Chickamauga Was Chickamauga a Union victory?

This is a pretty well known quote by DH Hill but is should be added to the discussion
"But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.
That " barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."
 
And now something from unpublished sources:
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This is a pretty well known quote by DH Hill but is should be added to the discussion
"But it seems to me that the elan of the Southern soldier was never seen after Chickamauga - that brilliant dash which had distinguished him was gone forever. He was too intelligent not to know that the cutting in two of Georgia meant death to all his hopes. He knew that Longstreet's absence was imperiling Lee's safety, and that what had to be done must be done quickly. The delay in striking was exasperating to him; the failure to strike after the success was crushing to all his longings for an independent South. He fought stoutly to the last, but, after Chickamauga, with the sullenness of despair and without the enthusiasm of hope.
That " barren victory" sealed the fate of the Southern Confederacy."
I bolded and underlined the part where Hill answers the question that is the topic of this thread.
 
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Extract from a letter by W. S. Furay, in the Ohio State Journal, September, 1888:

The campaign of Chickamauga was directed against a city which was the very key to the interior of the Confederacy, the crossing point of its greatest lines of railroad from all directions, the citadel of Georgia and the whole interior South. So long as Chattanooga remained in Confederate hands, the enemy's power was practically unbroken, the great slave empire untouched.

General Loring, one of the most sagacious of all the officers that wore the gray, said to the writer of this article, near the close of the war, and before he had heard of the surrender at Appomattox: "Our cause is probably lost, but your temporary victories up to the latter part of 1863, had little to do with it. Not a man in the Southern Confederacy felt that you had really accomplished any thing until Chattanooga fell."

"You do not mean to say, general, that Vicksburg and Gettysburg were nothing?"

"The loss of Vicksburg," he replied, "weakened our prestige, contracted our territory, and practically expelled us from the Mississippi river, but it left the body of our power unharmed. As to Gettysburg, that was an experiment; if we had won that battle, the government at Washington would, perhaps, have tendered peace with a recognition of the Confederacy. Our loss of it, except that we could less easily spare the slaughter of veteran soldiers than you could, left us just where we were." •
"But in the latter part of 1863, some of your people lost hope?" I asked.

"Not exactly that," said he, "but they experienced then for the first time a diminution of confidence as to the final result."

"And may I ask what it was that occurred then which occasioned this change of feeling?"

"It was the fall of Chattanooga," he replied, "in consequence of the Chickamauga campaign, and the subsequent total defeat of GenEral Bragg'sefforts to recover it."

"Why did you regard Chattanooga as of such importance?" I asked.

"As long as we held it," he replied, " it was the closed doorway
to the interior of our country. When it came into your hands the door stood open, and however rough your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free to march inside. I tell you," continued he, with a vehemence which, iu so modest and quiet a gentleman, greatly impressed me, "that when your Dutch General Rosecrans commenced his forward movement for the capture of Chattauooga, we laughed him to scorn; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would frown him out of existence; that he would dash himself to pieces against the many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and that then the Northern people and the government at Washington would perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the real South."

"But the capture of Chattanooga convinced you that even the real South was vulnerable, did it?"

"Yes," said he, "it was then only a question as to whether we could beat back your armies by sheer force of desperate fighting, and as you largely outnumbered us, and our resources were every day diminishing, the prospects to the thinking part of our people looked gloomy indeed."

"But, general," I said, "there are people in the North who regard the Chickamauga campaign as a failure for the Union arms."

"Ah!" he replied, " we would gladly have exchanged a dozen of our previous victories for that one failure."

This conversation took place in the mouth of April, 1865, on board a steamer bound to New Orleans, the day after the battle of Blakely, in which General Losing commanded the Confederate forces, and he and his entire force that survived the battle, rank and file, were made prisoners by the Union Army under General Canby. I had approached the distinguished prisoner, who, by the way, with a comparitively mere handful of men, had bravely held the approaches to Mobile against us for a good many days, had introduced myself as war correspondent of one of the leading journals of the North, and had asked him to give me the exact relative position of the different bodies of troops under his command in the battle of the previous day. This he very courteously did, and authorized me to make use of the information in the account of the battle which I was preparing while hastening northward to the home office.

