Chamberlain Was Chamberlain honest about Little Round Top in his memoir?

Fairfield

Sergeant Major
Member of the Month
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Dec 5, 2019
I used to be a lot more critical of Chamberlain and his accounts but I've mellowed some in recent years. Who doesn't love an old man spinning yarns even if they aren't entirely accurate? I think we've all met that person and Chamberlain was just as human as any of them. That said, as a general rule of thumb, take accounts from decades after said event with a grain of salt without more contemporary corroboration.

Ryan
Reading Chamberlain (he wrote two sets of memoirs), his final accounts were not the tall tales of an old man but the deliberate journalistic liberties of a rank opportunist (Hearst). The only real detractor who was contemporary was a Private Gerrish of the 20th. However, the private seems to have been in hospital at the time of LRT. JLC lived out a long life in Brunswick and Augusta, Maine. One of his associates in Augusta was Selden Conner who headed the pension office and was very active in veterans' organizations (also a Civil War general and also a governor of Maine); Maine vets took war service very seriously and General Conner would have raised all sorts of flags if he spotted inaccurate embellishment.
 

jackt62

Captain
Joined
Jul 28, 2015
Location
New York City
I have not read Chamberlain's memoirs, but I have read many other memoirs of CW generals. Overall, if Chamberlain did embellish his career, he was only following the example of other memoirs. Most were written to either justify or defend decisions they made, or alternatively to attack the reputations of others. Memoirs can be a good source of first hand information, but they must be read with a degree of skepticism.
 

Wallyfish

Sergeant Major
Honored Fallen Comrade
Joined
Nov 26, 2015
Location
Greensburg, Pa
I have always wondered really how difficult it was to hear orders given during the roar of an ongoing battle. Clearly not everyone could hear them in the line. So when "good things" happened, did the commanding officer actually issue the order, or did the action just occur and over the years the commanding officer took credit for the order that was never given? We will never know.

I take family and friends to Gettysburg for tours. I routinely ask one person to stand at each of the two 20th Maine Flank markers while the rest goes to the 20th Maine monument to show how JLC refused his line. I then have to yell for them to come to the main monument. It is kind of tough to hear me with no one around.

Can you imagine standing in a line with thousands of rifles shots being fired and the screams of wounded men? The sound had to be deafening. So who knows?
 

Fairfield

Sergeant Major
Member of the Month
Joined
Dec 5, 2019
I have not read Chamberlain's memoirs, but I have read many other memoirs of CW generals. Overall, if Chamberlain did embellish his career, he was only following the example of other memoirs. Most were written to either justify or defend decisions they made, or alternatively to attack the reputations of others. Memoirs can be a good source of first hand information, but they must be read with a degree of skepticism.
As a genealogist, I am keenly aware of the skepticism that must accompany even primary sources. In this case, however, I am inclined to put credence in his writing. Everyone knows that he was educated at Bowdoin but not everyone knows that he also took training at the Bangor Theological Seminary: he was trained to be accurate and honest. Not only was he educated at Bowdoin, but he taught there and was president of that college. There is a academic leaning toward historical truth. In Brunswick, he was one of a circle of people such as Elijah Kellogg--men who would have little patience with a braggart. Lastly, having researched deeply into the vets of other Maine regiments, I know that bravado on anyone's part was greeted with public protest. Not only were there many vets from the 20th but there were the vets of the 83rd PA and the 44th NY. When he died in 1914 there was a special tribute for him from the Maine Loyal Legion attributing honor for his contribution; among those who were there were many names that I recognize from this area of Maine.

One of the "Bibles" of the Maine experience in the ACW was a book put out by the Maine Gettysburg Commission: Maine at Gettysburg. No where in that collection of reports and narratives is there any hint of bravado. No where in the reports of the Union Army is there even a hint. With only the exception of Ellis Spear and Theodore Gerrish, none of his contemporaries have doubts--and Spear's came only after Hearst's mangling of Chamberlain's original.

General Chamberlain has had the great misfortune to have been glorified by recent media. This means two things: first, a great deal of misinformation was passed in order to tell a good story and second, he has become a target.
 

Wallyfish

Sergeant Major
Honored Fallen Comrade
Joined
Nov 26, 2015
Location
Greensburg, Pa
Here is JLC's original Gettysburg report written on July 6th - 4 days after his LRT action.

