Very Informative Article on How McClellan Outsmarted Lee at Antietam

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Saphroneth

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Yep. He's ordered them to cut down the trees (which would bring the supporting artillery at the entrenchments into play) and buildup breastworks on the rifle pits they'd already dug. However, the old line had almost a month of work and was physically much stronger.
Ah, for 1st Corps along the line of the Tolopatamoy... that turns it into a straight engineering fight on the Richmond front with McClellan's rear basically secure, and the superior Union artillery gives them the advantage there.
 

67th Tigers

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Ah, for 1st Corps along the line of the Tolopatamoy... that turns it into a straight engineering fight on the Richmond front with McClellan's rear basically secure, and the superior Union artillery gives them the advantage there.
I have zero doubt that McClellan's assertion at the time that he needed "one more good division" available to block Jackson was in fact correct. I have no doubt that if Shields' Division had followed McCall's then Richmond would have fallen in July 1862.
 

Saphroneth

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I think it could be argued that McClellan operated his Army of the Potomac with a finer margin for error than most commanders facing Lee did, simply because his army was generally close in size to Lee's and so he didn't have much ability to maintain a reserve - his troops were often nearly fully committed to task even if they didn't all fight in every engagement.
At the same time, it's also quite possible that Lee was fighting with a finer margin of error against McClellan simply because McClellan was a good manoeuvrist and didn't often make an unforced error. When Lee made an unforced error against McClellan in November McClellan pretty much pounced on it, and Lee was essentially saved indirectly by Lincoln's inability to do geometry.*

*Lincoln seems to have decided that the final test for McClellan was whether he could beat Lee to Culpeper, notwithstanding that (unlike Lincoln's assumptions, laid out as such in a letter) McClellan was further than Lee was from Culpeper on top of having to cross a major river.
 
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Saphroneth

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I have zero doubt that McClellan's assertion at the time that he needed "one more good division" available to block Jackson was in fact correct. I have no doubt that if Shields' Division had followed McCall's then Richmond would have fallen in July 1862.
Ah, so that's presumably Shields and (say) Sykes along the Tolopatamoy, with Morell along the north bank of the Chickahominy.
 

Scott1967

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67th Tigers

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*Lincoln seems to have decided that the final test for McClellan was whether he could beat Lee to Culpeper, notwithstanding that (unlike Lincoln's assumptions, laid out as such in a letter) McClellan was further than Lee was from Culpeper on top of having to cross a major river.
Lincoln said that post-facto. It's very unclear why he did, but he wrote the order on 5th November, just after the count of the 4th November elections was in and it was clear he'd lost his majority without the Radicals. There was immediately an orgy of firing generals whom the Radical faction hated. Given that it was part of a concerted purge whom one group who'd just gained a lot of power and influence hated, I tend to see that McClellan went for political, not military reasons.
 
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Saphroneth

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I have to say even most of my knowledge about McClellan comes from Sear's and other Historians
Ah! That may actually be part of the problem.

Sears has verifiably outclaimed his sources in key aspects of his anti-McClellan argument. One example is the timing of the Lost Order - Sears has claimed even in the face of evidence that McClellan's telegram to Lincoln was "12 M" with M standing for "Meridian", even though the original copy of the telegram (in the Lincoln papers) said "12 Midnight". There's an email chain out there between him and Thorp where Sears claims that the "idnight" is an addition in a later hand.*

Sears is worth taking with a grain of salt at the very least.


* there are several lines of evidence that further demonstrate that Sears is wrong here, from the rest of the content of the telegram (events that took place after the time Sears has the telegram being sent) to the timing of McClellan's telegram to Halleck. Sears didn't originate this myth, but he actually found the "midnight" telegram and then tried to pretend it didn't exist - thus ignoring the evidence in favour of the "story" he wanted to tell.
 
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Saphroneth

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It occurs to me that it might be useful to evaluate all the possibilities for straggling on the Maryland campaign, for Lee's force, and which categories could have what numbers.

