Was Lee a Poor Strategic Thinker?

OldReliable1862

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Beginning in the 1970s with Alan Nolan and Thomas Lawrence Connelly, the view of Lee as the unassailable, perfect general has started to be thoroughly taken to task. One of the most charges against Lee's supposed mastery of war was that he allegedly failed to grasp war above the operational, or "grand tactical" level. Lee had strategic "tunnel vision," unable to see the war outside of the Virginia theater of operations.

On the face of it, this seems somewhat substantiated when looking at how pessimistic he was of Longstreet's desire to use his troops in the West.
 
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I think "relatively short time" is a tricky thing to determine. The fundamental story of the siege of Petersburg is several months of Grant attempting to cut Petersburg off, followed by reinforcements reaching Grant to the point where he has enough men to actually cut the last rail line. At that point Lee abandons the Richmond-Petersburg city complex, but by that point the numerical advantage and the improvements of the Union cavalry mean that they can be cut off in the pursuit.

There are faster ways of getting through a fortified line (like regular approaches).


This by the way is a key aspect of strategy, which is that you want your strategy to maximize your advantages and minimize the enemy's advantages. The differing situations of the Union and Confederacy mean that this looks different.

For the Union, it looks like raising a larger army, presenting multiple simultaneous threats, pinning the enemy in their vital positions with large threatening armies and using superior sealane control to sustain those large armies, using artillery to break through fortifications, and economically disruptive blockade.
For the Confederacy, it looks like manoeuvre warfare, exploiting the advantages of the defence of vital points, interior lines, commerce raiding, and trying to avoid letting the Union focus on their most vital points. It also means prioritizing the East over the West.
Which would answer the question if Lee was a poor strategic thinker....
 
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The Confedracy had approximately as much territory to defend as the entirety of West Europe so to mass a large force in one area say Northern Virginia is a case of robbing Peter to pay Paul since it leaves the Western parts of the Confedrate vunarable which is more or less what happened.
Something I want to point out here is that the Confederacy has fundamentally only a couple of options. It can either concentrate force (that is, ensure that they prioritize one area differently to the way the Union has done it) or it can ascribe basically the same relative priority as the Union.

The problem is that if they do that second one then the Union can muster superior force against them in all theatres.

What the Confederacy more or less has to do is to pick one area to prioritize and then the other gets what they can spare, and furthermore the area they prioritize has to be the east.

There isn't really anywhere which the Union can reach easily in the West which is a knock-out blow when taken. Clearing the Mississippi takes ages, penetrating into the Confederate heartland takes ages, and Union offensives in the West have to be fairly concentrated or they end up with the Confederates able to focus force against a small Union army (in the way as was nearly done at Shiloh); this means that the Union is going to take years to win the war going via the west, even if the west is a low priority area (as it was historically for the Confederates).

In the East, meanwhile, there is a vital point that is a potential knock-out blow in 1862, and that is Richmond. Henrico County is by itself more industrially important than some entire states, and since it is the rail nexus which controls most of central and southern Virginia then it is as important in population terms as some entire states as well. Further to that, it's also the only viable route by which a Confederate army can be supplied in cantonments far enough north to actually hurt the Union.

If you imagine 1862 with 50,000 fewer Confederate soldiers in the East and 50,000 more in the West, what happens? Well, it's possible that Corinth might hold out; on the other hand, Richmond is certainly lost (taking with it key Confederate manufacturing capability, including their only steam hammer among other things) and the Union army is probably operating in North Carolina.
 
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I don't think Marse Robert really grasped the " Ground Truth" of the war even in his own TAOR. He was all about Virginia, from start to finish the " Big Picture " did not matter to him, only Virginia.
But Virginia is critical to the big picture.

There is no path to Confederate victory which can tolerate the loss of Virginia and Richmond. The loss of the Confederate capitol destroys any chance at international recognition; it's bad for continued Confederate viability in morale terms; it's an industrial and population-based (thus attritional) body blow; it means it is impossible to operate a Confederate army anywhere it can actually hurt the Union; it's an obvious visible sign to the Union public that the war is being won.

