Was Benjamin Grierson's Cavalry Raid in Mississippi Underrated In The Vicksburg Campagin?

As I continue to try and understand the events leading to the fall of Vicksburg, I ran across this, in the book I am currently reading. I think it sums up the importance of Grierson's activities nicely.

"Grant created two major diversions to continue befuddling Pemberton once the transports had run the batteries. He kept Sherman in place in front of Hayne's Bluff; even though the Union General had now discounted a frontal assault, his counterpart, Pemberton, could not. More importantly, he sent an obscure cavalry colonel, Benjamin Greirson, on a raid that set up the entire forthcoming campaign.

Grierson's orders were to prey on the railroad system in Mississippi and disrupt Pemberton's communications. A successful raid would also tie up vital forces in the interior of the state. Pemberton would argue after the fact that Johnston's stripping his department of cavalry forced him to react to Grierson's raid by deploying infantry, which hampered his ability to concentrate forces once Grant crossed the Mississippi.

Geierson left La Grange, Tennessee, on April 17, the day after the transports ran the batteries at Vicksburg. He commanded 1,700 men in his attacking column. At best, 1,500 Confederate troopers were available to contest his advance. Four-days into the raid and some 70 miles south of La Grange, Grierson used the 2nd Iowa Cavalry to create a diversion that would spring him deeper into the heart of Mississippi. The 2nd Iowa moved to the east, drew off pursuit, and worked its way north towards the Tennessee border.

The 2nd Iowa's efforts were a success, and the regiment retreated back to La Grange, arriving there on April 26. The chase to La Grange did the task intended, drawing off most of the Confederate cavalry in the area.

Grierson continued to ride south after the Iowa detachment left on April 21. The next day saw another flurry of activity from Pemberton. who was trying to manage the entire state of Mississippi. Keep an eye on Grant, and deal with Grierson from his headquarters in Jackson. He dispatched Loring to Meridian and complained to Johnston that his lack of cavalry was hampering his ability to react to Grierson's raid. And, more ominously, a dispatch from Brigadier General John Bowen commanding at Grand Gulf, warned that the Federal fleet had anchored at Judge Perkins'.

On April 24, Grierson struck the Southern Mississippi Railroad at Newton Station some 40 miles east of Jackson. The Southern Mississippi was the east-west rail line connecting Vicksburg and Jackson with points east. Railroad track was ripped up, and several locomotives and supply trains destroyed; Grierson continued on. At one point, he swung within 30 miles of Grand Gulf before moving south in a desperate run for the Union Lines at Baton Rouge, Louisiana. He arrived there safely on May 2, having kept Pemberton's attention focused on the interior of the state of Mississippi. Grierson later claimed to have kept as many as 20,000 troopers tied up during his raid."

I'd say Grierson's raid had a major impact on the events taking place at Vicksburg, and most importantly, diverted Pemberton's attention and resources at the time Grant and Porter were making their historically successful run down the Mississippi past the defenses of the intimidating batteries of Vicksburg to land at Grand Gulf.

Source: Compelled to Appear in Print, The Vicksburg Manuscript of General John C. Pemberton
Pages 34 and 35.

An excellent gift from a good friend :smile:
Interesting that Pemberon tried to salvage his reputation.
General Pemberton was,trully the "Rodney Dangerfield of Confederate General's ".
Leftyhunter
 
Interesting that Pemberon tried to salvage his reputation.
General Pemberton was,trully the "Rodney Dangerfield of Confederate General's ".
Leftyhunter
That’s an interesting point Lefty. My next thread will be to examine that subject. The more I read on the subject the more, questions I come up with. I don’t want to get into it here. However, I am finding grounds that challenge that train of thought. Should be an interesting study.
 
Pemberton would argue after the fact that Johnston's stripping his department of cavalry forced him to react to Grierson's raid by deploying infantry, which hampered his ability to concentrate forces once Grant crossed the Mississippi.

I think this quote from Compelled To Appear in Print, is rather misleading - not by you War Horse but by the book. Such statements, I fear, are merely parroting an anti-Pemberton narrative first established by Joe Johnston and carried forth historically by others. To insinuate that Pemberton somehow made a defense of lack of cavalry "after the fact" is to suggest he did not take it into consideration at the time, but used such defense as an argument in hindsight. In truth, Pemberton went just short of begging for cavalry from Johnston, long before Grierson's raid.

A quick glance at a portion of the correspondences in the Official Records (Vol. 24. Pt. 3., 689-769) reveals this fact. On March 25, 1863, long before Grierson launched his raid on April 17 and long before Grant ran the batteries of Vicksburg, Pemberton wired Johnston, stating that if Grant "continues his threatening attitude against Vicksburg and Port Hudson . . . and move a heavy force by land from the base supposed . . . I shall need all the cavalry force withdrawn from General Van Dorn [Department of the West]." (page 689 in Official Records, cited parenthetically above.)

