Grant Was Grant a tactician....

I'd class the move past Vicksburg as operations, rather than tactics. :smile: Again, roughly speaking, movement on and immediately around a battlefield = tactics; getting from one potential battlefield to another is more in the operational sphere.
Don't want to raise the temperature in a reasonably civil and informational thread, but it seems that the tactic of crossing the River below Vicksburg was a brilliant move (following a few failed tactics). That is, when does operational become different than tactical?
 
Don't want to raise the temperature in a reasonably civil and informational thread, but it seems that the tactic of crossing the River below Vicksburg was a brilliant move (following a few failed tactics). That is, when does operational become different than tactical?

Not to swamp your boat or anything, but isn't that tactical operations?
 
Don't want to raise the temperature in a reasonably civil and informational thread, but it seems that the tactic of crossing the River below Vicksburg was a brilliant move (following a few failed tactics). That is, when does operational become different than tactical?

Tactics refers to actions during the battle. Crossing the river below Vicksburg was an operational move because it's how Grant moved his troops to the battlefield.
 
So just to make sure I'm following, because I think I do, but . . .

Operations would be how Lee got his army from Fredericksburg/Chancellorsville into Pennsylvania.

Tactics would be how Ewell kicked Milroy's division into broken bits flying every which way.

Using this because everyone has seen those maps and movements and most people know 2nd Winchester.
 
Ive only read Bruce Cattons work on Grant and a few others, but I don't think he was a "highly skilled" tactictian. but a VERY determined and well trained soldier who learned NOT to take council of his fears This set him apart from 80 percent of generals.
I don't think he was as smart as Lee, or Sherman. But very will suited for what he did and rightfully a hero for millions.
Philip
 
I'd class the move past Vicksburg as operations, rather than tactics. :smile: Again, roughly speaking, movement on and immediately around a battlefield = tactics; getting from one potential battlefield to another is more in the operational sphere.
So maybe Grants gifts were in the strategy, operations and logistics area, and not so much in tactics. It seems to me that because of his gifts in these areas there he was involved in very few set piece battles in the west, and in the east, Lee didn't give him many openings.
 
So maybe Grants gifts were in the strategy, operations and logistics area, and not so much in tactics. It seems to me that because of his gifts in these areas there he was involved in very few set piece battles in the west, and in the east, Lee didn't give him many openings.

I'd agree with that, with the caveat that Meade appears to have run more of the tactical show in the East.

To return to J.F.C. Fuller, he considered neither Grant nor Lee particularly gifted in tactics, saying that both were sort of stuck in the Mexican War as far as tactical use of artillery and infantry were concerned. (His opinion, but I think Fuller knew what he was talking about.) But they excelled at the higher levels, which is what made them particularly good top commanders.

Don't want to raise the temperature in a reasonably civil and informational thread, but it seems that the tactic of crossing the River below Vicksburg was a brilliant move (following a few failed tactics). That is, when does operational become different than tactical?

No temperature raise... There is no sharp dividing line between strategy, operations, and tactics, any more than there is a sharp dividing line between bass, tenor, alto, and soprano; but they do play different roles in the grand scheme of things. I would tend to say that crossing the river below Vicksburg, since it involved the movements of large bodies of men not in direct contact with the enemy, was in the operations sphere, rather than the tactical.

Jomini referred to operations (which he called "grand tactics," at least in English translation, which doesn't help the definitions for our purposes) as the science of marches-- how far and how fast can a column march, how many roads do you need for how many columns, how do you get the columns into battle array at the end of the march, and so forth.
 
Tactics refers to actions during the battle. Crossing the river below Vicksburg was an operational move because it's how Grant moved his troops to the battlefield.
when the shore guns at Vicksburg opened on the fleet, did that change it from operations to tactics? "April 16th, Vicksburgs gunners fired 525 rounds, scored 68 hits and sank one of three transports and none of the eight gunboats."
 
The transporting of the troops south of Vicksburg was operations... Porter's direction to move the boats close under the Vicksburg batteries so the Confederates would overshoot during the passage was tactics. (Some things can be both at the same time; the categories should help understanding, not confuse the issue.)
 
when the shore guns at Vicksburg opened on the fleet, did that change it from operations to tactics? "April 16th, Vicksburgs gunners fired 525 rounds, scored 68 hits and sank one of three transports and none of the eight gunboats."

No. Moving the ships down below Vicksburg was an operational move. Their actions in getting down there were tactics.
 
I would say Grant was a great strategist and great logistician. Operationally he seems to have been overly ambitious sometimes, especially with the AotP, so I would say good not great.

Tactically: Grant made good tactical decisions to save the day at Donelson, aided by CSA loss of confidence. He did a good job setting up a last line of defense at Shiloh. I don't remember if the flanking moves at Champion Hill or Big Black River were Grant's call or at a lower level. Chattanooga seems to involve mostly his chief subordinates making the tactical decisions. The Overland Campaign seems to mostly involve Grant on the three higher levels, although I think he gets credit for recognizing Upton's tactics should be applied on a larger scale at Spotsylvania. It would take some closer examination of Grant's vs Meade's decisions (who decided what). I don't know enough about Petersburg yet to say.

EDIT:
Finished Rhea's book on Spotsylvania and now working on his North Anna book. Rhea essentially argues Grant tried to be a tactician at Spotsylvania rather than leaving that to Meade.

Grant in the Overland Campaign reminds me of Hood in the battles around Atlanta: some really good ideas, but not realistic about what his army was capable of. Grant's move (and it seems to have been his idea) on the night of May 13-14 seems like an excellent move (redeploying Warren and Wright from opposite Lee's entrenched and secured left to his exposed right), but trying to make that kind of move with exhausted troops on ground that had been soaked by days of rain and roads that had been churned to mud seems a horrible decision. The same kind of impatience that got Hood to attack at Franklin?

I don't know if I've heard Grant and Hood compared before...
 
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