Was Lee a Poor Strategic Thinker?

OldReliable1862

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Beginning in the 1970s with Alan Nolan and Thomas Lawrence Connelly, the view of Lee as the unassailable, perfect general has started to be thoroughly taken to task. One of the most charges against Lee's supposed mastery of war was that he allegedly failed to grasp war above the operational, or "grand tactical" level. Lee had strategic "tunnel vision," unable to see the war outside of the Virginia theater of operations.

On the face of it, this seems somewhat substantiated when looking at how pessimistic he was of Longstreet's desire to use his troops in the West.
 
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if Lee never finds himself forced into field command, but remains as Davis's staff, what strategic changes might Lee have pushed, that prove his strategic vision? Just a fun speculation.
I'm not sure that Lee exhibited the broad type of strategic thinking that was required even had he functioned solely as Davis' close military advisor. Defense of the border states was paramount to any successful Confederate strategy, but I am not aware that Lee suggested any moves or had any real role in that arena during the first year of the war, when it mattered. Lee was aware of the importance of defending and strengthening critical ports along the southern Atlantic coast, so that's a positive move. And he was ridiculed for his attempts to beef up the Richmond fortifications before he eventually gained full field command. During his tenure with the ANV, some of the motives for Lee's offensive moves and northern incursions were to sap the northern will to continue fighting and indirectly attain foreign intervention, certainly worthy aims if achieved. Ultimately, that strategy did not bear out; perhaps a more inward looking defense, starting with control of the western border states, but expanding to a defense of the entire Mississippi River system, would have proven more effective. But Lee was always more focused on his beloved Virginia.
 
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If the Confedracy can't defend it's ports it will economically collapse since it can't export agricultural products to buy weaponry or other needed items.
Ironically, the north understood that concept, and attempted to make inroads on the North and South Carolina coasts, not to mention points further south and along the Gulf of Mexico. But although the Union successful attained beachheads in many of those locations, it never made serious efforts to expand those beachheads afterwards, by using them as springboards for advancing inland. It settled on the blockade, which took time to gather effectiveness.
 
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@Irishtom29 You make an interesting point in your comments in post #77 above. But why would that be, do you think? Would it be because the British soldier was a regular, whereas the armies of the American Civil War we predominantly volunteers? Or is there more to it than that?

John

For one thing I think they were just tougher. British regular soldiers of the time were often driven to soldiering by poverty and probably took hardship as a given. No doubt many had a "bad attitude" and were violent and combative with few illusions as to the nature of their work. Perhaps the pride of being professional soldiers came into it too, especially with the officers. And British officers were nothing if not steadfast and courageous, despite their lisping. "Die hard 57th, die hard!" and all that.

I also think that the peoples of the British Isles, all of them, for whatever reasons, are a particularly pugnacious bunch.
 
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I admit that I haven't read those criticisms but based on what I know, I'm not sure I understand the attack on Lee.

Until late in the war his focus was the Virginia theater, defense of Richmond and the Army of Northern Virginia. He wasn't named General In Chief of all the armies of the CSA until February 1865. So, basically, it wasn't his job to be a strategic master-mind.

Strategic leadership of the Confederacy was the job of the Confederate War Department and specifically of President Davis who was also the "Commander In Chief" of the Confederate military. Additionally, from the little I know of Davis, he DID think that he was a strategic master-mind and probably did not countenance criticism well.

There's also an issue here of resources. "Strategic vision" depends a great deal on "strategic resources." As the old saying goes . . . . amateurs think tactics while professionals think logistics.

If you think of it that way, you do see Lee exercising strategic vision in 1863 when he argued against sending relief to Vicksburg and instead focusing on the invasion of the North.

The most important principle of war is the OBJECTIVE and I would argue that capturing Washington DC was the CSA's most important strategic objective.

