A letter from Goldsborough to Fox, during the siege of Yorktown, that confirms what the navy was asked to do:
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[L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH TO G. V. FOX]
U. S. Flag Ship "Minnesota,"
Hampton Roads, Va.,
April 21st 1862
My Dear Sir:
In your private letter of the 19th you say "the Navy is suffering severely from the condition of things at Hampton Roads, the great public not understanding why we cannot take Yorktown." The great public in our country unfortunately is very apt to misjudge Naval & military matters, because it is seldom correctly informed about them, & because of the disposition of every fool in the land to write & talk about things of which he scarcely knows the meaning.
Yorktown, to my understanding, was to have been taken by the Army, & not by the Navy; & because the former has, by miscalculation, got itself into a tight fix, the cry is only against the Navy, & even the papers are declaring that no assistance whatever is given by it when in fact every assistance asked for or desired by Genl. McClellan is & has been extended to him from the very beginning.
In the cabin of this ship, on two consecutive evenings, in the presence of others, the whole subject was fully discussed by Genl McClellan & myself, & the arrangement was that the Navy should cover the landings at the Sand-box & up the Severn river; then, in the event of turning the guns on Gloucester Point, & thus getting possession of them, & a successful move of the Army upon Yorktown, all of which was expected, the vessels, seven in number, were to unite & cover the movements of the Army all the way up to West Point, & even up the Pamunkey, if necessary, as far as they could possibly get. Four of the vessels I was to detach at once, which I did, for the Sand-box, & the rest I was to keep here ready to move at a moment's warning until I was in formed by Genl McClellan that the division of the Army under Franklin for the Severn was ready for their services. Finding that this division did not get on as was anticipated, I despatched a fifth vessel, at the request of Genl McClellan — the "Sebago" with a 100-pdr rifle — to aid the others, & have kept the other two in constant preparation to be off at the shortest notice.
To this hour however the turning of Gloucester has not been undertaken. It is impossible for me to spare more than the "Maratanza" in addition to the above, which I intend to do on her arrival, without incurring too much risk from the Merrimac & Co. The "Galena" shall of course go there if she is fit for the purpose. McClellan was perfectly satisfied with the original number of vessels designated, & freely & frankly expressed himself so. Indeed, he even thought that any more would be entirely unnecessary, or at least such was my understanding of his opinions. The truth is, both Yorktown & vicinity & Gloucester Point, are a great deal stronger than was supposed. At least 50 heavy guns are planted to play upon ships & all within a close range of each other, as Yorktown & Gloucester are but of a mile apart. If these forts are to be reduced by the Navy instead of the Army it must be done by first commencing at long bowls with our wooden vessels ; &, therefore, I beg you to read a note which I have just written to Harwood about the Frigates St Lawrence & Sabine. Until I see the Galena I cannot speak with any confidence as to the part she may be able to play. The more we worst them at Yorktown, the more anxious the Merrimac & Co will be to get there, & consequently, the more cautious must I be hereabouts.
I never dreamed until now that the Navy was to take a primary part in getting Yorktown nor do I believe that any one else ever did. The idea is brand new to me & had it been proposed a few weeks since, I rather think it would have been rejected with indignation by our grand Army. But the Navy shall do its work as far as I am concerned.
Yrs most Faithfully
L. M. Goldsborough
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McClellan failed to plan and coordinate with the Navy, and then blamed the Navy for his failure.
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[L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH TO G. V. FOX]
U. S. Flag Ship "Minnesota,"
Hampton Roads, Va.,
April 21st 1862
My Dear Sir:
In your private letter of the 19th you say "the Navy is suffering severely from the condition of things at Hampton Roads, the great public not understanding why we cannot take Yorktown." The great public in our country unfortunately is very apt to misjudge Naval & military matters, because it is seldom correctly informed about them, & because of the disposition of every fool in the land to write & talk about things of which he scarcely knows the meaning.
Yorktown, to my understanding, was to have been taken by the Army, & not by the Navy; & because the former has, by miscalculation, got itself into a tight fix, the cry is only against the Navy, & even the papers are declaring that no assistance whatever is given by it when in fact every assistance asked for or desired by Genl. McClellan is & has been extended to him from the very beginning.
In the cabin of this ship, on two consecutive evenings, in the presence of others, the whole subject was fully discussed by Genl McClellan & myself, & the arrangement was that the Navy should cover the landings at the Sand-box & up the Severn river; then, in the event of turning the guns on Gloucester Point, & thus getting possession of them, & a successful move of the Army upon Yorktown, all of which was expected, the vessels, seven in number, were to unite & cover the movements of the Army all the way up to West Point, & even up the Pamunkey, if necessary, as far as they could possibly get. Four of the vessels I was to detach at once, which I did, for the Sand-box, & the rest I was to keep here ready to move at a moment's warning until I was in formed by Genl McClellan that the division of the Army under Franklin for the Severn was ready for their services. Finding that this division did not get on as was anticipated, I despatched a fifth vessel, at the request of Genl McClellan — the "Sebago" with a 100-pdr rifle — to aid the others, & have kept the other two in constant preparation to be off at the shortest notice.
To this hour however the turning of Gloucester has not been undertaken. It is impossible for me to spare more than the "Maratanza" in addition to the above, which I intend to do on her arrival, without incurring too much risk from the Merrimac & Co. The "Galena" shall of course go there if she is fit for the purpose. McClellan was perfectly satisfied with the original number of vessels designated, & freely & frankly expressed himself so. Indeed, he even thought that any more would be entirely unnecessary, or at least such was my understanding of his opinions. The truth is, both Yorktown & vicinity & Gloucester Point, are a great deal stronger than was supposed. At least 50 heavy guns are planted to play upon ships & all within a close range of each other, as Yorktown & Gloucester are but of a mile apart. If these forts are to be reduced by the Navy instead of the Army it must be done by first commencing at long bowls with our wooden vessels ; &, therefore, I beg you to read a note which I have just written to Harwood about the Frigates St Lawrence & Sabine. Until I see the Galena I cannot speak with any confidence as to the part she may be able to play. The more we worst them at Yorktown, the more anxious the Merrimac & Co will be to get there, & consequently, the more cautious must I be hereabouts.
I never dreamed until now that the Navy was to take a primary part in getting Yorktown nor do I believe that any one else ever did. The idea is brand new to me & had it been proposed a few weeks since, I rather think it would have been rejected with indignation by our grand Army. But the Navy shall do its work as far as I am concerned.
Yrs most Faithfully
L. M. Goldsborough
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McClellan failed to plan and coordinate with the Navy, and then blamed the Navy for his failure.