Chancellorsville Was Chancellorsville a Great Victory?

whitworth

2nd Lieutenant
Joined
Jun 18, 2005
A Confederate victory, but what kind of victory? It never laid the groundwork for later victories.
It was in many ways a victory over a poor fighting Corps, the XI Corps, that was poorly lead by Gen O.O. Howard. In the end, beating the XI Corps meant nothing. Take the first day at Gettysburg, where the XI Corps was again pummeled by Ewell's Corps. No great meaning on the following two days, when the Confederates had to fight other Army of the Potomac Corps.

In both battles, the Confederates took heavy casualties and lost important generals. Great victory; I think not.

By late 1863, the XI Corps was out of the Army of Potomac. One of its brigades got shipped to South Carolina, a few months after the Battle of Gettysburg. By early 1864, all its division commanders and most if not all its brigade commanders were in minor commands or the quiet sector of the war.

Beating the XI Corps did not translate into beating the Army of the Potomac. Howard revived his own status, once he was out of the XI Corps and in a new command.
 
Tactically, one of Lee's and the ANV's finest hours. Strategically - a minimal success in that it fended off Hooker, (and there are doubts in my mind as to the degree of longer term success Hooker would have enjoyed from this campaign even if he had won at Chancellorsville) but came at a heavy cost in squandering resources(men) Lee was already recognizing as rapidly diminishing.
 
Spartan:
It would seem that Lee saw a possibility of destroying the AotP, thus effectively closing the war in the east on a positive note for the CSA. With that prospect, he invested heavily in its accomplishment. However, happenstance and circumstance have a way of interfering with the best laid plans.

I believe the same might be said of the foray into Pennsylvania. Although that included an element of desperation. He could see that the CSA was flagging and must ultimately concede if only through years of attrition. He had failed to destroy Lincoln's army at Chacellorsville; maybe he could get it on ground of his choosing in Pennsylvania.

When that didn't work out, the attrition he expected commenced.

Ole
 
The Importance of Chacellorsville

I think the importance of Chancellorsville is not the Confederate victory, but the inability of the Confederate army on an offense, to attack in depth. The importance being what didn't happen after the battle; much more than what happened at the battle.

It's like the boxer who hits the opponent with a tremendous punch, sends him reeling backward, but is unable to move forward and counterpunch him into submission.

Yes, there is the old claim of the importance of Stonewall Jackson. Well, many a general was killed in battle. If Stonewall Jackson was so important to victory, maybe the Confederacy should never have seceded. Soldiers and generals died in battle. The Union army seemed to sustain those losses much better than the Confederate army.
 
The Importance of Chancellorsville

I think the importance of Chancellorsville is not the Confederate victory, but the inability of the Confederate army on an offense, to attack in depth. The importance being what didn't happen after the battle; much more than what happened at the battle.

It's like the boxer who hits the opponent with a tremendous punch, sends him reeling backward, but is unable to move forward and counterpunch him into submission.

Yes, there is the old claim of the importance of Stonewall Jackson. Well, many a general was killed in battle. If Stonewall Jackson was so important to victory, maybe the Confederacy should never have seceded. Soldiers and generals died in battle. The Union army seemed to sustain those losses much better than the Confederate army.
 
Chancellorsville a Great Victory

That is how I view it- strategically a minimal success as the devastating punch thrown by Lee/Jackson was not followed up with successive follow up punches to the head and body of the AOP. Though I understand that CW history teaches us that it was consistently just as hard to reorganize and reform the routers and it was the routed, a golden opportunity to carve up the AOP between the rivers was clearly missed. Thus, the situation remained stalemated on the Rapidan and thousands of quality ANV veterans were lost forever in the process. Chancellorsville also clearly demonstrated to Lincoln, Stanton and Halleck that Fightin Joe was not up to the task of tactical command of the army and ultimate victory.
 
Army of the Potomac Artillery

Hooker did reorganize the chain of command with artillery, because of Chancellorsville. Artillery was too dispersed and had little central control at Chancellorsville.
Gen. Hunt assumed direct command of the Reserve Artillery, while the Corps Commanders had their artillery batteries.
At Gettysburg, Hunt had the abilitity to fill in the holes, resupply artillery batteries, and depend on his own judgment with a cashe of some 70 ammunition wagons, even Meade was unaware. Hunt never quite trusted all the Corps commanders to handle artillery effectively.
Gettysburg almost only lasted a day, as both Sickles and Hancock mishandled their artillery ammunition supply wagons. Sickles left all his artillery ammunition far in the rear and Hancock had lost half his artillery supply in the rear. Hunt kept tabs on artillery ammunition supply for the Army of the Potomac, a task the Confederates failed to do at Gettysburg.
 