It's not something I can do today - it's late - but I can certainly state my assumptions about the kinds and locations of straggling:

People who refused to cross into Maryland or fell out on the march to the Potomac.
People who straggled before Lee moved out of Frederick across South Mountain.
People who straggled from Longstreet and DH Hill west of South Mountain.
People who straggled from McLaws and Anderson before the Battle of Harpers Ferry.
People who straggled from Jackson's corps during their march west of the Potomac.
People who straggled from Jackson/Ewell during the mach to Sharpsburg.
People who straggled from McLaws/Anderson during the march to Sharpsburg.
People who straggled from AP Hill during the march to Sharpsburg.
People who straggled from Huger operating south of the Potomac.
People who were present between Antietam Creek and the Potomac but who did not join the line of battle.

Note that people can fall into more than one category.

For the Union it's much simpler, as the whole army moved from Frederick to Antietam Creek and no division was in territory subsequently swept by the enemy. As such it's just one major category, those who were not present in line on the 17th, with a side issue of those who came into line of battle on the 17th but would not have been present on the 16th.


The reason for evaluating this is to consider the five possible outcomes for a straggler:

Materially rejoined the army before Antietam and were thus engaged. Would show up on post-battle returns, if not made a casualty.
Captured by the Union during the pursuit phase before the battle, thus "vanish" in Maryland.
Collected up by the provosts and sent to camp before rejoining Lee's army after the battle. Would show in post-battle returns only if these returns are taken after the force from the camp rejoined.
Buggered off home, thus "vanish" in Virginia.
Was behind the lines at Antietam, not engaged but theoretically available if organized. Would show up on all post-battle returns.

And the other possible source of contamination:

Recovering convalescents from Lee's earlier campaigns, forwarded from the Confederate hospital system. These would likely show up all at once in some set of post-battle returns.
 

Saphroneth

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So, first thing to note - the pre campaign strength and post campaign strengths.

Pre campaign (September 2) - Joseph Harsh states that the strength on September 2 was 75,528, based on John Allen's Masters' thesis. This thesis did involve non-negligible estimation and so may be off by a few thousand in either direction, though it went down to brigade level and so the error in any given brigade is likely to be small.

Post campaign strength

The first full return listing the whole army is October 10, at which point there were 64,273 men present for duty. There were also 76,684 Absent, most of these being sick and wounded.
Using this number and adding-back Confederate-claimed Confederate casualties at South Mountain and Antietam (a non-complete set) results in an estimated pre-campaign strength of around 77,000. This is close to but slightly higher than the number from Harsh, which suggests that at least some of the wounded at Antietam had recovered in the intervening three weeks or some other source of replenishment had arrived.


The September 22 field return excludes both the cavalry and reserve artillery, and for the rest of the force claims 2,732 officers and 33,686 men PFD with 41,520 AP.
The September 30 field return excludes the cavalry, and for the rest of the force claimes 3,857 officers and 48,933 men PFD, with 62,713 AP.
The October 10 return is complete and was mentioned above. In addition it notes that there were 5,000 sick and wounded still at Winchester.

DH Hill's strength over time is:
September 22 5071
September 30 7073
October 10 7383

Since DH Hill can't have left stragglers *behind* on the march that subsequently show up here (they'd have been captured and wouldn't be able to show up) this suggests that the September 22 state is still badly scrambled from the retreat across the Potomac and is not a full account of everyone with the army (not least because it misses out Pendleton); I suspect it's an account of everyone who was part of a coherent unit. Otherwise DH Hill alone would have to have left 2,312 men south of the Potomac during the invasion, which IMO is not credible.

Looking at a division which did make a march from Harpers Ferry, AP Hill:

September 22 4777
September 30 7382
October 10 8699

The fact that this division is smaller than DH Hill on the 22nd but quickly grows to significantly larger suggests that this division *was* collecting in stragglers.


The increase exclusive of cavalry from September 30 to October 10 is 5,722 PFD (the October 10 return also confirms that the ANV definition of effective is enlisted PFD) and the rise in AP exclusive of cavalry is 9,113. The increase in Present and Absent exclusive of cavalry is only 5,447, which confirms that at least some of the rise in men in the Present categories is because of men no longer being Absent; since no new regiments had actually joined Lee over this time I'm at a loss to explain the increase in the P&A column.

The straggler depot near Leesburg and the returnees from Winchester (a mix of slightly sick from the campaign and convalescents from Richmond) did not join before September 30; certainly there was a big chunk still at Winchester on October 10.

