Part 7:
Rod Andrew’s detailed retelling of Hampton’s war years is admirable in its reliance on the Official Records and Wade’s correspondence with his family, as well as the reports on his actions by other Confederates. From his first fight at Manassas through the final Confederate surrender, Hampton proved himself to be one of the best of the “political generals” in either army.
At Bull Run, his legion took relatively heavy casualties and Hampton himself was hit in the face with canister. Yet Hampton displayed traits of heroism and coolness under fire that recommended him to his superiors. Throughout 1861 and early 1862 Hampton demonstrated a clear ability to command Confederate soldiers. His competence is detailed by Rod Andrew in this biography. What I missed in it was an examination of just how a man with no military training or experience became such a good combat officer in such a short time. The annals of the Civil War are filled with rich men and politicians, and Hampton was both, who were promoted in the first months of the war and who flamed out spectacularly or otherwise failed.
The other question I had that Andrew did not answer was “Why a legion.” I know that there were other legions formed, Cobb’s for instance, but what was Hampton’s thinking behind this decision? It clearly did not pan out and the three arms of his legion never fought together as a unit.
What Andrew does well is paint a portrait of an infantry commander forced into the cavalry during the Peninsula Campaign. He writes that Hampton “agreed to the change only with the understanding that the appointment was temporary. It was in the infantry that Hampton had learned how to be a soldier; besides, a transfer to the cavalry would take him farther away from the infantrymen of the Hampton Legion—the men with whom he had shared most of the last year.” The reluctant cavalryman was good at his new job, but extremely unhappy with the company he was forced to keep. He apparently never cared for his commander, J.E.B Stuart, and he found that having two colleagues with the last name Lee meant that he could never offer frank criticism of their performance.
Within six months of taking over a cavalry brigade, in “January 1863 Wade Hampton III of South Carolina was an angry man," Andrew writes. "As far as he was concerned, he was the victim of favoritism, arrogance, conceit, and professional negligence. One man was the source of all those evils bedeviling Hampton—Major General James Ewell Brown Stuart of Virginia. Hampton believed that Stuart was destroying his brigade.” Wade Hampton believed that Stuart favored the Virginia brigades and gave Hampton’s men the worst postings and the most wearing duties. The South Carolinian wrote that Stuart’s favoritism was “as marked, as it is disgusting & it constantly makes me indignant. I do not object to the work, but I do object to seeing my command broken down by positive starvation. We cannot get forage, & in the course of a few weeks, my Brigade will be totally unfit for service. This is a hard case, but unless Genl. Lee, to whom I have appealed, interferes, Stuart will certainly have my Brigade out of the field before very long.” (p. 138)
Soon, Hampton would lose his beloved brother Frank, whom he had encouraged to join the cavalry, in battle. In July 1863, Wade himself would be wounded again, this time at Gettysburg. He was cut on the head by two different Union cavalrymen and suffered a fractured skull. Apart from the danger to his health, the wounds were a danger to his self-image, according to Andrew. He writes that Hampton faced “the difficult matter of being nearly killed by Yankee swordsmen on horseback. Hampton was a physically powerful man, a splendid horseman, and a fine swordsman, and he was proud of all those traits. Each of them was important to his self-image as an example of chivalry and southern manhood. How, then, had those despised Yankees, whom he had once considered cowards, nearly managed to best him?” Hampton wrote only half joking in a letter: “Don’t you feel mortified that any Yankee should be able, on horseback, to split my head open? It shows how old I am growing, and how worthless.” (p. 167)
If Hampton felt neglected in the Army of Northern Virginia, his talents were appreciated elsewhere. Joe Johnston wanted him transferred to the West, a suggestion that James Longstreet, then in Tennessee, seconded. In March of 1864 Hampton’s anger at his perceived treatment in Virginia led him to write an insubordinate letter to Robert E. Lee. The commanding general lost his patience with Hampton and told him that “I would not care if you went back to South Carolina with your whole division.” (p. 186) This mortified Hampton, according to Andrew. Hampton spoke to Mary Chesnut who recounted it in her memoir, “Wade said [Lee’s] manner made this speech immensely mortifying. While General Hampton was talking to me, the president sent for him. It seems General Lee has no patience with any personal complaints or grievances. He is all for the cause and cannot bear officers to come to him with any such matters as Wade Hampton came.” (p. 187) Hampton was in danger of becoming just another one of Lee’s quarrelsome subordinates.
For all of his intelligence, Hampton was unable to objectively assess the state of the Confederacy or foresee its doom. As Grant’s Overland Campaign got underway, Hampton wrote “If we can only win the first great battle of the campaign, I hope that we can see the ‘beginning of the end.’ If Johnston & Lee can each defeat the enemy I do not think there will be another great Battle during the war.” (p. 190)
The death of Stuart at Yellow Tavern on May 11 opened a door for Hampton at the same time that it demanded that he express sorrow over his despised chief’s demise. Hampton may have been the natural choice to replace Stuart, but the fact that his two rivals were Rooney Lee and Fitzhugh Lee left the matter in contention longer than it should have, according to Andrew. Hampton’s dislike of Fitzhigh was so great that in 1898 when his son wished to volunteer to serve under Fitzhugh Lee in the Spanish-American War, Wade objected saying that “I would not wish a son of mine to serve, in any case, under Fitz Lee.” (p. 491)
While the Confederacy was suffering mortal wounds, so was Wade Hampton’s plantation empire built on the labor of black slaves. His Mississippi and Louisiana holdings were bleeding slaves and his core South Carolina holdings would soon be on the route of Sherman’s men. During the last ten months of the war, Hampton would do some of his best fighting against both Grant and Sherman to little strategic purpose. Andrew does an fine job of describing the now almost daily fighting by cavalry in Virginia and the Carolinas.
Then Hampton’s home was destroyed by Union forces. Hampton the cavalier now defended the summary execution of Union foragers by his men when they were described as arsonists. Perhaps he was now another hero caught up in the vindictive spirit of the last days of the Rebellion.
After Lee and Johnston surrendered, Hampton proposed that he be allowed to lead a cavalry force to escort Jefferson Davis to the West or even to Mexico to continue the war. He was among the last of the die-hards to put down the sword.
Part 8 will follow tonight, I hope.