Given the incoherent nature of the Confederacy's command structure, a person of Lee's stature could have asserted greater influence on overall war strategy, regardless as to whether he held general-in-chief rank. Davis, no doubt, considered himself the master warlord, a harmful trait that prevented him from obtaining fair and accurate counsel from other commanders. But Lee was probably the exception; Davis acquiesced to many of Lee's plans (including the ill-fated Pennsylvania incursion), and relied on Lee for advice on other matters including the choice of Hood to replace Johnston. I'm not sure if Lee can be considered to have exercised strategic vision when faced with a critical decision to help relieve Vicksburg. Lee did not view the choice from a large strategic point of view; rather, he firmly held to his own limited paradigm of bringing the war to Maryland and Pennsylvania in attempts, among other things, to weaken northern morale. That was a worthy goal, but rather than being a true strategic vision, it was Lee's preordained thinking, not a balanced and objective analysis of how to deploy the Confederacy's resources.
 
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The British were fond of a volley or two and a swift counter attack. The British regular soldier of the Peninsular War, be he English, Irish, Welsh or Scottish, had a ferocity and sheer bloody mindedness lacking in the armies of our Civil War.

That was exactly what General Sherman constantly complained about at the start of the war. He famously denigrated the fighting quality and discipline (or lack thereof) of American volunteers, and preferred to command regular troops. Of course, his attitude changed during the course of the war as he came to realize what the volunteer army was capable of doing.
 
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I'm not sure if Lee can be considered to have exercised strategic vision when faced with a critical decision to help relieve Vicksburg. Lee did not view the choice from a large strategic point of view; rather, he firmly held to his own limited paradigm of bringing the war to Maryland and Pennsylvania in attempts, among other things, to weaken northern morale. That was a worthy goal, but rather than being a true strategic vision, it was Lee's preordained thinking, not a balanced and objective analysis of how to deploy the Confederacy's resources.
How can you possibly know that?

The invasion of Pennsylvania was supposed to accomplish many things of great strategic value, including ending the war! How can you be more strategic than that? Lee planned to seize the initiative, pull Federal troops out of war-torn Northern Virginia, replenish his army in the rich lands to the north, threaten Baltimore and Washington, cement the case for Unionists who wanted the war to end, and so on.

What was the competing alternative in late May/early June 1863 . . . to relieve Vicksburg?

Lee might have considered issues like:

1) Who was he going to send? Jackson was dead. His Corps had been split in two and two new generals were now in charge. Was he supposed to send Longstreet? He had a good record but as was said: "Jackson was the Hammer and Longstreet the Anvil." He later fought well at Chicamauga but was criticized as being too slow for his later campaign in Tennessee ("Peter The Slow"). This slowness and confusion was well-known about Longstreet. We saw it at Gettysburg. I think Lee knew that about the man.

2) Besides which there is no guarantee that any troops sent west (even with Lee himself in command) could have changed the situation at Vicksburg. Grant was aware that his rear was wide open and he had placed Sherman in command of protecting that flank. Could the Confederates have broken through Sherman?

3) And that raises another question. Could the Confederates send more men to relieve Vicksburg than Halleck could send to help Grant. (I don't think so.)

4) And finally . . . what would have happened on the eastern front if a part of Lee's army had marched west in late May/early June? What if Lee himself had gone to take command out west? This was the start of the summer campaign season for the North. What happens to Richmond?

No sir, I disagree with you. I think a lot of "strategic thought" went into the decision.

I also think (can't prove it) that Lee had an instinctive of understanding of what 50 years later would come to be called "infiltration tactics" or "Hutier tactics." (In later years aka "Blitzkrieg, Deep Battle, Maneuver Warfare, Air/Land Battle, etc.) Some generals have the knack for it: Rommel, Guderian, Tuckachevsky, Patton, etc.

I think Lee had that vision. I think he understood that a deep thrust into the North would paralyze the Union military, shake the confidence of its leaders and end the war . . . maybe even without fighting the Army of the Potomac.

it was a gamble worth taking.
 