What this suggests to me is that:

per Harsh, people who objected to crossing the Potomac were rare, but a thousand or so fell out of column on the march north to the Potomac and were collected at Leesburg.
Some of the men in DH Hill's division and Longstreet's wing straggled after South Mountain and were captured by the Union, not appearing on Confederate casualty counts. Possibly the same is true of McLaws and Anderson on the march south to Harpers Ferry.
Some troops straggled behind Jackson's column en route to Harpers Ferry and were not collected up by September 22.
A large number of men fell out during the forced-march from Harpers Ferry to Sharpsburg, but many of them were collected up again by AP Hill. (Reports indicate that the HF forces were bulked out considerably while they were at Sharpsburg, with thousands of men rejoining the army by crossing Boteler's Ford.)
Substantial numbers of men were behind Lee's lines at Sharpsburg, at least by the end of the fighting.
By September 22 the AoNV has about 36,500 men with the colours and is disorganized, with reorganization and sweeping up remaining HF-to-Sharpsburg and march-to-HF stragglers causing it to climb to about 53,000 PFD. (That's an increase of about 15,500 men exclusive of the heavy artillery, though if DH Hill is representative most of that increase is reorg.)
The addition of the stragglers collected at Leesburg and the returnees from Richmond, plus the cavalry, cause the strength to climb to 64,000 or so. The size of the Leesburg depot is estimated at on the order of 1,000, which means that the implied situation is:

Pre campaign strength (PFD) 75,500
September 30 state (PFD) plus cavalry in October 10 state = 58,500
Leesburg stragglers: ~1,000
Implied Confederate casualties in campaign: 16,000 (75,500 - 59,500) minus the "permanently buggered off" number (PBN) and stragglers on Jackson's march to HF.
Minimal estimate of Confederate casualties: 13,500
Estimate of Confederate casualties by looking carefully at categories: 3,270 dead (of which 690 buried by Confederates and may be under "wounded"), ~2,500 captured not wounded, ~2,500 captured wounded (some of which may have been subsequently buried), 9,500 wounded (Confederate accounts) - 2,000 for those who died of wounds, = about 15,700.
October 10 state: 64,273, with 5,000 still at Winchester.
(Known Confederate permanent casualties since September 2 are 3,270 buried dead and at least 4,500 captures, counting 500 captured prisoners as having died of wounds. This indicates that the October 10 state must include at least some returnees from Richmond - the numbers otherwise don't add up.)

This suggests that either the number of returnees from Richmond was quite high or the "permanently buggered off" number was quite low.

The other conclusion is that Lee's army was badly disrupted by Antietam, in much the same way that McClellan's army was (e.g. on the 18th 1st Corps reported one entire division was down to about 1,000 effectives) through a combination of the straggling of hard marching and the heavy casualties inflicted.
 
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Stone in the wall

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Yes but Lee still had a lot of 6lb guns, McCellan had more larger, and more rifled guns if we look at the poundage difference and the rifled difference there is a big advantage here. Federal guns could hit and still be out of range of enemy fire. I would assume Jackson did not haul captured guns from harpers Ferry as this would mean a complete reorganization of the artillery.
 

Saphroneth

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Yes but Lee still had a lot of 6lb guns, McCellan had more larger, and more rifled guns if we look at the poundage difference and the rifled difference there is a big advantage here. Federal guns could hit and still be out of range of enemy fire. I would assume Jackson did not haul captured guns from harpers Ferry as this would mean a complete reorganization of the artillery.
It is worth looking at the guns at Antietam...

The numbers I have from a while ago are-

In the Maryland campaign the Union had:
108 Napoleon 12-lber at Antietam (130 in whole campaign)
42 Parrott rifles at Antietam (69 on whole campaign)
? 3" Ordnance rifles (93 on whole campaign)
? 20-lber Parrotts (22 on whole campaign)

Thus there's plenty of Union smoothbores. I don't have the numbers offhand for the Confederates, but remember that the Confederates were defending and so they can use lighter guns to reasonable effect.
For the Union to gain a decisive advantage by weight of superior artillery would take a long artillery duel at extended range, and essentially there wasn't the topography (or time) for it.
 
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67th Tigers

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Yes but Lee still had a lot of 6lb guns, McCellan had more larger, and more rifled guns if we look at the poundage difference and the rifled difference there is a big advantage here. Federal guns could hit and still be out of range of enemy fire. I would assume Jackson did not haul captured guns from harpers Ferry as this would mean a complete reorganization of the artillery.
If you read Tidball he gives an interesting account of what happened. He says the rebels kept their guns concealed on the reverse slopes waiting for the Federal infantry. The big Federal 20 pdrs spent all day bombarding them, but hit very little because they were concealed. The rebel artillery would only unmask themselves against Federal infantry, and gave the counterbattery on the heights little to engage.

