McClellan Union General George McClellan

A letter from Goldsborough to Fox, during the siege of Yorktown, that confirms what the navy was asked to do:

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[L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH TO G. V. FOX]
U. S. Flag Ship "Minnesota,"
Hampton Roads, Va.,
April 21st 1862

My Dear Sir:

In your private letter of the 19th you say "the Navy is suffering severely from the condition of things at Hampton Roads, the great public not understanding why we cannot take Yorktown." The great public in our country unfortunately is very apt to misjudge Naval & military matters, because it is seldom correctly informed about them, & because of the disposition of every fool in the land to write & talk about things of which he scarcely knows the meaning.

Yorktown, to my understanding, was to have been taken by the Army, & not by the Navy; & because the former has, by miscalculation, got itself into a tight fix, the cry is only against the Navy, & even the papers are declaring that no assistance whatever is given by it when in fact every assistance asked for or desired by Genl. McClellan is & has been extended to him from the very beginning.

In the cabin of this ship, on two consecutive evenings, in the presence of others, the whole subject was fully discussed by Genl McClellan & myself, & the arrangement was that the Navy should cover the landings at the Sand-box & up the Severn river; then, in the event of turning the guns on Gloucester Point, & thus getting possession of them, & a successful move of the Army upon Yorktown, all of which was expected, the vessels, seven in number, were to unite & cover the movements of the Army all the way up to West Point, & even up the Pamunkey, if necessary, as far as they could possibly get. Four of the vessels I was to detach at once, which I did, for the Sand-box, & the rest I was to keep here ready to move at a moment's warning until I was in formed by Genl McClellan that the division of the Army under Franklin for the Severn was ready for their services. Finding that this division did not get on as was anticipated, I despatched a fifth vessel, at the request of Genl McClellan — the "Sebago" with a 100-pdr rifle — to aid the others, & have kept the other two in constant preparation to be off at the shortest notice.

To this hour however the turning of Gloucester has not been undertaken. It is impossible for me to spare more than the "Maratanza" in addition to the above, which I intend to do on her arrival, without incurring too much risk from the Merrimac & Co. The "Galena" shall of course go there if she is fit for the purpose. McClellan was perfectly satisfied with the original number of vessels designated, & freely & frankly expressed himself so. Indeed, he even thought that any more would be entirely unnecessary, or at least such was my understanding of his opinions. The truth is, both Yorktown & vicinity & Gloucester Point, are a great deal stronger than was supposed. At least 50 heavy guns are planted to play upon ships & all within a close range of each other, as Yorktown & Gloucester are but of a mile apart. If these forts are to be reduced by the Navy instead of the Army it must be done by first commencing at long bowls with our wooden vessels ; &, therefore, I beg you to read a note which I have just written to Harwood about the Frigates St Lawrence & Sabine. Until I see the Galena I cannot speak with any confidence as to the part she may be able to play. The more we worst them at Yorktown, the more anxious the Merrimac & Co will be to get there, & consequently, the more cautious must I be hereabouts.

I never dreamed until now that the Navy was to take a primary part in getting Yorktown nor do I believe that any one else ever did. The idea is brand new to me & had it been proposed a few weeks since, I rather think it would have been rejected with indignation by our grand Army. But the Navy shall do its work as far as I am concerned.

Yrs most Faithfully
L. M. Goldsborough
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McClellan failed to plan and coordinate with the Navy, and then blamed the Navy for his failure.
 
Here is Fox's reply to Goldsborough:

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[G. V. FOX TO L. M. GOLDSBOROUGH]
Navy Department April 23d. 1862

My dear Commodore :

I have your note of the 20th inst and your two of the 21 st. It is perfectly understood that the Army were to dash up the peninsula without the Navy, and in fact we were never informed of the movement. I found it out accidentally, and did my best to turn it to Norfolk knowing the scant force we had, and the benefit the rebels would derive from the Merrimac. But as it was determined to go on to the peninsula we threw all the force we could towards you, and so continue to do — because the cry will be (it has already commenced) for the Navy to pull them out of the slough. The Navy have done it several times during the war for our army friends, but the golden opportunity is now present to save the Army, and immortalize the Navy. Harwood has written you about the Parrott guns. All our rifles of large calibre seem to be failures which leaves us in the lurch about such guns. Meeker's commission or appointment has been sent. It is all right about Daniels, he could not be reinstated as mid'n. Rowan's clerk has no chance, at present. I wish you could send two merchant steamers in lieu of the Susquehanna. Du Pont will send up a wail about withdrawing that noble ship, but the Government and people call upon us to lift the Army of the Potomac out of the mire. The sub marine boats I hope will be with you before many days, also another blow up matter, in which the party takes the risk and labor for $100,000.00 if successful. I think the Galena will trouble them if she runs the batteries. Our Potomac flotilla now have the run to Fredericksburg. Don't you learn anything about New Orleans?
Most truly yours,
G. V. Fox.
---------------------------------

As Fox is expressing this in private long before his JCCW testimony, it is apparent that he did not lie about it later.
 