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"Jackson was the Hammer and Longstreet the Anvil." He later fought well at Chicamauga but was criticized as being too slow for his later campaign in Tennessee ("Peter The Slow"). This slowness and confusion was well-known about Longstreet. We saw it at Gettysburg. I think Lee knew that about the man.
At what battle did they ever use Longstreet's corp as an anvil?

At 7 days the army was attacking.
At 2nd Manassas it was Jackson who made the defensive fight and Longstreet who came in on the flank and routed the union army in what was one of the most effective attacks of the war. (way way more effective that what Jackson did the following spring)

At Antietam and Fredericksburg the entire army was defensive,.
He was not at Chancellorsville.
At Gettysbrug the entire army was attacking.

Then he went west and commanded one of the great assaults of the war at Chickamauga.
And when he finally came back east he was wounded commanding yet another attack in the wilderness.
(after other parts of the army had done the defensive fighting)


Also the last part of you post.... infiltration tactics, is as the name say a tactic.
An army commander like Lee had very little to do with the actual infantry tactics.
And nothing even remotely like infiltration tactics was used doing the war. And it have nothing to do with Maneuver Warfare. that is something you do at the operational level.

It can be argued that 2nd Manassas is a time where Lee managed to do "maneuver warfare" very well.
Binding the entire enemy force in place with a part of your force... in a defensive fight and then bring the rest of your force down on the enemy flank is something Both Napoleon I and Von Moltke (the elder) would have recognized and approved off.
Since the both knew very well how to do that... so this was nothing new by the time Lee first started to study military tactics.
(so not something that was invented 50 years later)
 
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I guess that sooner or later, all of these many threads devoted to searching every aspect of a good man's life for defects will eventually turn up something.

But I don't understand the end game. They are already tearing down his statues, renaming schools and streets, etc. And what of those whose names replace his? Will there then be an investigation into their lives?
 
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I guess that sooner or later, all of these many threads devoted to searching every aspect of a good man's life for defects will eventually turn up something.
Yeah, and that goes for Lee's life too.

So, what's wrong with digging into historical characters on a history forum? You seem to be taking umbrage at the very notion of criticizing Lee.
 
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Ironically, the north understood that concept, and attempted to make inroads on the North and South Carolina coasts, not to mention points further south and along the Gulf of Mexico. But although the Union successful attained beachheads in many of those locations, it never made serious efforts to expand those beachheads afterwards, by using them as springboards for advancing inland. It settled on the blockade, which took time to gather effectiveness.
Not exactly. General Burnside after his forces siezed New Bern did want to the size the rail junction at Goldsboro. Unfortunately Lincoln ordered the bulk of his troops to be transferred to assist General McCelllan' s Peninsula Campaign.
General Grant did purpose attacking Richmond from the back door via landing in ( New Berne?) then working his way North. OA few of our posters have posted the ORs but unfortunately Lincoln insisted that AoP is always between Washington DC and Richmond.
Leftyhunter
 
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Not exactly. General Burnside after his forces siezed New Bern did want to the size the rail junction at Goldsboro. Unfortunately Lincoln ordered the bulk of his troops to be transferred to assist General McCelllan' s Peninsula Campaign.
General Grant did purpose attacking Richmond from the back door via landing in ( New Berne?) then working his way North. OA few of our posters have posted the ORs but unfortunately Lincoln insisted that AoP is always between Washington DC and Richmond.
Leftyhunter

Yes, and that shows that the Lincoln administration lacked the wherewithall to use those landing sites as launching sites for major offensives to places like Richmond or Atlanta. The strategy could have been different but as you point out, Lincoln was always more concerned with keeping a major force between Washington and the enemy.
 
