Was Bowen properly supported in the Vicksburg Campaign?

Nytram01

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I have recently been trying to look a bit more into the Civil War service of General John S. Bowen and so invariably that leads me to the Vicksburg Campaign where he appears to be arguably the finest performing of all Confederate General involved.

At, I believe, two points of that Campaign General Bowen came close to seriously hurting Grants advance but seemed to lack the manpower needed to finalize whatever he had achieved to that certain point. I believe this was at Port Gibson and Champion Hill but I'm not totally sure.

Was Bowen denied the proper support he should have had at those crucial moments and, if he was, would that extra support from the Confederate Forces in the Area have helped him slow or even stop Grant's advance towards Vicksburg?

What the question is really is; could Bowen have done more significant damage to the Army of the Tennessee had he been given just a little bit more support from his fellow Confederate Generals when he needed it most?
 
Interesting question.

Agree that Bowen's performance was better than the average Confederate Commander's. But where was this support to come from? Pemberton? He was, at best, mediocre. To be fair, he was also getting conflicting orders from several directions. Johnston wasn't getting what he wanted or needed either. Bragg had his own problems.

Seems that the entire Western Theater was ariot with conflicts of the non-shooting kind. Methinks I smell the hand of Jeff Davis.

Ole
 
Bowen preformed superbly w/ what he was given. The problem is that Ole has hit the nail spot on; where was it to come from? Greirson's raid did it's job superbly and Pemberton, along w/ everybody else in the CS general ranks in the area were royaly confused.

IMO Bowen was perhaps the finest CS general in the western theatre, his death in 63 creates a big what if for me. He was competant, aggressive and above all willing to take risks.
 
At Champion Hill, on the other hand, Pemberton failed as an army commander.

His failure at Port Gibson is understandable - but at Champion Hill, he should have been able to (and willing to) support Bowen for all he was worth.

As for Bowen's ability...he died too soon for me to judge. But he was a man the Confederacy could have used several of..
 
Pemberton Choice---

At Port Gibson, was Bowen's best shot at stopping Grant advance for it had the best topography for a defending force to use. The area was like the Wilderness area of Virginia but with hill and hollows..

Bowen had 8000 men and held out for 18 hours before falling back in good order. If he had a force the same size as Grant's, he could have held up Grant's advance for days.

Remember Sherman had made a mock assault at the bluffs north of Vicksburg during this same period. Sherman's feint held Pemberton at Vicksburg. What would you have done with Sherman to your North and Grant to your South?

Bowen did get support but it was just not enough for what he was facing. The question is without hindsight should Penberton have sent support knowing Sherman was so close by.

You make the call Sherman or Grant make your choice?


Off to ponder which choice I would have made...
 
The only proper support Bowen could have gotten is a proper fitting shoe with the right arch. Ole war correct, too many egos and games being played in high command. Davis lost Vicksburg
 
Few

5fish; Remember Sherman had made a mock assault at the bluffs north of Vicksburg during this same period. Sherman's feint held Pemberton at Vicksburg. [B said:
What would you have done with Sherman to your North and Grant to your South?[/B]

You make the call Sherman or Grant make your choice?

I see few to none want to make a choice between these two union generals. How do you think Pemberton must have felt like?

One could figure where Grant was was going to be the main strike force...but hindsight is on my side.
 
Siege of vicksburg...where were they?

Where is the best place to find exactly where and what a unit did during the siege of Vicksburg; specifically my Great, Great Grandfather's unit the 42nd Alabama Infantry.
 
The Confederacy lacked Logistics; Not bravery

The Confederacy never had the troops or supplies to force Grant out of the Mississippi area. Vicksburg was at the end of the impossible Confederate supply line. The Confederacy didn't have the troops or the supplies to effectively fight a two front war.

Once Grant got Vicksburg in a stranglehold siege, it was over. Johnson lacked the troops and supplies to lay siege to Grant's entrenched forces, and Pemberton had to either force a breakout or surrender.
Grant had that magnificent steamboat supply system on the Mississippi River to draw supplies. The Confederate States of America never counted on the magnificent Union steamboat system that would choke the Confederacy in the Mississippi River valley.
 