Could be because there was no importance placed on the suggestion.

The evidence supports that Goldsborough told the truth in his testimony. And that McClellan lied about the navy so as to avoid responsibility for the failure of the campaign.

We've been over this before.

Goldsborough stated he'd never been asked to attack. There are reams of documentary evidence of McClellan and Fox asking Goldsborough to attack, and Fox agreeing. Yet somehow it is the person whose statements match the documentary evidence who is "lying", and the people whose statements are contradicted by the documentary evidence who are "telling the truth".

You leapt to the conclusion that it must have been McClellan who was lying before the evidence was presented, then dismissed the evidence because it didn't support your conclusion.
 
That's crazy. McClellan had 58,000 as soon as he got there on the 2nd.

You do know that the Army was still being transported, and indeed Hooker's and Richardson's divisions wouldn't be landed until ca. 12th April.

By saying the Warwick line should be attacked on the 3rd, you are saying the attack force should have departed on the 1st, because it is two days march from Fort Monroe to the Warwick line.

By setting this date, neither Sedgwick's nor Casey's divisions have landed, nor any cavalry except the 6th Pa. Hence from the 58,000 McClellan moved on the 3rd-5th, two divisions and 2 cavalry regiments must be removed. Not surprisingly, the 58,000 reduces to about 35,000.

If you want to attack Magruder before he receives many reinforcements, then Heintzelman could have advanced two divisions (Porter and Smith) without cavalry ca. the 28th, arriving at the Warwick line ca. the 30th. Magruder would only have received the 14th and 26th Alabama from Richmond, and Colston's brigade.

That's the issue, if you turn the clock back to keep Magruder's reinforcements away, you also turn the clock back on Federal troops and decrease their numbers. Oddly, McClellan's actual timings produce roughly the best force ratio possible.
 
As Fox is expressing this in private long before his JCCW testimony, it is apparent that he did not lie about it later.
What does that standard mean about Keyes expressing in private to Sen. Ira Harris (in a letter of April 7th) that he'd obtained a promise (from the Navy department) that the Navy would attack Yorktown, and that was why he endorsed the Peninsular line?

It's in private, after all.


(Keyes' letter explains that he only approved the Peninsular plan after personally requesting and recieving that department's promise to shell the Confederates out of Yorktown, if necessary.)
 
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Any evidence that Johnston thought McClellan had 200,000 or is this just wishful thinking?
I didn't say Johnston personally stated it; Magruder however certainly included that in his estimates. He stated that McClellan's strength was "estimated at between 100,000 and 200,000" on the 11th, at which time Casey had only just become able to march up to join the main army (while Hooker and Richardson were still in the process of arriving), and at least one of the diarists 67th linked also repeated the larger number. I can't check which one myself at the moment as I'm on a VPN which bans archive.org...

Even with the lower bound of Magruder's estimate, however, at that time McClellan had about 70,000 PFD; with PFD being 1.2 to 1.25 times Effectives*, this means Magruder's estimate is anything between "half again the true value" (70,000 PFD versus 100,000) to "three and a half times the true value" (56,000 Effectives versus 200,000).

If McClellan was making these kinds of estimates he'd be raked over the coals; indeed, he's excoriated for an upper bound estimate of enemy strength at Richmond on par with the lower bound estimate Magruder makes here...

Also, 200,000 would be closer to three times the true figure. Depending on when it was made, maybe only two times.
The diarist's one was when McClellan first arrived at the Warwick line, which means in PFD terms it's about 60,000 men under McClellan**; less in Effectives, which was how the Confederates measured themselves.

If you use Union PFD then it's closer to three times than four; if you use Effectives it's closer to four.