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The invasion of Pennsylvania was supposed to accomplish many things of great strategic value, including ending the war! How can you be more strategic than that?
My post clearly indicated that the goals of the Pennsylvania move were worthy and in and of themselves, were justified by Lee for serious reasons including warding off new Union offensives in Virginia, damaging northern morale, and obtaining needed food and forage. But as I noted, this thinking reflected Lee's Virginia-centric focus on how the war was to be fought. This attitude may rightly reflect the concerns of a local field commander. But a strategist whose concern is national in scope would consider the pros and cons of all alternatives rather than advocate for only one particular point of view. The issue of relieving pressure on Vicksburg was brought up by Davis and Seddon in their meetings with Lee, but Lee was only interested in gaining approval for his Pennsylvania incursion. This is not meant as a particular criticism of Lee. The Confederate government never developed a clear consensus of war strategy, and ended up in a default position of assenting to different "visions" of individual commanders such as Lee, Johnston, and Bragg. Which is one reason why it lost the war.
 
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My post clearly indicated that the goals of the Pennsylvania move were worthy and in and of themselves, were justified by Lee for serious reasons including warding off new Union offensives in Virginia, damaging northern morale, and obtaining needed food and forage. But as I noted, this thinking reflected Lee's Virginia-centric focus on how the war was to be fought. This attitude may rightly reflect the concerns of a local field commander. But a strategist whose concern is national in scope would consider the pros and cons of all alternatives rather than advocate for only one particular point of view. The issue of relieving pressure on Vicksburg was brought up by Davis and Seddon in their meetings with Lee, but Lee was only interested in gaining approval for his Pennsylvania incursion. This is not meant as a particular criticism of Lee. The Confederate government never developed a clear consensus of war strategy, and ended up in a default position of assenting to different "visions" of individual commanders such as Lee, Johnston, and Bragg. Which is one reason why it lost the war.
In defense of or playing devil's advocate for Davis the war was already lost after the withdrawal of Union troops from Ft. Sumter. Union will bended but it never cracked. There is no viable strategy for a secessionist movement based on the economic engine of slavery and not being able to achieve pariety in manpower.
As others have mentioned either the Confedracy somehow wins the overwhelming loyalty of the border states, gains foreiegn recognition or somehow the Union public morale collapses.
British Army Major Dunsmore proved in the ARW that people of color will gladly fight for freedom plus that lesson was reiterated during the War of 1812 when the British Marines recruited " Colonial Marines" also from people of color who where eager to fight the Americans.
The Secessionists for some reason ignored these two historical examples but Lincoln did not.
As mentioned the Confedracy must defend it's ports at all costs but ultimately failed to do so.
Leftyhunter
 
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Yeah, and that goes for Lee's life too.

So, what's wrong with digging into historical characters on a history forum? You seem to be taking umbrage at the very notion of criticizing Lee.
Of course nothing is wrong with digging on a history forum.

I suppose it is just the spawning of thread after thread looking particularly for negatives. That's all
 
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At what battle did they ever use Longstreet's corp as an anvil?
The terminology has been used by writers figuratively versus literally. Jackson conducted the Shenandoah Campaign, not Longstreet. He then quickly marched east to join Lee for the Seven Days Battle. Jackson led the flanking march at Second Bull Run and then again at Chancellorsville, not Longstreet. True, Longstreet wasn't there, but two of his divisions were and Lee used them as a brick wall and anvil. Had Longstreet been there, I doubt anything would have changed.

Calling Longstreet the "anvil" is not derogatory. At least I've never read anyone using it that way. It was a comparison based on the employment of both men. You can argue that it was luck, geography, timing, etc, but I get the sense that Lee understood that if you want an independent commander for your flanking movement, Jackson was the man.

Also the last part of you post.... infiltration tactics, is as the name say a tactic.
An army commander like Lee had very little to do with the actual infantry tactics.
And nothing even remotely like infiltration tactics was used doing the war. And it have nothing to do with Maneuver Warfare. that is something you do at the operational level.

The terminology is difficult. "Infiltration tactics" did begin, as far as modern military history is concerned, during World War One as a "tactic" . . . . something used at battalion and company level. But it was very quickly adapted by the Germans to Division, Corps and Army level.

