Was anyone to blame for the Confederate defeat at the Battle of Atlanta?

General Hood had been Corps commander long enough to understand what a Corps could or could not accomplish. I assume he believed that Hardee's Corps should be able to do this march and make this attack.
I would argue that simply by pointing out that he still didn't understand "men and movement" as late as November 29 at Spring Hill. It takes time to move large bodies of men over long distances - even short distances.
 
He was defending and protected by fortifications. Attacking a fortified position should be done by the attacker with preferably a 5 to 1 ratio.
Did Hood ever say why he thought that he could defeat Sherman under unfavorable attacking odds?
 
Did Hood ever say why he thought that he could defeat Sherman under unfavorable attacking odds?
We must also remember that Davis/Bragg wanted something to happen and quick. When Bragg ask Johnston for details as to what his next move would be to protect Atlanta, Johnston never gave him an answer that was any different than Johnston had given from Rocky Face all the way down south of the Chattahoochee and the outskirts of Atlanta.
Davis made the change because he wanted something to happen to force Sherman back north of the Chattahoochee and hopefully further north and save the city of Atlanta. Hood was charged to go do something and not just sit there and allow Sherman to keep bombarding the city day and night.
Hood took over command and had to be aggressive and do it quick. I am sure Davis and Bragg pressed upon Hood to find the weakest link and attack....so he did. In truth, Hood only option at that time from his commanders (Davis/Bragg) was attack. I can't blame Hood to do what he was told to do. I lay blame on the preparation and the understanding of what was needed in the time frame.
 
We must also remember that Davis/Bragg wanted something to happen and quick. When Bragg ask Johnston for details as to what his next move would be to protect Atlanta, Johnston never gave him an answer that was any different than Johnston had given from Rocky Face all the way down south of the Chattahoochee and the outskirts of Atlanta.
Davis made the change because he wanted something to happen to force Sherman back north of the Chattahoochee and hopefully further north and save the city of Atlanta. Hood was charged to go do something and not just sit there and allow Sherman to keep bombarding the city day and night.
Hood took over command and had to be aggressive and do it quick. I am sure Davis and Bragg pressed upon Hood to find the weakest link and attack....so he did. In truth, Hood only option at that time from his commanders (Davis/Bragg) was attack. I can't blame Hood to do what he was told to do. I lay blame on the preparation and the understanding of what was needed in the time frame.
Looks to me like a "Hail Mary" pass. They were destined to lose either way by that time; it was just a question of time. Fortunately for Lincoln, it Hood made it happen earlier.
 
Looks to me like a "Hail Mary" pass. They were destined to lose either way by that time; it was just a question of time. Fortunately for Lincoln, it Hood made it happen earlier.
I totaly agree. Atlanta was a lost cause byt the time Hood took command. In an earlier post I mentioned Johnston was a major reason for the collapse of Atlanta than anyone.
 
I totaly agree. Atlanta was a lost cause byt the time Hood took command. In an earlier post I mentioned Johnston was a major reason for the collapse of Atlanta than anyone.

I wonder if Atlanta could have been defended anyway by anyone, given the troops, resources and ability that Sherman possessed. But that may be OT for this thread. I do believe that having Johnston with an intact army outside of Atlanta after it fell was a superior positon to Hood's destructive fiasco, leaving no army in front of Sherman and losing Atlanta anyway.

I'd posit Atlanta was doomed the moment Sherman went after it. Atlanta would fall - it was simply a question of when, and how costly. By that measure, Hood failed badly.
 
I wonder if Atlanta could have been defended anyway by anyone, given the troops, resources and ability that Sherman possessed. But that may be OT for this thread. I do believe that having Johnston with an intact army outside of Atlanta after it fell was a superior positon to Hood's destructive fiasco, leaving no army in front of Sherman and losing Atlanta anyway.