To this request, Johnston (through his Assistant Adjutant General) replied on April 3, telling Pemberton in no uncertain terms that "General Van Dorn's cavalry is much more needed in this Department than that of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana." Besides, Johnston would add in his reply, "You have now in your department five brigades of . . . infantry. This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van Dorn's cavalry command." (Page. 712.) It appears that Johnston simply ignored Pemberton’s concerns and requests for cavalry, “at the time.”

When Grierson's raid got under way, Pemberton reminded Johnston on April 20 of his predicament : "I have virtually no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City, while the enemy is threatening to cross river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf . . ." (Page 769.) In the meantime, Grierson’s raiders raised heck. Grierson was threatening to destroy Pemberton's line of communication and supply depots and manufacturing facilities. With cavalry support denied him by Johnston, Pemberton had little option. He was forced to use infantry to protect these vital and strategic locations. Can one imagine how history would have treated Pemberton had he allowed Grierson (a small raiding force) to utterly destroy these places unopposed? Grierson certainly would have if he had faced no opposition. The only reliable cavalry Pemberton had were Wirt Adams at Grand Gulf and two regiments in northern Mississippi. He was left with no choice but to order these cavalry units away from their positions and have them hunt the phantom raiders while the infantry also gave chase and also tried to protect these centers of strategic importance. Pemberton was placed in a very bad position, not only by Grierson's brilliant raid, but by General Johnston - not, in my humble opinion, by his own stupidity or lack of generalship.

Simply put, Pemberton did not decide, "after the fact," to use a will-o-the-wisp defense that he lacked cavalry to bolster his position in some back and forth argument. He properly asked for more cavalry, at the time, and was ignored, at the time, by the same people who would later accuse him of incompetency.
 
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I think this quote from David Smith's, Compelled To Appear in Print, is rather misleading - not by you War Horse but by the book. Such statements, I fear, are merely parroting an anti-Pemberton narrative first established by Joe Johnston and carried forth historically by others. To insinuate that Pemberton somehow made a defense of lack of cavalry "after the fact" is to suggest he did not take it into consideration at the time, but used such defense as an argument in hindsight. In truth, Pemberton went just short of begging for cavalry from Johnston, long before Grierson's raid.

A quick glance at a portion of the correspondences in the Official Records (Vol. 24. Pt. 3., 689-769) reveals this fact. On March 25, 1863, long before Grierson launched his raid on April 17 and long before Grant ran the batteries of Vicksburg, Pemberton wired Johnston, stating that if Grant "continues his threatening attitude against Vicksburg and Port Hudson . . . and move a heavy force by land from the base supposed . . . I shall need all the cavalry force withdrawn from General Van Dorn [Department of the West]." (page 689 in Official Records, cited parenthetically above.)

To this request, Johnston (through his Assistant Adjutant General) replied on April 3, telling Pemberton in no uncertain terms that "General Van Dorn's cavalry is much more needed in this Department than that of Mississippi and Eastern Louisiana." Besides, Johnston would add in his reply, "You have now in your department five brigades of . . . infantry. This is more than a compensation for the absence of General Van Dorn's cavalry command." (Page. 712.) Johnston clearly ignored Pemberton.

When Grierson's raid got under way, Pemberton reminded Johnston on April 20 of his predicament : "I have virtually no cavalry from Grand Gulf to Yazoo City, while the enemy is threatening to cross river between Vicksburg and Grand Gulf . . ." (Page 769.) In the meantime, Grierson’s raiders raised heck. Grierson was threatening to destroy Pemberton's line of communication and supply depots and manufacturing facilities. Pemberton had little option. He was forced to use infantry to protect these vital and strategic locations. Can one imagine how history would have treated Pemberton had he allowed Greirson to utterly destroy these places unopposed? Grierson certainly would have if he had faced no opposition. The only reliable cavalry Pemberton had were Wirt Adams at Grand Gulf and two regiments in northern Mississippi. He was left with no choice but to order these cavalry units away from their positions and have them hunt the phantom raiders while the infantry also gave chase and also tried to protect these centers of strategic importance. Pemberton was placed in a very bad position, not only by Grierson's brilliant raid, but by his own government - not, in my humble opinion, by his own stupidity or lack of generalship.

Simply put, Pemberton did not decide, "after the fact," to use a will-o-the-wisp defense that he lacked cavalry to bolster his position in some back and forth argument. He properly asked for more cavalry, at the time, and was ignored, at the time, by the same people who would later blame him for incompetency.
That’s very interesting and for those very reasons I am compelled to investigate those claims. Excellent post. We will investigate the actions of all involved very soon.
 
