Wall of fire - the rifle and Civil War infantry tactics

USS ALASKA

Captain
Joined
Mar 16, 2016
A paper to go with https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-rifle-musket-in-civil-war-combat-by-earl-j-hess.152570/ and https://civilwartalk.com/threads/un...doctrine-in-the-battle-of-chickamauga.153214/

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Wall of fire -- the rifle and Civil War infantry tactics.
Author; Kerr, Richard E., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis examines the effect the rifle had on infantry tactics during the Civil War. It traces the transition from smoothbore to rifle and the development of the Minie ball. The range and accuracy of various weapons are discussed and several tables illustrate the increased capabilities of the rifle. Tactics to exploit the new weapon are examined, primarily those of William Hardee. Using Hardee's tactics as the standard rifle tactics before the war, the change in how infantry soldiers fought is documented with two battle analyses. The 1862 Maryland Campaign shows the start of tactical evolution as soldiers seek cover, expend large quantities of ammunition and are decisively engaged at greater distances. During the 1864 Wilderness-Spotsylvania battle, the concepts of fortification defense and skirmish offense take hold. Examining several current books that deal with the rifle and its effects, the thesis concludes that the rifle's increased firepower was a major factor in the move away from Hardee's formation tactics.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1990-06-01
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 227467
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-02-19

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

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  • Wall of fire - the rifle and Civil War infantry tactics.pdf
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About 40 percent of the Confederates at Chickamauga had smooth bores.

Just think Chickamauga would be a strange example of the success of Cassey’s tactics when on the 19th it was a virtual draw, mostly because of terrain; woods with some open fields. Then on the 20th, a third of the Federal Army was Routed.
 
Great Read. Just think of the outcome if they could have done a MAD MINUTE
 
Hopefully another interesting paper for you fans of small arms...

University of Richmond
UR Scholarship Repository
Honors Theses Student Research
5-1957

An investigation of the history of the Virginia manufactory of arms
James N. Haskett

This Thesis is brought to you for free and open access by the Student Research at UR Scholarship Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in Honors Theses by an authorized administrator of UR Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact
[email protected].

The contribution of the Armory to the south's war effort during the first year of the war can hardly be overestimated. During this period it was the only reliable source of modern firearms available and functioning. Though the South had seized sizeable quantities of arms in the various United States' Depots and Arsenals, a goodly amount of them were of dubious quality. Quite a few were found to be in very poor condition and the bulk of them were obsolete when compared with the more modern type of Minie rifle. Only a small percentage were rifled, and some were still using the flint lock ignition systems. Although the South had belatedly made a number of contracts with Northern manufacturers for arms and manufacturing equipment, secession came so suddenly that few of
these contracts were even completed in part. Also, the South had sent a number of agents to Europe to purchase arms and supplies, but it took some time to purchase these arms and to transport them to the South and get them into the hands of Southern troops. It was some time before the Confederate Ordnance Department was receiving shipments of these arms regularly. Therefore it is easy to see how valuable the Armory was to the Confederacy during this period and why the Confederate Government accepted it so readily when the Virginia Legislate offered to turn it over to it.



Cheers,
USS ALASKA
 

Attachments

  • An investigation of the history of the Virginia manufactory of arms.pdf
    1.7 MB · Views: 37
A paper to go with https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-rifle-musket-in-civil-war-combat-by-earl-j-hess.152570/ and https://civilwartalk.com/threads/un...doctrine-in-the-battle-of-chickamauga.153214/

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Wall of fire -- the rifle and Civil War infantry tactics.
Author; Kerr, Richard E., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis examines the effect the rifle had on infantry tactics during the Civil War. It traces the transition from smoothbore to rifle and the development of the Minie ball. The range and accuracy of various weapons are discussed and several tables illustrate the increased capabilities of the rifle. Tactics to exploit the new weapon are examined, primarily those of William Hardee. Using Hardee's tactics as the standard rifle tactics before the war, the change in how infantry soldiers fought is documented with two battle analyses. The 1862 Maryland Campaign shows the start of tactical evolution as soldiers seek cover, expend large quantities of ammunition and are decisively engaged at greater distances. During the 1864 Wilderness-Spotsylvania battle, the concepts of fortification defense and skirmish offense take hold. Examining several current books that deal with the rifle and its effects, the thesis concludes that the rifle's increased firepower was a major factor in the move away from Hardee's formation tactics.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1990-06-01
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 227467
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-02-19