Notably during the period when the Union army is most heavily lamed (after Gettysburg) is when Longstreet heads west to Chickamauga. This is exactly what we would expect if Lee considered the Richmond axis to be the most important but not overriding priority.
 
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IF and by that I mean a big if, Lee had won the battle of Gettysburg, the answer changes,
I'm sure that he knew the gravity of the situation that summer of 63, I have been critical of him ma y times on this forum, but I have to recognize that it was Lee who kept the confederate forces motivated through to the end. Perhaps it would have been better for his own army if he hadn't.
IMO he did as well as he could given the circumstances, his lack of logistical support and the weight of his mission (preserving Richmond) limited his options, I often wonder how jealous he must have been to see many of the men in blue who had previously been his students at West Point, or had served under him, operate against him with so many resources at their disposal.
Still he kept up the fight,
 
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IF and by that I mean a big if, Lee had won the battle of Gettysburg, the answer changes,
We should realize that Gettysburg was a pretty close run thing (as of the end of Day One Lee has crippled two AotP corps and has most of his army on the field; Longstreet's attack on Day Two draws in all the Union reserves), which suggests that Lee at least had good reason for risking the battle. Even historically it rendered the Army of the Potomac unable to take the offensive for a long time, while sometimes reasonable risks go sour - if Lee had a 33% chance of winning an outright victory at Gettysburg and a 50% chance of an outcome like the historical then it was a good call to risk it, since he's unlikely to get a better chance at such an impactful victory.
 
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I don't think Marse Robert really grasped the " Ground Truth" of the war even in his own TAOR. He was all about Virginia, from start to finish the " Big Picture " did not matter to him, only Virginia.

What would you rather have him do? Do you think he should have brought his army West to relive Vicksburg, leaving the Army of the Potomac in his rear to capture Richmond and as much of the East Coast as they want until they came up on Bragg's rear, then combined against him with Rosecrans? Then Meade and Rosecrans uniting against Lee at Vicksburg?

First of all, really, Lee was an army commander. For at least most of the war, after he was Davis' military secretary and advisor. What in his role as army commander would have justified him in involving himself in the West? First, he would need intelligence reports from that theater, which would have to be directed out of channels from Richmond. Next, he would have to be devising strategy for the west, while he has the Army of the Potomac in his front maneuvering on Richmond.

What exactly does it look like with Lee not being "all about Virginia?"

Not to mention he did decide, in effect, to put Johnston in command in the West in 1864, which is certainly "outside of Virginia." And he did write a letter to Davis in late 1863 giving some advice on the Western Theatrer.

Simply put, Lee did not have the authority or jurisdiction to lead operations or strategy outside of Virginia. And the fact that he appointed Johnston, essentially, is contribution enough.

Davis likewise did not make any provisions, as far as I know, for handing Lee a share in the West before taking his recommendation on Johnston. So what exactly was Lee to do?

I find it remarkable that I've never seen Meade criticized for only thinking of Virginia, or Pennsylvania, or Grant only focusing on Vicksburg, Forts Henry and Donelson, or Chattanooga. Grant was fortunate in this regard, because his superiors kept moving him around. Whereas Lee was "pinned," as it were, to his home state.
 
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There is a sense in which an army commander should think strategically, but that's only in terms of keeping in mind that his struggle isn't the only one and that he can contribute meaningfully to the wider picture. But Lee does this - whenever he detaches Longstreet he's doing this, in fact - and he does well in pressuring the Union when there's the prospect of fighting the Union at advantage (to either gain advantage or compel greater Union focus on the East) while fighting defensively when the Union has focused plenty of resources concentrated into a single army in the East.

His strategic thinking isn't flawless, and he does get caught out on the operational level a few times, but he does pretty well.
 
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The insightful postings on this topic have convinced me that General Lee had no responsibility for constructing or implementing the strategy of the CSA until the very end of the war; by which time no strategy to achieve the objective of the wayward states was possible. So far as his strategy to protect the lives and property in Virginia, his alternative was to adhere to his oath, remain in the US Army, and use his skills to end the rebellion as quickly as possible. That would have saved lives and preserved property in Virginia. He was ignoring reality to believe that resistance would be successful. He was aware of the resources of the loyal states and was acquainted with so many of the officers. He surely knew that their fealty to the oath, the oath that he had forsaken, would not allow them to abandon the union until the rule of law was restored to every corner of the United States. Strategy for the CSA: not applicable; strategy for his person goals, unsuccessful.
 