Tidball comments that the rebel artillery was better organised, being fought as battalions. Contrarywise, many Federal brigadiers still considered "their battery" to be part of their brigade.

I have the Federal arty orbat to hand, thus:

1st Corps
L/1st NY - 6x OR - heavily engaged on the right etc.
D/1st RI - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
B/ 4th US - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
1st NH - 5x 12 pdr light (1 previously lost) - ditto
-
F/ 1st Pa - 4x OR - ditto
Independent bty/ Pa - 4x OR - ditto
-
A/1st Pa - 4x 12 pdr light - ditto
B/1st Pa - 4x OR - ditto
C/5th US - 4x 12 pdr light - ditto
(NB G/1st Pa is often listed, but was retained at Washington)

Corps total = 43 guns, all heavily engaged

2nd Corps
B/1st NY - 6x 10 pdr PR - heavily engaged at the Sunken Lane etc.
A and C/4th US - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
-
A/1st RI - 6x 10 pdr PR- heavily engaged on the right
I/1st US - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
-
G/1st NY - 6x 12 pdr light - heavily engaged at the Sunken Lane etc.
B/1st RI - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
G/1st RI - 6x 10 pdr - dropped off as fire support onto the Dunker Church, heavily engaged

Corps total = 42 guns, all heavily engaged

5th Corps
D/5th US - 2x 12 pdr light and 4x ordnance rifles; counterbattery fire from the bluffs
C/ Mass. light- 6x 12 pdr light; with Morell, not engaged
C/1st RI - 6x 12 pdr light' with Morell, not engaged
-
E and G/ 1st US - 4x 12 pdr light; heavily engaged across the Porter Bridge
I/ 5th US - 4x ordnance rifles ; ditto
K/ 5th US - 4x 12 pdr light; ditto

Corps total - 30 guns, 12 unengaged

6th Corps
D/2nd US - 6x 12 pdr light; heavily engaged at the Dunker Church
A/Md - 8x OR - ditto
A/Mass - 6x 12 pdr light - reported not engaged
A/NJ - 6x 10 pdr PR - heavily engaged at the Sunken Road giving flanking fire on the CS centre
-
F/5th US - 2x 12 pdr light and 4x OR - heavily engaged at the Dunker Church
B/Md - 6x OR - heavily engaged at the Dunker Church
1st NY - 4x OR - engaged in CB at the Dunker Church, maybe not heavily

Corps total - 42 guns, of which 6 are unengaged

9th Corps
E/2nd US - 4x 20 pdr PR - heavily engaged in fire support
8th Mass - 4x 10 pdr James R and 2x 12 pdr How - ditto
-
E/4th US - 4x 10 pdr PR - fire support then advanced with the infantry, heavily engaged
D/Pa - 6x 10 pdr PR - ditto
-
A.5th US - 6x 12 pdr light - advanced over the bridge and heavily engaged
Coy K, 9th NY Inf - 5x Naval Howitzers - Rodman dropped them off to protect the ford he used, engaged in flanking fire on AP Hill etc.
-
1st Ohio - 6x 14 pdr James R - heavily engaged in fire support from the bluffs
Kentucky Bty - 2x 20 pdr PR, 3x 10 pdr PR and 1x 10 pdr How - ditto

Corps total = 41 guns, all engaged (although 5 only lightly)

12th Corps
M/1st NY - 4x 10 pdr PR and 2x OR - heavily engaged on the right
F/4th US - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
4th Me - 6x OR - ditto
6th Me - 1x OR and 3x 12 pdr light - ditto
10th NY - 6x 12 pdr light - ditto
E/Pa - 6x OR - ditto
F/Pa - 4x OR - ditto

Corps total = 38 guns, all engaged

Cavalry Division
B and L/2nd US - 4x OR - heavily engaged across the Porter Bridge
A/2nd US - 4x OR - ditto
M/2nd US - 4x OR - ditto
C and G/3rd US - 4x OR - ditto
(a section of M/2nd and C and G/3rd US are detached)

Cavalry Division total = 16 guns, all engaged

Reserve Artillery
Btys A, B and C - 4 x 20 pdr Parrotts each, used to give long range fire support on 17th, out of ammunition on 18th
Bty D - 6x 32 pdr howitzers, same story as Btys A-C
5th NY Light Bty - 4 x 20 pdr Parrots, same story as A-C, 1st NY

K/1st US - 6 x 12 pdr light gun-howitzers; sent to support Richardson at the sunken road. Heavily engaged.
G/4th US - 6 x 12 pdr light gun-howitzers; sent to support Burnside who put them into battery on the Rohrbach house to defend the bridge if the rebs broke his infantry. Not engaged.