Remember Sherman had made a mock assault at the bluffs north of Vicksburg during this same period. Sherman's feint held Pemberton at Vicksburg. What would you have done with Sherman to your North and Grant to your South?

Bowen did get support but it was just not enough for what he was facing. The question is without hindsight should Penberton have sent support knowing Sherman was so close by.

You make the call Sherman or Grant make your choice?

Question about this.

Wasn't Snyders Bluff an easilly defensible position? Was it possible to leave essentially a token force there to defend against Sherman and manage to do so while leaving the rest of the AoM free and mobile?

If it was then I would think that once Grant failed to cross at Grand Gulf and was known to be moving South then he would be the obvious and immediate threat - despite Sherman being geographically closer.

Would there be time to move the bulk of the AoM south to link up with Bowen and oppose any move by Grant away from Bruinsburg - whether it succeeded or not?

If the answer is yes then I think my decision would be to move to reinforce Bowen and block Grant with most of my Army while leaving a smaller force around Vicksburg to defend against Sherman.
 
he appears to be arguably the finest performing of all Confederate General involved.
I totally agree.
Seems that the entire Western Theater was ariot with conflicts of the non-shooting kind.
Bowen preformed superbly w/ what he was given. The problem is that Ole has hit the nail spot on;
I totally agree again.
Greirson's raid did it's job superbly and Pemberton, along w/ everybody else in the CS general ranks in the area were royaly confused.
You're absolutely correct. Greirson's raid was successful beyond the wildest dreams of the Union High Command.
I would also argue that Streight's raid (at about the same time) indirectly played a part in the overall strategic situation that Pemberton faced.

Pemberton had virtually his entire Cavalry chasing Greirson, thus he was completely blind about Grant's movements in his own backyard.

What the question is really is; could Bowen have done more significant damage to the Army of the Tennessee had he been given just a little bit more support from his fellow Confederate Generals when he needed it most?

My answer is yes, but in a nutshell . . . if the Vicksburg Campaign were a sporting event, the Confederates were out-coached
from the start.
 
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If Bowen had survived longer we would have a better grasp on how he would have turned out in regards to greater responsibilities. It is certain that when the enemy was within reach of him (in actual combat) he was superb.

But it seems that when the enemy was a bit out of reach of him, he may have become a bit flustered.

This, of course, is largely due to his inexperience with responsibilities as a new commander. After all, Grand Gulf was his first independent command action.

At Port Gibson, his first independent command battle in open ground, he showed tactical, aggressive genius. However, once he retreated to the Bayou Pierre, he seems to have become unsure. Part of his force retreated over Grindstone Ford on his left flank before they joined the main force to the south. But he did not leave anyone there to watch are guard that approach, which I have always thought strange. Bowen was certain Grant would cross on the direct road to Grand Gulf. Grant did not. Grant crossed at Grindstone Ford, and because Bowen left no one there to warn him, he had no idea his flank was being turned (Loring found it unexposed for him the next morning).

It also appears that he allowed himself to be unduly influenced by Loring. Grabau refers to the relationship as a cabal against Pemberton.

At Champion Hill, when his division was situated in the center, he didn't know quite what to do with the enemy who stayed just out of reach of him. When initially ordered by Pemberton to the left flank, he did not obey (nor did Loring) and remained in front of the enemy seemingly puzzled by the Yankee inactivity, while at the same time, Stevenson's division went unsupported and was chewed to pieces. It took Pemberton sending another direct order to Bowen to get him to support the left. Of course, when Bowen arrived and got hold of the enemy on the left flank, he performed well, and but for running out of ammunition, might have changed the tide that day.

At the bridgehead at Big Black, he was overall commander, and to this day, no one knows how all of his artillery horses ended up west of Big Black, essentially leaving his artillery abandoned.

