Was Bragg's offensive into Kentucky a waste of time and resources?

Kentucky Derby Cavalier.

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Oct 24, 2019
For sometime I have wondered this, what was the thinking behind the offensive into Kentucky by Bragg and others? It seemed like a tactical blunder from my point of view. Wouldn't it have made more sense to be fighting around Vicksburg as to prevent it's capture?

Thoughts?
heartland campaign.png
 
Bragg and Kirby Smith in collaboration commenced the so-called "Heartland Offensive" for too many of the wrong reasons. Rather than view it as a strictly military move, the plan was predicated on attaining the political motives of enlisting Kentuckians to the Confederate cause and army, installing a Confederate state government, and tipping the state out of the Union. In that regard, the offensive was a total failure. The campaign did have the positive effect of drawing Buell's forces out of Middle Tennessee so there was some advantage gained in delaying Union movements against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. But the grander scheme of securing Kentucky's southern allegiance and establishing a defensive line along the Ohio River was further shattered by Bragg's pyrrhic tactical success at Perryville, which essentially ended the campaign.
 
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Bragg and Kirby Smith in collaboration commenced the so-called "Heartland Offensive" for too many of the wrong reasons. Rather than view it as a strictly military move, the plan was predicated on attaining the political motives of enlisting Kentuckians to the Confederate cause and army, installing a Confederate state government, and tipping the state out of the Union. In that regard, the offensive was a total failure. The campaign did have the positive effect of drawing Buell's forces out of Middle Tennessee so there was some advantage gained in delaying Union movements against Chattanooga and East Tennessee. But the grander scheme of securing Kentucky's southern allegiance and establishing a defensive line along the Ohio River was further shattered by Bragg's pyrrhic tactical success at Perryville, which essentially ended the campaign.
As pointed out earlier, Noe also excoriates Smith for failure to effectively cooperate. In a sense, Bragg was lucky to escape. Ill-served by his subordinate Polk, he completely underestimated the size of Buell's force opposing him at Perryville and should have suffered a devastating defeat. But "it was Buell, after all" - compounded by Thomas apparently deciding in a huff to occupy a front-row seat and Sill's division being MIA on the Frankfort frolic.
 
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Indeed, it was a wrong assumption, I think they only got 1000 men to join.
11/21 Tullahoma, Bragg to Gen Cooper-Gives details related to Buford's Bgde-At the time of our retrograde, he had some 2500 men on the rolls. All but 800 have since deserted; consol into 1 Regt-Others would have my preference that joined us earlier & known to be efficient.

11/22/62 Richmond, A Buford to Gen Cooper-asks to be made Brig Gen-presents the muster rolls of Vols recruited by me & mustered in the CSA during the presence of Gen Bragg's army in Ky-2197 men were recruited by the authority granted me by K Smith on 9/2-of these 1622 are now in different Regts of K Smith & Marshall

K Smith said in the evacuation of Ky Buford lost many men requiring consol of the 3 partial Regts into 1.
 
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A couple of footnotes to add.

1. Bragg and EKS were influenced by prominent Kentuckian John Morgan's continuous assurances that Kentucky would welcome the invasion, rise up and fill the ranks with new recruits. At the time, Morgan's star was in its ascendancy.

2. There was another strategic component of Bragg's Kentucky campaign. The left wing of the Confederate Army under Price/Van Dorn was given the amorphous task of defeating or maneuvering Grant out of Northern Mississippi and cooperating with Bragg somehow. This is to the earlier point that Vicksburg looked impregnable, at least for a few months. This impractical goal ended at Corinth.
 
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every day the theater of war was outside the Confederacy was a win for the South, assuming the CS army wasn't lost.
Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the CS army was "lost" in its engagements beyond the borders of the seceded states. Perhaps part of the problem was that southern goals were not coordinated, were too ambitious, or were over-reaching from what should have been strictly military aims. The Kentucky campaign was heavily influenced by the desire to tilt that state to the side of the Confederacy; the New Mexico campaign was similarly oriented towards acquiring that territory for the Confederacy. In contrast, Lee's northern campaigns were more precisely defined in their attempts to possess food and forage, and derange northern willpower by delivering significant military victories over northern arms. But whether ill-conceived or not, none of these southern offensives achieved their major goals, and only further burdened the Confederacy with diminishing manpower.
 
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I think it was a good (but not great) idea badly executed.
I would generally agree. Unfortunately, that description can be applied to a lot of what the Confederacy did. :smile:

1. Bragg or EKS needed to be under a unified command with a unified plan.
Yes, that would help. Bragg out-ranked Kirby Smith, but Kirby Smith showed little inclination to serve under Bragg.

Beauregard, OTOH, was willing to be recovered from his illness, resume command of the Department and be in command of the operation.

