Was Gettysburg THAT pivotal to the war?

"He who defends everything, defends nothing" - Frederick the Great.
Interestingly enough in a letter Davis admitted that during the ACW that the Confederacy simply lacked enough manpower to protect its ports from being seized. I have the source at home. If a proposed nation or region in rebellion that is economically wholly dependent on maritime commerce can't protect it's ports from amphibious operations that's not really good.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy Davis was right and there really wasn't a viable solution to the problem.
Leftyhunter
 
One thing to keep at the forefront of our minds is that it was exceedingly uncommon for any army, Union or Confederate, to be routed from the field so completely as to be considered destroyed. Lee may well win at Gettysburg, and may even well drive the AoP from the field. But, he was highly unlikely to drive it straight out of the war. So the real question to ask is this; what does Lee do next after winning at Gettysburg?

He is operating with no supply line deep in enemy territory. Even in victory his army would be burdened by prisoners and casualties. He has almost certainly expended much of the one item he cannot replenish from Pennsylvania farmland, ammunition. The AoP has skittered off to lick its wounds, but is still a close threat to him. Gambling on Northern war weariness is one thing, but is he in a position in that moment to win the war on the battlefield? I daresay not, at least no more than he ever was.
 
It all goes back to the Hail Merry Pass argument. If the AnV decisively beats the AoP on Northern soil then a demoralized Union public will demand an end to the war or least that's Lee's hope anyway.
In the summer of 1863 Lee has be to thinking that an invasion of Pennsylvania is his least bad option. There are no good options.
Leftyhunter
 
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I have felt that there were lots of 'pivotal moments' in the war. After Shiloh, both sides realized it was not going to be settled anytime soon. After Antietam, the possibility of a foreign nation coming in on the side of the Confederacy was gone. After Fredericksburg, the Union was unlikely to entertain anything but total revenge after the slaughter. And after Chancellorsville, Jackson was gone, depriving Lee of his most effective general (his 'right arm' as he said). And Gettysburg & Vicksburg (to me) were the last of the 'pivotal moments'. Another wondering thing for me is: how Gettysburg might have turned out had Jackson been at Lee's side; I suspect the AoNV would have occupied the high ground right away instead of ceding it to the AoP. All just my musing opinions....
 
The Southern Historical Society/Jubal Early/Lost Cause created a myth that Gettysburg was the "high watermark of the Confederacy" in 1875. Lee, Jackson & Joe Johnston were anointed as demigods. Hood & Longstreet were the designated goats who had denied the sainted Lee the victory at Gettysburg he so richly deserved. For the next 75 years, an endless supply of Lost Cause mythology deliberately obscured the actual history. Compared with Vicksburg or Chattanooga, Gettysburg was just another puff-poof stand off.

I'm far from a Lost Causer and I don't see how all that romanticization of Confederate generals is really connected to whether Gettysburg was actually a pivotal engagement and seen as pivotal at the time.

If we consider the simultaneous impact of Gettysburg and Vicksburg it is clear that the federal victory at Gettysburg did not alter the balance of power whereas the federal victory at Vicksburg did. The ANV was bloodied, but not defeated; the Confederate Army of Mississippi was totally destroyed by its mass surrender. Moreover, Vicksburg signaled the near end of Union military operations to secure the Mississippi River and Valley; thereafter the action shifted towards the Chattanooga-Atlanta axis, further decimating the Confederate heartland. The ANV returned to its former line along the Rappahanock River and kept the struggle for the Confederacy going for another 21 months.

Those are good points but Vicksburg and the Western theater was smaller overall. The Confederate surrender at Vicksburg was slightly under 30,000 men with a few thousand more casualties, a little less than the total dead and wounded Confederates at Gettysburg. At Vicksburg it was most of the army, at Gettysburg it was only 1/3 of a much larger army. That's why I think it is valid to consider the Eastern Theater of operations more relevant and important for most of the war, as it seems it was seen by most people at the time. Not only was there a proportionally much larger population in the Eastern Theater and consequently much larger armies maneuvering in a smaller region but the US and CSA capitals were both right there as well. There is a reason 7/10 of the largest battles of the Civil War were in Virginia and Maryland. That's where the fighting was heavily concentrated because that's what the commanders and leaders thought was the most important and decisive in the short term. The Union capture of the Mississippi was decisive in the long run (like the capture of New Orleans in May 1862), but it's not like the Confederacy didn't get back on their feet and go on fighting for another almost two years in the Western Theater as well. Yes, Vicksburg ensured Union control of the Mississippi but it didn't end the war anytime soon. The Army of Tennessee defeated the Union two months later at Chickamauga and the Army of Mississippi was reformed in 1864. In fact it was Lee and Johnston who surrendered first in Virginia in April 1865 effectively bringing the war to and end, while most of the Trans-Mississippi took until May and even June to surrender.