Reserve Arty = 34 guns, of which 6 were not engaged

Total = 286 guns present with the army, of which 24 are unengaged (all close range 12 pdrs)
 
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Saphroneth

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For counter battery fire to be accurate you need a target to aim at while you do your under/over/interpolate. If batteries are masked except when conducting fire at close infantry, then the best you can do is target the area they're in.

That being said, it's also the case that American rifles do not appear to have had the same performance as European ones* (which were capable of very accurate counter-battery fire at long range) - I've not been able to find direct performance stats for the Parrott and Ordnance field rifles (if you find any then please let me know!), but I have found indications that the few Whitworth rifles which made it to America were considered the most accurate pieces on any given battlefield.
With this in mind it's an open question whether the rifles at Antietam were transformatively different, or just "a bit longer ranged and a bit more accurate".



* by this I mean British Armstrong or Whitworth rifles, or German Krupps.
 

Scott1967

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Lee made it quite clear he favoured 12 pound Napoleons and didn't like the rifled cannon at all , Might explain extreme CSA artillery casualties in the NVA as Union gunners normally came out on top and also the ineffectiveness of CSA Artillery on the third day of Gettysburg however they were the perfect tool at Fredericksburg.
 
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Saphroneth

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Lee made it quite clear he favoured 12 pound Napoleons and didn't like the rifled cannon at all , Might explain extreme CSA artillery casualties in the NVA as Union gunners normally came out on top and also the ineffectiveness of CSA Artillery on the third day of Gettysburg however they were the perfect tool at Fredericksburg.
Gettysburg is tricky, because by the third day the guns were running out of ammunition anyway - certainly long range ammunition, since artillery ammunition for period cannon was shell, shot or canister and the canister is close-range only. That being said there's nothing that should have prevented the use of a grand battery to pound down an enemy position, it's actually very (later) Napoleonic.

Given the limitations of infantry training in the American Civil War, using cannon primarily for infantry support and canister fire and only secondarily for long range work was fine - at Antietam some cannon deployed at about 200 yards from the enemy or less and were able to operate just fine. The rifle was more of a necessity in Europe, though, where rifle armed infantry had pushed engagement ranges out enormously.

I think the biggest change in the use of artillery in America was probably in siege work, as the long range heavy rifles had an advantage there. The way the field rifles were actually used wasn't a huge improvement over smoothbores firing Shrapnel shot, with a relatively minor accuracy premium, and very long range firing is comparatively rare in field actions. (An exception is the counter battery work by the Parrotts and Whitworths on Malvern Hill.)
 

Saphroneth

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Aha, useful comparison info.

pg 465-6 of Bloody Crucible of Courage:

Artillery - Division of the Potomac (July 1861)
4 12 pdr Napoleons
16 10 pdr Parrott
10 13 pdr James
14 6 pdr
6 12 pdr Howitzers
2 20 pdr Parrott
1 30 pdr Parrott
2 Dahlgren Boat Howitzers

Artillery - Army of the Potomac (11th October 1862)
126 12 pdr Napoleons
64 10 pdr Parrott
20 20 pdr Parrott
98 3" Ordnance
6 32 pdrs
2 12 pdr Howitzers
5 30 pdr Parrott

Artillery - Army of Northern Virginia (Summer 1863)
107 12 pdr Napoleons
103 3" Ordnance
30 12 pdr Howitzer
4 12 pdr Whitworths

The interesting thing here is that the AoNV actually has nearly as many rifles as smoothbores in the Summer 1863 note. It's still less rifle heavy than the AotP but it's not a case of "I reject your rifles and substitute my smoothbores".
 