2. Breckinridge and basically every Kentucky regiment in the theater should have come along.
Breckinridge was trying to get there and Bragg wanted him there. Confederate inefficiency and conflicting commands prevented Breckinridge from making it -- and then Bragg decided it was Breckinridge's fault. Like so many things with Bragg, that turned into a grudge and a grudge tended to become a feud with Bragg.

3. Bragg successfully intercepting Buell before Louisville would have helped a lot.
I would wonder what would happen if he had done it. I don't think it is all that clear he would have won a battle against Buell.

I think Confederate leadership was unrealistically optimistic about what they could accomplish in Kentucky, but more benefits could have been reaped than actually were.
Bragg's Beauregard's plan:
MOBILE, ALA.,(*) September 2, 1862.
General BRAXTON BRAGG,
Commanding Department No. 2, Chattanooga, Tenn.:

MY DEAR GENERAL: As you have shown your confidence in me by asking my views relative to your intended movement from Tupelo to Middle Tennessee via Mobile and Chattanooga, I have thought, after a conversation with General Slaughter, that you might probably desire to have my views also relative to the campaign about to be inaugurated in that State. Unfortunately, being entirely unprovided with pontoon trains, your armies will be divided at first by one river (the Tennessee) and afterward by two (Tennessee and Cumberland). Hence they will be unable to support each other, but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will then refer first to the operations east of the Tennessee and then to those west of it.

In the first case your objective points must be first Louisville and then Cincinnati. How to best reach them from Chattanooga with Buell at Huntsville and Stevenson is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations--the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers--and that if you advance toward your objective points without getting rid of him you would expose your lines of communication with Chattanooga. You must then give him battle first or compel him to retire before you. Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing) you will be advancing toward Louisville, but should he retire on Florence or Savannah to unite his forces with Rosecrans or Grant you will have to concentrate enough of your forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when you will be able to resume your movement as before indicated. You must, however, as soon as practicable, construct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, for otherwise your communications will be cut off by the enemy as soon as these two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats and transports. The best position for said works is about 40 miles below Forts Donelson and Henry, not far from Eddyville, where those two rivers come within 1½ miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation where a strong field work could be constructed for a garrison of about 2,500 or 3,000 men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) for months against a large army. Under the guns of this work and along the bank of each river a series of batteries, armed with the heaviest guns (8, 9, and 10 inch and rifled guns), could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers. When Louisville shall have fallen into your possession I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible so completely that future travelers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankees' vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of your army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main column would be marching to Cincinnati; but if you could get boats enough it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.

Now for the operations in Western Tennessee: The object there should be to draw the enemy from there and resume the command of the Mississippi River. For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dorn's; from there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident the forces at Memphis and Yazoo River would then have their line of communication by the river with the north cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their lines of communication would be cut off also. I could then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or Ohio at Paducah. I would thus compel the enemy to evacuate at once the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss of only a few hundred men. General Price could then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy.

Such are the operations I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the President had done me the justice to order me back to the command of that army which I had with your assistance collected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my health while my presence could be spared from it and until you informed me that it was ready to take the offensive.

Hoping, however, for your sake and that of our country, you will meet with brilliant success in Tennessee and Kentucky, I remain, sincerely, your friend,
G. T. BEAUREGARD.

P. S.--The armament complete and ammunition of the works referred to ought to be collected as soon as possible at Meridian and Chattanooga.

Of course, Bragg defeating Buell and sending him limping into Louisville probably results in Thomas coming to army command earlier. (Ordered to command rather than offered.)
:smile:
 
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The Kentucky campaign was heavily influenced by the desire to tilt that state to the side of the Confederacy; the New Mexico campaign was similarly oriented towards acquiring that territory for the Confederacy.

I think those two campaigns are far apart.

The New Mexico expedition was over long distances and difficult terrain, with fragile logistics stretched very thin. It's remarkable it got as far as it did. It was never going to accomplish anything meaningful.

Kentucky was overly ambitious, but more realistic goals were within reach.
 
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I think those two campaigns are far apart.

The New Mexico expedition was over long distances and difficult terrain, with fragile logistics stretched very thin. It's remarkable it got as far as it did. It was never going to accomplish anything meaningful.

Kentucky was overly ambitious, but more realistic goals were within reach.
It's also a good thing that Sibley was assigned to lead the New Mexico campaign and not Kentucky. The state's bourbon supply would have been demolished. 🥃
 
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Unfortunately for the Confederacy, the CS army was "lost" in its engagements beyond the borders of the seceded states. Perhaps part of the problem was that southern goals were not coordinated, were too ambitious, or were over-reaching from what should have been strictly military aims. The Kentucky campaign was heavily influenced by the desire to tilt that state to the side of the Confederacy; the New Mexico campaign was similarly oriented towards acquiring that territory for the Confederacy. In contrast, Lee's northern campaigns were more precisely defined in their attempts to possess food and forage, and derange northern willpower by delivering significant military victories over northern arms. But whether ill-conceived or not, none of these southern offensives achieved their major goals, and only further burdened the Confederacy with diminishing manpower.
Which army was "lost" (as in surrounded and captured)?
And, I would say that a major goal was to liberate Virginia and other frontline states to allow for harvesting and gathering supplies by the CS government, which was achieved.
And the manpower drain through battle was going to occur whether it was fought in Perryville or Chattanooga.
Loss of territory also caused a significant drain to manpower.
 