If the ANV had won decisively at Gettysburg, I think that would have really tipped things in their favor more than any similarly sized victory anywhere in the West. Why? Because it was right there north of Washington. It would have been the ultimate blow to Northern moral which is exactly what the Confederacy most needed to win the war, either militarily or by preventing Lincoln's reelection in 1864. Instead the Confederacy was soundly defeated at Gettysburg, crippling their ability to launch further offensives against the North and consolidating Northern support for Lincoln as fighting a winnable war. To me that seems just as if not more important than Vicksburg and anything that went on way out in the boonies comparatively speaking.
 
I'm far from a Lost Causer and I don't see how all that romanticization of Confederate generals is really connected to whether Gettysburg was actually a pivotal engagement and seen as pivotal at the time.



Those are good points but Vicksburg and the Western theater was smaller overall. The Confederate surrender at Vicksburg was slightly under 30,000 men with a few thousand more casualties, a little less than the total dead and wounded Confederates at Gettysburg. At Vicksburg it was most of the army, at Gettysburg it was only 1/3 of a much larger army. That's why I think it is valid to consider the Eastern Theater of operations more relevant and important for most of the war, as it seems it was seen by most people at the time. Not only was there a proportionally much larger population in the Eastern Theater and consequently much larger armies maneuvering in a smaller region but the US and CSA capitals were both right there as well. There is a reason 7/10 of the largest battles of the Civil War were in Virginia and Maryland. That's where the fighting was heavily concentrated because that's what the commanders and leaders thought was the most important and decisive in the short term. The Union capture of the Mississippi was decisive in the long run (like the capture of New Orleans in May 1862), but it's not like the Confederacy didn't get back on their feet and go on fighting for another almost two years in the Western Theater as well. Yes, Vicksburg ensured Union control of the Mississippi but it didn't end the war anytime soon. The Army of Tennessee defeated the Union two months later at Chickamauga and the Army of Mississippi was reformed in 1864. In fact it was Lee and Johnston who surrendered first in Virginia in April 1865 effectively bringing the war to and end, while most of the Trans-Mississippi took until May and even June to surrender.

If the ANV had won decisively at Gettysburg, I think that would have really tipped things in their favor more than any similarly sized victory anywhere in the West. Why? Because it was right there north of Washington. It would have been the ultimate blow to Northern moral which is exactly what the Confederacy most needed to win the war, either militarily or by preventing Lincoln's reelection in 1864. Instead the Confederacy was soundly defeated at Gettysburg, crippling their ability to launch further offensives against the North and consolidating Northern support for Lincoln as fighting a winnable war. To me that seems just as if not more important than Vicksburg and anything that went on way out in the boonies comparatively speaking.
I appreciate your Virginia-centric analysis, but even through those rose colored glasses dismissing the profound strategic importance of Vicksburg is quite a stretch. Lee went into Pennsylvania & lost half his army in the process. Grant crossed the Mississippi River, marched inland & destroyed the vital Confederate facilities in Jackson. He then turned & won a battle. He then invested a fortress guarding a strategic site that the Confederacy could not live without. He then wiped an entire army off the map. He did all that while maintaining the health & strength of his army. That is, of course, nothing compared with Lee going 40 miles into enemy territory & getting his head handed to him on a plate.

I don't deal in what if's. My wife's g-g-great's regiment lost 45% & mine lost 82% at Gettysburg. So, that great catastrophe has a personal element for me. Nearly every young man in their cohort was killed or maimed. I see that battle for what it was.
 