Official Reports for the 20th Maine at Gettysburg
Numbers 196. Report of Colonel Joshua L. Chamberlain, Twentieth Maine Infantry.
FIELD NEAR EMMITSBURG,
July 6, 1863.
SIR: In compliance with the request of the colonel commanding the brigade, I have the honor to submit a somewhat detailed report of the operations of the Twentieth Regiment Maine Volunteers in the battle of Gettysburg, on the 2nd and 3rd instant. Having acted as the advance guard, made necessary by the proximity of the enemy’s cavalry, on the march of the day before, my command on reaching Hanover, Pa., just before sunset on that day, were much worn, and lost no time in getting ready for an expected bivouac. Rations were scarcely issued, and the men about preparing supper, when rumors that the enemy had been encountered that day near Gettysburg absorbed every other interest, and very soon orders came to march forthwith to Gettysburg. My men moved out with a promptitude and spirit extraordinary, the cheers and welcome they received on the road adding to their enthusiasm.
After an hour or two of sleep by the roadside just before day break, we reached the heights southeasterly of Gettysburg at about 7 a. m., July 2. Massed at first with the rest of the division on the right of the road, we were moved several times farther toward the left. Although expecting every moment to be put into action and held strictly in line of battle, yet the men were able to take some rest and make the most of their rations. Somewhere near 4 p. m. a sharp cannonade, at some distance to our left and front, was the signal for a sudden and rapid movement of our whole division in the direction of this firing, which grew warmer as we approached. Passing an open field in the hollow ground in which some of our batteries were going into position, our brigade reached the skirt of a piece of woods, in the farther edge of which there was a heavy musketry fire, and when about to go forward into line we received from Colonel Vincent, commanding the brigade, orders to move to the left at the double-quick, when we took a farm road crossing Plum Run in order to gain a rugged mountain spur called Granite Spur, or Little Round Top. The enemy’s artillery got range of our column as we were climbing the spur, and the crashing of the shells among the rocks and the tree tops made us move lively along the crest. One or two shells burst in our ranks.
Passing to the southern slope of Little Round Top, Colonel Vincent indicated to me the ground my regiment was to occupy, informing me that this was the extreme left of our general line, and that a desperate attack was expected in order to turn that position, concluding by telling me I was to “hold that ground at all hazards.” This was the last word I heard from him. In order to commence by making my right firm, I formed my regiment on the right into line, giving such direction to the line as should best secure the advantage of the rough, rocky, and straglingly wooded ground. The line faced generally toward a more conspicuous eminence southwest of ours, which is known as Sugar Loaf, or Round Top. Between this and my position intervened a smooth and thinly wooded hollow. My line formed, I immediately detached Company B, Captain Morrill commanding, to extend from my left flank across this hollow as a line of skirmishers, with directions to act as occasion might dictate, to prevent a surprise on my exposed flank and rear.
The artillery fire on our position had meanwhile been constant and heavy, but my formation was scarcely complete when the artillery was replaced by a vigorous infantry assault upon the center of our brigade to my right, but it very soon involved the right of my regiment and gradually extended along my entire front. The action was quite sharp and at close quarters. In the midst of this, an officer from my center informed me that some important movement of the enemy was going on in his front, beyond that of the line with which we were engaged. Mounting a large rock, I was able to see a considerable body of the enemy moving by the flank in rear of their line engaged, and passing from the direction of the foot of Great Round Top through the valley toward the front of my left. The close engagement not allowing any change of front, I immediately stretched my regiment to the left, by taking intervals by the left flank, and at the same time “refusing” my left wing, so that it was nearly at right angles with my right, thus occupying about twice the extent of our ordinary front, some of the companies being brought into single rank when the nature of the ground gave sufficient strength or shelter. My officers and men understood my wishes so well that this movement was executed under fire, the right wing keeping up fire, without giving the enemy any occasion to seize or even to suspect their advantage. But we were not a moment too soon; the enemy’s flanking column having gained their desired direction, burst upon my left, where they evidently had expected an unguarded flank, with great demonstration.
We opened a brisk fire at closes range, which was so sudden and effective that they soon fell back among the rocks and low trees in the valley, only to burst forth again with a shout, and rapidly advanced, firing as they came. They pushed up to within a dozen yards of us before the terrible effectiveness of our fire compelled them to break and take shelter. They renewed the assault on our whole front, and for an hour the fighting was severe. Squads of the enemy broke through our line in several places, and the fight was literally hand to hand. The edge of the fight rolled backward and forward like a wave. The dead and wounded were now in our front and then in our rear. Forced from our position, we desperately recovered it, and pushed the enemy down to the foot of the slope. The intervals of the struggle were seized to remove our wounded (and those of the enemy also), to gather ammunition from the cartridge-boxes of disabled friend or foe on the field, and even to secure better muskets than the Enfields, which we found did not stand service well. Rude shelters were thrown up of the loose rocks that covered the ground. Captain Woodward, commanding the Eighty-third Pennsylvania Volunteers, on my right, gallantly maintaining his fight, judiciously and with hearty co-operation made his movements conform to my necessities, so that my right was at no time exposed to a flank attack.
The enemy seemed to have gathered all their energies for their final assault. We had gotten our thin line into as good a shape as possible, when a strong force emerged from the scrub wood in the valley, as well as I could judge, in two lines in echelon by the right, and, opening a heavy fire, the first line came on as if they meant to sweep everything before them. We opened on them as well as we could with our scanty ammunition snatched from the field. It did not seem possible to withstand another shock like this now coming on. Our loss had been severe. One-half of my left wing had fallen, and a third of my regiment lay just behind us, dead or badly wounded. At this moment my anxiety was increased by a great roar of musketry in my rear, on the farther or northerly slope of Little Round Top, apparently on the flank of the regular brigade, which was in support of Hazletts Battery on the crest behind us. The bullets from this attack struck into my left rear, and I feared that the enemy might have nearly surrounded the Little Round Top, and only a desperate chance was left for us.
