Chancellorsville Was Chancellorsville a Pyrrhic victory?

Lee never placed much trust in foreign intervention, AFAIK. He wrote to Davis about this back in 1862, before Antietam. I see no evidence that he was any different than that earlier. I would think that Lee felt that foreign intervention would only come about because of proven Confederate success. In Lee's mind, a sucessful invasion of MD-PA in September 1862, combined with success for Bragg/E. Kirby Smith in Kentucky and Van Dorn/Price in Kentucky, might have been the excuse the British and French needed, but it woud have been the result of Confederate victory, not the cause of it.
And up until October 1862 the administration was putting a good deal of effort into controlling the far west and the Mississippi as far down as possible, and not having an army on the York or James peninsula where the end of the US Revolutionary war could be re-enacted.
The war proceeded as if there was an understanding between the British Ambassador Lyons and Sec'y Seward that if the US controlled the Mississippi, and the railroads of the Midwest were paying their investors, the British would wait out the war.
General Lee did everything he could to influence opinion with his east coast victories. But General Lee was very aware that the struggle was continental in scope. The Confederacy simply did not the resources to contend on that scale.
 
Lee never placed much trust in foreign intervention, AFAIK. He wrote to Davis about this back in 1862, before Antietam. I see no evidence that he was any different than that earlier. I would think that Lee felt that foreign intervention would only come about because of proven Confederate success. In Lee's mind, a sucessful invasion of MD-PA in September 1862, combined with success for Bragg/E. Kirby Smith in Kentucky and Van Dorn/Price in Kentucky, might have been the excuse the British and French needed, but it woud have been the result of Confederate victory, not the cause of it.

With good reason it was never going to happen , To much money invested in North American infrastructure by British industrialists saw to that combined with the sales of weapons , ships in fact anything to both parties , The reality is Britain was making some good money off the back of the war i am sure they didn't want it to end.

As to the point about Chancellorsville well in my eyes Lee lost his sword in Jackson but still had his shield in Longstreet however just having his shield he was already on the road to defeat in my view , Jackson without doubt was the greatest loss as a leader the CSA suffered , The fact that Lee had to lean on Longstreet at Gettysburg highlights his lack of attacking options and although we all love what ifs and maybes i can hopefully say Longstreet would not have been Lees first choice to conduct any attacking manoeuvre at Gettysburg.

So yes Chancellorsville was a pyrrhic victory for the CSA in my view.
 
With good reason it was never going to happen , To much money invested in North American infrastructure by British industrialists saw to that combined with the sales of weapons , ships in fact anything to both parties , The reality is Britain was making some good money off the back of the war i am sure they didn't want it to end.

I don't think there was ever a good chance Britain would intervene, but there were interests in Britain that would have done it. The longer the war went on, probably the less chance of an intervention. The French probably would have done it, because Napoleon III would have seen it as an advantage to his ambitions, but the French were never going to do it without the British. The peak for an intervention probably was around early September, 1862 (Lee, Bragg, Van Dorn and Price all moving North, seemingly victorious). Lee's analysis was realistic: Britain and France were not going to fight to rescue "the South", but they would take advantage of an opportunity that benefited them if they saw one -- most likely with an offer to mediate between the sides rather than to intervene with troops and ships.

Some parts of Britain were making some good money off the Civil War; some others were suffering in 1861-62 particularly. The harvest failure in northeastern Europe was also making grain imports from the US more important than ever before (which the US was making good money off). These are complex situations that are murky to evaluate when they are occurring. What seems inevitable and inescapable in hindsight was not so clear at the time.

One of the aspects that is rarely talked about is the impact of a potential Lee success in either the Antietam or Gettysburg Campaigns. Lee's aim in both of those was not Washington, DC -- it was up in Pennsylvania. If Lee had been able to win a battle and establish his army up there for a substantial period of time, he would have cut two of the three East-West transportation lines in the Union. With the B&O and the Pennsylvania gone, all traffic would have had to re-route further north, to the loose collection we think of as the New York Central and the Erie Canal. That bottleneck would have clamped down on shipments of grain to Britain and -- if allowed to continue -- might have caused a change in the odds for British action.
 
As to the point about Chancellorsville well in my eyes Lee lost his sword in Jackson but still had his shield in Longstreet however just having his shield he was already on the road to defeat in my view , Jackson without doubt was the greatest loss as a leader the CSA suffered , The fact that Lee had to lean on Longstreet at Gettysburg highlights his lack of attacking options and although we all love what ifs and maybes i can hopefully say Longstreet would not have been Lees first choice to conduct any attacking manoeuvre at Gettysburg.

I agree that Jackson was a big loss. He had his limits and would probably have been ill-suited to replace Lee, but he was an excellent independent commander for a force of maybe 40,000 troops or so acting within a larger commander's plan. I have no feeling that Ewell, Early, A.P. Hill or any of a few others was as good for that. Longstreet's record in independent command was not good, but he was a hard hitter responsible for some of the most successful Corps assaults of the war: 2nd Manassas, Gettysburg, Chickamauga and the Wilderness all come to mind. What Lee really needs at Gettysburg is both Jackson and Lee; I don't think replacing Longstreet with Jackson would have made much of a difference.
 
