Union artillery and overhead fire

Good afternoon
Thank you all very much for your detailed replies and messages of welcome. I`d always been under the impression that the climax of `Gettysburg` was filmed at the National Park and that somehow I was watching something close to the historical deployment and terrain. There is also a war time illustration (P389 Vol 111 of `Battles and Leaders of the Civil War`) which shows the union gun line very close behind the infantry. I`d always wondered that if the artillery on the slope had to cease fire before the infantry stood up then how was this co-ordination achieved? I`m aware of the command problem between Gens. Hunt and Hancock, but where would Gibbon and Hazard have fitted re infantry/artillery co-ordination? -I notice that Maj Gen Webb ordered up batteries to replace Cushing and Brown so could artillery batteries be devolved as low as Brigade command?
I have read a lot of histories of the battle, Haskell`s account and everything in `Battles and Leaders`, but still can`t see how it all might have happened without either a dangerous gap in fire volume or huge holes being torn in the back of Webb`s Brigade. I`m aware that I`m asking questions about probably the most researched few minutes in American military history so my apologies in advance if I`ve got anything horribly wrong!!
Many thanks to `ucvrelics` for the link to Joseph Roberts. I notice that Roberts writes re artillery positioning.....`while a position in rear is nearly as bad, as the fire might seriously injure, or at least greatly disquiet them`(the infantry).
Many thanks
Regards
Ian R
 
I`d always been under the impression that the climax of `Gettysburg` was filmed at the National Park and that somehow I was watching something close to the historical deployment and terrain.
It was not. You are not allowed to film (simulated) combat at national parks, just like they don't allow reenactments.
They do allow living history demonstrations. The difference is that this don't include simulated combat with two opposing lines trading "fire"

Some parts of the movie was filmed in the park. Part of the early marching of pickets charge until they start taking artillery fire. And one point General Warren can be seen standing on little round top... if you look closely you can see the statue of him right behind the actor/extra. And a number of the talking screens at LRT was similarly filmed there.

The rest of it was filmed at a farm some miles north of town. So the types of trees, type of rocks and similar is pretty much the same.
----

I would guess that Webb simply walked over to the battery commander and told him when to stop firing.
 
Good afternoon
Thank you all very much for your detailed replies and messages of welcome. I`d always been under the impression that the climax of `Gettysburg` was filmed at the National Park and that somehow I was watching something close to the historical deployment and terrain. There is also a war time illustration (P389 Vol 111 of `Battles and Leaders of the Civil War`) which shows the union gun line very close behind the infantry. I`d always wondered that if the artillery on the slope had to cease fire before the infantry stood up then how was this co-ordination achieved? I`m aware of the command problem between Gens. Hunt and Hancock, but where would Gibbon and Hazard have fitted re infantry/artillery co-ordination? -I notice that Maj Gen Webb ordered up batteries to replace Cushing and Brown so could artillery batteries be devolved as low as Brigade command?
I have read a lot of histories of the battle, Haskell`s account and everything in `Battles and Leaders`, but still can`t see how it all might have happened without either a dangerous gap in fire volume or huge holes being torn in the back of Webb`s Brigade. I`m aware that I`m asking questions about probably the most researched few minutes in American military history so my apologies in advance if I`ve got anything horribly wrong!!
Many thanks to `ucvrelics` for the link to Joseph Roberts. I notice that Roberts writes re artillery positioning.....`while a position in rear is nearly as bad, as the fire might seriously injure, or at least greatly disquiet them`(the infantry).
Many thanks
Regards
Ian R

That would be Brigadier General Webb, and normally he would be requesting rather than ordering up additional batteries from the Artillery Reserve, but the emergency at that particular point was pressing and obvious to all. Cowan was already close by, firing, when one of Webb's aides ordered him to report to Webb. Cowan hesitated a moment, because he had been instructed to support the First Corps line (Stannard, etc.), but he responded and went into the gap left by Brown just as the Confederate infantry appeared in the distance. Hunt was there to confirm the move - actually within Cowan's battery when the Confederates came over the wall 50 yards away. Cowan's battery, incidentally, belonged to the Sixth Corps, so neither Webb, Gibbon or Hancock would normally have control over it. However, rules like that were thrown out the window when the fate of the battle hung in the balance.