Then I gave him the latest information I possessed as to the progress being made by Grant in Virginia, aud of the advance of Sherman through the Carolinas toward Richmond. It was upon this that he made the first remark in the conversation I have just detailed, and in which 1 mentally noted every word he said with an absorbing interest which the reader will readily understand.

Half an hour afterward I was seated flat ou my haunches on the deck of the steamer, writing for dear life, when General Loring approached and accosted me.

"What are you writing now?" he inquired.

He had been so courteous under adverse circumstances to me, that I felt I could not be otherwise than entirely frank with him.

"I am writing out your remarks concerning the effect of the Chickamauga campaign," said I, "every word of which I well remember." i

"It struck me," said he, "that you might be doing that. But I think you will see that the publication of those remarks while the war continues might be seriously misunderstood by my compatriots in arms, and might subject me to heavy censure. I did not intend them for publication, and regarded them as part of a private conversation we were having after the public portion was closed. I can not take back the remarks now, and I have no power to prevent you from printing them. I can only ask you as a gentleman to withhold them from publication until the war is over."

It was a hard request to comply with. If the Jstruggle were to go on, General Loring's views would make a sensation, and be a great encouragement to the loyal people of the laud. I felt that in printing them I should make a big hit both as a journalist and a patriot. But with that courteous, sad-eyed, mild-mannered, and unfortunate gentleman standing over me, helpless as a prisoner of war who had given me his confidence, there was only one thing to do.

"Your wishes shall be respected, General," said I. "I shall finish my notes while our talk is fresh in my mind; but they will never see the light until I feel sure that their publication will discredit you with no one."

"Thank you," said he; "however the war may end, print what I said if you choose, and if you think it worth printing, any time after the conflict is closed."

More than twenty three years the notes of that conversation have remained in my hands, and they see the light for the first time to-day.

From https://books.google.com/books?pg=PA123&dq=general+loring+chickamauga&id=MJc-AAAAYAAJ#v=onepage&q=general loring chickamauga&f=false
I think this is pretty fascinating.
 
The question of whether Rosecrans should have gone to Thomas has been debated almost from the time right after Chickamauga. There are several versions of what was said between Garfield and Rosecrans none of which is independently verifiable. Rosecrans said he ordered Garfield to Chattanooga but Garfield said he couldn't do all the tasks assigned him and suggested Rosecrans himself go. Garfield had a different version.(Much of Garfield's story comes from JD Cox's book published in 1900) I would pose this question: If Rosecrans really believed his army was routed on the field what should he have done? Fight to the finish (or death) with Thomas or prepare the defenses of Chattanooga? What was the prize Chickamauga Creek or Chattanooga? Most historians of the battle believe that Forrest could not have taken Chattanooga because it was so well defended.

That's true, Rosecrans seemed to believe the battle was already behind him and his best option was to organize the next. I'm always a little suspicious of Garfield! There is some back and forth about Forrest's suggestion of pursuit. Forrest couldn't do it with his troops but he didn't believe the army was as winded as Bragg thought it was. Bragg, after the fact, was right but Forrest thought they could pull the extra rabbit out of their hats if they smelled victory. They might have at that, if they thought they could annihilate the Federal army.
 
Retreating from the field and relying on an inadequate supply line is not the way to achieve victory. Now for sources Here's Einholf
p.186
" The Union army suffered terribly in its defeat at Chickamauga , but the Confederates fared little better. In terms of of the proportion of casualties to the total number engaged ,Chickamauga was the bloodiest battle of Civil War. The Union Army suffered 16,179 casualties, or 28% of its total number of 57,840 men; and the confederates suffered about 18,000 casualties 26% of their force of 68,000. While the Confederate army held the field after the battle, it had suffered more casualties then the Union army , making the victory an extremely costly one. Bragg had almost succeeded in destroying at least part of the Union army , and if he succeeded he could have changed the outcome of the war. Thomas's leadership had saved the Union cause from disaster."
Leftyhunter
I was asking about Einhoff's source for the quote that begins: "looked worn and exhausted and was laboring under excitement .He heard my statement but in doing so showed want of one "
 