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
Thanks for posting this. While he had Paddy Griffith's work that was critical of the impact of the rifle-musket, the author did not have the advantage of reading Earl Hess's The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat (2016) or Scott Hippensteel's book just out, Myths of the Civil War (2021). Both are very well-done and present convincing analyses that refute the author's ultimate conclusion insofar as it is based on the actual impact of the rifle-musket and its (theoretical) range.
 
A minor point, but Scott's Tactics were in general use pre-1861. Hardee's, though first printed in 1855, was still new stuff to the old timers.
 
Very interesting read, thanks for sharing that!

I wish the author had been able to go into more depth on some things, and there are a few minor issues in which I think he is in error, but, that said, I think he makes a number of important points. Time was obviously an issue for him in doing his research, nevertheless, he was still able to find numerous examples in the official records of troops engaging at distances far beyond the range of a smoothbore musket. Engagements in which the eyewitness accounts, and the casualty figures, both bear witness to the effectiveness of the fire.

I know in my own case, even though I do not do extensive research in the OR, I nevertheless often come across records of engagements at 200 yards or more. Why has it become accepted as fact that the war was fought exclusively at short ranges? I don't mean that the preponderance of engagements were at long range or anything like that, but examples of rifle-muskets being used at ranges beyond those of a musket in the OR are not rare by any means. The author obviously found numerous examples.

I readily agree that the issue of smoke, the lack of training, the amateur nature of the army in general, etc., undoubtedly prevented the rifle-musket from being used to full effectiveness, but that doesn't mean we should just ignore the evidence to the contrary. Aiming a rifle isn't exactly rocket science!

Brett Gibbons, in Destroying Angel says this of Earl Hess's book: "Dr.Hess's entire thesis is undermined by his profoundly incorrect understanding of the trajectory of the rifle-musket. He describes the 300-yard trajectory of the rifle-musket as having a 'killing zone' (i.e. dangerous space) of 'only about 75 yards long,' with the equally incorrect conclusion that for 'nearly half the 300-yard range, enemy troops would be untouched by the balls.' The actual dangerous space is over twice what Dr. Hess claims, at 145 yards for the P1853 Enfield rifle (with essentially identical span for the M1861 Springfield and other contemporary rifle-muskets). The only place that troops would be 'untouched by the balls' in this trajectory is an uncomfortably narrow span in the middle of the trajectory where the bullet reaches it's zenith. Dr. Hess points to this precarious zone of invulnerability to highlight the difficulty of accurately shooting a rifle-musket, but does not explain why soldiers would set their sights at 300 yards to fire on enemies at 150 yards."

I must admit I suffer from the problem of never having read Dr. Hess's book, it was published after several other books covering the same territory so I skipped it as offering nothing new. Nonetheless, I have seen numerous articles based upon it that demonstrate a fundamental lack of knowledge of ballistics. We recently discussed such an example on this forum. The ignorant assertions I have seen in a number of other books, which invariably point back to his book, leave me believing it to be a seriously flawed work. Brett Gibbons would appear to agree. I think Dr. Hess is guilty of introducing and perpetuating myths, rather than slaying them.

Did the tactics used during the war change as the war went on as the author asserts? I think he makes a pretty strong case. He quotes General Sherman regarding the use of skirmish tactics to replace battles. Sherman's entire campaign through the South is testament to a fundamental change that occurred. The entrenchments around Petersburg bear witness to the changes that took place in the East during the final year of the war.

