- Joined
- Jul 28, 2015
- Location
- New York City
I've been thinking about the similarities between Grant's Overland Campaign and Hooker's Chancellorsville Campaign. While Hooker's campaign is considered as a failure, we do not often apply the same terminology to Grant's 1864 effort. In both instances, the plan (with certain exceptions in each) was for the AotP to cross the Rapidan/Rappahannock Rivers and outflank Lee's ANV to cause that army to be forced to fight on open ground or to retreat and have its supply lines cut. Both campaigns envisioned a quick march through the Wilderness to the open ground to the east. But in both cases, the AotP was caught flat-footed in the dense growth of the Wilderness, where its artillery and numerical advantages were diminished. (Despite its passage, Hooker negated his advance and chose to maintain a position in the Wilderness.) In both campaigns, Lee quickly took advantage of the Union position by mounting aggressive counterattacks each time. In Hooker's case, that was enough to prompt him to withdraw the AotP back across the river and essentially terminate his campaign. But Grant chose to maintain his offensive by embarking on a series of southeastward movements to outflank the ANV. The idea still being to force the ANV into open terrain from which it could be cut off from its supply lines and effectively assaulted.
Needless to say, that never happened. After the Wilderness battle, Lee chose to react defensively by fighting behind fixed entrenchments. This was the pattern from Spotsylvania through North Anna and Cold Harbor. Grant was forced to throw his force against a well entrenched enemy, and except at North Anna, amassed huge casualties with no apparent benefit. Was Grant overly optimistic in believing that Lee would not fight that type of defensive war, or did Grant believe that he had no other option but to continue attempted flanking movements until he ran out of room near the James River? In any case, it is hard to assess the Overland Campaign as anything more than a failed attempt to destroy the ANV.
Needless to say, that never happened. After the Wilderness battle, Lee chose to react defensively by fighting behind fixed entrenchments. This was the pattern from Spotsylvania through North Anna and Cold Harbor. Grant was forced to throw his force against a well entrenched enemy, and except at North Anna, amassed huge casualties with no apparent benefit. Was Grant overly optimistic in believing that Lee would not fight that type of defensive war, or did Grant believe that he had no other option but to continue attempted flanking movements until he ran out of room near the James River? In any case, it is hard to assess the Overland Campaign as anything more than a failed attempt to destroy the ANV.