Nonetheless, he was an incredible commander when in contact with the enemy. The nuances I mentioned above are probably due to his inexperience that might have been corrected had he lived.

Another thing to consider is that it was hard to look bad when the type men he commanded is considered!
 
Question about this.

Wasn't Snyders Bluff an easilly defensible position? Was it possible to leave essentially a token force there to defend against Sherman and manage to do so while leaving the rest of the AoM free and mobile?

On paper, that assessment does look reasonable at first glance, but situation was more complex.
 
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On paper, that assessment does look reasonable.

However, the reality was the Confederate forces that had been engaged at Champion's Hill and the debacle at the Big Black River Bridge were exhausted and demoralized.

The CSA troops at the Snyder's, Hayne's & Drumgould's Bluff complex were fresh and (had also tasted some degree of victory over the previous months) were an obvious first choice to bring into the the Vicksburg works . . . since Pemberton had resolved to a temporary siege until Joe Johnston might attack Grant's rear lines.

But we all know how that didn't work out.

IMHO Pemberton made the right decision to evacuate Snyder's bluff.

I'm sure he was sick to sacrifice his big guns, but such is War.

It's about 11 days away from being 8 years ago that I wrote that comment now but, if I remember correctly, I was asking that in relation to hypothetically sending more troops to assist Bowen at the Port Gibson area when Grant first successfully crossed the Mississippi rather than about defending Snyder's Bluff after the AoM had been driven beyond the Big Black River into Vicksburg's defence.
 
It's about 11 days away from being 8 years ago that I wrote that comment now but, if I remember correctly, I was asking that in relation to hypothetically sending more troops to assist Bowen at the Port Gibson area when Grant first successfully crossed the Mississippi rather than about defending Snyder's Bluff after the AoM had been driven beyond the Big Black River into Vicksburg's defence.

It is a good question.

However, I think that it is only in hindsight that it seems feasible for Pemberton to have so thoroughly weakened Snyder's Bluff to support Bowen's operations at Grand Gulf.

First, I don't have it with me, perhaps someone else could find Grant's orders to Sherman. Whatever the case, Sherman's mission was not simply limited to a "diversion." He had full authority to launch an all-out attack against Vicksburg if he found the defenses around Snyder's/Chickasaw Bluff area undefended or weak.

Second, Pemberton's overall duty was to defend Vicksburg and Port Hudson. This was a positive directive from Richmond and the Davis administration. As well, such a reduction of forces from Vicksburg's flank (Snyder's Bluff) would have had to have come from Johnston as well. At no time during the period of threat did Johnston suggest Pemberton so weaken Vicksburg or its flanks to support Bowen at Grand Gulf. Johnston starts suggesting all this after the war in his writings to try and place blame on Pemberton. (My opinion).

History has treated him unjustly as it is, but just imagine how history would have treated Pemberton had he pulled troops from Snyder's and allowed an enemy corps (Sherman's 15 corps) to simply walk into Vicksburg from the north without a fight?

As it stood, Pemberton kept two brigades (one of which, Vaughn's, was made up of conscripts and were green) to protect Vicksburg's northern flank.

Third, there was more than just Snyder's Bluff for Pemberton to consider. While Grant was concentrated opposite Grand Gulf (Hard Times), it is, again, only hindsight that tells us Grant's intention was Grand Gulf. Grant could have easily moved against Warrenton instead, landing his force north and west of the Big Black and just a few miles south of Vicksburg (while Sherman was also opposite Snyder's).

Fourth, The refusal of the Confederacy, particularly Johnston, to send Pemberton cavalry, prevented Pemberton from properly defending his department. Grierson's raid effectively scattered Pemberton's infantry (Loring). Had Pemberton been given cavalry, Loring's troops could have been used to timely reinforce and support Grand Gulf/Port Gibson. The whole question of using troops from Snyder's Bluff would never have arisen.
 
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It is a good question.

However, I think that it is only in hindsight that it seems feasible for Pemberton to have so thoroughly weakened Snyder's Bluff to support Bowen's operations at Grand Gulf.