Moxley Sorrell, Longstreet's Chief of Staff, wrote this about Fredericksburg:

"Looking back at the situation, it seems surprising that we did so little in the way of defensive fieldworks. The enemy in great masses were crowding the Falmouth Hills, and we knew intended to cross and strike us. But yet we contented ourselves with the little stone wall (which proved helpful), and two or three tiers of light trenchwork extended on the slope of the hill behind and on our left.

The like observation extends to Jackson, whose lines were about the same as ours in strength, except the stone wall.

Later in the war such a fault could not have been found. Experience had taught us that to win, we must fight; and that fighting under cover was the thing to keep up the army and beat the enemy. He knew it, too, and practiced it, so later on veterans no sooner got to facing each other tham they began to dig, if ever so little; a little trench, a tiny hillock is often a very helpful defense and protection."

Can all of this be attributed to the rifle-musket? It is certainly true that there was nothing new about fortifications in general. There were also advancements in rifled field artillery that surely contributed to the changes that occurred, batteries could effectively hit troops from much greater distances. Nonetheless, it is very naive to think that placing a weapon that possessed much greater accuracy, extended range, and an improved sighting system, in the hands of every soldier, had no effect at all. It is hard for me to understand how it has become the predominant view when it is not at all difficult to find evidence to the contrary.

The medical records state that something like 70% of the wounds treated were from small arms. It seems rather obvious to me that the rifle-musket must have played a role in the greatly expanded use of entrenchments and the evolution of total war strategy.
 
Very interesting read, thanks for sharing that!

I wish the author had been able to go into more depth on some things, and there are a few minor issues in which I think he is in error, but, that said, I think he makes a number of important points. Time was obviously an issue for him in doing his research, nevertheless, he was still able to find numerous examples in the official records of troops engaging at distances far beyond the range of a smoothbore musket. Engagements in which the eyewitness accounts, and the casualty figures, both bear witness to the effectiveness of the fire.

I know in my own case, even though I do not do extensive research in the OR, I nevertheless often come across records of engagements at 200 yards or more. Why has it become accepted as fact that the war was fought exclusively at short ranges? I don't mean that the preponderance of engagements were at long range or anything like that, but examples of rifle-muskets being used at ranges beyond those of a musket in the OR are not rare by any means. The author obviously found numerous examples.

I readily agree that the issue of smoke, the lack of training, the amateur nature of the army in general, etc., undoubtedly prevented the rifle-musket from being used to full effectiveness, but that doesn't mean we should just ignore the evidence to the contrary. Aiming a rifle isn't exactly rocket science!

Brett Gibbons, in Destroying Angel says this of Earl Hess's book: "Dr.Hess's entire thesis is undermined by his profoundly incorrect understanding of the trajectory of the rifle-musket. He describes the 300-yard trajectory of the rifle-musket as having a 'killing zone' (i.e. dangerous space) of 'only about 75 yards long,' with the equally incorrect conclusion that for 'nearly half the 300-yard range, enemy troops would be untouched by the balls.' The actual dangerous space is over twice what Dr. Hess claims, at 145 yards for the P1853 Enfield rifle (with essentially identical span for the M1861 Springfield and other contemporary rifle-muskets). The only place that troops would be 'untouched by the balls' in this trajectory is an uncomfortably narrow span in the middle of the trajectory where the bullet reaches it's zenith. Dr. Hess points to this precarious zone of invulnerability to highlight the difficulty of accurately shooting a rifle-musket, but does not explain why soldiers would set their sights at 300 yards to fire on enemies at 150 yards."

I must admit I suffer from the problem of never having read Dr. Hess's book, it was published after several other books covering the same territory so I skipped it as offering nothing new. Nonetheless, I have seen numerous articles based upon it that demonstrate a fundamental lack of knowledge of ballistics. We recently discussed such an example on this forum. The ignorant assertions I have seen in a number of other books, which invariably point back to his book, leave me believing it to be a seriously flawed work. Brett Gibbons would appear to agree. I think Dr. Hess is guilty of introducing and perpetuating myths, rather than slaying them.

