Featured Vicksburg: Animated Battle Map by the American Battlefield Trust

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Published on Jun 27, 2019

We at the American Battlefield Trust are re-releasing our Animated Battle Maps with newly branded openings. Learn about the 48 day siege during the summer of 1863 that gave the Union Army, commanded by Ulysses S. Grant, control of the Mississippi River - thus cutting the Confederate supply line to the South.
 
Thanks for sharing this awesome video! Learned something new from this video how Grant won at Vicksburg! Been a reading a book on the battle of Vicksburg and this video crosses the book right on the money so far. But still got away to to finish the story...
 
Great Vid. They always do them right. Thanks for sharing it.
 

Published on Jun 27, 2019

We at the American Battlefield Trust are re-releasing our Animated Battle Maps with newly branded openings. Learn about the 48 day siege during the summer of 1863 that gave the Union Army, commanded by Ulysses S. Grant, control of the Mississippi River - thus cutting the Confederate supply line to the South.
I watched the one on Gettysburg .It was very informative and to watch this battle as was shown gives a better insight into the battle than any I have seen,the narration was accurate and very simple to understand,not so tactical.The one thing one word that was clear was the word reinforcements on the Northern side and how they filled in the gaps were needed.Lee did not have the reinforcements to support to reinforce his movements ,think what Mead would have done if a second wave would have followed Pickett into the center.The one statement which was made was that Meade was the one general who anticipated Lee's moves,but yet he is given no real credit for doing so .Grant made his movements to force Lee to react ,Meade was more farsighted than Grant.Grant used force to win Meade used skill and insight.Grant was a booker player while Meade played chess.Question;Was Lee's movement based on the thought that Meade was another McClellan or Burnside?The fact that these troops were fighting on their turf as the Confederates would fight on theirs cause the AP to fight that more determined? You are here But no further will You GO,!
 

Published on Jun 27, 2019

We at the American Battlefield Trust are re-releasing our Animated Battle Maps with newly branded openings. Learn about the 48 day siege during the summer of 1863 that gave the Union Army, commanded by Ulysses S. Grant, control of the Mississippi River - thus cutting the Confederate supply line to the South.
Thank you for doing this.I watched this one and the one on Gettysburg.The inquiry that I would make is ,Davis ordered that Vicksburg be held.Did not Johnson ,who was in command of that section,want Pemberton to join with his army against Grant? Did the Confederacy survival depend upon Vicksburg? If the loss was so great why does Gettysburg loss rank greater,at least in the Eastern papers and historians? Its not just the loss of the port but the civilian losses.When one mentions Atlanta no one mentions the civilians losses as with Vicksburg.Grant's actions as to destruction of property esp.siege of Vicksburg could be a prelude to Sherman's visit to Atlanta?
 
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Its not just the loss of the port but the civilian losses.When one mentions Atlanta no one mentions the civilians losses as with Vicksburg.Grant's actions as to destruction of property esp.siege of Vicksburg could be a prelude to Sherman's visit to Atlanta?

In them times were civilians of an enemy not treated with disregard. Their safety wasn't treated as a priority ? Even in the conflicts of the 20th century the safety of civilians was far from the minds of commanders.
 
I hate that “Grant’s two-pronged attack” has become canon. It didn’t happen like that. Grant began marching south because he didn’t have enough troops at the time to comfortably hold all of north Mississippi and Western Tennessee, and thought consolidating his forces and taking the initiative would at least prevent an attack.

He was very nearly halfway to Jackson when all his plans were countermanded by direct order from Halleck to launch a direct assault by river. Grant so disliked the idea he actually considered disobeying the order.

it wasn’t Grant’s two-pronged plan. It was Grant’s Overland Campaign, aborted by Lincoln and McClernand’s Chickasaw Bayou brainchild.
 
The one statement which was made was that Meade was the one general who anticipated Lee's moves, but yet he is given no real credit for doing so. Grant made his movements to force Lee to react, Meade was more farsighted than Grant. Grant used force to win Meade used skill and insight.
Meade famously predicted that Lee would attack the Union center on the 3rd day at Gettysburg, and that seems to be the basis for claiming that Meade was the one general who anticipated Lee's moves. Additionally, Meade probably "anticipated" Lee when he learned of Longstreet's Corps' departure to Tennessee in September 1863, which prompted the AotP to move against the ANV along the Rappahannock River. But I do not believe that Meade was more farsighted than Grant, and that Meade's skill and insight were superior to Grant's use of force to win. Grant was one of the greatest strategists of that war, for which he had already proven himself in the Vicksburg Campaign. Without diminishing Meade's leadership of the AotP during Gettysburg, once Union forces collected themselves after Day 1 by assuming a strong defensive position, it is highly likely that many a competent commander would have performed as admirably as did Meade. So I don't extend Meade's performance at Gettysburg by elevating his generalship to a particular level of skill and insight. After all, once Grant assumed overall command, he and Meade (having tactical control of the AotP), worked pretty much in lockstep during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns so differentiating who used force vs. skill and insight becomes much more muddled.
 

