Dennis Frye, a former chief historian at the Harpers Ferry National Historical Park, has posted an informative, insightful article on how George McClellan outwitted Robert E. Lee at Antietam--actually, not just at Antietam but in the Maryland Campaign as a whole. Frye discusses some interesting little-known facts and addresses a few of the common myths about McClellan's performance at Antietam.
Face Facts: 'Little Mac' Outwitted Lee at Antietam
http://www.historynet.com/no-small-deed-face-facts-little-mac-outwitted-lee-antietam.htm
Here's an excerpt:
McClellan didn’t know Lee’s thinking, but as a strategist he certainly could surmise Lee’s intentions. McClellan had divined Pennsylvania to be a primary Confederate target since the invasion’s outset. He knew Lee was concentrating at Sharpsburg, and he could interpret this two ways: Either Lee expected to fight there, or the Confederate commander intended to move north from there. If McClellan were to capture the Sharpsburg–Hagerstown Turnpike and block Lee’s avenue northward, he could eliminate the “move” option, and produce an outstanding outcome—defeating the Rebel army’s invasion.
The Union commander seized the occasion. By afternoon and evening of September 16, McClellan had moved nearly 23,000 soldiers from his 1st and 12th Corps—about one-third of his total force—around the Confederate left flank. And they took the road! Consider McClellan’s wise preemptive action. About two miles north of Sharpsburg, he had blocked Lee’s line of advance into Pennsylvania, and had done so without a battle, indeed barely firing a shot!
McClellan’s prescient move on September 16 constituted the demise of Lee’s invasion strategy. The most famous Southern general of the war had been outsmarted, outflanked, and outmaneuvered by the most harshly criticized Union general of the war.
There are some serious problems with this interpretation of the events proposed by Frye. I would recommend it be read with caution. Here is a breakdown refutation of his points:
"Lee failed to draw the war into Pennsylvania."
The documentation proves that as of Sept. 7-9 Lee did not intend to push the war into Pennsylvania unless Secessionists in Maryland rose up in rebellion against the federal government. Here is the quote from Lee that appeared in the Philadelphia Inquirer on Sept. 12, 1862: "We have now come to redeem our pledge to the people of this State (i.e., Maryland). We extend the olive branch to them, and, should they accept it, we shall welcome and protect them, with the assurance that the next battle ground will be in Pennsylvania. But, should they not come forward, after having been amply assured that their property would be unmolested, and every guarantee given that the Southern army should remain on Maryland soil, for the maintenance of their sacred rights, then the battle-ground must hereafter be in Maryland."
"Lee failed to threaten any major Northern city."
Please show me where Lee said he ever intended to threaten a Northern city. This is rank speculation stated as fact.
"Lee failed to disrupt and destroy Federal railroads and commerce above the Mason-Dixon Line."
Please show me where Lee said in 1862 that he intended to do this. He focused on the rail line that he could cut - the Baltimore and Ohio. Other than this all Lee said about his campaign was that he hoped to annoy and harass the enemy.
"Lee failed to gather food and supplies from the riches of the Keystone State."
See point one. The objective of the Maryland Campaign was to bring Maryland into the Confederacy, not to invade PA. IF Secessionists rose in rebellion, as Lee stated, then he would move into PA, but if that did not happen he would stay and fight in Maryland.
"Lee failed to sway enough voters to dethrone the Republican majority in Congress."
Please show me where Lee wrote or said anything on this subject. There is no evidence that Lee hoped to influence Northern elections in 1862. More rank speculation.
"Lee failed to persuade Britain and France to officially recognize the Confederate cause."
Lee stated early in the war that the Confederacy would need to win its own battles and could not count on the help of others. There is no statement that I've been able to find in 10 years of research indicating that Lee EVER counted on hel from Europe. This is more speculation by Frye.
"Lee failed to whip the Yankee army on its home turf."
Home turf? Maryland in 1862 was contested territory under federal military occupation. The writ of habeas corpus had been suspended, property confiscated by federal troops, politicians and others arrested, and presses closed. Doesn't sound like Northern "turf" to me. Does it to you? Go back and read newspaper reports about conditions in Maryland at the beginning of September. They often express the opinion that conditions in Maryland were not satisfactory to loyal men. Calls were made to disarm the populace in Maryland, particularly if the ones possessing firearms were known Secessionist sympathizers. Frye's statement about this subject shows that he is coming at it from an ex post facto ahistorical perspective. Maryland in September 1862 is a divided border state, not Northern "turf."