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The Kentucky campaign was heavily influenced by the desire to tilt that state to the side of the Confederacy; the New Mexico campaign was similarly oriented towards acquiring that territory for the Confederacy.
It had been going on, (before Sibley) since 1861, and by the time of Bragg and Smith's movements into Kentucky was pretty much over. Plus given how much of a backwater New Mexico Territory was, I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if Bragg and company had no idea it was going on, or if Richmond had forgotten about it.

It was pretty much the Confederate State of Texas's show rather than the CS Government's, Texas providing not only the troops but all supplies for it out of its stores, and had been the biggest pushers for it. By the time of Kentucky most folks in Texas had probably forgotten about it! In the shadow of Pea Ridge, the Fall of New Orleans, fears of Federal invasion through the Indian Nations, and Hindman moving heaven and earth to make the Prairie Grove Campaign happen hijacking all the Texas troops and supplies going elsewhere, New Mexico Territory was gonna be the last thing on most folk's minds, even in the place that had demanded it most.
 
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It's also a good thing that Sibley was assigned to lead the New Mexico campaign and not Kentucky. The state's bourbon supply would have been demolished. 🥃
Much like New Mexico, he'd have been three sheets to the wind, plastered, and every other drunken euphemism known all at once while his subordinates organized, led, and fought the campaign.

An invasion of Kentucky would be Sibley's dream assignment! :D
 
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I think those two campaigns are far apart.

The New Mexico expedition was over long distances and difficult terrain, with fragile logistics stretched very thin. It's remarkable it got as far as it did. It was never going to accomplish anything meaningful.

Kentucky was overly ambitious, but more realistic goals were within reach.
Agreed that for the factors you mentioned, those 2 campaigns were not similar. But the point I was making is that in both cases, the Confederacy was trying to extend its territorial reach beyond the immediate borders of the seceded states. In that respect, the campaigns had similar "political" objectives.
 
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given how much of a backwater New Mexico Territory was, I wouldn't be the least bit surprised if Bragg and company had no idea it was going on, or if Richmond had forgotten about it.
Which makes the point that the Confederacy lacked a central, consistent, and coordinated policy for defense and strategic goals. Bragg was off doing his thing, regardless of what had occurred in the southwest, but in both cases the Confederacy was attempting to seize or acquire possessions beyond its immediate borders.
 
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I would generally agree. Unfortunately, that description can be applied to a lot of what the Confederacy did. :smile:


Yes, that would help. Bragg out-ranked Kirby Smith, but Kirby Smith showed little inclination to serve under Bragg.

Beauregard, OTOH, was willing to be recovered from his illness, resume command of the Department and be in command of the operation.


Breckinridge was trying to get there and Bragg wanted him there. Confederate inefficiency and conflicting commands prevented Breckinridge from making it -- and then Bragg decided it was Breckinridge's fault. Like so many things with Bragg, that turned into a grudge and a grudge tended to become a feud with Bragg.


I would wonder what would happen if he had done it. I don't think it is all that clear he would have won a battle against Buell.


Bragg's Beauregard's plan:
MOBILE, ALA.,(*) September 2, 1862.
General BRAXTON BRAGG,
Commanding Department No. 2, Chattanooga, Tenn.:

MY DEAR GENERAL: As you have shown your confidence in me by asking my views relative to your intended movement from Tupelo to Middle Tennessee via Mobile and Chattanooga, I have thought, after a <ar23_791> conversation with General Slaughter, that you might probably desire to have my views also relative to the campaign about to be inaugurated in that State. Unfortunately, being entirely unprovided with pontoon trains, your armies will be divided at first by one river (the Tennessee) and afterward by two (Tennessee and Cumberland). Hence they will be unable to support each other, but their operations must be more or less dependent on or connected with each other. I will then refer first to the operations east of the Tennessee and then to those west of it.