I'd posit Atlanta was doomed the moment Sherman went after it. Atlanta would fall - it was simply a question of when, and how costly. By that measure, Hood failed badly.
Atlanta was crucial to keeping, for other reasons.
1- The rail hub that stretched out from the city allowed food, material and troops to be moved faster than by foot. Chattanooga was taken and Atlanta was the main sole hub left in the deep Confederacy.
2- The 1864 election. Lincoln needed something to be gained to sooth the northern people that the war was in the beginning of the last stage. Victory was in sight and to complete the task at hand. Grant and Lee was bogged down in the trenches around Petersburg and it became a bloodbath in the mud with no end in sight.
3- The Confederate nation was already split with the loss of Vicksburg in July 1863 and now the loss of a deep main city which would even slice the CSA into thirds.
If Johnston would have and properly would, retreated south of Atlanta, it would have left him with only one supply line and that would have been Macon and that one line could not support the army in its needs. Plus, Sherman's hub of supply would have gain 100 miles from Chattanooga to Atlanta and made Sherman's army even stronger. Then what really would or could Johnston even do while he is sitting south of Jonesboro?
 
If Johnston would have and properly would, retreated south of Atlanta, it would have left him with only one supply line and that would have been Macon and that one line could not support the army in its needs. Plus, Sherman's hub of supply would have gain 100 miles from Chattanooga to Atlanta and made Sherman's army even stronger. Then what really would or could Johnston even do while he is sitting south of Jonesboro?

A valid point, and I agree there were limits to what a retreated army under Johnston could do - not even considering how desertions might have further weakened it. But an intact army anywhere in front of Sherman was better than the fiasco losses by Hood. Admittedly it's pure speculation, but it seems unlikely that either general (or any general) could have postponed the fall of Atlanta until after the election - so that's a wash. An intact army has much more potential military value then a smashed one, however it is used, it would provide options that were lost when Hood lost.

Again I believe the CSA had few viable options from the moment when Sherman began the campaign. Hood merely greased the wheels for the defeat, giving the USA a field victory, speeding the fall, and reducing the CSA's already scant fighting resources.

It was the classic CSA dilemma: a fighting retreat conserves limited resources but gives up objectives, and bold attacks deplete limited resources but (IF you win, a big if) gains a little time at best. And bold attacks that fail, well … they lose everything.
 
it seems unlikely that either general (or any general) could have postponed the fall of Atlanta until after the election

I'm in the opinion that Johnston could have held out longer than he did. He fell back from Rocky Face down pass two main rivers before he even hit the open area south of the Kennesaw line. There he fell back over the last river, Chattahoochee on into Atlanta.
Johnston fell back at times when their wasn't much push against his line. The lines that Johnston fell back from were entrenchments that were prepared even before he retreated back to them. Hard to believe they could even dig them and prepare them as fast as Johnston was moving toward Atlanta. Sherman even had a hard time keeping his supplies up to the front they were moving so fast south.
"IF", Johnston would have defended these areas and manovered his army to the left and right more often he could have defended those well prepared defensive lines a lot longer. The A.O.T. wasn't that spread out to begin with. They were pretty tight and close already, which at times Johnston did move part of his army toward the stress points but soon fell back without a battle.
The only time Johnston defended a place worth mentioning was on the Kennesaw Mountain line and when Sherman did attack him there, he was repulsed. What happened after that repulsed? Just a week later without any more battles, Johnston fell back toward the Smyrna line which he only stayed there long enough to make sure his army crossed the Chattahoochee. Johnston did not even attempt to hold that last river line, he fell on back beyond Peachtree Creek and settled in for Sherman to march close to Atlanta to set up his artillery to bombard the city itself day and night.
Johnston could not see any type of reasons) to attack Sherman at all during this long trek through the mountainous area of Georgia. Johnston did not use his defensive lines to hold back Sherman at all during this time. All Johnston did was react ot what Sherman did and most of what Sherman did was faint toward the Confederate left and Johnston high tailed it out and went to his next prepared defensive line.
Sherman was not about to lose contact with the W&A railroad, that was his life line for his supplies. Johnston knew that but for the life of me, I am no train soldier but knowing the RR was his life line, go ahead and let Sherman slide around , this makes for an advantage to Johnston to hit which ever part of Sherman's army was out forging about Rome, Dallas, Georgia. But just don't pick up and leave an entrench position with you striding the RR yourself. Yes, that RR which Sherman would not and could not afford to get far from during the movements toward Atlanta. ( It was hard enough to sustain only parts of Sherman's army with no army before him when Sherman march to to sea began)
I do believe Johnston could have held out past November if he had decided to fight for every inch. Sherman would have used up a lot of his troops doing this. After the election of 1864 and Lincoln NOT being elected...well that is another "what if" but we do know what happened because Lincoln did get re-elected.
The cool thing is we can analyze this campaign and see the outcome, they could only hope to know what we know now.
 
