightly to the west. Common sense says that Longstreet should have sped things up by over an hour or more by having the tail of Hood's division, Law's Brigade, become the lead unit, but he could not do so as Lee had tied his hands by his overly specific and very public directions to McLaws.

So, Law's brigade, instead of leading the way behind the nearby ridge-line had to march almost back to the start line in order for McLaws to again resume the lead.

A bit complicated , I know, but this is the story behind the overly long counter-march. Maybe if Longstreet had not been publicly humiliated, he might simply have over-rode Lee's orders and reversed the order of march. What this meant was that Longstreet would have been in position and started his assault before Sickels moved his corps forward, thereby exposing his right flank to the IIIrd Corps.

A thought for another day.
 
Longstreet was totally against the attack plan of the 2nd and 3rd, but he did what Lee ordered in the end. Lee had a scout pick out the planned marching route for McLaws and Hood but they did not personally look at it. As others have stated they realized once on the march that they were going to be able to be seen from the Round tops on the path they were on so McLaws had to counter march and take another road.
 
Porter Alexander went back and met the infantry when they were stopped in sight of the signal station on Little Round Top and told them to go the way he had gone earlier with his artillery, out of sight, but they told him they could not deviate from Lee's orders and were waiting for further orders and/or a guide. I say "they" because he doesn't say who he spoke with.
 
Porter Alexander went back and met the infantry when they were stopped in sight of the signal station on Little Round Top and told them to go the way he had gone earlier with his artillery, out of sight, but they told him they could not deviate from Lee's orders and were waiting for further orders and/or a guide. I say "they" because he doesn't say who he spoke with.

I have always thought it was odd that Longstreet did not simply follow the ruts made by Alexander's battalion of artillery. Could Lee have give McLaws strict and very explicit instructions as to how he was to take up position on Hill's right?
 
I don't know, but they adamantly refused to go the way he indicated. He said there was no one there with enough authority to make the call to go a different way (even a way that had been proven successful), which IMO suggests a feeling of being under the gun.
 
I am glad that I found this site. I can tell that I am going to learn a lot here.

After reading your responses I have another question. First I would like to state that I am a southerner and I have a great deal of respect for General Lee. Reason I state that is to some he is a god and questioning him is blasphemous.

Do you think that General Lee was just getting tired of the war and it showed in his decisions he made (Pickett's charge) or his harsh behavior to subordinates? From what I have learned of the man is that he was a gentleman of the first order and very professional in his duties. I have led men in combat so I would not fault him if he was approaching that point but if he had been too tired to fight or let it affect his decisions an officer's duty would be to step aside. I am not claiming that this is the case. I am by no means an R. E. Lee scholar and that is why I present the question.

Thanks
 
I'm not sure if he intentionally slipped, but the notion that he was overwhelmed by the (in a word) stress, coupled with his shaky health at the time of Gettysburg, could have lead him thinking less than clear headedly.

The problem being (if this is correct) that the very condition that would make it so he should have stepped aside would also impair his ability to realize he's not operating at his best.

You may be on to something here, but I'm not aware of anything indicating it.
 
I am glad that I found this site. I can tell that I am going to learn a lot here.

As another "new recruit" to this forum, I am with you 100% on that!

Do you think that General Lee was just getting tired of the war and it showed in his decisions he made (Pickett's charge) or his harsh behavior to subordinates? From what I have learned of the man is that he was a gentleman of the first order and very professional in his duties. I have led men in combat so I would not fault him if he was approaching that point but if he had been too tired to fight or let it affect his decisions an officer's duty would be to step aside.

There's no doubt he would not have intentionally slipped, but he was having health issues, that's reported consistently, and stress, well, most of us can probably never even begin to imagine the level......but if those affected his decision making, I guess only he could answer that, and then again, even he may not have realized it himself.
 
I'm not sure if he intentionally slipped, but the notion that he was overwhelmed by the (in a word) stress, coupled with his shaky health at the time of Gettysburg, could have lead him thinking less than clear headedly.

The problem being (if this is correct) that the very condition that would make it so he should have stepped aside would also impair his ability to realize he's not operating at his best.

You may be on to something here, but I'm not aware of anything indicating it.

You make an excellent point that if Lee was in that condition he wouldn't have the ability to recognize that he should step down. The ultimate responsibility of relieving a commander goes to the 2nd in command or the commander-in-chief. Would Longstreet be Lee's second in command? Was he the most senior Corps commander? I don't know how it would have been received by the CS army had Longstreet relived the beloved Lee of his command.

I don't think that there is a question that Lee and Grant were tired of the war and wanted to hurt each other at Cold Harbor.
 
http://books.google.com/books?id=Dm...="I wish it placed just the opposite"&f=false

After Lee did this (referenced by Prroh earlier, if I understand what he was referring to correctly), I would (as an officer in First Corps) feel a little micromanaged too. Not a situation encouraging taking a different route on the suggestion of an artillery battalion commander.

I don't see it as Lee micromanaging the attack as much as I see Longstreet trying to change Lee's orders for the alignment of Mclaws' attack. Lee showed Mclaws the mark on the map drawn perpendicular to the Emmittsburg Rd. and after Mclaws was denied a chance to scout the area by Longstreet due to it already being scouted, Longstreet then drew a line exactly opposite of the line marked on the map with his finger. That's when Lee interrupted with "I wish it place just the opposite." I see it as Longstreet being a pain in the butt.

There were probably conversations between Lee and Longstreet that we will never know about. We know they both weren't in the best temper.

dvrmte
 
You make an excellent point that if Lee was in that condition he wouldn't have the ability to recognize that he should step down. The ultimate responsibility of relieving a commander goes to the 2nd in command or the commander-in-chief. Would Longstreet be Lee's second in command? Was he the most senior Corps commander? I don't know how it would have been received by the CS army had Longstreet relived the beloved Lee of his command.
Longstreet was indeed 2nd in command. If he had taken steps to have Lee relieved in the middle of a battle, and Lee did not consent, it would have been a tremendous blowup with far-reaching consequences. I don't know if Longstreet would even have that authority. It seems like he'd need to notify Davis or S. Cooper, or... somebody. And build an excellent, watertight case with lots of corroborating witnesses for future legal proceedings. This would not be something to be taken lightly.

Bragg's subordinates thought he was unfit, but did any ever try to actually remove him? Did anybody ever try to remove anybody during the war? I can't think of an example.
 
I don't know, but they adamantly refused to go the way he indicated. He said there was no one there with enough authority to make the call to go a different way (even a way that had been proven successful), which IMO suggests a feeling of being under the gun.

Not necessarily. It might just mean that he did not come across anybody with enough authority to order the change and that if new orders arrived momentarily, as expected, changing the new orders might only serve to add confusion and further delays to the situation. he does mention that lee was getting impatient for the assault to begin. A message from the boss asking why you haven't started creates an atmosphere to discourage making changes.

Note that Alexander says that the trail made by his artillery was easy enough to follow. It was, after, only a short off-road detour before rejoining the road he was following.
 
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