In the first case your objective points must be first Louisville and then Cincinnati. How to best reach them from Chattanooga with Buell at Huntsville and Stevenson is the question. It is evident he has the advantage of two bases of operations--the Cumberland and Tennessee Rivers--and that if you advance toward your objective points without getting rid of him you would expose your lines of communication with Chattanooga. You must then give him battle first or compel him to retire before you. Should he retire on Nashville (as the newspapers say he is now doing) you will be advancing toward Louisville, but should he retire on Florence or Savannah to unite his forces with Rosecrans or Grant you will have to concentrate enough of your forces from Middle and East Tennessee to follow him rapidly and defeat him in a great battle, when you will be able to resume your movement as before indicated. You must, however, as soon as practicable, construct strong works to command the Tennessee and Cumberland Rivers, for otherwise your communications will be cut off by the enemy as soon as these two rivers shall have risen sufficiently to admit the entrance of their gunboats and transports. The best position for said works is about 40 miles below Forts Donelson and Henry, not far from Eddyville, where those two rivers come within 1½ miles of each other. I am informed there is at that point a commanding elevation where a strong field work could be constructed for a garrison of about 2,500 or 3,000 men, who could hold out (with ample provisions and ammunition) for months against a large army. Under the guns of this work and along the bank of each river a series of batteries, armed with the heaviest guns (8, 9, and 10 inch and rifled guns), could be constructed, bearing directly on obstructions placed in each of said rivers. When Louisville shall have fallen into your possession I would construct a work there for the command of the Ohio and the canal, and I would destroy the latter as soon as possible so completely that future travelers would hardly know where it was. This I would do as a return for the Yankees' vandalism in attempting to obstruct forever the harbors of Charleston and Savannah. A detachment of your army could, I think, take Louisville, while the main column would be marching to Cincinnati; but if you could get boats enough it would be shorter to go up the Ohio in them. To keep the command of Cincinnati I would construct a strong work, heavily armed, at Covington.

Now for the operations in Western Tennessee: The object there should be to draw the enemy from there and resume the command of the Mississippi River. For these purposes I would concentrate rapidly at Grand Junction Price's army and all that could be spared from Vicksburg of Van Dorn's; from there I would make a forced march to Fort Pillow, which I would take with probably only a very small loss. It is evident the forces at Memphis and Yazoo River would then have their line of communication by the river with the north cut off, and they would have either to surrender or cross without resources into Arkansas, where General Holmes would take good care of them. From Fort Pillow I would compel the forces at Corinth and Jackson, Tenn., to fall back precipitately to Humboldt and Columbus, or their lines of communication would be cut off also. I could then pursue them vigorously beyond the Mississippi at Columbus, or Ohio at Paducah. I would thus compel the enemy to evacuate at once the State of Mississippi and Western Tennessee, with probably the loss of only a few hundred men. General Price could then be detached into Missouri to support his friends, where his presence alone would be worth an army to the Confederacy.

Such are the operations I would carry into effect, with such modifications as circumstances might require, if the President had done me the justice to order me back to the command of that army which I had with your assistance collected together and organized, and which I had only left to recover my health while my presence could be spared from it and until you informed me that it was ready to take the offensive.

Hoping, however, for your sake and that of our country, you will meet with brilliant success in Tennessee and Kentucky, I remain, sincerely, your friend,
G. T. BEAUREGARD.

P. S.--The armament complete and ammunition of the works referred to ought to be collected as soon as possible at Meridian and Chattanooga.


:smile:

Surely no one can accuse Beauregard of thinking small…
 
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I don't know much about this era of the war, that's why the topic fascinates me. What happened during the retreat? Why did they end up at Murfreesburo?
I am not really sure why Bragg didn't take a bolder approach on Nashville at the October retreat from Kentucky. I know Buell had some problem with guarding it, and perhaps thought of letting it go but Andrew Johnson wouldn't hear of it. There were Union troops left to guard the city, but I have no recollection of anything said about Nashville by the confederates when they returned. I do know they held Chattanooga, and the Duck River line up to Gallatin may have been more promising for them. Possibly due to such disorganization and trying to reassemble in Tennessee was their main objective, fearing another battle so soon.
Lubliner.
 
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Columbia River goes to Nashville. Confederacy had no answer for Yankee gun boats. Reason A S Johnston gave up Nashville to begin with.

KY and the Nashville basin was the AOTs bread basket. Every time Bragg withdrew and gave up territory he lost groceries he couldn’t replace. Confederacy always considered MO and KY Confederate States. Confederate National Flag had stars for MO and KY. Might tell us something.
 
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Columbia River goes to Nashville. Confederacy had no answer for Yankee gun boats. Reason A S Johnston gave up Nashville to begin with.

KY and the Nashville basin was the AOTs bread basket. Every time Bragg withdrew and gave up territory he lost groceries he couldn’t replace. Confederacy always considered MO and KY Confederate States. Confederate National Flag had stars for MO and KY. Might tell us something.
Depends on the season of year -- the water in the Cumberland was sometimes too low for river traffic. Before the first railroad and telegraph arrived (1850), there were times when Nashville was a very isolated place because the only way to get there was by overland travel.
 
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