My ammunition was soon exhausted. My men were firing their last shot and getting ready to “club” their muskets. It was imperative to strike before we were struck by this overwhelming force in a hand-to-hand fight, which we could not probably have withstood or survived. At that crisis, I ordered the bayonet. The word was enough. It ran like fire along the line, from man to man, and rose into a shout, with which they sprang forward upon the enemy, now not 30 yards away. The effect was surprising; many of the enemys first line threw down their arms and surrendered. An officer fired his pistol at my head with one hand, while he handed me his sword with the other. Holding fast by our right, and swinging forward our left, we made an extended “right wheel,” before which the enemy’s second line broke and fell back, fighting from tree to tree, many being captured, until we had swept the valley and cleared the front of nearly our entire brigade. Meantime Captain Norrill with his skirmishers (sent out from my left flank), with some dozen or fifteen of the U. S. Sharpshooters who had put themselves under his direction, fell upon the enemy as they were breaking, and by his demonstrations, as well as his well-directed fire, added much to the effect of the charge.
Having thus cleared the valley and driven the enemy up the western slope of the Great Round Top, not wishing to press so far out as to hazard the ground I was to hold by leaving it exposed to a sudden rush of the enemy, I succeeded (although with some effort to stop my men, who declared they were “on the road to Richmond”) in getting the regiment into good order and resuming our original position. Four hundred prisoners, including two field and several line officers, were sent to the rear. These were mainly from the Fifteenth and Forty-seventh Alabama Regiments, with some of the Fourth and Fifth Texas. One hundred and fifty of the enemy were found killed and wounded in our front.
At dusk, Colonel Rice informed me of the fall of Colonel Vincent, which had devolved the command of the brigade on him, and that Colonel Fisher had come up with a brigade to our support. These troops were massed in our rear. It was the understanding, as Colonel Rice informed me, that Colonel Fisher’s brigade was to advance and seize the western slope of Great Round Top, where the enemy had shortly before been driven. But, after considerable delay, this intention for some reason was not carried into execution. We were apprehensive that if the enemy were allowed to strengthen himself in that position, he would have a great advantage in renewing the attack on us at daylight or before. Colonel Rice then directed me to make the movement to seize that crest. It was now 9 p. m.
Without waiting to get ammunition, but trusting in part to the very circumstance of not exposing our movement or our small front by firing, and with bayonets fixed, the little handful of 200 men pressed up the mountain side in very extended order, as the steep and jagged surface of the ground compelled. We heard squads of the enemy falling back before us, and, when near the crest, we met a scattering and uncertain fire, which caused us the great loss of the gallant Lieutenant Linscott, who fell, mortally wounded. In the silent advance in the darkness we laid hold of 25 prisoners, among them a staff officer of General [E. M.] Law, commanding the brigade immediately opposed to us during the fight. Reaching the crest, and reconnoitering the ground, I placed the men in a strong position among the rocks, and informed Colonel Rice, requesting also ammunition and some support to our right, which was very near the enemy, their movements and words even being now distinctly heard by us.
Some confusion soon after resulted from the attempt of some regiment of Colonel Fisher’s brigade to come to our support. They had found a wood road up the mountain, which brought then on my right flank, and also in proximity to the enemy, massed a little below. Hearing their approach, and thinking a movement from that quarter could only be from the enemy, I made disposition to receive them as such. In the confusion which attended the attempt to form them in support of my right, the enemy opened a brisk fire, which disconcerted my efforts to form them and disheartened the supports themselves, so that I saw no more of them that night. Feeling somewhat insecure in this isolated position, I sent in for the Eighty-third Pennsylvania, which came speedily, followed by the Forty-fourth New York, and, having seen these well posted, I sent a strong picket to the front, with instructions to report to me every half hour during the night, and allowed the rest of my men to sleep on their arms. At some time about midnight, two regiments of Colonel Fishers brigade came up the mountain beyond my left, and took position near the summit; but as the enemy did not threaten from that direction, I made no effort to connect with them.
We went into the fight with 386, all told- 358 guns. Every pioneer and musician who could carry a musket went into the ranks. Even the sick and foot-sore, who could not keep up in the march, came up as soon as they could find their regiments, and took their places in line of battle, while it was battle, indeed. Some prisoners I had under guard, under sentence of Court-Martial, I was obliged to put into the fight, and they bore their part well, for which I shall recommend a commutation of their sentence. The loss, so far as I can ascertain it, is 136- 30 of whom were killed, and among the wounded are many mortally. Captain Billings, Lieutenant Kendall, and Lieutenant Linscott are officers whose loss we deeply mourn – efficient soldiers, and pure and high-minded men. In such an engagement there were many incidents of heroism and noble character which should have place even in an official report; but, under present circumstances, I am unable to do justice to them. I will say of that regiment that the resolution, courage, and heroic fortitude which enabled us to withstand so formidable an attack have happily led to so conspicuous a result that they may safely trust to history to record their merits.
About noon on the 3rd of July, we were withdrawn, and formed on the right of the brigade, in the front edge of a piece of woods near the left center of our main line of battle, where we were held in readiness to support our troops, then receiving the severe attack of the afternoon of that day. On the 4th, we made a reconnaissance to the front, to ascertain the movements of the enemy, but finding that they had retired, at least beyond Willoughbys Run, we returned to Little Round Top, where we buried our dead in the place where we had laid them during the fight, marking each grave by a head-board made of ammunition boxes, with each dead soldiers name cut upon it. We also buried 50 of the enemys dead in front of our position of July 2. We then looked after our wounded, whom I had taken the responsibility of putting into the houses of citizens in the vicinity of Little Round Top, and, on the morning of the 5th, took up our march on the Emmitsburg road.
I have the honor to be, your obedient servant,
JOSHUA L. CHAMBERLAIN,
Colonel, Commanding Twentieth Maine Volunteers.
Lieutenant GEORGE B. HERENDEEN. A. A. A. G.,
Third Brig., First Div., Fifth Army Corps.
 