Here are more problems with this "informative article."
"McClellan knew instinctively, and his military mind confirmed conclusively, that Lee's logical strategic target was Baltimore."
McClellan probably reached this conclusion based on the fact that Lee had Stuart spread information that the Army of Northern Virginia intended to march on Baltimore. Lee, however, never stated that Baltimore was his objective.
"McClellan's prompt and prescient defense of Baltimore"
Against disinformation spread by Stuart's men, but not a real threat.
"Lee stood within sight of the Mason-Dixon Line on September 13, waiting at Hagerstown for Maj. Gen. Thomas J. "Stonewall" Jackson to complete his Harpers Ferry mission. As he gazed into Pennsylvania, already directing the van of his army to Middleburg, Md. (State Line today), Lee's hopes of achieving independence for his new nation never appeared so near."
Flat out wrong. See point made above about PA being Lee's target.
"Lee's decision to retreat from South Mountain meant he had every intention of returning to Virginia."
For about 3 hours on the night of September 14, yes, but by late that night Lee had already begun calling McLaws to meet him at Sharpsburg. Then, when Lee received word from Jackson of Harpers Ferry's fall around 8:00 on the morning of September 15, Lee decided firmly to stand at Sharpsburg. He began calling all of the detached portions of his army to him and never ever uttered a single word afterward about moving from his position.
"Lee's best prospect was not to stand, but to move. Pennsylvania was near. The border and the Mason-Dixon Line—only 22 miles distant from Lee's position at Sharpsburg—was just one day's march. Invasion of Pennsylvania, from the outset, had been his principal goal. The way was open. A good road—the Hagerstown–Sharpsburg Turnpike—ran due north unimpeded. If Jackson could rush from Harpers Ferry (a one day's march), Lee could reunite his army, drive it north, and then move upon prized Pennsylvania."
Here, Frye parrots a lie spread by the late Joseph Harsh. Lee never intended to move his army away from Sharpsburg. There is zero evidence for this claim. See this expose on the lie Harsh constructed and passed off as fact -
https://alexanderrossinocom.wordpre...tried-to-escape-sharpsburg-on-sept-16-thesis/
"if Lee moves on September 16, there is no Battle of Antietam. Lee's option to move north depended absolutely on the Union army's remaining in place on Antietam Creek's opposite bank, his assumption being that McClellan would not cross the creek."
Rank speculation. Show me any quote from Lee that says he assumed McClellan would not cross Antietam Creek. On the contrary, Lee watched for it and began shifting troops to his left as early as the evening of September 15. Then, on the morning of Sept. 16, he sent Stuart to attack a body of federal skirmishers that had been spotted west of the Antietam. Stuart's men see that the skirmishers are the vanguard of a much larger force and the fight develops around the East Woods as a result.
"These critics ignore an important point—McClellan moved. He sensed opportunity. On September 16, for the first time (in his mind), he outnumbered Lee."
Huge red flag here. When you read "historians" stating what was in someone's mind 160+ years ago be very careful what you believe. At no time does McClellan ever say that he thought his force outnumbered Lee's. To have believed so would in fact have run counter to every piece of intelligence McClellan had at his disposal. The important thing is that McClellan attacked Lee's army despite that intelligence. This was in itself a bold move for which McClellan needs to be given credit.
"But what if McClellan's main target was not Lee, but the road to Pennsylvania? McClellan didn't know Lee's thinking, but as a strategist he certainly could surmise Lee's intentions. McClellan had divined Pennsylvania to be a primary Confederate target since the invasion's outset. He knew Lee was concentrating at Sharpsburg, and he could interpret this two ways: Either Lee expected to fight there, or the Confederate commander intended to move north from there. If McClellan were to capture the Sharpsburg–Hagerstown Turnpike and block Lee's avenue northward, he could eliminate the "move" option, and produce an outstanding outcome—defeating the Rebel army's invasion."
Again, pure and utter speculation. McClellan NEVER stated that he intended to cut the Hagerstown Turnpike. As a matter of fact, when Hooker followed the road to toward the Hagerstown Pike too far, McClellan reined him in and ordered him to the left away from the pike. As for the PA invasion nonsense, see point one made above.
Bottom line: this article by Frye is filled with speculation and outright nonsense. You'd be better off not reading it at all than trying to come to terms with the interpretive problems it presents.