Interestingly in the same letter Magruder gives McClellan "between 100,000 and 200,000", he estimates his strength at 31,500 men. Going regiment by regiment with arrival times his actual strength on that date (the 11th) was 34,300 Effectives, this means he's clearly not talking PFD and in fact even in Effectives he's underestimated himself by about 10%.


* different conversion factors will lead to different results
** this counts five divisions, though McClellan only contacted the Warwick line with four in two columns of two; Sedgewick is the fifth.
 
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I have your note of the 20th inst and your two of the 21 st. It is perfectly understood that the Army were to dash up the peninsula without the Navy, and in fact we were never informed of the movement. I found it out accidentally, and did my best to turn it to Norfolk knowing the scant force we had, and the benefit the rebels would derive from the Merrimac.



It may be worth mentioning that there's a note from Welles to Stanton on the 14th of March, refusing McClellan's urgent request of the 13th March that warships be sent to Fort Monroe for combined operations in the York or the Rappahanock.

Interestingly, we know from McDowell that Fox agreed "to assist in the Army movement which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads" in a meeting with McDowell and Barnard on the 17th March.

So as of the 17th of March, McClellan has sent a request to Welles to gather warships ASAP, and Fox has agreed to assist in the army movement.
Being told about the army movement "which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads" and agreeing to assist it...
...is a funny way of "finding out accidentally" and "understanding that the army was to dash up the peninsula without the Navy".

The 17th March meeting doesn't contain a promise to bombard Yorktown, in and of itself, but it rather conclusively proves that Fox's letter of the 24th April is a false report.

But by the 17th March we have:

Keyes getting a Navy promise to shell the Confederates out of Yorktown if necessary. (13th March.)
McClellan asking for warships for combined operations (14th March.)
Fox agreeing to assist in the Army movement from Hampton Roads, i.e. up the Peninsula (17th March).

The first division of McClellan's army began embarking on the 18th.
 
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We've been over this before.

Goldsborough stated he'd never been asked to attack. There are reams of documentary evidence of McClellan and Fox asking Goldsborough to attack, and Fox agreeing. Yet somehow it is the person whose statements match the documentary evidence who is "lying", and the people whose statements are contradicted by the documentary evidence who are "telling the truth".

You leapt to the conclusion that it must have been McClellan who was lying before the evidence was presented, then dismissed the evidence because it didn't support your conclusion.
There are no reams. Goldsborough was never asked to reduce Yorktown with naval gunfire alone. So yes, McClellan lied.
 
You do know that the Army was still being transported, and indeed Hooker's and Richardson's divisions wouldn't be landed until ca. 12th April.

By saying the Warwick line should be attacked on the 3rd, you are saying the attack force should have departed on the 1st, because it is two days march from Fort Monroe to the Warwick line.

By setting this date, neither Sedgwick's nor Casey's divisions have landed, nor any cavalry except the 6th Pa. Hence from the 58,000 McClellan moved on the 3rd-5th, two divisions and 2 cavalry regiments must be removed. Not surprisingly, the 58,000 reduces to about 35,000.

If you want to attack Magruder before he receives many reinforcements, then Heintzelman could have advanced two divisions (Porter and Smith) without cavalry ca. the 28th, arriving at the Warwick line ca. the 30th. Magruder would only have received the 14th and 26th Alabama from Richmond, and Colston's brigade.

That's the issue, if you turn the clock back to keep Magruder's reinforcements away, you also turn the clock back on Federal troops and decrease their numbers. Oddly, McClellan's actual timings produce roughly the best force ratio possible.
The "best force ratio possible?" Not even close.

By your own admission, McClellan had "rejected" the Peninsula in January because of the possibility of being bogged down in a siege at Yorktown.

The best force ratio would have enough to quickly land and quickly assault the Warwick line, in order to avoid a siege.

As discussed before, some of McClellans own men, after the fact, felt the Warwick line could have been taken (Keyes, Barnard, Smith)

Your efforts to increase the confederate force and decrease the federal force is nothing but McClellan apologia.
 
It may be worth mentioning that there's a note from Welles to Stanton on the 14th of March, refusing McClellan's urgent request of the 13th March that warships be sent to Fort Monroe for combined operations in the York or the Rappahanock.

Interestingly, we know from McDowell that Fox agreed "to assist in the Army movement which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads" in a meeting with McDowell and Barnard on the 17th March.

