Was General Henry Halleck good, bad, or only so so general?

I listened to a discussion on YouTube where they ranked Union generals of the civil war into tiers and one of the gentleman went on about a “halleck clique”. Basically to him, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, and a slew of others who rose to be generals were basically friends or friendly to Halleck, and basically he played a game of politics when he was general in chief.

Is this true?

I see halleck as some who was best with admin and logistics work.
I think there is a strong case for Sherman benefitting from being Hallecks prewar buddy, but not the others
 
And Phil Sheridan did some much needed quartermaster and commissary work for Halleck in Missouri when the need for such was pressing. McPherson seemed to move up when he was working with Grant and Sherman.
 
I listened to a discussion on YouTube where they ranked Union generals of the civil war into tiers and one of the gentleman went on about a “halleck clique”. Basically to him, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, and a slew of others who rose to be generals were basically friends or friendly to Halleck, and basically he played a game of politics when he was general in chief.

Is this true?

I see halleck as some who was best with admin and logistics work.
No, it wasn't true. But since that is the favorite narrative, it is what it is.


To me, Halleck is easily the most underrated general of the war.
 
Basically to him, Grant, Sherman, Sheridan, McPherson, and a slew of others who rose to be generals were basically friends or friendly to Halleck, and basically he played a game of politics when he was general in chief
Grant had assumed Halleck's friendship, but unbeknownst to Grant until years later, Halleck had conspired behind his back during Halleck's tenure as Department of the Missouri commander. Probably more out of jealousy rather than rumor mongering over Grant's alleged drinking habits, Halleck attempted to relieve Grant or downgrade his status on more than one occasion. Of the listed personalities, perhaps Sherman is the only one who professed a friendship with Halleck because Sherman perceived that Halleck safeguarded his reputation and career after Sherman's nervous episode in Kentucky in 1861. But even that friendship soured when Sherman got trashed for granting generous surrender terms to Joe Johnston in April 1865. Bottom line is that Halleck was a political operator; his alliances, "friendships," kowtowing, or backstabbing others were all predicated on whatever was convenient to his interests at a particular time.
 
To me, Halleck is easily the most underrated general of the war.
Halleck has gotten a raw historical reputation mainly because of his political machinations, his penchant to evade responsibility, and habit of deflecting blame from himself to others. But he was an effective military administrator particularly under Grant's tutelage; it may not sound like much, but controlling, funneling, and coordinating the logistics of men and material across a wide front was a critical function that predated 20th century staff organizations. He also performed effectively in his early field command in Missouri; he may not have been the type of aggressive, energetic commander that would become necessary, but his strategic insight regarding the campaigns to possess Kentucky, Tennessee, and the riverine approaches to the southland were on point.
 
No, it wasn't true. But since that is the favorite narrative, it is what it is.


To me, Halleck is easily the most underrated general of the war.

Just letting you know

That what I said about the halleck clique is not something I agree with, or that I disagree with. I still haven’t researched him thoroughly to come to a pointed conclusion.

I do think he was a brilliant administrator and logistician
 
General Halleck failed to have a force ready to act in cooperation with David Farragut when Farragut came up river to Vicksburg. That failure had to be remedied a year later.
Similarly Halleck failed to move Buell's force to Nashville and advance into Tennessee from that direction. It took Rosecrans about 9 months to fix that.
Similarly once McClellan had made it to the James River that put tremendous pressure on Lee and Davis. The scale of the Seven Days assaults should have been evidence of just how much the position on the James mattered to the Confederacy. It was up to Halleck to solve the military problem of protecting Washington and threatening Richmond simultaneously. He never did.
And by late the fall of 1863 when Halleck was of the opinion that the railroads could not move soldiers from the army of the Potomac to Bridgeport, Sec'y Stanton lost patience with Halleck. Stanton worked with the railroad men directly and then met with Grant directly. And that was not the first time Stanton had disregarded the chain of command.
The less Halleck was involved in operations and strategic choices, the better the US armies performed.
 
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It should be observed that neither Grant, Sherman or Sheridan ever defended Halleck in the post war period. The representatives of the old army like Meade and Thomas never became Halleck advocates. And in the post war period it was John Schofield that the US sent to Paris to inform Napoleon III of the reality the French faced in Mexico, not Henry Halleck.
Grant and McClellan did not agree on much, even though Grant was quietly implementing McClellan's ideas. But they did agree that Halleck was wrong about just about all strategic choices and that Halleck knew nothing about how to conduct an operation.
 
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When Lincoln decided that Ripley as the head ordnance man was getting long in the tooth, and the new man Grant, and his officers were delivering success, Halleck's sand was running through the hour glass. The fact that the US was taking a decided anti-French position did not help Halleck either.
 
Hooker for sure, and Grant at the opening of the Overland campaign. On the latter, I think Lee let Grant get across too easily; his army was positioned too far west and south. But then I think Grant made a mistake by turning west to attack Lee in the Wilderness. I would have posted Warren's and Sedgewick's corps facing west in a defensive line then headed to Spotsylvania with Hancock and Burnside.
it's worth noting that Meade persisted in urging an easterly route around Richmond to encircle And isolate the city from the south. Grant insisted on the frontal approach, until the very end, when Meade's strategy resulted in the fall of Richmond.
 
it's worth noting that Meade persisted in urging an easterly route around Richmond to encircle And isolate the city from the south. Grant insisted on the frontal approach, until the very end, when Meade's strategy resulted in the fall of Richmond.
If so Meade most likely had an ally in Rufus Ingalls. Ingalls would have been able to explain that once the army gets to the James River, everything can be delivered over water.
 
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General Halleck may not have been a great strategist, nor an operational commander. But even a short list of the careers he touched is evidence that he knew what competency looked like. The list probably starts with Sherman and Ord. But Sheridan also got a boost when he worked for Halleck.
Getting Grant out of the public eye for a few months after Shiloh may not have been nice, but I suspect it was what the administration wanted. And Grant had a lot to learn about how to build and run an army.
Halleck probably misused Rosecrans. Old Rosy would have been better utilized as an engineering officer or in ordnance. He certainly had a creative mind. After the Corinth campaign when Halleck went to Washington, I think Halleck never observed how physically demanding campaigning was for General Rosecrans.
 
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