Chancellorsville was a great victory for General Lee and the Confederacy in and of itself. This was a battle Robert E Lee had no business winning- General Hooker's strategic plan should have been a huge winner, but Lee would have none of it. What Lee did and accomplished at Chancellorsville is absolutely amazing. He had but Jackson's Corps, Stuart's horsemen, and two divisions of Longstreet's to work with, while having to hold off 3 Union Corps at Fredericksburg on his flank. And he then ignores the raiding Union cavalry and splits his command for a flank attack in front of Hooker's hordes- incredible!! That Lee stood Hooker up, stole the initiative and utterly cowed Hooker is a tribute to him; that Hooker crumpled in the face of Lee's audacity is a factor in Lee's favor as having created the situation.

That Lee produced a victory here is as I say amazing. That he then had visions of polishing off the Union Army and attempted to do it is amazing as well. That he could not do it does not reflect poorly on him. I don't see how he could have given the disproportion of numbers and the masses of unused Union troops in the area. Actually, good for him that Hooker pulled out of his entrenchments Confederate-side of the Rapidan, against his generals' advise. These lines were well nigh impregnable and manned by grim and undemoralized generals and men. The only thing they could not defeat at that point of time was their commanding general's cowardly orders. Still, none of this takes anything away from General Lee and this masterful victory.
 
Lee was lucky Hooker lost his nerve - twice. First was when he stopped and dug in. Second was after Jackson rolled up the XI Corps and was killed during a night reconnaisance (and Stuart assumed command). Hancock later found himself in a position to roll up Stuart's flank but Hooker wouldn't let him and ordered a retreat. All in all, an amazing victory snatched from the proverbial jaws of defeat by Lee. However, as Robert K. Krick put it, it was the "smoothbore volley that doomed the Confederacy."
 
Yes Lee was lucky- all commanders need a bit of luck to help things along their way. But Hooker losing his nerve was more a bit of Lee making his own luck than being 'lucky.' All was going swimmingly for Hooker until two things happened. The first was that after all his bluster and arrogance, Hooker was finally at that desperate moment when he meets his great adversary 'eye-to-eye' so to speak. In this 'meeting' the pretender blinked before the grim, hard faced, brilliant, and renowned Lee. And thus Hooker hesitated, hesitating meant thinking, thinking meant doubt. The other thing is that Lee reacted unexpectedly- not only did he not flee before Hooker's might and brilliant flank movement, he moved immediately to confront Hooker on terrain, the Wilderness, favorable to the Rebels. And so seizing the initiative, he never allowed it to pass from his hands and kept the Union reeling. But again I feel it is more a matter of creating one's luck and then using what fortune comes one's way to benefit.

Where luck does come into play for Lee is that Hooker against his generals' advice removed the army from an impregnable position before he could be assailed by Lee, an attack likely to cost Lee dearly and for no gain. But again, this incident can as well come under the heading of Lee's complete domination in moral courage over his adversary.
 
Well again, I think you would have to look hard and long to find an argument against it being anything short of an impressive tactical victory but was it GREAT in the strategic sense? Beyond it being yet another well executed punishing defense against another of a string of poorly executed Federal offensives preceeding it, what was gained strategically to achieve ultimate goals? It bought more time surely, but to what end. For all it's notoriety as a Confederate victory, it did not seriously damage the AOtP, it did not bring the Europeans into the CSA camp. Heck, I would argue that the repulse of BAnks and Steele associated with the failed Red River campaign in spring of 1864 did as much to blunt Federal initiatives in the Trans-Miss and the deep south which was more a key to the CSA's survival than the stalemated line of the Rapidan.
 
Spartan, I understand what you're saying that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville, though 'impressive' to use your bit of understatement only served to fend off the inevitable. But can that really take away from the magnitude of what Lee and what he had available of his army acheived on the field? True, things stayed much as they were before the battle occurred, the odds and the political and strategic situation facing the Confederacy were relatively unchanged. But these are factors beyond the amazing victory acheived on the field. By your reckoning, Antietam was a greater victory for how it influenced the war and the political situation and how the war would be fought. And Antietam was a poorly fought battle by the victor, McClellan. What you bring up are elements beyond the control of the commanding general. Lee and the Confederacy were always going to be behind the 8-Ball, and he and President Davis were perspicacious enough to realize it. European recognition was a will o the wisp from the get-go. What really mattered throughout was the will of the North to prosecute the War. Every Confederate victory mattered in this regard. In what dire straits would the Confederacy have been if Hooker had succeeding in this masterful plan of his? Without question the Confederates are in a very bad way. regards, ed
 