From John Turchin's Chickamauga:
"So, the battle of Chickamauga, instead of demoralizing our men, served as a fiery furnace, in which their bravery
was steeled and hardened so as to be proof against any danger and undaunted under any reverse, however appalling."
https://archive.org/stream/chickamauga00turcgoog#page/n188/mode/2up (pg 163f)
I just reread the chapter from which you took the Turchin quote which is chapter 13, titled "Was it a rebel victory or defeat?
Taking one sentence out of context of the whole chapter is not putting the total chapter in before the forum here.Turchin book in total is one that feels the union won because they did not lose Chattanooga.The book itself it's is an interesting read though slightly biased. In the same chapter that you quote he also puts in these quotes.Gen.James Longstreet wrote on Sept. 26,1863 "the most complete victory of the war, except perhaps the first Manassas."Gen. Bragg, in his order of the day Sept.22,1863, say "It has pleased Almighty God to award the Valor and endurance of our troops by giving to arms a complete victory over the enemy's superior numbers".
Turchin also wrote " The rebels harped and are still harping on the Chickamauga battle as a great victory.these quotes are all from page 157.i can go on with more but this will do for now.
 
I just reread the chapter from which you took the Turchin quote which is chapter 13, titled "Was it a rebel victory or defeat?
Taking one sentence out of context of the whole chapter is not putting the total chapter in before the forum here. Turchin book in total is one that feels the union won because they did not lose Chattanooga.The book itself it's is an interesting read though slightly biased. In the same chapter that you quote he also puts in these quotes.Gen.James Longstreet wrote on Sept. 26,1863 "the most complete victory of the war, except perhaps the first Manassas."Gen. Bragg, in his order of the day Sept.22,1863, say "It has pleased Almighty God to award the Valor and endurance of our troops by giving to arms a complete victory over the enemy's superior numbers".
Turchin also wrote " The rebels harped and are still harping on the Chickamauga battle as a great victory.these quotes are all from page 157.i can go on with more but this will do for now.
So you're saying Turchin himself considered Chickamauga a Union defeat? Here is a quote to note: "If there was a final victory on the battle-field of Chickamauga, it rested on the standards of our own regiments, rather than on those of the rebels."to Did you read what he wrote about Rosecrans?
Here is some of it:
But the creation of such an army, as the Army of the Cumberland showed itself to be in the battle of Chickamauga, and the infusing of such a spirit into its men, as they manifested themselves, under the most trying circumstances, during that campaign and battle, required a commander-in-chief capable of doing so. Gen. Rosecrans, before he assumed the command of that army, was considered one of the most distinguished officers in the West, and came to the army immediately after Gen. Buell's unfortunate campaign, in which all was lost that was gained before through Tennessee and Kentucky. He reorganized the army, increased the cavalry, established depots
of supplies, and in a short time advanced from Nashville, as the base, against the rebel army under Bragg, lying at Murfreesboro.

By his personal bravery, shown during the battle of Stone River, his untiring energy and the success achieved, his kind treatment of soldiers, his splendid equipment, and particular care taken of the army, Rosecrans made himself exceedingly popular among his soldiers, who had unbounded confidence in him. His brilliant campaign of Tullahooma strengthened his hold on the army still more, and when the battle of Chickamauga came, the army was in the best of trim and its mettle unsurpassed. It is an historical fact that what Rosecrans gained he held, and that for which he fought he obtained.

He left to his successor a splendid army, and in a position to strike the Confederacy at its very heart; he achieved all that he undertook, and if he did not achieve more his commander-in-chief, Gen. Halleck, was responsible in refusing to reenforce him and in misleading him in regard to the strength of the enemy's army; he made the most difficult campaign of the late war, through the roughest and most mountainous part of the entire theatre of our operations; he skillfully extricated his army from great danger in the face of a much stronger enemy, and in the battle every blow of the enemy was returned with liberal interest. When at Chattanooga, he would have brought Hooker to his help and reopened the railroad on the south side of the Tennessee River, if he had stayed longer with the army. What was done afterward at Brown's ferry, was but the carrying out of Rosecrans' plan. Whatever failings he had will be forgotten, while the splendid service he performed, the country will gratefully remember and the name of Wm. S. Rosecrans will shine in history.
 
No, Turchin is one of the very few that believe Chickamauga was a Union victory since they did not lose Chattanooga.i really do not you believe that you should bring Stone's River into the conversation because if Bragg had attacked on Jan.1 then we never would have heard of Rosecrans.but that is another what if of the civil war.Tullahoma was Rosecrans shinning moment so I think you should just leave it at that.as much as you may what to change history I feel you are joining the Rebs in a Lost Cause.
 
