Was Banks Set Up To Fail In The Red River Campaign?

He wanted Mobile (against which operations should have commenced as soon as possible after Vicksburg fell IMO), but had to allow the Red River Campaign for political reasons.
Disagree with the 'but' part. Grant wanted Mobile, to do so required freeing up troops and the way he saw to do that was to defeat the Confederates to the west so that the numbers needed for holding Louisiana, Arkansas and Missouri could be reduced.

Grant to Banks in March 1864:
"Inclosed herewith I send you copy of General Orders, No. 1, assuming command of the armies of the United States. You will see from the order it is my intention to establish headquarters for the present with the Army of the Potomac. I have not fully determined upon a plan of campaign for this spring, but will do so before the return of our veteran troops to the field. It will, however, be my desire to have all parts of the Army, or rather all the armies, act as much in concert as possible. For this reason I now write you. I regard the success of your present move as of great importance in reducing the number of troops necessary for protecting the navigation of the Mississippi River. ... It may be a part of the plan for the spring campaign to move against Mobile. It certainly will be if troops enough can be obtained to make it without embarrassing other movements."

This was a concept pushed by Halleck earlier when writing to Grant ("If the forces of Smith, Price, and Magruder could be so scattered or broken as to enable Steele and Banks to occupy Red River as a line of defense, a part of their armies would probably become available for operations elsewhere. ")
 
Giving my answer to the original post, I don't believe for a minute Banks was "set up" to fail. The main objectives for the campaign were to:
1. Cut the Confederacy off from Mexico
2. Cut the Confederacy off from the C.S. Trans-Mississippi Department once and for all, (it along with the port of Matamoros were important for supply, the Confederacy out West was still able to smuggle good East of the Mississippi)
3. Perhaps most important to politicians during an election year, Acquire as much cotton for supposedly starving mills in New England
4. Earn the loyalty of the supposed majority of unhappy with the Confederacy Southern citizenry in Louisiana and Texas

I honestly don't know Grant's or Sherman's views on the campaign, but the War Department had been planning the Campaign before Grant was promoted to command of the whole Army, and if I remember correctly, not going to swear to it, Halleck had been in favor of the Campaign so I don't see how Banks was set up to fail on the military level. On the political level I can't see any way the Campaign was set for failure as it was an important Election year, mills in need of cotton were at an supposed standstill, and politicians believed a great victory in the believed weak Trans-Mississippi was more possible in time for the Election season than back East, thus sinking any theory of a political set-up. The U.S. Government wanted as many victories as possible for a plethora of reasons, I can't see how Banks could have been set up for failure, when he was so set up for victory with such a large fleet, extra troops on loan from Sherman under Gen. Smith, and resources put at his disposal in the form of all the resources needed to transport cotton back to Union lines, all the money believed to be needed to buy the cotton, (that was a play to try and earn the loyalty of Louisianans and Texans by offering them a profit, where the War, blockade, and Confederate Government had prevented it), all and all I'd say.

However I'd say the things that Banks and the War Department didn't account for, and what really led to their defeat were:
1. Confederate morale West of the Mississippi was WAY higher than believed

2. The C.S. Army of the Trans-Mississippi was WAY more capable than believed especially, under General Richard Taylor, and in such an emergency more than a match for Banks' and his Army

3. Admiral Porter and his fleet's greed for prize money acquired from confiscating, rather than the Army's plan to buy cotton did more to engender rage among the populace than get them to "switch sides"

4. Banks deviating from the original plan by breaking away from the Red River and Porter's fleet by opting to take the "Stagecoach Road" to Shreveport, rather than the Army staying near the river and the fleet for mutual protection, (its convoluted on reasons, but even with the fleet unable to move further due to low water, Banks could have had better luck f it stayed with the fleet, perhaps the use of "Bailey Dams" at this stage and a delay of a week or two the Army and fleet could have conceivably have moved Northward together)

5. Moving the ENTIRE Union Army on a SINGLE road, and with the rural roads of Western Louisiana, this invited defeat.

In the end I'd say the blame for defeat, rests with Banks and Porter, and not anywhere else.
 
Sherman's had asked for them back 30 days from when they entered the Red River; Grant allowed for "ten to fifteen days more ". So at most Banks has 45 days to take Shreveport or give up. Given the distances and Confederate opposition, 45 days was not enough time to take Shreveport. Consider how long it took to take Vicksburg, Atlanta, Richmond, Chattanooga -- if any of them had been given a 45 day time limit, they all would have failed.