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I think to be honest that to argue that "believing that resistance would be successful" is "ignoring reality" is a bit post hoc ergo propter hoc. There is good reason to think that Confederate independence is at least achievable, both beforehand (when the US began trying to go for independence it was notably weaker than the expected loyalist forces on the North American Continent; the US had never before fought a war to subdue rebellious states) and during the war (if the pre-existing economic and military balance defined how the war was going to inevitably go, you wouldn't have seen the Union repeatedly embarrassed during the war to the degree it was - even in 1864 the Union came fairly close to losing their capital).
More than that, though, it is fair to say that Lee viewed himself as a patriot of the State of Virginia; he followed Virginia because that is in keeping with that personal view.

It is actually quite easy given the way the Civil War actually went for a fairly minor change or two to result in the Confederacy being put in a dominating military position, and that's with hindsight; for people living at the time (including in the Union) Confederate independence, including Confederate independence won by foreign intervention, was considered quite plausible.


The final thing I want to point out here is that when Lee makes the decision to side with the Confederacy there is no way he can possibly know how much damage the our-time-line Civil War would do to Virginia - because nobody else had any idea about that either. If he'd been part of the discussion about secession and the military viability thereof then I think you could accuse him of professional negligence if he incorrectly laid out the relative strengths of North and South, but he wasn't involved with that, and to argue that Lee could have known he'd be protecting Virginia by invading it seems to be unfair.


(this is not to say that secession was something which was justified, but to say that to many people at the time they felt it was).
 
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The insightful postings on this topic have convinced me that General Lee had no responsibility for constructing or implementing the strategy of the CSA until the very end of the war; by which time no strategy to achieve the objective of the wayward states was possible. So far as his strategy to protect the lives and property in Virginia, his alternative was to adhere to his oath, remain in the US Army, and use his skills to end the rebellion as quickly as possible. That would have saved lives and preserved property in Virginia. He was ignoring reality to believe that resistance would be successful. He was aware of the resources of the loyal states and was acquainted with so many of the officers. He surely knew that their fealty to the oath, the oath that he had forsaken, would not allow them to abandon the union until the rule of law was restored to every corner of the United States. Strategy for the CSA: not applicable; strategy for his person goals, unsuccessful.
I wholeheartedly can agree with @Saphroneth ´s reply to your thread - with a slight addition:

I am currently reading Pryor´s "Six Encounters with Lincoln" and she especially lays an emphasis on the dilapidated state of the US military in 1861, showing how white-haired the leading military figures had become, some even decrepit, how badly underfunded the organization generally was and how many weapons and equipment were transferred to the South by confederate sympathizers.

I was rather perplexed to read about that all - and if this showed really the actual state of the US military in 1861 then I'd say that a victory for the Union was everything but foreseeable in 1861.

Regarding the obligation to an oath and the question of treason/secession, well, I think there are a lot of threads here that are somehow suggesting that those things were in those days seen a bit in a different light (than we today would see them....).

As far as I know it was quite common to tender one´s resignation and to return into private life (as the underfunded and very small US army before the war rarely provided promising chances - and many left the service disappointed.

It shouldn't´t have been too extraordinary or extravagant if one tendered his resignation, resumed life as a private person and then followed the call of his state´s militia....
 
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I was rather perplexed to read about that all - and if this showed really the actual state of the US military in 1861 then I'd say that a victory for the Union was everything but foreseeable in 1861.
The US military was not in a good state in 1861 at all. Most of the northern militia units were very low quality and the regular army was in no sense concentrated - indeed, in 1858 or so for the Mormon War the entire US Army had managed to scrape together about a brigade of regulars to go to Utah. Much of the force was scattered around in sub-battalion sized packets, and a pretty big fraction got captured on the outbreak of war.
 
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From the evidence of events, it would seem that to the extent Lee can be considered a strategic thinker of any note, IMO, he cannot rank any higher than does Gen. Braxton Bragg.

