Yes, that is what happened IMHO.
When the ninth State ratified (New Hampshire), Article VII of the Constitution triggers. That is June 21, 1788 (and almost started a civil war in Rhode Island at a July 4th barbecue celebration). Virginia (June 25) and New York (July 26) followed quickly (nobody ever seems to claim they "seceded", probably because of the short gap). That leaves North Carolina (November 21, 1789) and Rhode Island (May 29, 1790) as laggards bringing up the rear.
Article VII says that as soon as the 9th state ratifies, the Constitution goes into effect between the states that have ratified. ("
The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.") The Constitution
does not say what the relationship between the states that have ratified and the states that have not ratified will or should be. Nothing does.
If you take that literally, the government of the Constitution was established when NH ratified (or when the Congress was officially notified of it a few days later). The Supreme Court has decided the government of the Constitution actually began March 3, 1789 when the members of the new Congress assembled in New York and began to organize the houses of Congress. In the eight months between those dates, the Congress of the Articles was still running the show and the states that had ratified were still participating in the government of the
Articles of Confederation and Perpetual Union. Very clearly, the mere act of ratification did not sever the relationship between the states and the Union still continued.
Here's what Federalist No. 43 (James Madison) says about this matter:
This article speaks for itself. The express authority of the people alone could give due validity to the Constitution. To have required the unanimous ratification of the thirteen States, would have subjected the essential interests of the whole to the caprice or corruption of a single member. It would have marked a want of foresight in the convention, which our own experience would have rendered inexcusable. Two questions of a very delicate nature present themselves on this occasion:
- On what principle the Confederation, which stands in the solemn form of a compact among the States, can be superseded without the unanimous consent of the parties to it
- What relation is to subsist between the nine or more States ratifying the Constitution, and the remaining few who do not become parties to it? The first question is answered at once by recurring to the absolute necessity of the case; to the great principle of self-preservation; to the transcendent law of nature and of nature's God, which declares that the safety and happiness of society are the objects at which all political institutions aim, and to which all such institutions must be sacrificed.
PERHAPS, also, an answer may be found without searching beyond the principles of the compact itself. It has been heretofore noted among the defects of the Confederation, that in many of the States it had received no higher sanction than a mere legislative ratification. The principle of reciprocality seems to require that its obligation on the other States should be reduced to the same standard. A compact between independent sovereigns, founded on ordinary acts of legislative authority, can pretend to no higher validity than a league or treaty between the parties. It is an established doctrine on the subject of treaties, that all the articles are mutually conditions of each other; that a breach of any one article is a breach of the whole treaty; and that a breach, committed by either of the parties, absolves the others, and authorizes them, if they please, to pronounce the compact violated and void. Should it unhappily be necessary to appeal to these delicate truths for a justification for dispensing with the consent of particular States to a dissolution of the federal pact, will not the complaining parties find it a difficult task to answer the MULTIPLIED and IMPORTANT infractions with which they may be confronted? The time has been when it was incumbent on us all to veil the ideas which this paragraph exhibits. The scene is now changed, and with it the part which the same motives dictate.
The second question is not less delicate; and the flattering prospect of its being merely hypothetical forbids an overcurious discussion of it. It is one of those cases which must be left to provide for itself. In general, it may be observed, that although no political relation can subsist between the assenting and dissenting States, yet the moral relations will remain uncancelled. The claims of justice, both on one side and on the other, will be in force, and must be fulfilled; the rights of humanity must in all cases be duly and mutually respected; whilst considerations of a common interest, and, above all, the remembrance of the endearing scenes which are past, and the anticipation of a speedy triumph over the obstacles to reunion, will, it is hoped, not urge in vain MODERATION on one side, and PRUDENCE on the other.
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