Outside of the Western Front (eastern front, the desert), there were many examples of lightning movement, "dislocation" and "strategic paralysis" . . . all of which are the aims of this kind of warfare. So you could see "infiltration tactics" being used in a battalion-level attack by the German Army . . . and at the same time General Allenby was keeping Ottoman armies off-balance by using the same methods.

Therefore, it's not totally not correct to say that "Maneuver Warfare" is strictly "Operational." It has applications at all levels of warfare. (I say "totally correct" because writers are free to define things however they want.)

Throughout history, there have been two types of combat: Attrition and Maneuver. Leaders usually have a tendency to favor one over the other . . . or as I said:

(In later years aka "Blitzkrieg, Deep Battle, Maneuver Warfare, Air/Land Battle, etc.) Some generals have the knack for it: Rommel, Guderian, Tuckachevsky, Patton, etc.​

So my real point is that in late May 1863, Lee had that vision of using maneuver/infiltration/deep battle, etc against the North. I think he understood that a deep thrust into the North would paralyze the Union military, shake the confidence of its leaders and end the war . . . maybe even without fighting the Army of the Potomac.

It can be argued that 2nd Manassas is a time where Lee managed to do "maneuver warfare" very well.
Binding the entire enemy force in place with a part of your force... in a defensive fight and then bring the rest of your force down on the enemy flank is something Both Napoleon I and Von Moltke (the elder) would have recognized and approved off.
Since the both knew very well how to do that... so this was nothing new by the time Lee first started to study military tactics.
(so not something that was invented 50 years later)​

We're talking apples & oranges.

True . . . the basic form of sending cavalry or fast-marching infantry against the enemy flanks or rear has been used throughout history. But the evolution of it into what we recognize today was actually an "invention" of the 1920s and 30s. It involved actual development and employment of new technology and philosophies, not available to Napoleon or von Moltke . . . or Hannibal or Frederick The Great.

Von Moltke's planned envelopment of the French Army, for example, was totally different from the operation against France in 1940 where a hole was punched into the French defense and then masses of armor pushed through to the English Channel without infantry support. In fact, the first German plan looked a lot like Von Moltke's plan and was rejected in favor of the "lightning strike."

So there was "invention" and "evolution" between 1920 and 1940 that Lee, Napoleon and von Moltke might have recognized but would have considered it very radical.
 
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But as I noted, this thinking reflected Lee's Virginia-centric focus on how the war was to be fought. This attitude may rightly reflect the concerns of a local field commander. But a strategist whose concern is national in scope would consider the pros and cons of all alternatives rather than advocate for only one particular point of view.

I have to admit that I may not be totally understanding the point you're trying to make. LOL Maybe I'm confused and so maybe we're talking apples and oranges (?)

What I think you are saying is that as an army commander Lee was fixated on what was to his front and blind to every other consideration affecting the South.

OK . . . but what if Lee had considered the totality of the Southern situation and concluded (rightly, I think) that the DECISIVE POINT was right where he was?

In his book On War which Lee, (as commandant of West Point) would have read, Von Clausewitz defined what he called the Center Of Gravity. Here is how a modern writer describes it and how Lee would have understood it in 1863:

Clausewitz’s original definition follows the physics analogy more closely than previous analyses of his work have appreciated. In fact, it is not a source of strength or a critical capability, but a focal point that is essentially effects-based, rather than capabilities-based. In modern elementary physics, which was about the state of the mechanical sciences in Clausewitz’s day, a CoG represents the point where the forces of gravity converge within an object. Striking at the CoG with enough force will usually cause the object to lose its balance, or equilibrium, and fall. A CoG is, therefore, not a source of strength, but a factor of balance.​

Wasn't that Richmond? By June of 1863 wasn't Richmond the equivalent of the King in a game of chess? Likewise, wasn't Washington the other side's "King?"