Hazard, being attached to the Second Corps Artillery, did what Hancock told him, which included firing off all of his long range ammunition during the preceding barrage. Gibbon was somewhat involved, having, I think, directed Arnold to load with canister and await the approach of the enemy for a final shot, but that was a Second Corps battery posted on his front. Wheeler's battery was sent from the Eleventh Corps to support Hancock, who directed him into position. Like Cowan, Weir had earlier been ordered to report to the First Corps, but Newton sent him back, saying he did not want a Napoleon battery (during the long-range duel). Weir was next ordered to Webb's position, replacing both Arnold and Cushing's demolished battery, but the Confederate attack was largely spent by that time. Both Fitzhugh's and Parson's batteries arrived in time to make a difference (although their markers are near the Pennsylvania Memorial, accounts suggests they were just southeast of the copse behind Hall/Harrow at the critical moment). At the peak of the attack, Arnold was headed to the rear, Pettit/Rorty's guns were abandoned when Hall and Harrow abandoned them, Cushing was overrun and abandoned, and Cowan was pulling his guns to the rear. At that moment, the Union artillery on both flanks was carrying the load for that arm - McGilvery's line further south (along with Wheeler's three guns closer in), and the guns on Cemetery Hill further north (along with Woodruff in Ziegler's Grove).
 
Last edited:
The Union Hotchkiss shell was notoriously dangerous to forward friendly troops. It was not uncommon for the 3-piece projectile to come apart as soon as it left the barrel and scatter among friendly troops the cannoneers were attempting to shoot over. This was especially true of the lead sabot.
 
Wow!! Huge thanks for all that detail and setting me straight! Sorry about getting Webb's rank wrong- I just copied it from the article in 'Battles and Leaders' which calls him Brevet Major-General
Regards
Ian R
 
Something that the movie leaves out is the majority of the rounds fired are being fired from a distance: places like Cemetary Hill, LRT, Zeigler's Gove. Rounds passing high overhead relatively speaking, hitting targets far to the front.
 
Thanks to all of the interesting posts.

Is there any rough breakout as to what % of Confederate casualties from the charge were from artillery versus muskets? I'd imagine this would probably be very difficult to calculate but are there any credible estimates?
 
Looking at just Pickett's division of three Virginia brigades on July 3, I list 357 casualties identified as to type (rounding to the nearest percent):

Gunshot - 274 (77 percent)
Artillery - 82 (23 percent)
Other - 1

This includes the artillery exchange preceding the charge.
 
All of the "Pickett's Charge" stuff filmed up close (not on the battlefield park itself) was around the Ski Liberty property miles away from the actual locations. Ted Turner fed us well during the filming. Beer trucks were brought in after a day's production every night. Dinner was steak or lobster. Box lunches were provided to all second unit re-enactors like myself. He didn't do any of that for us during the filming of "Gods and Generals." No wonder that movie was a flop.

IIRC, Daniels' 9th Michigan Battery took out quite a few Vermont infantry troops during the assault of Pickett's advancing brigades. At that point in time, Daniels' battery had switched over to cannister shells and the Vermont boys stepped out too far in front of a 6 gun battery discharge.
 
Hello and welcome to the talk forum from Southeast Missouri located on the banks of the muddy Mississippi River. Overhead artillery fire is something else. I have experienced overhead artillery when it was firing blank charges. That was weird enough, actually it happened several times to the unit I was in at the time. A friend of mine at a private event about 40 years ago experienced the real thing. He said it was pretty bad, and it probably contributed to his loss of hearing later on.
 