That’s very interesting and for those very reasons I am compelled to investigate those claims. Excellent post. We will investigate the actions of all involved very soon.
Thanks, War Horse. I look forward to further investigations into similar events.

This is a very good thread but is one of many threads that ought, in my opinion, be place in the Vicksburg Forum. I know many folks go to the Vicksburg Forum looking for such good threads as this but are disappointed when they can’t find it. It is your thread, but Maybe you could contact a moderator and have it shifted over? I know in the future I might want to revisit this but might not remember the title and thus not find it. If it were in V’burg Forum it would be easier I think. Just a thought. Thanks for your posts!
 
Thanks, War Horse. I look forward to further investigations into similar events.

This is a very good thread but is one of many threads that ought, in my opinion, be place in the Vicksburg Forum. I know many folks go to the Vicksburg Forum looking for such good threads as this but are disappointed when they can’t find it. It is your thread, but Maybe you could contact a moderator and have it shifted over? I know in the future I might want to revisit this but might not remember the title and thus not find it. If it were in V’burg Forum it would be easier I think. Just a thought. Thanks for your posts!
I couldn’t agree more. How about it @WJC, @JerseyBart and any other mod monitoring online. Can we please move this thread to the Vicksburg forum?
 
I live 10 minutes from Enterprise. There is historical marker there saying that Enterprises was for a while saying the state gov’t was located here due to Vicksburg campaign. One of main places Grierson attacked was Newton Station which is now named Newton . The John Wayne movie Horse Soldiers was based on raid.
This 36-year-old former music teacher and storekeeper from Jacksonville, Illinois who by the way also hated horse's due to a kick as a young child. Commanded a large force of Calvary 1700 in all. Grierson had orders only to disable the section of the Southern Railroad that ran east from Jackson to an intersection with the Mobile & Ohio Railroad at Meridian, just north of Enterprise. Beyond that, his movements had been left to his own discretion. The news of the raid soon reached Confederates in the state. Lieutenant Colonel C.R. Barteau raced north along the Mobile & Ohio Railroad with the 2d Tennessee Battalion, Colonel J.F. Smith’s militia regiment, and Major W.M. Inge’s battalion. Lieutenant General John C. Pemberton, commanding the defense of Vicksburg, called on district commanders James R. Chalmers and Daniel Ruggles to mobilize Confederate cavalry in northern Mississippi. (All Potentially weakening defenses at Vicksburg)
Despite the deteriorating roads, the hard-riding horsemen were maintaining a brisk pace of 30 miles per day.

To help keep up that pace, Grierson stripped his command of dead weight. In a midnight inspection he personally weeded out 175 of the least effective troopers. At 3:00 a.m. on April 20, Major Hiram Love of the 2d Iowa led this Quinine Brigade–along with prisoners, broken down horses, and a single artillery piece–out of the Federal camp toward La Grange. By moving in columns of fours under cover of darkness, Grierson hoped Love would deceive local residents into thinking the entire command had turned back. Grierson's tactic's worked, Confederate troops were dispatched to Macon from Meridian to protect the rail. This weakened the defenses of Vicksburg and combined with Porters successful movement down stream with his navel vessels set the stage for the Unions and Grant's eventual victory. As I read more about Vicksburg, It seems to me, Grierson gets very little credit. Or I could just be hanging out in the wrong books. What are your thoughts?
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Joshism, I’ll have to look into it deeper, but I’m almost certain that Johnston was concerned with General Rosecran at this time. So Van Dorn would have been used by Johnston in this regard.

Van Dorn was placed in command of Bragg’s Calvary where he and Forrest won the battle of Thompson Station in March of 1863. Also in March the two men fought the first battle of Franklin. The results were not favorable and Forrest blamed Van Dorn for the loss. Van Dorn challenged Forrest to a duel for his critizium. Forrest declined. In May of 1863 (Before Vicksburg fell) Van Dorns womanizing caught up with him and he was shot to death.

Considering the importance of Vicksburg I’d say he was needed elsewhere more. Considering the final results of his transfer, I’d say he’d agree with me :smile:
 
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Van Dorn challenged Forrest to a duel for his critizium

Whoah, I never knew that! Please tell the whole story, that sounds like a Hollywood movie plot! Now I definitely look forward to you new thread(s), I know next to nothing about the western theater and it seems there is a LOT to explore!
I will not be able to post much in these threads (maybe besides remarks like that one here), but I will be eager to learn more through reading.
Thank you in advance!
 
I wonder what Forrest's legacy would be if he had fought that duel and lost.

And I wondered how Forrest could decline a duel without being seen as dishonored. It probably needed a warrior like Forrest who saw no need to defend his reputation in a duel. Everybody just knew he was no coward and the least thing the Confederacy needed was seeing her most able warriors killing each other!
 
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