- Joined
- Mar 31, 2012
- Location
- Central Ohio
On July 15, 1863, the steamboat Imperial arrived at New Orleans, after having left St. Louis on July 8. It is thought that this was the first vessel to make the trip since the river had been closed to commercial traffic some two years before, highlighting Union control of the entire length of the Mississippi Valley.
Most histories of the war on the Mississippi and its tributaries end at this point (with the exception of coverage of the 1864 Red River Campaign). But should they?
Control of a river is a tenuous thing. For the moment, we can define it as a condition where there is a reasonable expectation of safety from attack. Under this definition, the Union unquestionably controlled a great deal of the river, but it might be too much to say that the entire length was under control. The fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson marked the end of centrally-directed Confederate military control of the Mississippi River Valley, but “bushwhacking” and irregular activity continued, punctuated by occasional Confederate cavalry raids (notably Forrest’s).
To combat this, Rear Admiral Porter directed that the Mississippi Squadron be divided up into districts; each district would be responsible for a given length of river, and would have an ironclad or two assigned for heavy fire support if needed, and a force of ‘tinclad’ gunboats for patrol and escort work. No gunboat was allowed to leave its district without orders from Porter; if a transport was to be escorted across several districts, gunboats from each district would meet it and escort it through the assigned area; this allowed the gunboat commanders, pilots, and crews to become very familiar with local river conditions and Confederate activity.
This system of organization was maintained for the rest of the war, except when most of the ironclads were drawn off for the Red River Campaign in spring 1864, and when a number of gunboats were concentrated up the Cumberland River during the Nashville Campaign in the winter of 1864-5. While there were some notable exceptions (frequently involving Forrest, such as at Johnsonville), the arrangement appears to have worked well to keep the Mississippi policed. Some authors have speculated that it was effective partly because the gunboats could move to trouble spots and deal with matters, and then would leave once the job was done, so that there was no stationary “occupying” force that might have increased local resentment.
Action on the rivers in the latter half of the war has not attracted much attention from historians, although the documentation, in the form of the OR/ORN, letters, diaries, etc., is available. The only work to deal with it in more than a superficial fashion is Myron J. Smith, Jr.’s book, Tinclads in the Civil War: Union Light-Draught Gunboat Operations on Western Waters, 1862-1865 (McFarland, 2009).
Most histories of the war on the Mississippi and its tributaries end at this point (with the exception of coverage of the 1864 Red River Campaign). But should they?
Control of a river is a tenuous thing. For the moment, we can define it as a condition where there is a reasonable expectation of safety from attack. Under this definition, the Union unquestionably controlled a great deal of the river, but it might be too much to say that the entire length was under control. The fall of Vicksburg and Port Hudson marked the end of centrally-directed Confederate military control of the Mississippi River Valley, but “bushwhacking” and irregular activity continued, punctuated by occasional Confederate cavalry raids (notably Forrest’s).
To combat this, Rear Admiral Porter directed that the Mississippi Squadron be divided up into districts; each district would be responsible for a given length of river, and would have an ironclad or two assigned for heavy fire support if needed, and a force of ‘tinclad’ gunboats for patrol and escort work. No gunboat was allowed to leave its district without orders from Porter; if a transport was to be escorted across several districts, gunboats from each district would meet it and escort it through the assigned area; this allowed the gunboat commanders, pilots, and crews to become very familiar with local river conditions and Confederate activity.
This system of organization was maintained for the rest of the war, except when most of the ironclads were drawn off for the Red River Campaign in spring 1864, and when a number of gunboats were concentrated up the Cumberland River during the Nashville Campaign in the winter of 1864-5. While there were some notable exceptions (frequently involving Forrest, such as at Johnsonville), the arrangement appears to have worked well to keep the Mississippi policed. Some authors have speculated that it was effective partly because the gunboats could move to trouble spots and deal with matters, and then would leave once the job was done, so that there was no stationary “occupying” force that might have increased local resentment.
Action on the rivers in the latter half of the war has not attracted much attention from historians, although the documentation, in the form of the OR/ORN, letters, diaries, etc., is available. The only work to deal with it in more than a superficial fashion is Myron J. Smith, Jr.’s book, Tinclads in the Civil War: Union Light-Draught Gunboat Operations on Western Waters, 1862-1865 (McFarland, 2009).