Scott1967

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Aha, useful comparison info.

pg 465-6 of Bloody Crucible of Courage:

Artillery - Division of the Potomac (July 1861)
4 12 pdr Napoleons
16 10 pdr Parrott
10 13 pdr James
14 6 pdr
6 12 pdr Howitzers
2 20 pdr Parrott
1 30 pdr Parrott
2 Dahlgren Boat Howitzers

Artillery - Army of the Potomac (11th October 1862)
126 12 pdr Napoleons
64 10 pdr Parrott
20 20 pdr Parrott
98 3" Ordnance
6 32 pdrs
2 12 pdr Howitzers
5 30 pdr Parrott

Artillery - Army of Northern Virginia (Summer 1863)
107 12 pdr Napoleons
103 3" Ordnance
30 12 pdr Howitzer
4 12 pdr Whitworths

The interesting thing here is that the AoNV actually has nearly as many rifles as smoothbores in the Summer 1863 note. It's still less rifle heavy than the AotP but it's not a case of "I reject your rifles and substitute my smoothbores".
Very interesting I suspect most those Ordnance Cannon were captured at Norfolk and Harpers ferry?.

As far as I'm aware the CSA only produced a limited number of 10 pounder rifled cannon and didn't make the 20 pounders at all of course I could be wrong , The James is an interesting cannon I presume it was rifled although I have them down as 14 pounders a very strange ordinance for the time.

Obviously the CSA couldn't pick and chose their cannon and tended to capture a lot but why do you think their is such a mix in the Union cannon? Is it a case of many cannon for different situations after all the North had the capacity to pick a chose what cannon.
 
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Saphroneth

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Very interesting I suspect most those Ordnance Cannon were captured at Norfolk and Harpers ferry?.

As far as I'm aware the CSA only produced a limited number of 10 pounder rifled cannon and didn't make the 20 pounders at all of course I could be wrong
The Ordnance rifle was a pre-war design, so both sides had access to them (Tregedar produced them). The Parrotts were being actively developed by Parrott himself so the late marks were Union only, but it looks like Tregedar produced their own copies of at least the 10- 20- and 30-lber marks. (The first 8" Parrotts turned up towards the end of the Yorktown siege, I know that from other research.)

Obviously the CSA couldn't pick and chose their cannon and tended to capture a lot but why do you think their is such a mix in the Union cannon? Is it a case of many cannon for different situations after all the North had the capacity to pick a chose what cannon.
I think it's partly that the Union cannon are shown earlier in the war than the Confederate ones, and partly that the Union sample there includes their heavy artillery in the second case (that's the 20-lbers and larger).

It's important not to underrate Tregedar, though, it was by some measures the best American iron foundry in 1860.


From Nosworthy:

This certainly did not represent the high point of the 12-pounder Napoleon's popularity. In fact, there are incidents of Union artillery batteries exchanging their rifled field pieces for smoothbore artillery at least as late as spring 1863. While preparing for the eventuality of a summer campaign, the gunners of Battery B of the First Regiment of Rhode Island Light Artillery, for example, eagerly exchanged their 10-pounder Parrotts for six brass Napoleons at Harrison Landing early that year. Battery B of the New Jersey Light Artillery fired out all six of its 10-pound Parrotts during the Battle of Gettysburg, which were then also replaced by six Napoleons. Not counting the VI Corps's artillery, which is impossible to identify with certainty, the Union amassed no fewer than 280 artillery pieces at Gettysburg (July 1-3, 1863). Of these at least 122 were Napoleons, that is, 43.6% of its total artillery resources. This trend certainly was not confined to the North, and the Napoleon gun accounted for 43.9% of the artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia. Some writers believe this trend only continued as the war went on and that Napoleons accounted for nearly 50% of all artillery by 1865.

Brent Nosworthy. The Bloody Crucible of Courage: Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War (Kindle Locations 5515-5521). Kindle Edition.
 

Scott1967

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Of these at least 122 were Napoleons, that is, 43.6% of its total artillery resources. This trend certainly was not confined to the North, and the Napoleon gun accounted for 43.9% of the artillery in the Army of Northern Virginia. Some writers believe this trend only continued as the war went on and that Napoleons accounted for nearly 50% of all artillery by 1865.
Yeah the Napoleon was a good allrounder and I'm not surprised the Arty men loved them easy to use not many problems unlike the Parrott's and the they had better defensive capability's unlike the Parrott's if I was in the Arty in those times id pick a napoleon crew.
 
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