The nature of the war changed dramatically during the summer and fall of 1862. The decisive act was Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation, issued in the immediate aftermath of the Battle at Antietam. It was a truly revolutionary document which attacked the South’s greatest source of wealth, inaugurated a massive change in the political, economic and social orders, and revolutionized the congressional balance of power. In military terms, it marked the definitive end of the conciliatory approach to subduing the rebellion. The Emancipation marked a point of no return; the Lincoln administration was committed to a policy of “hard war.” As Ethan Rafuse writes in
McClellan's War, “From that point forward, the Union war effort would be conducted in a manner consistent with the principle that Southerners were enemies to be vanquished, rather than brothers to be reconciled.” Philosophically and temperamentally, McClellan had no place in this new war, and Lincoln removed him permanently from command on November 7, 1862.
Many of the army's top officers did not hide their opposition to the proclamation. William Franklin, for example, noted his pleasure when his 6th Corps did not cheer the President during his visit: "I understand all the other Corps cheered him except mine. They were entirely silent much to my pleasure." Others, like Fitz-John Porter, were much more vocal in their opposition.
Despite the misgivings he had expressed earlier, however, Meade seems to have accepted Lincoln’s Emancipation Proclamation -- at least he expressed no outward opposition, even to his wife. He also recognized the fundamental change that had taken place in the conduct of the war, and its revolutionary implications. “The day for compromise, for a brotherly reconciliation for the old Union in reality as well as name, has passed away,” he wrote, “and the struggle must be continued till one side or the other is exhausted & willing to give up.” This does not mean that Meade had become a radical abolitionist, but as always, he believed his duty was to execute his government’s orders to the best of his ability. As a military professional, it was not his place to determine, or even to question (at least publicly) policy.
Meade believed that McClellan’s removal was itself a political act: “If he had been relieved immediately after the Battle of Antietam, or at any period before he moved, I could have seen some show of reason on military grounds.” The removal of McClellan and the cashiering of Fitz-John Porter were abject lessons to those officers of more conservative views -- Gibbon, Warren, Humphreys, Hancock, Sedgwick, Reynolds and Meade among the most prominent -- who remained with the army. Their careers survived in large part because they kept their political views for the most part to themselves. Those commanders who did not accept the new war, or at least those who were unable to conceal their disapproval, would find their careers derailed.
Meade did not say much in his correspondance (at least not the edited version that was published) about slavery, emancipation, or the enlistment of blacks into the army. However, in February 1863, he did recount a conversation that sheds some light on his attitude about it:
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I had seen Hudson (McClellan's aide) in the morning, and he asked me to come at six and dine with the general. I declined the invitation on the ground of previous engagements, but said I would drop in after dinner. As it was past eight o'clock when I got back, I went in to the private parlor where McClellan was dining, and found a party of some dozen or more, all officers but one, a Mr. Cox, Democratic member of Congress from Ohio. Among the party were Andrew Porter, Sykes, Buchanan, General Van Allen and others. McClellan received me with much distinction and seated me alongside of himself, and asked very kindly after you and the children, etc. The subject of conversation at the table was general, and referred principally to military matters and pending acts of legislation. My friend, who doubtless had heard of my confirmation and was in consequence disgusted, said he heard I was to be given an Army Corps of ******s. I laughingly replied I had not been informed of the honor awaiting me, but one thing I begged to assure, that if the ******s were going into the field and really could be brought heartily to fight, I was ready to command them, and should prefer such duty to others that might be assigned me. As this was a fair hit at's position, it silenced him, and I heard nothing further about commanding ******s."