Interestingly enough in a letter Davis admitted that during the ACW that the Confederacy simply lacked enough manpower to protect its ports from being seized. I have the source at home. If a proposed nation or region in rebellion that is economically wholly dependent on maritime commerce can't protect it's ports from amphibious operations that's not really good.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy Davis was right and there really wasn't a viable solution to the problem.
Leftyhunter

Davis was astute enough to understand the impossibility of defending the entire inland and coastal borders of the Confederacy. But he was also constrained by the governors of Atlantic seaboard states who insisted on maintaining their coastal defenses. Davis' initial inclination was also to adopt a "cordon" defense along the Kentucky-Tennessee line, that unfortunately lacked sufficient manpower to hold.
 
I appreciate your Virginia-centric analysis, but even through those rose colored glasses dismissing the profound strategic importance of Vicksburg is quite a stretch. Lee went into Pennsylvania & lost half his army in the process. Grant crossed the Mississippi River, marched inland & destroyed the vital Confederate facilities in Jackson. He then turned & won a battle. He then invested a fortress guarding a strategic site that the Confederacy could not live without. He then wiped an entire army off the map. He did all that while maintaining the health & strength of his army. That is, of course, nothing compared with Lee going 40 miles into enemy territory & getting his head handed to him on a plate.

I don't deal in what if's. My wife's g-g-great's regiment lost 45% & mine lost 82% at Gettysburg. So, that great catastrophe has a personal element for me. Nearly every young man in their cohort was killed or maimed. I see that battle for what it was.
So what other options did Lee have? Has mentioned by June 1863 Lee had no choice but to invade Pennsylvania and go for the Hail Merry Pass. If Lee just waited for the Union Army to invade then more likely then not the AnV will still loose at least as many men as they did at Gettysburg.
Grant had good options vs Lee had at best the ability to choose the least bad option.
Leftyhunter
 
I appreciate your Virginia-centric analysis, but even through those rose colored glasses dismissing the profound strategic importance of Vicksburg is quite a stretch. Lee went into Pennsylvania & lost half his army in the process. Grant crossed the Mississippi River, marched inland & destroyed the vital Confederate facilities in Jackson. He then turned & won a battle. He then invested a fortress guarding a strategic site that the Confederacy could not live without. He then wiped an entire army off the map. He did all that while maintaining the health & strength of his army. That is, of course, nothing compared with Lee going 40 miles into enemy territory & getting his head handed to him on a plate.

I don't deal in what if's. My wife's g-g-great's regiment lost 45% & mine lost 82% at Gettysburg. So, that great catastrophe has a personal element for me. Nearly every young man in their cohort was killed or maimed. I see that battle for what it was.
Clarksville, TN. That's my post.
 
The Southern Historical Society/Jubal Early/Lost Cause created a myth that Gettysburg was the "high watermark of the Confederacy" in 1875. Lee, Jackson & Joe Johnston were anointed as demigods. Hood & Longstreet were the designated goats who had denied the sainted Lee the victory at Gettysburg he so richly deserved. For the next 75 years, an endless supply of Lost Cause mythology deliberately obscured the actual history. Compared with Vicksburg or Chattanooga, Gettysburg was just another puff-poof stand off.
The high water mark was Antietam. By March 1863, when it was evident that all cross Mississippi traffic had to move on the Shreveport, Monroe, Vicksburg, Jackson line, because New Orleans and Memphis were permanently occupied by the United States, the reality began to set in that 5 Atlantic southern states, plus Alabama and part of Mississippi could not possibly hold the mass of the 21 contiguous US states.
 
It's not just a question of what options Lee had but rather what options the Confederacy had. The other option, understood and considered at the time, was to reinforce the west. While the security of Virginia and Richmond was a valid concern, the west was the most urgent developing crisis, and the check administered to the Yankees at Chancellorsville, by an understrength ANV, suggested that troops might be spared to address it.
 
"He who defends everything, defends nothing" - Frederick the Great.
That's OK. But the Confederate leadership stuck to their program. They formed large armies and won land battles, in one operational area.
Meanwhile the US navy was capturing ports. The river gunboats were pushing down the river. Communication with California was maintained by telegraph and steamship. The far flung US navy was patrolling the main commerce routes, and high value traffic between New York and Liverpool was already running on British and German ships. A lot of poor southerners were dying for a cause that was lost after 14 months of political/military contention.
 