Certainly Bragg's movements from Ms to Ky ranks far above Lee's two adventures North and accomplished less than Bragg di on a strategic level and covered a lot more ground in the bargain.
 
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From the evidence of events, it would seem that to the extent Lee can be considered a strategic thinker of any note, IMO, he cannot rank any higher than does Gen. Braxton Bragg.

Certainly Bragg's movements from Ms to Ky ranks far above Lee's two adventures North and accomplished less than Bragg di on a strategic level and covered a lot more ground in the bargain.
I don't necessarily think you can call covering a lot of ground a strategic issue. The question is (1) what did you accomplish, (2) what could you reasonably have accomplished, (3) was the risk worth the potential or actual reward, and (4) what is the opportunity cost.

What was the goal of Bragg's movement? What was the goal of Lee's movement?
 
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I read somewhere that Bragg originally was quite a sound general but that he was somehow hampered by his ailing health and seemingly had developed a tendency to falter under pressure.
I don‘t know anymore where I read it but there Bragg‘s earlier operations were also positively appreciated.
But I also recall having read a thread of @Rhea Cole where Bragg was looked at very critically....
Maybe @Saphroneth ‘s approach could lead to somewhere?
 
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I read somewhere that Bragg originally was quite a sound general but that he was somehow hampered by his ailing health and seemingly had developed a tendency to falter under pressure.
I don‘t know anymore where I read it but there Bragg‘s earlier operations were also positively appreciated.
But I also recall having read a thread of @Rhea Cole where Bragg was looked at very critically....
Maybe @Saphroneth ‘s approach could lead to somewhere?
Certainly Bragg taking his entire army from Tupelo to Chattanooga via Mobile could be called a very well-done move.
 
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As far as I know it was quite common to tender one´s resignation and to return into private life (as the underfunded and very small US army before the war rarely provided promising chances - and many left the service disappointed.

It shouldn't´t have been too extraordinary or extravagant if one tendered his resignation, resumed life as a private person and then followed the call of his state´s militia....
Which makes sense to me considering a Braxton Bragg, who left the army in 1856, settled into civilian life including being active in the state militia; or Jackson who left the army in 1851 for a similar path. But the argument about Lee is he stayed in the Army right up until April 20 1861, then hops a train to Richmond to promptly take command of the entire state militia.

Though really neither here nor there when it comes to the topic of this thread.

I like Saphroneth's thoughts that there needs to be a question of goals, opportunities, accomplishments and risks.

When he took charge in the spring of 62, he reversed a lot of the US progress in the east. It had a cost, but a price had to be paid to achieve anything. The main complaint seems to be that in 63 he focused on the east while the west was crumbling. For the first several months of 63, it didnt look like much was happening in the west and that the commanders there had it under control. And then Lee had to deal with Hooker's advance. Once that was stopped, the window to give direct aid to the Vicksburg was gone so the best choice was indirect action by striking in the east. His move was a gamble which didnt achieve anything lasting, so we dismiss it as bad, but given the situation at the time, it made sense. When a new problem arose with Rosecrans campaign in the summer, he took the action of detaching Longstreet for the west.

Given the constraints Lee worked in, his strategic sensibility seems really good to me.
 
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It's also worth considering that at the time the Union considered the invasion of the North really serious. They tapped every reinforcement they could find, with one regiment promised Medals of Honor all round if they stayed for an extra week or so and some companies of Lockwood's Brigade outright mutinied upon being assigned to the Army of the Potomac; the battle itself was a pretty close run thing, which suggests that Lee wasn't tilting at windmills in thinking a victory could be had.
 
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I read somewhere that Bragg originally was quite a sound general but that he was somehow hampered by his ailing health and seemingly had developed a tendency to falter under pressure.
I don‘t know anymore where I read it but there Bragg‘s earlier operations were also positively appreciated.
But I also recall having read a thread of @Rhea Cole where Bragg was looked at very critically....
Maybe @Saphroneth ‘s approach could lead to somewhere?
Start with Connelly’s Army of the Heartland & Autumn of Glory two volume history of the Army of Tennessee. Bragg & the A of TN are inextricably intertwined. Practically every other book you read will have Connelly in the footnotes.
 
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