So as of the 17th of March, McClellan has sent a request to Welles to gather warships ASAP, and Fox has agreed to assist in the army movement.
Being told about the army movement "which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads" and agreeing to assist it...
...is a funny way of "finding out accidentally" and "understanding that the army was to dash up the peninsula without the Navy".

The 17th March meeting doesn't contain a promise to bombard Yorktown, in and of itself, but it rather conclusively proves that Fox's letter of the 24th April is a false report.

But by the 17th March we have:

Keyes getting a Navy promise to shell the Confederates out of Yorktown if necessary. (13th March.)
McClellan asking for warships for combined operations (14th March.)
Fox agreeing to assist in the Army movement from Hampton Roads, i.e. up the Peninsula (17th March).

The first division of McClellan's army began embarking on the 18th.
No, Fox's letter of the 24th is not a "false report." He found out the objective had changed from Urbanna to the Peninsula, a change made without consulting the Navy as to whether Norfolk would be a better target. That's what he's saying. The Army made the decision without the Navy.
 
The best force ratio would have enough to quickly land and quickly assault the Warwick line, in order to avoid a siege.
And is that a possible force ratio? Maybe it was before Heintzelman spooked Magruder, but after that?

I'll note by the way that they didn't know about the Warwick line, and that a siege was still a possibility even if the Warwick line didn't exist - you have to take Yorktown somehow and it's a bastion.


As discussed before, some of McClellans own men, after the fact, felt the Warwick line could have been taken (Keyes, Barnard, Smith)
Keyes?

"If I thought the four army corps necessary, when I supposed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the osbstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinion of officers stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other souces, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite, now that the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immesusurably greater than I had been led to expect! The line in front of us, in the opinion of all military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world".
 
No, Fox's letter of the 24th is not a "false report." He found out the objective had changed from Urbanna to the Peninsula, a change made without consulting the Navy as to whether Norfolk would be a better target. That's what he's saying. The Army made the decision without the Navy.
Eh?
The meeting on the 17th March has McDowell discussing with Fox the Army movement to take place from Hampton Roads.
Keyes states that he checked with the Navy whether Yorktown could be attacked on the 13th March, before he gave his approval to the decision; thus, the navy was consulted during the change, and Fox was told about the new movement plan no later than the 17th of March.

When exactly do you think Fox should have been informed? Remember, he says he found out "by accident", but he was clearly told on purpose by McDowell on the 17th March; unless you think McDowell lied to Fox's face about what the plan was...
 
And is that a possible force ratio? Maybe it was before Heintzelman spooked Magruder, but after that?

I'll note by the way that they didn't know about the Warwick line, and that a siege was still a possibility even if the Warwick line didn't exist - you have to take Yorktown somehow and it's a bastion.



Keyes?

"If I thought the four army corps necessary, when I supposed the navy would co-operate, and when I judged of the osbstacles to be encountered by what I learned from maps and the opinion of officers stationed at Fort Monroe, and from all other souces, how much more should I think the full complement of troops requisite, now that the navy cannot co-operate, and now that the strength of the enemy's lines and the number of his guns and men prove to be almost immesusurably greater than I had been led to expect! The line in front of us, in the opinion of all military men here who are at all competent to judge, is one of the strongest in the world".
If the federals had gotten above Yorktown, it would have been evacuated. Magruder and Lee's communications suggest this. Lee would have been stupid to let the Yorktown garrison get penned up like Donelson.

Yes Keyes. Check his JCCW testimony where he admits that if McClellan had ordered an attack along the line, it would have succeeded.
 
Eh?
The meeting on the 17th March has McDowell discussing with Fox the Army movement to take place from Hampton Roads.
Keyes states that he checked with the Navy whether Yorktown could be attacked on the 13th March, before he gave his approval to the decision; thus, the navy was consulted during the change, and Fox was told about the new movement plan no later than the 17th of March.

When exactly do you think Fox should have been informed? Remember, he says he found out "by accident", but he was clearly told on purpose by McDowell on the 17th March; unless you think McDowell lied to Fox's face about what the plan was...
Sometime between March 9th, when the Urbanna plan became useless, and March 17th, is presumably when Fox learned by "accident" that the Army had changed the plan without consulting the navy, or at least without consulting him.
 
The "best force ratio possible?" Not even close.

The best force ratio would have enough to quickly land and quickly assault the Warwick line, in order to avoid a siege.

This is a complete non sequitur.