Did the tactics used during the war change as the war went on as the author asserts? I think he makes a pretty strong case. He quotes General Sherman regarding the use of skirmish tactics to replace battles. Sherman's entire campaign through the South is testament to a fundamental change that occurred. The entrenchments around Petersburg bear witness to the changes that took place in the East during the final year of the war.

Moxley Sorrell, Longstreet's Chief of Staff, wrote this about Fredericksburg:

"Looking back at the situation, it seems surprising that we did so little in the way of defensive fieldworks. The enemy in great masses were crowding the Falmouth Hills, and we knew intended to cross and strike us. But yet we contented ourselves with the little stone wall (which proved helpful), and two or three tiers of light trenchwork extended on the slope of the hill behind and on our left.

The like observation extends to Jackson, whose lines were about the same as ours in strength, except the stone wall.

Later in the war such a fault could not have been found. Experience had taught us that to win, we must fight; and that fighting under cover was the thing to keep up the army and beat the enemy. He knew it, too, and practiced it, so later on veterans no sooner got to facing each other tham they began to dig, if ever so little; a little trench, a tiny hillock is often a very helpful defense and protection."

Can all of this be attributed to the rifle-musket? It is certainly true that there was nothing new about fortifications in general. There were also advancements in rifled field artillery that surely contributed to the changes that occurred, batteries could effectively hit troops from much greater distances. Nonetheless, it is very naive to think that placing a weapon that possessed much greater accuracy, extended range, and an improved sighting system, in the hands of every soldier, had no effect at all. It is hard for me to understand how it has become the predominant view when it is not at all difficult to find evidence to the contrary.

The medical records state that something like 70% of the wounds treated were from small arms. It seems rather obvious to me that the rifle-musket must have played a role in the greatly expanded use of entrenchments and the evolution of total war strategy.
That's why I suggested the new Hippensteel book. He covers this issue pretty carefully (and some other unrelated issues, as well, including the mythology of sharpshooters being effective "snipers" at extended ranges). Full disclosure - I have not read Gibbons myself. The ACW examples that seem to have demonstrated the wisdom of fortifications/entrenching - such examples as Malvern Hill, the fighting at Antietam, Fredericksurg, July 3 at Gettysburg, Cold Harbor - do not, so far as I've seen, show significant casualties at long range from small arms, as opposed to artillery. As you note, the ACW saw increasing use of rifled artillery with effective range out to 1900-2000 yards and the great improvement in effective range for smoothbore shell/case of the 12 lb Napoleon over the M1841 12 lb howitzer - from 1100 yards to close to 1400 yards. As an aside, I have seen at least one study that concludes the standard 18th century fire-lock musket had an effective range out to 270-300 yards, well beyond the generally-accepted 100 yards.
 
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That's why I suggested the new Hippensteel book. He covers this issue pretty carefully (and some other unrelated issues, as well, including the mythology of sharpshooters being effective "snipers" at extended ranges). Full disclosure - I have not read Gibbons myself. The ACW examples that seem to have demonstrated the wisdom of fortifications/entrenching - such examples as Malvern Hill, the fighting at Antietam, Fredericksurg, July 3 at Gettysburg, Cold Harbor - do not, so far as I've seen, show significant casualties at long range from small arms, as opposed to artillery. As you note, the ACW saw increasing use of rifled artillery with effective range out to 1900-2000 yards and the great improvement in effective range for smoothbore shell/case of the 12 lb Napoleon over the M1841 12 lb howitzer - from 1100 yards to close to 1700 yards. As an aside, I have seen at least one study that concludes the standard 18th century fire-lock musket had an effective range out to 270-300 yards, well beyond the generally-accepted 100 yards.

The author in the OP's article cited examples of casualties at long range from small arms. Like I said previously, I have seen multiple examples in the OR myself. I don't know why you can't find them in the books you recommend.

The effective range of a smoothbore musket is pretty well established by actually firing them, regardless of any "studies" to the contrary.

I respectfully disagree with your conclusions, you are wrong. I do not presume to think that I will convince you of that, I am simply expressing that your arguments leave me quite unmoved in the face of the evidence to the contrary.
 