So I think you believe that Lee was blinded by his immediate, narrow battlefield responsibility but couldn't it have been that he simply concluded that Richmond was the center of gravity for the Confederacy? More importantly, couldn't he have concluded that Washington was the enemy's center of gravity?

I think there's plenty of evidence that not just lee but most Confederate loyalists considered Richmond the most important city in the Confederacy.

The Confederate government never developed a clear consensus of war strategy, and ended up in a default position of assenting to different "visions" of individual commanders such as Lee, Johnston, and Bragg. Which is one reason why it lost the war.

The Confederacy did have a strategy. It just didn't work. Their strategy was a DEFENSIVE WAR OF ATTRITION. They knew they could not conquer the North so they wanted to hold on long enough for either the North to give up or for a European power to intervene (or both).

Both Lee and Davis (as well as other Southern leaders) were well aware of how the Romans fought the Second Punic Wars, their campaigns against the Germanic tribes and their campaigns in the British Isles . . . they were aware of how Washington fought the British during the Revolution . . . they were aware of Napoleon's disastrous campaign in Spain and then again in Russia.

So they understood the concept of trading space for time, bleeding the enemy, making the enemy's government and civilian population lose the will to fight and generally, winning the war of Will. And again, this is something that von Clausewitz wrote about extensively, so did Jomini and so did the elder Mahan who taught most West Point officers in the Civil War. Mahan emphasized the use of fortifications and using terrain which were "new" ideas in the 1860s.

As has been argued, the South lost its war of attrition because it bled itself dry through over-using the Offense, it lost too many key leaders for the same reason . . . and because Southern governors held back large numbers of soldiers (and logistics) to defend their own states.
 
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Of course nothing is wrong with digging on a history forum.

I suppose it is just the spawning of thread after thread looking particularly for negatives. That's all
In my defense, I thought asking if Lee was a poor strategic thinker would spur one to counter it with positive examples, whereas asking if he was a good one would provoke discussion of his drawbacks.

That aside, while I would avoid going to the extremes of Bonekemper, I think there are valid questions we can ask on Lee's decision making.
 
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What I think you are saying is that as an army commander Lee was fixated on what was to his front and blind to every other consideration affecting the South.

OK . . . but what if Lee had considered the totality of the Southern situation and concluded (rightly, I think) that the DECISIVE POINT was right where he was?

Yes, to put things in a modern day context, the Confederacy lacked a unified command structure to develop a political strategy that could be translated into a military strategy and operational plans. At best, the Confederacy's political strategy was to be "let alone," in the hope that the Union would call it a day and let the southland go its separate way. That strategy was dashed when Lincoln and his administration refused to accept the breakup of the Union, defined the secession as an act of rebellion, and sought to quell it by military means. So that left the Confederacy with the necessity of safeguarding its independence, a difficult but perhaps not impossible undertaking given the relative differences between the 2 sides. So the Confederacy devises a political strategy based on using economic and military means to attain foreign recognition and/or intervention and diminishing the northern will to fight. But beyond that, actual military strategy and operations become muddled and inconsistent. We have Lee, who advocates for an "offensive-defense" in the hopes of scoring decisive battlefield victories and threatening northern population centers. But we also have Johnston and his somewhat "fabian" approach of trading land to maintain his fighting forces and to expose northern supply lines. Then we have Davis, who initially advocates for a "cordon" defense of the Confederacy's critical borders, seaports, and rivers. The fact is, the Confederacy could not agree on a national strategy with logical military plans.

To your following point, I have no doubt that Lee considered his area of operations the critical center, (although I do not see targeting Washington as being his primary fixation, nor did it have to be had for example the ANV been able to deliver a crushing blow to the AotP at Gettysburg). But no matter how successful Lee was for a time in the east, the Confederacy was slowly but surely losing the war in the west. And Davis and his administration must bear the major responsibility for that reality.
 
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