General Hood had been Corps commander long enough to understand what a Corps could or could not accomplish. I assume he believed that Hardee's Corps should be able to do this march and make this attack.
I don't necessarily think so. He only commanded a corps for about 2 and a half months. I'm not sure he really grasped it in that amount of time, then couple that with the elevation to army command.
 
I don't necessarily think so. He only commanded a corps for about 2 and a half months. I'm not sure he really grasped it in that amount of time, then couple that with the elevation to army command.
Would think as a division commander in the AoNV he had witnessed repeatedly what a Corps could do...…..if it carried out its orders and moved promptly, with determination, and initiative...….which seems to have been somewhat lacking in the AoT

He had witnessed Lee issue orders without micromanaging every movement, and trusting his subordinates to carry them out.
 
Arguably we could blame Longstreet and Bragg both of equal rank if memory serves. If Longstreet's Corps was deployed to prevent Major General Hooker from using his 20k Corps to breakthrough Confederate lines and establish the Cracker Line perhaps Bragg could of forced the AoC to surrender at Chattanooga by starving them out.
Instead of course Longstreet was sent to capture Knoxville which as we know was not Longstreet's finest hour.
We can't know if Longstreet's Corps would of prevented Hooker from establishing the Cracker Line but if the AoT can't defeat the AoC plus reinforcements from Hooker and Sherman at Chattanooga then I can't see how the Confederate Army can stop the Union Army in Georgia.
Leftyhunter

Longstreet was on top of Lookout Mountain at Sunset Rock with Bragg, watching Hooker come up. Longstreet went to Knoxville latter.
 
Johnson rebuilt the AOT at Dalton. They lost


I've just studied that. extensively, It is interesting? Longstreet was responsible for all of the Confederate Left. That included, Browns Ferry and Lookout Valley.
All I know about Hooker establishing the Cracker Line comes from Einholf's biography of General Thomas. I don't recall Hooker having to fight a major battle to establish the Cracker Line. Maybe there was a large battle. Due to the mountainous terrain theoretically Longstreet's Corps should of been able to stop Hooker's 20k man Corps.
Obviously something didn't go as planned on the Confederate side if both Bragg and Longstreet were aware of Hooker's attempt to break the siege of Chattanooga.
Leftyhunter
 
All I know about Hooker establishing the Cracker Line comes from Einholf's biography of General Thomas. I don't recall Hooker having to fight a major battle to establish the Cracker Line. Maybe there was a large battle. Due to the mountainous terrain theoretically Longstreet's Corps should of been able to stop Hooker's 20k man Corps.
Obviously something didn't go as planned on the Confederate side if both Bragg and Longstreet were aware of Hooker's attempt to break the siege of Chattanooga.
Leftyhunter

There wasn't a battle with Hooker coming up. Longstreet will attack Geary with a Brigade at Wauhatchie in the Night Attack. Hooker leaves his train unsecured. While Bragg and Longstreet was at Sunset Rock, Bragg tells Longstreet to get Lookout Valley Back. Offers Longstreet another Division. All of those troops are on the East side of Lookout in Chattanooga Valley. There is a small one wagon width road around the north face of Lookout. It would take a day or more to move the troops. So, Longstreet uses 2 Brigades to attack Hooker to check the Box. Follow his order. This gets a little long. Cozzens in Shipwreck of Their Hopes gives the best account I've read. Subject is rarely discussed in detail. We will get into it sometime.
 
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