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Hough, "Soldier in the West " p.150-151.
Leftyhunter
No, Turchin is one of the very few that believe Chickamauga was a Union victory since they did not lose Chattanooga.i really do not you believe that you should bring Stone's River into the conversation because if Bragg had attacked on Jan.1 then we never would have heard of Rosecrans.but that is another what if of the civil war.Tullahoma was Rosecrans shinning moment so I think you should just leave it at that.as much as you may what to change history I feel you are joining the Rebs in a Lost Cause.
What do think about what Lincoln said about Stones River, not only in August 1863 but on the last day of his life?
Lincoln to Rosecrans Aug 31, 1863. "I can never forget, whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year, and beginning of this, you gave us a hard earned victory which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over."
Check also April 14 1865 entry in Gideon Welles' Diary.
FYI recent scholarship is very favorable to Rosecrans. I always advise recommend reading Victors in Blue by Albert Castel.
Gateway to the Confederacy is also good. Both published in the last few years. I would hope that you would test your opinions against the most recent scholarship.
 
What do think about what Lincoln said about Stones River, not only in August 1863 but on the last day of his life?
Lincoln to Rosecrans Aug 31, 1863. "I can never forget, whilst I remember anything, that about the end of last year, and beginning of this, you gave us a hard earned victory which, had there been a defeat instead, the nation could scarcely have lived over."
Check also April 14 1865 entry in Gideon Welles' Diary.
FYI recent scholarship is very favorable to Rosecrans. I always advise recommend reading Victors in Blue by Albert Castel.
Gateway to the Confederacy is also good. Both published in the last few years. I would hope that you would test your opinions against the most recent scholarship.
Again I fail to understand you.i just read Gideon Welles Diary from 4/14/65 to 4/17/65 and all that they are discussing is the assassination of Lincoln and the inauguration of Johnson and what the government will do.there is no mention of Rosecrans period.
On the first part of your post again you take a statement out of context.your quote from Lincoln's letter is from the latter part of the letter but you refuse to disclose what the letter was about.it was in response to a letter that Lincoln receive from Rosecrans of the 22nd.the letter was just Lincoln's way of giving an apology that through Halleck, Rosecrans heard that Lincoln was dissatisfied with him.lincoln was just being nice in the way he handled his generals.he was just kissing butt.thats all.
 
My verdict:

Confederate Tactical (albeit Pyrrhic) Victory (as the Confederate's did take the field and forced the Union Army back to Chattanooga)

Union Tactical Defeat but also Union Strategic Victory (because they weren't pursued by Bragg and retained Chattanooga)
 
Extract from a letter by W. S. Furay, in the Ohio State Journal, September, 1888:

The campaign of Chickamauga was directed against a city which was the very key to the interior of the Confederacy, the crossing point of its greatest lines of railroad from all directions, the citadel of Georgia and the whole interior South. So long as Chattanooga remained in Confederate hands, the enemy's power was practically unbroken, the great slave empire untouched.

General Loring, one of the most sagacious of all the officers that wore the gray, said to the writer of this article, near the close of the war, and before he had heard of the surrender at Appomattox: "Our cause is probably lost, but your temporary victories up to the latter part of 1863, had little to do with it. Not a man in the Southern Confederacy felt that you had really accomplished any thing until Chattanooga fell."

"You do not mean to say, general, that Vicksburg and Gettysburg were nothing?"

"The loss of Vicksburg," he replied, "weakened our prestige, contracted our territory, and practically expelled us from the Mississippi river, but it left the body of our power unharmed. As to Gettysburg, that was an experiment; if we had won that battle, the government at Washington would, perhaps, have tendered peace with a recognition of the Confederacy. Our loss of it, except that we could less easily spare the slaughter of veteran soldiers than you could, left us just where we were." •
"But in the latter part of 1863, some of your people lost hope?" I asked.

"Not exactly that," said he, "but they experienced then for the first time a diminution of confidence as to the final result."

"And may I ask what it was that occurred then which occasioned this change of feeling?"

"It was the fall of Chattanooga," he replied, "in consequence of the Chickamauga campaign, and the subsequent total defeat of GenEral Bragg'sefforts to recover it."