Looking at just Pickett's division of three Virginia brigades on July 3, I list 357 casualties identified as to type (rounding to the nearest percent):

Gunshot - 274 (77 percent)
Artillery - 82 (23 percent)
Other - 1

This includes the artillery exchange preceding the charge.

Thanks for the stats. I find the artillery number a bit surprising (not doubting the data, I just thought it would be higher). If you just simply take 82 X 3 for the other 2 divisions (I'm sure this is wrong but just for illustrative purposes), that gets you to artillery casualties of 246. Given how much long rang ordnance (how many shots? 100 union guns, 3x a minute, 18,000 shots?) was fired and how long the men were under fire, and then given the cannister rounds, I'm surprised that figure was ONLY around 250. A double cannister shot can take out a company of men? 5 of those and you're already at 100-150 casualties.

I'm sure my back of the envelop math has many many flaws, but my point is, I'm surprised for such a disastrous charge where artillery is known for its effectiveness, that ONLY ~250 men fell.

Thanks for sharing,
mike
 
Thanks for the stats. I find the artillery number a bit surprising (not doubting the data, I just thought it would be higher). If you just simply take 82 X 3 for the other 2 divisions (I'm sure this is wrong but just for illustrative purposes), that gets you to artillery casualties of 246. Given how much long rang ordnance (how many shots? 100 union guns, 3x a minute, 18,000 shots?) was fired and how long the men were under fire, and then given the cannister rounds, I'm surprised that figure was ONLY around 250. A double cannister shot can take out a company of men? 5 of those and you're already at 100-150 casualties.

I'm sure my back of the envelop math has many many flaws, but my point is, I'm surprised for such a disastrous charge where artillery is known for its effectiveness, that ONLY ~250 men fell.

Thanks for sharing,
mike

The numbers I posted are identified casualties by type and are only a fraction of the actual casualties. Pickett's division suffered 599 killed and 1,223 wounded (per Busey and Martin's Regimental Strengths at Gettysburg), so multiplying that total by 23 percent gives you the estimated number of artillery casualties for that division alone - 419 (1,822 times .23).
 
The numbers I posted are identified casualties by type and are only a fraction of the actual casualties. Pickett's division suffered 599 killed and 1,223 wounded (per Busey and Martin's Regimental Strengths at Gettysburg), so multiplying that total by 23 percent gives you the estimated number of artillery casualties for that division alone - 419 (1,822 times .23).

Thanks for clarifying. So back of the envelope, almost 1,500 implied casualties across 3 divisions, or roughly 1 in 10 men falling to artillery. I don't like those odds.
 
Thanks for clarifying. So back of the envelope, almost 1,500 implied casualties across 3 divisions, or roughly 1 in 10 men falling to artillery. I don't like those odds.

It's not easy to separate out the casualties in Pettigrew's, Trimble's and Anderson's troops by day since they also fought heavily on either July 1 or 2. Lee's army as a whole is not far apart (about 20 percent versus 23 percent from artillery). So of those Confederates who fell in the battle, we could say that approximately 1 out of every 5 was due to enemy artillery, but for the participants in the July 3 charge, it was closer to 1 in 4 (including the preceding cannonade). The generally open ground around Gettysburg conveyed a distinct advantage to the Federal artillery arm.

Lang's Florida brigade and Wilcox's Alabama brigade fought over nearly the same ground on both July 2 and 3, so one might think their numbers would mirror Pickett's division. The sample size is smaller, so the margin of error is greater, but here are combined figures for those two brigades:
Gunshot - 52 (63 percent)
Artillery - 30 (37 percent)

Let's look at Wright's brigade, who covered about the same ground on July 2 as Pickett did on July 3:
Gunshot - 26 (76 percent)
Artillery - 8 (24 percent)

Now contrast with Johnson's division losses, which fought principally in the woods around Culp's Hill:
Gunshot - 121 (85 percent)
Artillery - 21 (15 percent)
 
Back
Top