That certainly could have undermined the campaign.

But the real issue seemed to be that as soon as Banks lost at Mansfield he only stopped long enough to save his naval support.

Did Banks retreat because he had to return Smith or because he didn't think he could take Shreveport even with Smith's men?
 
But the real issue seemed to be that as soon as Banks lost at Mansfield he only stopped long enough to save his naval support.

Did Banks retreat because he had to return Smith or because he didn't think he could take Shreveport even with Smith's men?

Mansfield was fought on April 8.
April 9 a second battle was fought at Pleasant Hill, this time the Confederates were repulsed but Banks could not stay there so the next day he moved back to the river to unite with the fleet.
He then sat at Grand Ecore on the Red River for over week, writing for reinforcements, trying to communicate with Steele and claiming he was looking for another way to advance.
On April 16 Smith let him know that his time was up and he was going to leave. Banks forbade it, but Smith was disgruntled and the time allotted for Banks to return him was running out.
On the 17th Banks discovered that the navy had left him and gone down the river to Alexandria because of the low water.
On the 18th a letter from Grant arrived with new instructions to organize a campaign against Mobile as soon as possible
At some point in there he also learned that Steele wasnt coming to join him
There was now no possibility of taking Shreveport, with our without Smith
So on the 21st (13 days after Mansfield) he gave orders for the army to march back down river to Alexandria
At Alexandria, he stayed until Porter was rescued by the dam, then continued to the Mississippi.
 
...
its convoluted on reasons, but even with the fleet unable to move further due to low water, Banks could have had better luck f it stayed with the fleet, perhaps the use of "Bailey Dams" at this stage and a delay of a week or two the Army and fleet could have conceivably have moved Northward together
How would this have helped? The Confederates had obstructed the Red River and were flooding Bayou Pierre.
Would a week or two of delay have made the outcome better or would it just have brought closer the time at which Smith had to be returned and Grant wanted the campaign given up?


5. Moving the ENTIRE Union Army on a SINGLE road, and with the rural roads of Western Louisiana, this invited defeat.

I agree that moving up a single road is a problem, but what was the alternative?
Do you suggest splitting the army and moving it up roads that are distant from each other?
 
How would this have helped? The Confederates had obstructed the Red River and were flooding Bayou Pierre.
Would a week or two of delay have made the outcome better or would it just have brought closer the time at which Smith had to be returned and Grant wanted the campaign given up?




I agree that moving up a single road is a problem, but what was the alternative?
Do you suggest splitting the army and moving it up roads that are distant from each other?


My questions are motivated by this -- its all well and good to say the campaign failed and Banks was no good, so everyone then jumps to the conclusion he must have been the reason it failed, but no one explains how a better general would make different decisions that would lead to a successful outcome. Switch Banks for someone else (Sherman? Thomas? Grant?) but keep the same forces, the same overall plan, the same limitations on time, the same opposition and someone tell me how Shreveport would be captured and held? Say Taylor was repulsed at Mansfield - then what? Or say the army had moved along the river with the fleet and reached the spot where the Confederates had blocked the river by sinking a steamer edgewise -- then what?
 
Banks wanted reinforcements after Mansfield and Pleasant Hill. Even if Smith didn't need to leave and even if Grant wasn't more concerned with Mobile, there were no reinforcements to be sent, were there?
 
How would this have helped? The Confederates had obstructed the Red River and were flooding Bayou Pierre.
Would a week or two of delay have made the outcome better or would it just have brought closer the time at which Smith had to be returned and Grant wanted the campaign given up?

The hypothesis I espoused regarding "Bailey Dams" would have involved building one directly below where the fleet was, and after enough water built up to move the fleet up river aways to where they hit mud again, they could have built another dam to build up more water, and letting the water behind them flow downriver after there ascension and the building of the next dam could conceivably help with the transport of supplies via the river for a very short time. It would basically be a leap frog movement, risky, time consuming, but a possible counter to the ingenuity of the Confederate Engineers in Shreveport. As for the problem of protecting themselves against a Confederate counter-attack while building up water, Banks could have entrenched wherever the fleets current stop was and send out his Cavalry with Infantry support on raids, or rather probing movements to keep the Confederates off balance, after a short time it wouldn't be Richard Taylor he would be facing, but rather the, rather inept, Kirby Smith, after a switch of Confederate principals, which probably would have happened with no Battle of Mansfield.
As to General Smith's Divisions time limit, I think in the face of progress, (wartime progress is a matter of perspective, and explanation, both areas Banks was half-way competent in), and the support for the Campaign in Washington, I think Banks could have talked his way into keeping them.