Published on Jun 27, 2019

We at the American Battlefield Trust are re-releasing our Animated Battle Maps with newly branded openings. Learn about the 48 day siege during the summer of 1863 that gave the Union Army, commanded by Ulysses S. Grant, control of the Mississippi River - thus cutting the Confederate supply line to the South.
Very good production of the battles. IF there is any questions as to Vicksburg or Gettysburg , then one only as to read what both Lincoln and Davis stated as to the essential value of that city to the Confedercery. Grant must have realized the value of Vicksburg , knowing that with the two forts taken and the fall of New Orleans, that Vicksburg was the key deriving the Confedercery with the goods needed from the West .Then when he released Sherman to move against Atlanta ,then he knew with this strategic move that it would deny the ANV with any supplies from the Deep South. The most horrendous aspect of these battles and with Vicksburg was that of the coast of soldiers by Grant. Some have been critical of Grant over this ,but these professional analyst do not offer any other strategy. These same will state this criticism against him in Va. But after the surrender of the ANV , Grant accomplished what possible no other general would have. I have not read of any criticism from Lincoln or Stanton on Grant. With Grant and the Union Navy , Operation Anaconda was successfully accomplish
 
it wasn’t Grant’s two-pronged plan. It was Grant’s Overland Campaign, aborted by Lincoln and McClernand’s Chickasaw Bayou brainchild.
McClernand's Chickasaw Bayou brainchild? McClernand wasn't at Chickasaw Bayou nor did he intend to go. Sherman attacked Chickasaw Bayou and McClernand didn't arrive until after the attack was repulsed.
 
McClernand's Chickasaw Bayou brainchild? McClernand wasn't at Chickasaw Bayou nor did he intend to go. Sherman attacked Chickasaw Bayou and McClernand didn't arrive until after the attack was repulsed.
It was Lincoln's plan as suggested by McClernand after Antietam.

Grant began marching south after receiving no instructions on what he was supposed to be doing, thinking it would be easier to achieve momentum than simply waiting to be attacked along a thinly stretched line between Memphis and Corinth. After enjoying some success pushing Pemberton south, Halleck began inexplicably offering suggestions to attack Vicksburg via river. What Halleck wasn't telling Grant is that Lincoln had ordered an attack on Vicksburg via river to be led by McClernand.

Grant took the suggestion for what it was and continued south. But in early December, after suggesting a riverine operation several times, Halleck finally ordered Grant to go no further south and to send Sherman with as many men as possible against Vicksburg via river. Grant so disliked the plan that he called Sherman to his HQ to discuss disobeying the order.

So ... *not* Grant's two-pronged plan. Grant's Overland Campaign as terminated by Lincoln and McClernand's half-witted love-child.
 
Meade famously predicted that Lee would attack the Union center on the 3rd day at Gettysburg, and that seems to be the basis for claiming that Meade was the one general who anticipated Lee's moves. Additionally, Meade probably "anticipated" Lee when he learned of Longstreet's Corps' departure to Tennessee in September 1863, which prompted the AotP to move against the ANV along the Rappahannock River. But I do not believe that Meade was more farsighted than Grant, and that Meade's skill and insight were superior to Grant's use of force to win. Grant was one of the greatest strategists of that war, for which he had already proven himself in the Vicksburg Campaign. Without diminishing Meade's leadership of the AotP during Gettysburg, once Union forces collected themselves after Day 1 by assuming a strong defensive position, it is highly likely that many a competent commander would have performed as admirably as did Meade. So I don't extend Meade's performance at Gettysburg by elevating his generalship to a particular level of skill and insight. After all, once Grant assumed overall command, he and Meade (having tactical control of the AotP), worked pretty much in lockstep during the Overland and Petersburg campaigns so differentiating who used force vs. skill and insight becomes much more muddled.
Interesting point concerning Grant and Meade. What characteristic do you think that Grant saw in Meade that convinced him to maintain him in command of the AoP instead of releasing him of the command and possibly sending him West or even back to Washington. This would show that Grant ,as with George Marshall, was a very good evaluator of command ,as with Thomas and Sherman. Can not say the same about Dwight. aka Mark Clark.
 
Interesting point concerning Grant and Meade. What characteristic do you think that Grant saw in Meade that convinced him to maintain him in command of the AoP instead of releasing him of the command and possibly sending him West or even back to Washington. This would show that Grant ,as with George Marshall, was a very good evaluator of command ,as with Thomas and Sherman. Can not say the same about Dwight. aka Mark Clark.
Yes, Grant could often be a careful and deliberate evaluator of persons for command positions. But he was also politically savvy, and understood that he as an outsider, needed to establish goodwill and maintain stability with the soldiers of the AotP. The best way to do that would be to retain Meade, who in any case was still the most successful commander of that army to that time. It also didn't hurt that Meade first offered to resign to allow Grant to pick his own commander; Grant was a modest and sensitive person who likely was touched by Meade's gesture.
 
It was Lincoln's plan as suggested by McClernand after Antietam.

Grant began marching south after receiving no instructions on what he was supposed to be doing, thinking it would be easier to achieve momentum than simply waiting to be attacked along a thinly stretched line between Memphis and Corinth. After enjoying some success pushing Pemberton south, Halleck began inexplicably offering suggestions to attack Vicksburg via river. What Halleck wasn't telling Grant is that Lincoln had ordered an attack on Vicksburg via river to be led by McClernand.

Grant took the suggestion for what it was and continued south. But in early December, after suggesting a riverine operation several times, Halleck finally ordered Grant to go no further south and to send Sherman with as many men as possible against Vicksburg via river. Grant so disliked the plan that he called Sherman to his HQ to discuss disobeying the order.

So ... *not* Grant's two-pronged plan. Grant's Overland Campaign as terminated by Lincoln and McClernand's half-witted love-child.
So not Mcclernand's Chickasaw Bayou brainchild. Sherman did not attack the bluffs north of Vicksburg because Mcclernand thought of it first.
 
So not Mcclernand's Chickasaw Bayou brainchild. Sherman did not attack the bluffs north of Vicksburg because Mcclernand thought of it first.
McClernand suggested it to Lincoln, Lincoln ordered Halleck, Halleck wanted Sherman instead of McClernand, Halleck issued direct order to Grant putting Sherman in charge.
 
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