Cavalier

First Sergeant
Joined
Jul 20, 2019
@Wallyfish I don't remember seeing that report before. Thanks for posting that.

I'm kinda ambiguous about Chamberlain but I remember the book by Pullen, The Twentieth Maine, coming out in about 1960. It was the first book I had seen that went into any kind of tactical detail, if I remember correctly.

Also it was not generally a habit of the pop culture in that time to portray Yankees as heros, so it was unusual in that way, being about a Union regiment.

It was one of the books that generated my civil war interest. Then came Bruce Catton and my fate was sealed.

John
 

JPK Huson 1863

Brev. Brig. Gen'l
Joined
Feb 14, 2012
Location
Central Pennsylvania
As a genealogist, I am keenly aware of the skepticism that must accompany even primary sources. In this case, however, I am inclined to put credence in his writing. Everyone knows that he was educated at Bowdoin but not everyone knows that he also took training at the Bangor Theological Seminary: he was trained to be accurate and honest. Not only was he educated at Bowdoin, but he taught there and was president of that college. There is a academic leaning toward historical truth. In Brunswick, he was one of a circle of people such as Elijah Kellogg--men who would have little patience with a braggart. Lastly, having researched deeply into the vets of other Maine regiments, I know that bravado on anyone's part was greeted with public protest. Not only were there many vets from the 20th but there were the vets of the 83rd PA and the 44th NY. When he died in 1914 there was a special tribute for him from the Maine Loyal Legion attributing honor for his contribution; among those who were there were many names that I recognize from this area of Maine.

One of the "Bibles" of the Maine experience in the ACW was a book put out by the Maine Gettysburg Commission: Maine at Gettysburg. No where in that collection of reports and narratives is there any hint of bravado. No where in the reports of the Union Army is there even a hint. With only the exception of Ellis Spear and Theodore Gerrish, none of his contemporaries have doubts--and Spear's came only after Hearst's mangling of Chamberlain's original.

General Chamberlain has had the great misfortune to have been glorified by recent media. This means two things: first, a great deal of misinformation was passed in order to tell a good story and second, he has become a target.


This whole post confirms a lot I've felt without having the credentials, academic or otherwise to back it up. It was just a progression, of course first from watching the bizarre backlash post Killer Angels then digging into it. Oddest aspect of the whole backlash was Chamberlain being accused of self promotion. Politicians kinda have to do that for one thing, for another I just couldn't find a thing where he Dan Sickled his war, during it or afterwards. I'm not a professional researcher, never was able to figure out why on earth Spears spent so much time shredding Chamberlain.

Bottom line has always seemed to me Chamberlain, a man who sure didn't have to, got on a horse and went to war, never ducked a thing and paid for it. Plenty of uniformed officers nicely placed in offices for the duration who invented reputations they didn't earn. Chamberlain wasn't one of them.

Thanks for the post!
 
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