Your argument seems to resolve to the War Department should have gotten their act together quicker and provided McClellan more transport. Given the available transports provided the troops were moved as quickly as was physically possible. Simply, given the constraints, troops could not be moved any quicker to Fort Monroe with the available resources. At the same time, the rebels moved troops to reinforce the Peninsula.

What you seem to want is for all the troops that had landed by the 3rd April (hence reach the Warwick line by the 5th) to be counted, but none of the reinforcements that Magruder received. Tough. Time is linear, and advances for both sides at equal rates.

I will freely admit that if only McClellan had teleporters or a time machine then the result would have been different.
 
As discussed before, some of McClellans own men, after the fact, felt the Warwick line could have been taken (Keyes, Barnard, Smith)

Anyway, we can split the difference here?

I lean towards your position that they should have attempted to storm the Warwick line as early as possible with as much men. Also taking into account the other posters points that the Confederates may have had more men and McClellan somewhat less. It may have resulted in a bad repulse but that doesn't seem like a horrible outcome in my mind.

However, in saying McClellan should have attacked earlier and with more men, I feel I'm being a bit of an armchair general. According to Swinton, Barnard post-war said they could have taken the line but at the time he recommended against it. Should McClellan, leading his first real campaign, be expected to go against the recommendation of his chief engineer when faced with a fortified position? Also keeping in mind McClellan's planning put alot of emphasis on McDowell's turning movement.
 
The order of events is:

13th March

"HEADQUARTERS ARMY OF THE POTOMAC,

Fairfax Court-House, March 13, 1862.

A council of the generals commanding army corps at the Headquarters Army of the Potomac were of the opinion-

I. That, the enemy having retreated from Manassas to Gordonsville, behind the Rappahannock and Rapidan, it is the opinion of the generals commanding army corps that the operations to be carried on will be best undertaken from Old Point Comfort, between the York and James River, upon Richmond, provided-

1. That the enemy's vessel Merrimac can be neutralized.

2. That the means of transportation sufficient for an immediate transfer of the force to its new base can be ready at Washington and Alexandria to move down the Potomac, and

3. That a naval auxiliary force can be had to silence or aid in silencing the enemy's batteries in York River.

4. That the force to be left to cover Washington shall be such as to give an entire feeling of security for its safety from menace.

Unanimous.

II. If the foregoing cannot be, the army should then be moved against the enemy behind the Rappahannock at the earliest possible moment, and the means for reconstructing bridges, repairing railroads, and stocking them with material sufficient for the supplying the army should at once be collected for both the Orange and Alexandria and the Aquia and Richmond Railroads.

Unanimous.

NOTE.- That, with the forts on the right bank of the Potomac fully garrisoned, and those on the left bank occupied, a covering force in front of the Virginia line of 25,000 men would suffice.

KEYES.

HEINTZELMAN.

McDOWELL.

A total of 40,000 men for the defense of the city would suffice.

SUMNER."

Hence some degree of confusion. Months had been made preparing for an operation and at the last minute McClellan had a change of plans imposed on him. McClellan immediately moves to implement said plan, and he writes to Stanton to secure the help of the navy. Keyes had already obtained a verbal promise from Fox to knock down Yorktown (see his 7th April letter).

14th March

Welles initially rebuffs McClellan's note. He's only interested in Norfolk. Said note is handed to Lincoln (it is in the Lincoln files) and we don't know what was said but....

17th March

The Navy Dept agrees to McClellan's terms and Welles orders all available ships to concentrate at Fort Monroe. Fox has a meeting with Barnard and McDowell and agrees "to assist in the Army movement which is to take place immediately from Hampton Roads." McClellan orders his lead division embarked on receiving the news. Woodbury is sent to liase with Goldsborough.

19th March

Woodbury reports that Goldsborough's offers of aid are not convincing, and he may be unreliable. Hence McClellan sends Barnard to Goldsborough, and kicks the matter upstairs to Stanton. McClellan suspends the order for the movement, awaiting the Navy question. Stanton tells Lincoln and Lincoln immediately writes he wishes to see McClellan at Alexandria, which will happen on the 21st.

20th March

McDowell, Lincoln, Stanton, Welles, Dahlgren, and Fox have a sit down meeting at the White House to discuss the matter, which McDowell says was "indecisive", because the Navy people disagree about whether the Navy can attack Yorktown or not. We know the hawk here was Fox, and we know Welles was against the idea. Dahlgren suggested taking the heavy ships (frigates etc.) up the river and reducing Yorktown. The meeting was adjourned with a decision to defer to Goldsborough.