Looking closely at the definition of "Pyrrhic Victory" though a brilliant battle of maneuver, Lee keeping a rein on JEB Stuart, which he failed to do at Gettysburg, the loss of Stonewall Jackson which he needed at Gettysburg, was devastating. Also the Confederate losses, very hard to replace in 1863. These two mentioned by Lee himself.....

"At Chancellorsville we gained another victory; our people were wild with delight—I, on the contrary, was more depressed than after Fredericksburg; our loss was severe, and again we gained not an inch of ground and the enemy could not be pursued.”
 
Longstreet would not have been Lees first choice to conduct any attacking manoeuvre at Gettysbur

Yet Lee relied on Longstreet as being the "hammer" in contributing to battlefield victory. Longstreet displayed that ability to successfully direct and maneuver large formations at 2nd Bull Run and the Wilderness to name a few; Day 2 of Gettysburg was just the type of operation that Longstreet normally excelled at but faulty reconnaissance and a strong Union position were some of the reasons that the assault failed. Jackson, by contrast, was superior at executing flanking movements with speed and stealth. In combination with Longstreet, had both commanders been present, a battle plan utilizing the specific skills of each commander might have had the better chance of success at Gettysburg.
 
Yet Lee relied on Longstreet as being the "hammer" in contributing to battlefield victory. Longstreet displayed that ability to successfully direct and maneuver large formations at 2nd Bull Run and the Wilderness to name a few; Day 2 of Gettysburg was just the type of operation that Longstreet normally excelled at but faulty reconnaissance and a strong Union position were some of the reasons that the assault failed. Jackson, by contrast, was superior at executing flanking movements with speed and stealth. In combination with Longstreet, had both commanders been present, a battle plan utilizing the specific skills of each commander might have had the better chance of success at Gettysburg.

Yeah i am with you on your point about both of them being more effective at Gettysburg , And i mean no disrespect to Longstreet but both of them together could have been a game changer that i do agree on.

Both had very unique quality's i just feel Jackson was more decisive than Longstreet he instilled a sense of fortitude and toughness into his troops , I'm sure Culps Hill would not have been in Union hands on the first day if Jackson was around , But again ifs and maybes.
 
Jackson was more decisive than Longstreet he instilled a sense of fortitude and toughness into his troops

Different personalities to be sure; Jackson's charisma and eccentricities combined to make him a leader unlike any other Confederate or Union general.
 
Both had very unique quality's i just feel Jackson was more decisive than Longstreet he instilled a sense of fortitude and toughness into his troops , I'm sure Culps Hill would not have been in Union hands on the first day if Jackson was around , But again ifs and maybes.

Jackson likely would have tried to take Culp's Hill, were he in Ewell's place in the same situation.

But whether he would have succeeded is another matter. Jackson was a talented commander and, like Lee and Stuart, was something of a boogie man in the minds of Union generals.

But more modern studies that can look beyond the 'cult of Stonewall' have pointed out how he made a number mistakes in the Valley and (probably due to exhaustion) delivered a dud in the Seven Days.

Jackson was a good general with a difficult personality whom Lee trusted. But his reputation has been inflated by the two ends of his CSA career: his stubborn defense at First Bull Run and his flank march at Chancellorsville. His death certainly hurt the ANV who had no comparable replacement, but a live Stonewall is no gurantee of victory, at Gettysburg in particular and certainly not the war in general.
 
Jackson likely would have tried to take Culp's Hill, were he in Ewell's place in the same situation.

But whether he would have succeeded is another matter. Jackson was a talented commander and, like Lee and Stuart, was something of a boogie man in the minds of Union generals.

But more modern studies that can look beyond the 'cult of Stonewall' have pointed out how he made a number mistakes in the Valley and (probably due to exhaustion) delivered a dud in the Seven Days.

Jackson was a good general with a difficult personality whom Lee trusted. But his reputation has been inflated by the two ends of his CSA career: his stubborn defense at First Bull Run and his flank march at Chancellorsville. His death certainly hurt the ANV who had no comparable replacement, but a live Stonewall is no gurantee of victory, at Gettysburg in particular and certainly not the war in general.
General Jackson's soldiers accomplished great feats. But he was also using up their strength rapidly. Its doubtful that by 1863 the movement ability of the Confederate army was the same as it was in 1863. Also, General Meade adjusted this tactics, and the Army of the Potomac became much denser and mutual support became a high priority. If Jackson had taken Culp's Hill, General Meade would have pulled back to another position to put himself between the Confederates and Washington, D.C. Meade did not need to whip Lee's army, he only needed to buy time until Vicksburg surrendered.
 
By definition, the battle was in no way a Phyrric Victory, but iit did it did confirm confirm Lees belief that under his leadershhip the AN and, set inV was invincablelset in motion Lees decisions to both invade Pa. and reorganize his army almost simultneously. and as noted before on this board, the results of Chancellorsville resulted in Gettysburg, which led to Grant coming East, and less than a year after Grant began moving South, the War was effectively over.
 
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