"Why did you regard Chattanooga as of such importance?" I asked.

"As long as we held it," he replied, " it was the closed doorway
to the interior of our country. When it came into your hands the door stood open, and however rough your progress in the interior might be, it still left you free to march inside. I tell you," continued he, with a vehemence which, iu so modest and quiet a gentleman, greatly impressed me, "that when your Dutch General Rosecrans commenced his forward movement for the capture of Chattauooga, we laughed him to scorn; we believed that the black brow of Lookout Mountain would frown him out of existence; that he would dash himself to pieces against the many and vast natural barriers that rise all around Chattanooga; and that then the Northern people and the government at Washington would perceive how hopeless were their efforts when they came to attack the real South."

"But the capture of Chattanooga convinced you that even the real South was vulnerable, did it?"

"Yes," said he, "it was then only a question as to whether we could beat back your armies by sheer force of desperate fighting, and as you largely outnumbered us, and our resources were every day diminishing, the prospects to the thinking part of our people looked gloomy indeed."

"But, general," I said, "there are people in the North who regard the Chickamauga campaign as a failure for the Union arms."

"Ah!" he replied, " we would gladly have exchanged a dozen of our previous victories for that one failure."

This conversation took place in the mouth of April, 1865, on board a steamer bound to New Orleans, the day after the battle of Blakely, in which General Losing commanded the Confederate forces, and he and his entire force that survived the battle, rank and file, were made prisoners by the Union Army under General Canby. I had approached the distinguished prisoner, who, by the way, with a comparitively mere handful of men, had bravely held the approaches to Mobile against us for a good many days, had introduced myself as war correspondent of one of the leading journals of the North, and had asked him to give me the exact relative position of the different bodies of troops under his command in the battle of the previous day. This he very courteously did, and authorized me to make use of the information in the account of the battle which I was preparing while hastening northward to the home office.

Then I gave him the latest information I possessed as to the progress being made by Grant in Virginia, aud of the advance of Sherman through the Carolinas toward Richmond. It was upon this that he made the first remark in the conversation I have just detailed, and in which 1 mentally noted every word he said with an absorbing interest which the reader will readily understand.

Half an hour afterward I was seated flat ou my haunches on the deck of the steamer, writing for dear life, when General Loring approached and accosted me.

"What are you writing now?" he inquired.

He had been so courteous under adverse circumstances to me, that I felt I could not be otherwise than entirely frank with him.

"I am writing out your remarks concerning the effect of the Chickamauga campaign," said I, "every word of which I well remember." i

"It struck me," said he, "that you might be doing that. But I think you will see that the publication of those remarks while the war continues might be seriously misunderstood by my compatriots in arms, and might subject me to heavy censure. I did not intend them for publication, and regarded them as part of a private conversation we were having after the public portion was closed. I can not take back the remarks now, and I have no power to prevent you from printing them. I can only ask you as a gentleman to withhold them from publication until the war is over."

It was a hard request to comply with. If the Jstruggle were to go on, General Loring's views would make a sensation, and be a great encouragement to the loyal people of the laud. I felt that in printing them I should make a big hit both as a journalist and a patriot. But with that courteous, sad-eyed, mild-mannered, and unfortunate gentleman standing over me, helpless as a prisoner of war who had given me his confidence, there was only one thing to do.

"Your wishes shall be respected, General," said I. "I shall finish my notes while our talk is fresh in my mind; but they will never see the light until I feel sure that their publication will discredit you with no one."

"Thank you," said he; "however the war may end, print what I said if you choose, and if you think it worth printing, any time after the conflict is closed."

More than twenty three years the notes of that conversation have remained in my hands, and they see the light for the first time to-day.

From https://books.google.com/books?pg=PA123&dq=general+loring+chickamauga&id=MJc-AAAAYAAJ#v=onepage&q=general loring chickamauga&f=false
I think it is understandable that Loring would want to diminish the seriousness of the loss of Vicksburg. It seems he is trying to distract from his failures.
 
In the end Chickamauga was the first scene in what can be the Chattanooga Siege... a tactical loss but in the end a victory for the North... Rosecrans was on a roll until Chickamauga if he had won the battle or made it a standoff maybe he would have gone East instead of Grant...
 
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