First, I don't have it with me, perhaps someone else could find Grant's orders to Sherman. Whatever the case, Sherman's mission was not simply limited to a "diversion." He had full authority to launch a full attack against Vicksburg if he found the defenses around Snyder's/Chickasaw Bluff area undefended or weak.

Second, Pemberton's overall duty was to defend Vicksburg and Port Hudson. This was a positive directive from Richmond and the Davis administration. As well, such a reduction of forces from Vicksburg's flank (Snyder's Bluff) would have had to have come from Johnston as well. At no time during the period of threat did Johnston suggest Pemberton so weaken Vicksburg or its flanks to support Bowen at Grand Gulf. Johnston starts suggesting all this after the war in his writings to try and place blame on Pemberton.

Could anyone imagine how history would have treated Pemberton had he pulled troops from Snyder's and allowed an enemy corps (Sherman's 15 corps) to simply walk into Vicksburg from the north without a fight?

As it stood, Pemberton kept two brigades (one of which, Vaughn's, was made up of conscripts and were green) to protect Vicksburg's northern flank.

Third, there was more than just Snyder's Bluff for Pemberton to consider. While Grant was concentrated opposite Grand Gulf (Hard Times), it is, again, only hindsight that tells us Grant's intention was Grand Gulf. Grant could have easily moved against Warrenton instead, landing his force north and west of the Big Black and just a few miles south of Vicksburg (while Sherman was also opposite Snyder's).

Fourth, The refusal of the Confederacy, particularly Johnston, to send Pemberton cavalry, prevented Pemberton from properly defending his department. Grierson's raid effectively scattered Pemberton's infantry (Loring). Had Pemberton been given cavalry, Loring's troops could have been used to timely reinforce and support Grand Gulf/Port Gibson. The whole question of using troops from Snyder's Bluff would never have arisen.


Good analysis.

Pemberton's intel from the Louisiana side of the river was pretty lacking as well. IIRC, he had no idea Grant had shifted nearly 2/3 of his force so far downriver, though he knew the Navy was there with some support. After a lethargic winter, Grant moved quickly, at the same time tossing mud in Pemberton's eye.

I am not sure how Pemberton would have been able to suss out that Sherman was the diversion and not the other way around.
 
In 1863 it was very difficult to know where the enemy was. It was also very difficult to know how large the enemies force was.
In 2017 we know all these things and more. We know exactly what everyone should have done all the time.
In the Civil War, field command required a person to make decisions on incomplete knowledge and then adjust at additional data arrived.
 
Good analysis.

Pemberton's intel from the Louisiana side of the river was pretty lacking as well. IIRC, he had no idea Grant had shifted nearly 2/3 of his force so far downriver, though he knew the Navy was there with some support. After a lethargic winter, Grant moved quickly, at the same time tossing mud in Pemberton's eye.

I am not sure how Pemberton would have been able to suss out that Sherman was the diversion and not the other way around.
Yeah, I agree. He had no way to suss it out. I do think he understood Grant's design was likely somewhere south of Vicksburg - Bowen kept him informed of the Federal 13 corps' advance down the west side of the river.

The problem for him, as you stated, was that he could never determine what Sherman was up to over there on the opposite shore. There was also a division still at Milliken's Bend that he was unable to monitor.

When you combine Sherman's corps and the other division around Millikin's Bend, the troop numbers of that force alone was around 20,000 - a very large force indeed that could not be monitored. Add to the mix that Loring was off chasing cavalry with infantry, Pemberton didn't have sufficient troop numbers to roll the dice on Grant's design. As a consequence, Sherman simply could not be ignored until Grant revealed his intentions on May 1 by committing an entire corps (13th) and divisions of another (17th) onto the east side of the Mississippi. Once that happened he knew for sure that Snyder's or Warrenton was not the main objective.

That Bowen (and eventually a small portion from Loring) could not hold the line of the Bayou Pierre for a bit longer proved devastating.
 
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