The author in the OP's article cited examples of casualties at long range from small arms. Like I said previously, I have seen multiple examples in the OR myself. I don't know why you can't find them in the books you recommend.

The effective range of a smoothbore musket is pretty well established by actually firing them, regardless of any "studies" to the contrary.

I respectfully disagree with your conclusions, you are wrong. I do not presume to think that I will convince you of that, I am simply expressing that your arguments leave me quite unmoved in the face of the evidence to the contrary.
Relax. Did you read what I posted? The only two books I "recommended" are Hess and the new Hippensteel book (which you haven't read, so I'm not sure which "multiple examples" you're referring to). They both rejected the theory. That, by the way, doesn't mean that there weren't casualties at longer ranges. They just concluded that the increased range of the rifle-musket didn't play a significant role in changing tactics. And I'm not pushing "my" conclusions - I've simply referred to the conclusions by two others, and added my own observation about certain notable, bloody attacks.

"I do not presume to think that I will convince you of that, I am simply expressing that your arguments leave me quite unmoved in the face of the evidence to the contrary."

That's cool. I have no dog in this hunt - as I said, I simply referred to two books that reached a different conclusion. Nobody's forcing you to read Hippensteel. And I'm not invested in "moving" you - if it's all the same. You'll either choose to read the relevant sources or not.
 
Except tactics did change. In the east there was the Wilderness firefight under cover of the vegetation, and the resulting fire. That was followed by mostly battles between entrenched defenders and advancing attackers.
In the west, Sherman made one last attempt to take a prepared position, and then concentrated on movement and the tactical defense.
Grant in the east began concentrating on the mobility of cavalry, and creating a shock force around the VI corp, which he saved until the critical attack.
Grant made very few attacks between October 1864 and April 1865. It was the Confederates that attacked in that period, and the results were generally the same. Some tactical success was achieved before US numbers and fire power closed in on the attackers.
 
I think there was enough long distance fire power that infantry formations had to start from further away from the objective. And artillery had fire from much greater distance, and hence was less destructive as an offensive weapon.
 
Except tactics did change. In the east there was the Wilderness firefight under cover of the vegetation, and the resulting fire. That was followed by mostly battles between entrenched defenders and advancing attackers.
In the west, Sherman made one last attempt to take a prepared position, and then concentrated on movement and the tactical defense.
Grant in the east began concentrating on the mobility of cavalry, and creating a shock force around the VI corp, which he saved until the critical attack.
Grant made very few attacks between October 1864 and April 1865. It was the Confederates that attacked in that period, and the results were generally the same. Some tactical success was achieved before US numbers and fire power closed in on the attackers.
I suppose the question is whether it was the range issue that caused the change in tactics. That almost certainly was not involved in the fighting at the Wilderness. Field fortifications became more of a factor at Spotsylvania - yet the attacks on May 10 and May 12 were able to breach (failing due to support problems).
 
I would have to rely on the experts as whether it was the range and accuracy that deterred offensive tactics, or the rate of fire that was the greater deterrence. I suspect the soldiers became much better at loading the minie balls into the rifles as the war progressed. And in prepared positions the best shooters did not necessarily have to load the rifles. As the war went on, there were fewer men left in the ranks who were not prepared to shoot, and to shoot to kill.
 
A paper to go with https://civilwartalk.com/threads/the-rifle-musket-in-civil-war-combat-by-earl-j-hess.152570/ and https://civilwartalk.com/threads/un...doctrine-in-the-battle-of-chickamauga.153214/

Collection; Master of Military Art and Science Theses
Title; Wall of fire -- the rifle and Civil War infantry tactics.
Author; Kerr, Richard E., Jr.