ewc said:
Spartan, I understand what you're saying that the Confederate victory at Chancellorsville, though 'impressive' to use your bit of understatement only served to fend off the inevitable. But can that really take away from the magnitude of what Lee and what he had available of his army acheived on the field? True, things stayed much as they were before the battle occurred, the odds and the political and strategic situation facing the Confederacy were relatively unchanged. But these are factors beyond the amazing victory acheived on the field. By your reckoning, Antietam was a greater victory for how it influenced the war and the political situation and how the war would be fought. And Antietam was a poorly fought battle by the victor, McClellan. What you bring up are elements beyond the control of the commanding general. Lee and the Confederacy were always going to be behind the 8-Ball, and he and President Davis were perspicacious enough to realize it. European recognition was a will o the wisp from the get-go. What really mattered throughout was the will of the North to prosecute the War. Every Confederate victory mattered in this regard. In what dire straits would the Confederacy have been if Hooker had succeeding in this masterful plan of his? Without question the Confederates are in a very bad way. regards, ed

Perhaps we are guilty of excessive "deep thinking" in pondering this simple question posed earlier by Whitworth. I take nothing away from the what t Lee tacticallly achieved on the field and yes, it was one impressive piece of leadership in the heat of battle however understated that may sound. In attempting to answer the question of the degree of greatness of a victory I tend to look at victory also in the strategic sense, and in this view I maintain when all the above is considered it was strategically a minimal success sir. The knockout punch WAS in Lee's control and this was not achieved which in my mind marginalizes to various degrees the immediate tactical benefit gained. As you cited Antietam. I would offer that the situation was reversed in that Little Mac failed miserably in taking strategic advantage of tactical gain in blunting Lee's Maryland campaign on that field of honor. In this case however, a case for a tactical victory by the Federals was anything but cut and dried, so no I do not view Antietam in the capacity you reckon I do. Respectfully, Spartan
 
Has anyone read Stephen Sears' book on Chancellorsville? I haven't and wonder if anyone could recommend it.

The definition for "great victory" seems to be, "one that wins the entire war." a Waterloo. By that criteria, the South won no "great victories" because they ultimately lost the war.

What interesting on the Union side is that the AoP did not consider itself whipped, as it had at Fredericksburg or Bull Run. The army was capable of continuing the fight, it was the high command that was "used up." If the errant shell had killed or wounded Hooker enough to put him out of the fight, a hard charging 2nd in command, like Meade or Couch could have pulled something out of the fire.
 
matthew mckeon said:
Has anyone read Stephen Sears' book on Chancellorsville? I haven't and wonder if anyone could recommend it.

The definition for "great victory" seems to be, "one that wins the entire war." a Waterloo. By that criteria, the South won no "great victories" because they ultimately lost the war.

What interesting on the Union side is that the AoP did not consider itself whipped, as it had at Fredericksburg or Bull Run. The army was capable of continuing the fight, it was the high command that was "used up." If the errant shell had killed or wounded Hooker enough to put him out of the fight, a hard charging 2nd in command, like Meade or Couch could have pulled something out of the fire.

Well MAtthew, that makes even my strategic view of what constitutes a great victory look narowly focused LOL. But you are correct, ask Meade, Couch, Hancock and the gang at corps level and those at division level of command if they felt whipped at Chancellorsville. Respectfully, Spartan
 
Heres one.......

Yes... it would of been interesting if Meade was in command but I don't think he could have pulled off a victory for the North. Now here's a great "What if"........How about Grant @Chancellorsville? hmmmmmmmmm.
 
Good question. I don't think Meade would have pulled off an outright victory, but possibly the Union rout that occurred would not have been such a panic. Maybe it wouldn't have happened at all. If Grant was in command, the battle possibly would have turned into brutal, costly slug-fest with the end result being a draw, or possibly a narrow Union victory. The terrain was much different than at Gettysburg, and Lees tactics were, of course, much different. I don't know but I can't see an easy Union victory under either Meade or Grant.
Just me opining.

Terry
 
william42 said:
Good question. I don't think Meade would have pulled off an outright victory, but possibly the Union rout that occurred would not have been such a panic. Maybe it wouldn't have happened at all. If Grant was in command, the battle possibly would have turned into brutal, costly slug-fest with the end result being a draw, or possibly a narrow Union victory. The terrain was much different than at Gettysburg, and Lees tactics were, of course, much different. I don't know but I can't see an easy Union victory under either Meade or Grant.
Just me opining.

Terry

Meade very likely could not have pulled a victory out of the jaws of defeat but seems to me a tactical draw could have been pulled out of the hat. This was not the George Gordon Meade who was so easily ready to retire to the Pipe Creek Line the the months ahead. He and Couch were among those very vocal and critical desenters against Hooker pulling back over the Rappahannock. The force under his command was by and large not engaged and fresh and like Couch was fully expecting to and ready to counterattack. The Federals had more than enough IMHO to reform and punch back, no doubt the end result being a costly slugfest ending with two angry boxers staring each other down as was the case in this same Wilderness a year later.
 
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