21st March

Lincoln meets McClellan in the morning at Alexandria to discuss the Navy issue. Lincoln reassures McClellan enough that McClellan un-suspends the movement and orders Porter's division embarked. Lincoln returns to Washington and continues said meeting. Again, nothing is concluded and McDowell states they're awaiting for Barnard to return.

22nd March

Barnard returns, and reiterates Goldsborough's reluctance. McClellan orders a siege train to be carried as it appears that the promises made in Washington may be hollow. A previous study by Shields in January had suggested it would take 6 weeks to take Yorktown by regular approaches.

24th March

Fox sends a request to Goldsborough to attack Yorktown. He won't.

3rd April

Knowing his army will be at Yorktown on the 5th, McClellan asks Goldsborough to arrive at Yorktown on the 5th and attack it.

5th April

Four gunboats show up but refuse to attack. They are Marblehead (5), Wachusett (10), Penobscot (5) and Currituck (5).

9th April

Fox visits McClellan and spends the night. He promises to get the fleet up to destroy Yorktown, and promises to get Franklin's division released for amphibious operations.

10th April

Writing to Lorenzo Thomas, McClellan reports Fox has offered him the ironclad Galena, and that McClellan will have it run past the batteries at night, and take the fortifications from reverse (i.e. exactly that Johnston feared). Over the coming weeks Goldsborough will find reasons not to send the Galena upriver.

14th April

A fifth gunboat, Sebago, armed with rifles joins the force in the York.

16th April

Sebago engages the batteries at long range, and is not hit.

19th April

Fox repeats his request to Goldsborough to have a force run past Yorktown and attack it. He cites Lincoln's annoyance at the Navy.

21st April

Goldsborough writes a long piece of self-justification, which he'll repeat at the JCCW.

1st May

Battery no. 1 opens and destroys the rebel wharf at Yorktown. Johnston can no longer supply his army and is now compelled to withdraw.

3rd May

Fox again visits McClellan. He's present at the evacuation.

7th May

Fox, having examined Yorktown, writes Goldsborough that indeed Yorktown could easily have been attacked, and that the Navy had been "humbugged". In this his understanding is exactly that of Joe Johnston, and the fact that he quotes Johnston confirms he'd read the latters letter to Davis.

Conclusion

Keyes and McClellan both contacted the Navy on the day the decision was taken to move to Fort Monroe. Presidential intervention got Welles to agree to support the movement on the 17th, after he refused on the 14th.

McClellan never "relied" on the Navy. Indeed, for all their promises he considered them unreliable. This is because he put a lot of effort into trying to secure it, including getting Presidential intervention, but never managed it. Fox desperately tried to get Goldsborough to co-operate but failed.

McClellan understood one of two things would happen - the Navy might attack as promised by Fox but denied by Goldsborough, or he might need to destroy Yorktown conventionally which was estimated to require six weeks when assessed in January and was one of the primary reasons for the initial rejection of the Peninsula.

McClellan indulged the Navy in various schemes involving Franklin to try and get their cooperation, but in early May he gave up on the Navy. He ordered Franklin ashore as part of an 8-division assault planned for 5th May, when the batteries opened fire.

When they got into Yorktown it was obvious to all that the Navy easily could have done the job, and it was embarrassing that they didn't.

At the JCCW in 1863, both Fox and Goldsborough "deny everything" in an effort to protect the reputation of the US Navy. Unfortunately, the paper trail shows their claims to be false.

Misroon was removed from active service at his own request in late April. It was an "asked to resign" thing. Goldsborough had fatally weakened his standing. Whilst a run up the James towards Drewry's Bluff prevented his immediate removal, it was decided to supercede him in active command ASAP.
 
I lean towards your position that they should have attempted to storm the Warwick line as early as possible with as much men. Also taking into account the other posters points that the Confederates may have had more men and McClellan somewhat less. It may have resulted in a bad repulse but that doesn't seem like a horrible outcome in my mind.


As it happens, McClellan ordered an immediate attack on the 5th from both columns - one of them was ordered to attack "if only with the bayonet".

However, the artillery defending the line was great enough in quantity that it prevented either column from being able to get within several hundred yards on that day. There's almost literally nothing more aggressive McClellan can do than order a bayonet charge!


It would be interesting to make a table of available troops to McClellan with a given departure time (starting on the 1st) compared to troops available to Magruder two days later.
 
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