It's not just a question of what options Lee had but rather what options the Confederacy had. The other option, understood and considered at the time, was to reinforce the west. While the security of Virginia and Richmond was a valid concern, the west was the most urgent developing crisis, and the check administered to the Yankees at Chancellorsville, by an understrength ANV, suggested that troops might be spared to address it.
Which is what Longstreet's Corps tried to accomplish in Tennessee but not much to show for their losses.
More likely then not Lee knew if he stayed in static positions in Virginia then a good portion of the AnV would be fritted away in the West. That is a good reason to go for the Hail Merry Pass in Pennsylvania.
Leftyhunter
 
It's not just a question of what options Lee had but rather what options the Confederacy had. The other option, understood and considered at the time, was to reinforce the west. While the security of Virginia and Richmond was a valid concern, the west was the most urgent developing crisis, and the check administered to the Yankees at Chancellorsville, by an understrength ANV, suggested that troops might be spared to address it.
I do concur that arguably after Perryville and the fall of New Orleans Confederate options were narrowing and definitely post Antietam. Which by the summer of 1863 the argument is that Lee had only one risky option on the table and that was a Hail Merry Pass to Pennsylvania which some have argued almost worked. Of course almost only counts in horseshoes and hand grenades.
Leftyhunter
 
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I don't deal in what if's
You certainly do deal in what ifs by your repeated pooh poohing of everything that went on in the east as some kind of a "side show" and inferring that had the CSA abandoned VA and by inference, the east, and concentrated their efforts in the West, things would have somehow turned out differently.
 
So what other options did Lee have? Has mentioned by June 1863 Lee had no choice but to invade Pennsylvania and go for the Hail Merry Pass

Although by that time Lee had made his strategic intentions clear, there was another option besides raiding Pennsylvania. That was the proposal advocated by the "Western Concentration" group of military and political officials (including Longstreet and Wigfall), to reinforce Bragg's AOT, thereby relieving pressure on the Vicksburg front. Had the Confederacy operated under a general staff system with a commanding chief, the needs of all key fronts could have been considered equally, and perhaps a decision made to apply maximum force to the critical western seat of war and forego a Pennsylvania incursion. But Lee's Virginia-centric thinking and his influential position with Davis made the road to Gettysburg a foregone conclusion.
 
I appreciate your Virginia-centric analysis, but even through those rose colored glasses dismissing the profound strategic importance of Vicksburg is quite a stretch. Lee went into Pennsylvania & lost half his army in the process. Grant crossed the Mississippi River, marched inland & destroyed the vital Confederate facilities in Jackson. He then turned & won a battle. He then invested a fortress guarding a strategic site that the Confederacy could not live without. He then wiped an entire army off the map. He did all that while maintaining the health & strength of his army. That is, of course, nothing compared with Lee going 40 miles into enemy territory & getting his head handed to him on a plate.

I don't deal in what if's. My wife's g-g-great's regiment lost 45% & mine lost 82% at Gettysburg. So, that great catastrophe has a personal element for me. Nearly every young man in their cohort was killed or maimed. I see that battle for what it was.

I wasn't trying to dismiss that it was important but I'm saying Gettysburg was at least as important. What ifs are relevant to an analysis of a situation. If one of the only realistic paths to victory was taken away from the Confederates at Gettysburg, then that sealed their fates as much as Vicksburg eventually did.

I think the biggest direct evidence that is the case can like I said be seen in how Lee and Johnston surrendered first in Virginia while it took most of the west another month or two until their final surrenders. Doesn't that indicate that the Confederates in the Eastern Theater were actually the most hard-pressed by the Union since they surrendered first and fought most of the bloodiest battles?
 
It did not seem to make much difference. 49,000 men were either killed, wounded or unaccounted for. But 155 years later people still want to advocate that there was some honor, chivalry or decency about the Civil War. People still can't get into their minds that its a business, and in that era, the side that the most steam locomotives, steam warships, and domestic steam driven machinery, was going to win.
 
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