Abstract; This thesis examines the effect the rifle had on infantry tactics during the Civil War. It traces the transition from smoothbore to rifle and the development of the Minie ball. The range and accuracy of various weapons are discussed and several tables illustrate the increased capabilities of the rifle. Tactics to exploit the new weapon are examined, primarily those of William Hardee. Using Hardee's tactics as the standard rifle tactics before the war, the change in how infantry soldiers fought is documented with two battle analyses. The 1862 Maryland Campaign shows the start of tactical evolution as soldiers seek cover, expend large quantities of ammunition and are decisively engaged at greater distances. During the 1864 Wilderness-Spotsylvania battle, the concepts of fortification defense and skirmish offense take hold. Examining several current books that deal with the rifle and its effects, the thesis concludes that the rifle's increased firepower was a major factor in the move away from Hardee's formation tactics.

Series; Command and General Staff College (CGSC) MMAS thesis
Publisher; Fort Leavenworth, KS : US Army Command and General Staff College,
Date; Original 1990-06-01
Date; Digital 2008
Call number; ADA 227467
Release statement; Approved for public release; Distribution is unlimited. The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student-authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to these studies should include the foregoing statement.)
Repository; Combined Arms Research Library
Library; Combined Arms Research Library Digital Library
Date created; 2008-02-19

Cheers,
USS ALASKA
I think the true story is that the killing power of massed formations led to dramatic changes in operations and tactics. The US began to concentrate on complete naval and blockade dominance, and in operational goals that degraded Confederate logistics. The Confederates, as least in the east, largely abandoned the offensive. Hood could not do that the west because the Confederates were not capable of supporting two besieged armies. Hood was also more greatly outnumbered, and Sherman/Thomas had expertise in blocking with one component and flanking with the other.
The traditional story of mass slaughter in big infantry battles does not fight with what happened after August 1, 1864.
 
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As noted above, the transition from muskets to rifles was a process not an event. And the Confederates experienced some setbacks due to equipment lost at Vicksburg and greater efficiency of the US blockade in 1863.
 
Relax. Did you read what I posted?
Lol, I want to say the same thing to you!

The only two books I "recommended" are Hess and the new Hippensteel book (which you haven't read, so I'm not sure which "multiple examples" you're referring to)
I believe the Hess book has already been demonstrated to be sufficiently flawed that it not worth my time to read it. I will take the other book under consideration. My reference to the multiple examples clearly stated that I was referring to the Official Records, not your books. That is what leaves me wondering if you actually read and considered what I wrote.

You'll either choose to read the relevant sources or not.
I'm merely arguing that those relevant sources should include the Official Records and memoirs of the participants instead of just books written by academics. Those books have their place, but I prefer to make up my own mind.
 
Lol, I want to say the same thing to you!


I believe the Hess book has already been demonstrated to be sufficiently flawed that it not worth my time to read it. I will take the other book under consideration. My reference to the multiple examples clearly stated that I was referring to the Official Records, not your books. That is what leaves me wondering if you actually read and considered what I wrote.


I'm merely arguing that those relevant sources should include the Official Records and memoirs of the participants instead of just books written by academics. Those books have their place, but I prefer to make up my own mind.
I actually don't think we disagree on the best way to approach these things generally. I just started off by pointing out that the author of the article in the OP hadn't read Hess or Hippensteel. You could add Gibbons, and probably some others. Hippensteel is worth reading not just on this but on the other, unrelated topics he covers.

And it's always worth looking at something that questions the "conventional wisdom" on an issue - even if you end up unconvinced. Everybody who reads about the AWI is told that late 18th century muskets were worthless beyond 100 yards. There's some interesting evidence that it's not true.
 
In the days of the black powder musket tactics combining skirmishing light infantry backed by fast moving infantry in an open order were not unknown. Such tactics were commonly used by the British in our rebellion against them and to good effect.

I'm not convinced the use of trenches late in the war had much to do with rifle muskets; going to ground and making obstacles might just as well have been a sensible reaction by rebel armies on both a strategic and tactical defensive. I'm in mind of Wellington and the lines of Torres Vedras. And late in the war considerable fighting was done without benefit of trenches.

Cordoba's use of arquebusiers behind fieldworks at Cerignola certainly had nothing to do with rifling but with the common sense of using his troops and position to their best advantage. On that day, in that place.
 
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