The above is short version of my thought process on what I had previously commented lol.

I agree that moving up a single road is a problem, but what was the alternative?
Do you suggest splitting the army and moving it up roads that are distant from each other?

There was a road alongside the Red River, if my memory of the maps isn't mistaken, and there were more than a few smaller, (considering the small size of the main roads, that's admittingly a logistical nightmare), connecting the roads in the area, and if Banks did have guides at his disposal, if they were worth a cent they would know them.

Another possibility would have been to divide his Army with one section going into Texas to use the roads there to head Northward to Marshall, and then strike East to Shreveport, best case scenario at the same time Banks was hitting it from the South, a risky move from their viewpoint to be sure, but given how troops on both sides in the Trans-Mississippi had been accustomed to living off the land in some areas since 1862, and how Eastern Texas was the main breadbasket, with the limited number of experienced Confederate troops, this would have been possible. It could have conceivably possible with such a move Taylor would have had to divide his already small force to try a fight two groups, and if he had been forced into that position, Mansfield either wouldn't have happened, or there would have a greater chance of Union victory. I admit, if Banks had split his forces, with one wing going into Texas, and the other using the same "Stagecoach Road" it would have been a very risky move, a bold move, and from they're point of view no guarantee of success, but I think it could have had a possibility of success.

Again, short version of my thought process lol, but its my explanation in the shortest terms I can espouse my thinking.
 
Unless the United States re-built the railroad westward from Vicksburg to Monroe, the United States army was vulnerable to General Taylor's tactical innovation. Since west Louisiana was not strategically important to ending the war, the expense of doing that was not justified. Under those circumstances Porter and Banks should have been more cautious.
 
For those unfamiliar with the Red River Campaign, it had many interesting features including politics, greed, military strategy, bad decisions, and infighting among the leaders on both sides. As usual, the courage of the men fighting on both sides is without question as they often suffered poor leadership decisions, hunger and disease during the entire campaign.

I'm a fan of Ludwell Johnson's book from the 1950s here, but there's a new one that I think is very worthwhile.

Henry O. Robertson's, The Red River Campaign and its Toll; 68 Bloody Days in Louisiana, March-May 1864.

I bought it and read it and I think it's very fair, to everyone involved. It's got a nice modern touch to it as well.

Can't quote from it, gave it away to a person I thought might like it, but anyone interested in this campaign is encouraged to have at it.
 
In defense of Banks, didn't he have prior doubts as to the campaign's potential for success?
614

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
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"Set up to fail" overstates the situation. But between March of 1864 and August of 1864 a West Point coalition took control of the United States army. Sigel and Banks lost their commands. General Butler was retained, but Grant was in Virginia supervising Butler's command. A unified command was created for Phil Sheridan.
By August of 1864 the West Pointers, supporting Farragut at Mobile Bay, confronting the Confederates at Atlanta, working under Sheridan near Washington, and holding onto Lee under Grant's command, were either going to win the war or be responsible for losing it.
The United States began the final phase of dismembering the Confederate economy in August of 1864. That did not include invading western Louisiana or Texas, which could not support the Confederate capital or the remaining Confederate armies.
 
A note to mods: I had a hard time finding this thread tonight. It's in the General Discussion Forum rather than the Western Theatre Forum, which seems like the right place. Just a thought.
 
The conditions for success never existed.

E.K. Smith could pull together about 30,000 men to defend Shreveport; Banks and AJSmith together was about 32,000 and Steele has about 12,000, so combined they would have a numeric advantage but separately not really and even the combined advantage wasn't that great.

The distances involved were great and the river was difficult for large boats even under normal circumstances so establishing a line of supply and communication would require time and dispersion of force.

A campaign that needed a good amount of time to do it right was given a tight time limit requiring AJ Smith to be sent back and Banks prepare for a different campaign.
 
Yes. And in January 1864 he had his chief engineer write a report about what was needed to make a campaign against Shreveport work. This was forwarded to Halleck with no effect.

So much like Russian Admiral Zinovy Rozhestvensky and Spanish Admiral Pascual Cervera y Topete, Banks did his due diligence and alerted his leadership of the futility of the mission. After being told to 'press on', he attempted to accomplish his task with the support at his disposal. Honorable on his part.

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 
Sorry for being late to this party, but is there a place to find out more about the Confederate engineers lowering the Red River levels? That's fascinating.
 
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